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Abstract 
 
I have two aims in this dissertation. The first is to record an extraordinary period of human 
rights institution-building in Southeast Asia. This period began in 2007, with the signing of 
the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Charter explicitly 
links the purpose of ASEAN with the strengthening of democracy and the protection of 
human rights and provides for the establishment of an ‘ASEAN Human Rights Body’. This 
body was established in 2009, as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights. The Commission’s first task was to draft the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, 
which was completed and adopted by ASEAN Heads of State in November 2012. In the 
context of the political diversity of Southeast Asia, the region’s historical resistance to 
international human rights law, and the long shadow cast by the ‘Asian Values’ debate of the 
1990s, I ask the following questions: What factors explain the establishment of these 
institutions? How deep is ASEAN’s new commitment to human rights and democracy? What 
do these institutions augur for the way rights are realised in Southeast Asia?  
 My second aim is to explore and test my theory that regional institutions possess a 
particular legitimacy in the promotion and protection of human rights. The theory is driven 
by a simple observation. Since the end of World War II, the discourse of human rights has 
become, to borrow a phrase used by Charles Beitz, ‘the common moral language of global 
society.’1 Yet the original post-World War II vision of a legalised international human rights 
order (with judicial oversight, mechanisms for enforcement, and sanctions for non-
compliance) has faded. The global human rights system works by setting standards, which 
are then invoked (by domestic and international non-governmental organisations, members of 
civil society, political oppositions, the international community) to persuade, shame or coerce 
                                                 
1
 Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (2009) Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1. 
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states into compliance. The problems are: change is very slow, many states (both predatory 
and decent) are resistant to influence, and in circumstances of exception (civil conflict, war, 
political crisis) when human rights are most vulnerable to abuse, the system is least effective. 
The failures of the global system are many and patent.  
On the other hand, states seem more willing to subscribe to binding norms promoted 
by regional organs of restricted membership. Regional systems now exist under the auspices 
of the Council of Europe, the Organisation of American States, the Organisation of African 
Unity, the League of Arab States and most recently, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations. Scholars have observed that there seems to be a ‘directness of association’ between 
members of regional organisations, which positively influences (or has the potential to 
influence) causal processes such as socialisation, binding, monitoring and enforcement. My 
theory is that regional factors such as smaller numbers, deeper levels of integration, greater 
consensus around the importance of certain societal values, similar geographic characteristics 
and shared economic and security interests, create the conditions for legitimate governance. I 
test my theory using a case study of Southeast Asia and its new institutions.  
In the end, my conclusion is that in circumstances where regions possess low levels of 
democracy, then regional human rights systems do not possess a particular legitimacy. The 
nature of democracy, the relationship between democracy and human rights, and the deficit 
of democracy in Southeast Asia are at the heart of my explanation about why Southeast 
Asia’s nascent human rights system (currently) lacks legitimacy.  
 
 iii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................... i 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... iii 
Preface....................................................................................................................................... ix 
Declaration of Originality ........................................................................................................ xii 
Table of Treaties, Legislation and International Documents .................................................. xiii 
1. International Treaties ........................................................................................... xiii 
2. Regional Treaties and Agreements ....................................................................... xv 
3. International Case Law ...................................................................................... xviii 
4. Domestic Case Law ........................................................................................... xviii 
5. National Legislation ............................................................................................. xix 
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................. xxii 
Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Why States Change ................................................................................................. 8 
1.2. Legitimacy ............................................................................................................ 12 
1.3. What Conception of Human Rights? .................................................................... 15 
1.4. Testing the Theory: Why Southeast Asia? ............................................................ 17 
1.5. Structure of the Dissertation ................................................................................. 19 
1.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 20 
 iv 
 
Chapter 2: Democracy and Human Rights .............................................................................. 23 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 24 
2.2 Defining Democracy ............................................................................................. 27 
2.3 The Relationship Between Democracy and Human Rights .................................. 33 
2.3.1 Southeast Asia’s Autocratic Peace? ........................................................ 35 
2.3.2 Democracy and Economic and Social Rights ......................................... 42 
2.4 Democracy as a Human Right? ............................................................................. 50 
2.4.1  Self-Determination and Democracy ....................................................... 51 
2.4.2  Democracy as a Freestanding Human Right? ......................................... 55 
2.5 Democracy in Southeast Asia ............................................................................... 61 
2.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 65 
Chapter 3: Resisting Democracy  ............................................................................................ 67 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 68 
3.2 Explaining Southeast Asia’s Scepticism about Democracy ................................. 70 
3.2.1 The Legacy of Colonialism ..................................................................... 71 
3.2.2 Asian Values ........................................................................................... 75 
3.2.3 Communism ............................................................................................ 84 
3.3 Can We Separate Democracy from Human Rights? ............................................. 90 
3.4 Why ‘Democracy’ in the ASEAN Charter? .......................................................... 92 
 v 
 
3.5 The Legitimacy of a Regional Human Rights Regime sans a Commitment 
to Democracy ........................................................................................................ 98 
3.5.1 Legitimacy of the ASEAN Charter in the Absence of the Consent 
of Democratic States ............................................................................... 99 
3.5.2 Democracy in the Charter Drafting Process ......................................... 106 
3.5.3 Democracy and Compliance ................................................................. 111 
3.5.4 Democracy’s Lack of Determinacy ...................................................... 112 
3.6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 119 
Chapter 4: Regional Institutions and Democratic Consolidation: ASEAN and Myanmar .... 122 
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 122 
4.2 Myanmar: History and Transition to Democracy ............................................... 132 
4.2.1 Entering Democracy’s ‘Grey Area’ ...................................................... 142 
4.2.2 The Architecture of Transformation ..................................................... 152 
4.3 Regionalism and the Consolidation of Democratic Transformation .................. 165 
4.3.1 Modes of Engagement: Myanmar and ASEAN ................................... 170 
4.3.2  Myanmar and the International Community ........................................ 186 
4.4 Regional Organisations and the Consolidation of Democracy ........................... 189 
4.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 200 
Chapter 5: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration ............................................................. 203 
 vi 
 
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 203 
5.2 The Drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration ................................... 206 
5.3 The Content of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration .................................... 222 
5.3.1 The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: Overview ............................ 223 
5.3.2 Self-Determination and Indigenous Rights? ......................................... 226 
5.3.3 Preamble ............................................................................................... 232 
5.3.4 Article 1: ‘Free and Equal in Dignity and Rights …’ ........................... 233 
5.3.5 Article 2: Non-Discrimination .............................................................. 242 
5.3.6 Article 6: Duties .................................................................................... 247 
5.3.7 Article 7: ‘Indivisible, Interdependent and Interrelated’ ...................... 256 
5.3.8 Article 8 Limitations: ‘Public Morality’ ............................................... 262 
5.3.9 Article 9: Particularisation .................................................................... 277 
5.3.10 Solidarity Rights: Peace, the Environment and Development .............. 279 
5.4  Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 281 
Chapter 6: The Rights of Women at the Global, Regional and Local Levels ....................... 283 
6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 283 
6.2 The Global Level: CEDAW ................................................................................ 293 
6.3 ASEAN States and CEDAW .............................................................................. 297 
6.4 The Emerging Regional Order ............................................................................ 317 
 vii 
 
6.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 333 
Chapter 7: Trafficking in Persons .......................................................................................... 338 
7.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 338 
7.2 The Global Regime to Prevent Trafficking in Persons ....................................... 341 
7.3 Response of ASEAN States to the Global Regime ............................................. 348 
7.4 Domestic Response of ASEAN States to Trafficking in Persons ....................... 353 
7.5 Responding to Pressure ....................................................................................... 357 
7.6 ASEAN and Trafficking in Persons .................................................................... 366 
7.7 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 383 
Chapter 8: Conclusion............................................................................................................ 387 
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 394 
1. Secondary Sources .............................................................................................. 394 
2. Interviews ............................................................................................................ 433 
3. Media Reports ..................................................................................................... 434 
4. Speeches and Addresses...................................................................................... 448 
5. Conference Papers............................................................................................... 450 
6. ASEAN Reports .................................................................................................. 452 
7. Reports of Non-Governmental Organisations..................................................... 453 
8. UN Reports, General Comments, Treaty Body Reports ..................................... 457 
9. Reports of Regional Human Rights Bodies and Regional 
Intergovernmental Organisations ........................................................................ 460 
 viii 
 
10. Reports of National Human Rights Commissions .............................................. 462 
11. Government Reports ........................................................................................... 462 
 
 ix 
 
Preface 
 
The period during which I worked on this dissertation, 2010–2013, was a tumultuous time in 
Southeast Asia. The 2010 general elections in Myanmar (Burma), in which Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s National League for Democracy refused to participate, returned to power the military-
backed Union Solidarity and Development Party. It was unclear whether the election marked 
Myanmar’s first step towards genuine democracy, or merely a new consolidation of military 
power. Given that my hypothesis was about the legitimacy of regional human rights systems, 
it seemed important that I try to understand the relationship between the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the region’s ‘pariah state’. Myanmar was an obvious 
candidate for a case study in my dissertation. In 2010, I sought ethics clearance to interview 
key actors (government representatives, civil society activists, lawyers, members of the newly 
formed Myanmar National Human Rights Commission) in Yangon.  
Because of the uncertain political circumstances within Myanmar, the University of 
Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee did not grant my ethics application lightly. The 
approval was eventually given (Ethic Approval ID 13246) in large part due to the efforts of 
one of my supervisors, Professor David Kinley, and two of Australia’s former ambassadors to 
Burma, Mr Christopher Lamb and Mr Trevor Wilson. I owe all three a great deal of thanks, 
not only for supporting my ethics application, but also for the time and trouble they took to 
provide me with contacts, introductions and advice on how to go about my work in 
Myanmar. My visits to Myanmar were extremely productive. Although not everyone I spoke 
to in Yangon in 2010 and 2013 was comfortable about being recorded or signing official 
ethics documents, everyone was willing—indeed, eager—to talk. I thank all those in Yangon 
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who gave me their time and assistance by agreeing to be formally interviewed, or by 
informally sharing their experiences with me. 
My involvement in the Mekong Lawyers Network, and a particularly illuminating 
meeting of that network that I attended in Chiang Mai in April 2012, gave me access to civil 
society members from Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia. This opened up possibilities 
for researching attitudes in the ‘CLMV’ countries, which are too often ignored by scholars of 
Southeast Asia. I owe thanks to Daniel King and Earthrights International for inviting me to 
this meeting. In June 2012, I went to Kuala Lumpur to attend the civil society/ASEAN 
Human Rights Commission meeting about the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. I am 
grateful to the Indonesian Human Rights Commissioner, Rafendi Djamin, and the Malaysian 
Human Rights Commissioner, Dato’ Sri Muhammad Shafee Abdullah, for their efforts to 
give me access to this meeting.  
A particularly fruitful period was spent in 2012 as a visiting scholar at the Centre for 
International Governance and Justice, which is part of the Regulatory Institutions Network 
(RegNet) in the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University. The visit 
took place under the auspices of Professor Hilary Charlesworth’s Australian Research 
Council Laureate Fellowship, ‘Strengthening the International Human Rights System: Rights, 
Regulation and Ritualism’. I am grateful to Hilary Charlesworth, Ben Authers, Emma 
Larking and all of the warm and generous scholars at RegNet for their interest and support. 
It is impossible to imagine a better principal supervisor than Professor Ben Saul. 
Every sentence in this dissertation was written with the thought: What would Ben say about 
this? The result was a great deal of agonising but, I am certain, a far better result in the end. 
A different kind of support was provided by my dear friend, Dr Emily Crawford. With 
enormous patience and care, Emily proofread my entire dissertation. She also gave advice, 
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guidance and encouragement at the times when these things were most needed. Mere thanks 
is not enough.  
There are many others who provided me with support: at the beginning of this project, 
Professor Terry Carney; Dr Daniel Joyce; later, Dr Melissa Crouch and Professor Wojciech 
Sadurski. Kathleen Heath, research assistant par excellence, undertook the task of recovering 
my bibliography after a computer failure. Her friend Alice Gardoll finished this job. Sally 
Asnicar formatted my dissertation. I am grateful to all these people. 
My parents, Michael and Christine Shanahan, and my brothers, Christopher and 
Matthew, were unstinting in their faith in me. My children, Jack, Maddy and Marcus, have 
my gratitude and love for their patience and good humour throughout this process. The final 
thanks, and the deepest, goes to John.  
 
March 2014 Catherine Renshaw 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Why States Change 
1.2 Legitimacy 
1.3 What Conception of Human Rights? 
1.4 Testing the Theory: Why Southeast Asia? 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
I have two aims in this dissertation. The first is to record an extraordinary period of human 
rights institution-building in Southeast Asia. This period began in 2007, when the ten 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
1
 signed the ASEAN 
Charter.
2
 The Charter confirms ASEAN’s international legal personality,3 deepens processes 
for cooperation between states,
4
 provides new frameworks for decision-making,
5
 and 
                                                 
1
 ASEAN was formed in 1967. ASEAN’s current members are Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, 
the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
2
 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (adopted 20 
November 2007, entered into force 15 December 2008) (‘ASEAN Charter’). 
3
 Ibid, Chapter II, Article 3.  
4
 Ibid, Articles 8–10. 
5
 Ibid, Article 8. 
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explicitly links the purpose of ASEAN with the strengthening of democracy and the 
protection of human rights within the region.
6
  
The Charter was followed, on 23 October 2009, by the inauguration of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), established under Article 14 of 
the Charter, with a mandate to promote ‘the principles of democracy and constitutional 
government’ as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms.7 The Commission was 
tasked with drafting an ‘ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’, which was eventually adopted 
on 18 November 2012.
8
  
For a number of reasons, these events are remarkable. First, the states of Southeast 
Asia have diverse political systems and historically, their leaders have had varying ideas 
about the value and importance of human rights. Southeast Asia cannot describe itself in the 
same way Europe did in the Preamble to the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, as 
a region comprised of ‘like-minded’ nations with ‘a common heritage of political traditions, 
ideals, freedom, and the rule of law.’9  
Second, ASEAN states have traditionally been reluctant to engage with the 
international human rights treaty monitoring system. Of the seven major international human 
                                                 
6
 Ibid, Preamble. The Preamble to the ASEAN Charter states that: ‘ADHERING to the principles of democracy, 
the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms;’ 
‘Purposes’ of the Charter, include Article 1(7): ‘To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the 
rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights 
and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN;’ ‘Principles’ of ASEAN, Article 2(2)(h), oblige states to 
adhere to: ‘the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government’ and 
Article 2(2)(i) ‘respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the 
promotion of social justice’. 
7
 Terms of Reference (TOR) of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (2009) (AICHR), 
Article 2.1(d) refers to: ‘adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and 
constitutional government’ and 2.1(e) refers to “respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection 
of human rights, and the promotion of social justice”.’ TOR AICHR, Article 2.4, stipulate a constructive, non-
confrontational and evolutionary approach to developing human rights norms and standards in ASEAN. 
8
 The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, 18 November 18, 2012. 
9
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 
1950, 213 UNTS 2, entered into force 3 September 1953), as amended by Protocol 11 (1998) and Protocol 14 
(2010), Preamble. 
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rights treaties, only the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) have been ratified 
by all ASEAN member states. Even in relation to these treaties, several ASEAN states have 
entered substantial reservations.
10
 Only the Philippines is a party to the First Optional 
Protocol (1966) to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
allowing its citizens the right of individual petition to the Human Rights Committee.
11
 The 
reluctance to engage in the international treaty system suggests, at the least, there has 
historically been ambivalence about subjecting government action to external scrutiny, and at 
the most, ongoing state-level resistance to the international human rights project altogether. 
Against this backdrop, what explains the turn to human rights and democracy, and what 
potential does it have to further the realisation of rights in Southeast Asia?  
My second aim in this dissertation is to explore and test my argument that regional 
institutions possess a particular kind of legitimacy in the promotion and protection of human 
rights. The theory is driven by a simple observation. Since the end of World War II, the 
discourse of human rights has become, to borrow a phrase used by Charles Beitz, ‘the 
common moral language of global society.’12 Yet a legalised international human rights order 
(with judicial oversight, mechanisms for enforcement and sanctions for non-compliance) 
                                                 
10
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (‘CEDAW’) (adopted 18 
December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13, entered into force 3 September 1981); Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(adopted 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, entered into force 2 September 1990). Brunei has entered a 
reservation in regard to provisions of the Convention that may be contrary to the Constitution and to the beliefs 
and principles of Islam. Malaysia has declared that accession is subject to the understanding that the provisions 
of the Convention are not contrary to and do not conflict with the Constitution and the beliefs and principles of 
Islamic law. Singapore has similarly entered a reservation that provides that all of its obligations are subject to 
Singaporean law. Generally, on reservations of ASEAN states see: Susanna Linton, ‘ASEAN States, Their 
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Proposed ASEAN Commission on Women and Children’ (2008) 
30 Human Rights Quarterly 436.  
11
 The Philippines acceded on 22 August 1989. First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 March 1976). 
12
 Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (2009) Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1. 
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remains a distant prospect.
13
 The global human rights system works by setting standards, 
which are then invoked (by domestic and international non-governmental organisations, 
members of civil society, political oppositions, the international community) to persuade, 
shame or coerce states into compliance.
14
 There is broad agreement among scholars that the 
system functions best in domestic circumstances where there is an active civil society, 
democratic conditions enabling freedom of expression, the rule of law, and a politically 
responsive government.
15
 The problems are: change is very slow,
16
 many states (both 
predatory and decent) are resistant to influence,
17
 and in circumstances of exception (civil 
conflict, war, political crisis) when human rights are most vulnerable to abuse, the system is 
least effective.
18
 The failures of the global system are many and patent.
19
  
On the other hand, states seem more willing to subscribe to binding norms promoted 
by regional organs of restricted membership, ‘of which the other members are its friends and 
neighbours, rather than to a world-wide organ in which it (and its allies) play a proportionally 
                                                 
13
 Manfred Nowak, ‘The Need for a World Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 7(1) Human Rights Law Review 251. 
14
 Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights (2009) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Jutta Brunee 
and Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (2010) Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press; Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International 
Norms and Domestic Change (1999) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp 
and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance (2013) 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Harold Koh, ‘How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’ 
(1999) 74(4) Indiana Law Journal 1396, 1397–1398.  
15
 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe’ 
(1995) 1(2) European Journal of International Relations 157; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘How to 
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law’ (2004) 54(3) Duke Law Journal 621; 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance, above n 
14. 
16
 Jose Alvarez, ‘Do States Socialize?’ (2005) 54(4) Duke Law Journal 961, 967-968. 
17
 Alexander Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’ (1994) American Political 
Science Review 384, 385. 
18
 Emilie Hafner‐Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, ‘Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty 
Promises’ (2005) 110(5) American Journal of Sociology 1373. 
19
 Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Take Hold of it Boldly and Duly’, Romanes 
Lecture, Oxford University (11 November 1997) available at: <http://www.un.org/rights/50/dpi1938.htm> 
[accessed 1 February 2013]; Emilie Hafner-Burton and K. Tsutsui, ‘Justice Lost! The Failure of International 
Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most’ (2007) 44(4) Journal of Peace Research 407. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
5 
 
smaller part.’20 Regional systems now exist under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the 
Organisation of American States, the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab 
States and most recently, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Some 
scholars have observed that there seems to be a ‘directness of association’21 between 
members of regional organisations, which positively influences (or has the potential to 
influence) causal processes such as socialisation, binding, monitoring, and enforcement.
22
 
Regional systems are, in general, characterised by smaller numbers of members, deeper 
levels of integration, greater consensus around the importance of certain societal values, 
similar geographic characteristics and shared economic and security interests.
23
 These things, 
many argue, are pre-conditions for effective governance.
24
 
What drives my argument about the legitimacy of regional human rights arrangements 
is this: Judgments about human rights involve navigating difficult questions about the 
relationship between culture and rights, and the appropriate balance between rights and 
freedoms. They must be made with a deep understanding of the specific circumstances in 
which human rights violations take place in different complex societies, and with knowledge 
of the nature and importance of local peculiarities (religion, history, custom). For this reason, 
power in relation to rights should be exercised close to the people. In the language of 
                                                 
20
 A H Robertson, Human Rights in the World 2
nd
 ed (1982), Manchester University Press, 164–165. 
21
 Norman J. Padelford, ‘Recent Developments in Regional Organisations’ (1955) 49 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 23, 204. 
22
 Kong Qingjiang ‘Construction of the Discourse on Legitimacy of International Institutions’ in Rudiger 
Wolfrum and Volker Roben (eds) Legitimacy in International Law (2008) Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, New 
York 369-380, 378-379. 
23
 Robertson, Human Rights in the World, above n 20, 164–165; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Explaining International 
Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe’ (1995) 1(2) European Journal of International 
Relations 157, 157; Louise Fawcett ‘Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism’ 
(2004) 80(3) International Affairs 429, 429–431; Andrew Hurrell, ‘One World? Many worlds? The Place of 
Regions in the Study of International Society’ (2007) 83(1) International Affairs 127, 131; Jon C Pevehouse, 
Democracy from Above: Regional Organisations and Democratisation (2005) Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 19–28; Harry Estill Moore ‘Regionalism and Permanent Peace’ (1944) 23(1) Social Forces 
15–19, 19; Burns Weston, Robin Lukes and Kelly Hnatt, ‘Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and 
Appraisal’(1987) 20 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 585, 590. 
24
 Hurrell, above n 23, 131; Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, ‘Regional Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights’, 28th Report (1980), 15. 
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subsidiarity, we would say that power should be devolved to the smallest, lowest, or least 
centralised competent unit.
25
 The level of the state, it would seem, is best suited to promoting 
and protecting human rights.
26
 Yet we know from history that the state is also often the 
primary violator of rights, and that within closed political communities such as states, 
judgments about the balance between individual freedom and public morality, or between 
liberty and security, are sometimes poorly struck.
27
  
For these reasons, we need what Adam Smith described as a ‘certain distance’ in 
order to obtain objectivity about questions of justice: ‘We can never survey our own 
sentiments and motives, we can never form any judgment concerning them; unless we 
remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station, and endeavour to view them as at 
a certain distance from us.’28 My hypothesis is that regional organisations might provide the 
‘certain distance’ that imparts objectivity (as well as understanding) in judgments about 
rights. Hélène Ruiz Fabri, writing in the first edition of the Asian Journal of International 
Law, put it very simply: ‘National is not enough any more for most countries. Global is too 
much. Regional is, let us say, practicable.’29  
My working hypothesis is that the regional level of governance provides something 
unique and additional to the global level, a via media between the particularistic nature of 
rights violations in their local contexts, and the ideal of universalism; and that the mediating 
function of regional organisations lends them a particular kind of legitimacy, and hence 
                                                 
25
 Paolo G. Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97 
American Journal of International Law 38. 
26
 Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement on the Opening of the 61st Session of 
the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva (14 March 2005). 
27
 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’ (2003) 11(2) Journal of Political Philosophy 
191. 
28
 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiment (1759) (rev ed 1976) Oxford, Clarendon Press, 11. Smith’s 
perspective on moral reasoning is discussed in Amartya Sen, ‘Open and Closed Impartiality’ (2002) 99 Journal 
of Philosophy 445. 
29
 Hélène Ruiz Fabri, ‘Reflections on the Necessity of Regional Approaches to International Law Through the 
Prism of the European Example: Neither Yes nor No, Neither Black nor White’ (2011) 1 Asian Journal of 
International Law 83, 83. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
7 
 
influence, in the promotion and protection of human rights. But the sorts of arguments that 
could be marshalled against my theory spring readily to mind. One argument, for example, 
might be that much of the power of human rights lies in its claim to universality. Might not 
undue attention to the efficacy of regional systems dilute this? Another argument might be 
that not all regions behave like a ‘society of states’, linked by common interests and common 
values.
30
 In these circumstances, might not regional politics stymie the efforts of 
neighbouring states to influence one another’s behaviour?  
Yet another argument might be that the global and regional levels each have a distinct 
and complementary role to play in implementing rights, and that dichotomising the division 
between the universal and regional levels is unproductive. The most powerful argument, 
perhaps, is that empirically, the effectiveness of different regional systems is highly 
variable.
31
 A common theme that emerges from the work done on individual regional systems 
is that effectiveness depends very much on the same kinds of domestic variables that 
influence the efficacy of global instruments and institutions (the presence of the rule of law, 
strong civil society, pre-existing civil liberties).
32
 If this is the case, then the structural 
conditions within states, rather than external influences (regional or global) might better 
explain why states respond to pressure to change. Throughout the course of this dissertation, I 
am alert to these counter-arguments. Some of them, as I will show, substantially undercut my 
theory about regional human rights arrangements. 
                                                 
30
 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics (2002) New York, Columbia 
University Press. 
31
 Alexandra Huneeus, ‘Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court's Struggle to Enforce 
Human Rights’ (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 493; Stephen Greer, The European Convention on 
Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (2006) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Dinah 
Shelton, ‘The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe’ (2003) 13 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 95; Dinah Shelton, ‘The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (1994) 
10 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 333. Pbiora Okafor The African Human Rights 
System: Activist Forces and International Institutions (2007) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Mervat 
Rishmawi, ‘The Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights: a Step Forward?’ (2005) 5(2) Human Rights Law 
Review 361. 
32
 Ibid. 
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1.1. Why States Change 
 
At the heart of this research project is the question of why states commit to international 
human rights norms, and after they have committed, why they (sometimes) proceed to give 
human rights norms prescriptive status within their own domestic systems.  
This question engages, but does not fit neatly within, established research traditions of 
law, international relations, political science and sociology. I do not adopt and apply a single 
theoretical approach in this dissertation. I prefer what Peter Katzenstein calls ‘analytic 
eclecticism’; a focus on concrete policy and practice, attention to the complexity of real-
world situations, an emphasis on interactions among different types of causal mechanisms 
normally analysed in isolation from each other.
33
  
Nonetheless, many of the insights I find most useful emanate from within the broad 
school of constructivism. Within that school, in relation to human rights, different theories 
exist about how and why states change their human rights practices. One idea is ‘the spiral 
theory of human rights’ put forward by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink.34 
The authors argue that states act instrumentally in committing to international human rights 
norms, rationally balancing the costs and benefits of material and/or social sanctions and 
rewards (a logic of consequences).
35
 They argue that commitments to international human 
rights, which are often merely tactical concessions, provide domestic and international actors 
with the leverage to pressure states into (eventually) making substantive changes.
36
 A second 
                                                 
33
 Rudra Sil and Peter J Katzenstein, ‘Analytic Electicism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring 
Problems and Mechanisms Across Research Traditions’ (2010) 8(2) Perspectives on Politics 411; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter Burley, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: a Dual Agenda’ (1993) 87(2) 
American Journal of International Law 205. 
34
 Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999), above n 14; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (2013), above n 14.  
35
 Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (2013), Ibid, 16. 
36
 Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999), above n 14; Thomas Risse and Stephen C. Ropp ‘Introduction and 
Overview’ (2013) in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (2013) ibid. 
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set of scholars argue that states are influenced to behave in ways that suggest appropriate 
patterns of behaviour within a community of states. Where the adoption of international 
human rights norms is part of this pattern then, like their peers, states will also adopt these 
norms (a logic of appropriateness).
37
 A third group of scholars view change in domestic 
attitudes to human rights as the result of social learning and deliberation, where states have 
their interests redefined through processes of interaction and mutual learning that lead to 
lasting preference change: the choice mechanism is non-instrumental and non-calculative.
38
 
Even from this brief sketch, we can see how regional and global influences might 
operate differently to effect change in the human rights practices of states. In relation to the 
spiral theory, civil society’s efforts to persuade states to translate norms into domestic 
legislation might be enhanced if the norm is endorsed by other states within the region. On 
the other hand, the norm might be such that an appeal to its universal, global nature gives 
greater purchase. This is precisely what I conclude from my discussion in Chapters 6 and 7, 
after contrasting the different ways that ASEAN states respond to global and regional efforts 
regarding the promotion of the rights of women, and norms regarding ending trafficking in 
persons. The rights of women, it seems, at least in Southeast Asia, are more effectively 
promoted by global instruments. In contrast, efforts to end trafficking in persons seem to be 
more effectively organised at the regional level. In relation to the logic of appropriateness, it 
seems likely that a ‘community of states’ and a ‘group of peers’ situated at the regional level 
might have more influence than the amorphous ‘global society’ to which all states belong.  
On the other hand, some regions are marked by intractable differences between states 
(South Asia, East Asia) and in others, the presence of a hegemonic power distorts the way 
                                                 
37
 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’ (1998) 
52(4) International Organization 943. Jeffrey Checkel, ‘Why comply? Social Learning and European Identity 
Change’ (2001) 55(3) International Organization 553. 
38
 Brunee and Toope, above n 14. 
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that a logic of appropriateness might function (the Americas).
39
 In relation to the redefinition 
of interests through interaction and learning, again, it would seem that proximity within 
regions should enhance these processes. Yet what if states belong to a region where the 
predominant norms are not ‘good’, liberal, democratic, human rights orientated norms? Might 
states be socialised in other directions?
40
 These are the kinds of arguments that scholars have 
made in relation to ASEAN’s effort (or lack of effort) in relation to effecting change in 
Myanmar (discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation).
41
  
The theories I have outlined above each in different ways draw upon individual level 
psychology (shame, social status, material reward) to explain what motivates macro-level 
state practices.
42
 The anthropomorphism of constructivist scholarship has several critics.
43
 
Sceptics wonder whether people are really an appropriate metaphor for states, and how we 
can tell whether or not states are internalising patterns of behaviour, or ideas about the 
appropriateness of norms.
44
 Jose Alvarez calls theories about socialisation ‘pop 
psychology’.45 He argues that ‘states (or “organizations” in the abstract) do not “socialize”; 
people do.’46  
                                                 
39
 Joseph Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (1971) Boston, Little, Brown.  
Nico Krisch, ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International 
Legal Order’ (2005) 16(3) European Journal of International Law 369. 
40
 Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’ (1998) 23(1) International 
Security 171, 180, ‘Constructivism is agnostic about change in world politics.’ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52:4 (1998), pp 
887–917, 892. 
41
 Mathew Davies, ‘The Perils of Incoherence: ASEAN, Myanmar and the Avoidable Failures of Human Rights 
Socialization?’ (2012) 34(1) Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 1. 
42
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004) Princeton, Princeton University Press, 206–207.  
43
 Jose Alvarez, ‘Do States Socialize?’ above n 16, 969. For a response to some of the criticisms, see Ryan 
Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative 
Challenges’ (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 983.  
44
 Alvarez, above n 16, 969.  
45
 Ibid.  
46
 Ibid. 
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To clear the ground, then, let me set out what I mean by socialisation. I follow 
Alderson’s definition of state socialisation as: ‘the process by which states internalize norms 
originating elsewhere in the international system.’47 This process is primarily the result of 
interaction (between states, between governments and transnational civil society members, 
through judicial processes), which leads to internalisation of norms, ideas and attitudes.
48
 The 
result of internalisation is a change in how states define themselves, or in the identity of 
states.
49
 The difficult question is, how can we tell that norm internalisation is occurring?
50
 
What we are looking for is evidence that a particular idea, which was previously peripheral or 
opposed, is now viewed as right and appropriate and requires no further justification in order 
to secure compliance. Another way of saying this is that the norm generates a sense of 
obligation. In terms of state internalisation of human rights norms, the sorts of indicators that 
might reveal internalisation are: the attitude change of individuals (of political leaders, key 
civil society actors, the broader public), political change (change in political leadership or 
change in policy), the establishment of institutions to preserve and further particular norms 
(measures to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, the adoption of a bill of rights, or 
the establishment of a National Human Rights Institution). 
Given this, both my theory and the empirical bent of my investigation become clearer. 
The proposition I am testing is that interaction at the regional level is particularly likely to 
lead to the internalisation of human rights norms. I am looking, within the particular region of 
Southeast Asia, for indicators that regional-level interaction among states has led (or seems to 
be leading to) shifts in the attitudes and perceptions of key actors, political change, and the 
establishment of human rights institutions.  
                                                 
47
 Kai Alderson, ‘Making Sense of State Socialization’ (2001) 27(03) Review of International Studies 415, 417. 
48
 Brunee and Toope, above n 14. 
49
 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics’ (1992) 
46(2) International organization 391; Brunee and Toope, above n 14, 14. 
50
 Goodman and Jinks, above n 43, 993-994. 
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1.2. Legitimacy 
 
Why is legitimacy the touchstone for my investigation?
51
  
As I have explained, my central question is whether or not—and if so, the 
circumstances in which—interaction at the regional level is likely to lead states to change 
their human rights practices. Another way of putting this is, under what circumstances will 
regional-level interaction give a human rights norm or institution authority?
52
 From Weber, 
we know that authority is exercised in one of three ways: via means of: (1) coercion (2) self-
interest, or (3) legitimacy.
53
 Coercion requires the exercise or threat of force, and so is costly 
and oppressive. Self-interest requires continual acts of persuasion in order to convince actors 
about the benefits of compliance. It is expensive and demanding as a system of governance. 
Legitimate rule engenders compliance because actors hold ‘a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.’54 It is the optimal basis 
for compliance.
55
 Most social scientists argue in a circular fashion that legitimacy (as a 
subjective concept denoting perceptions of appropriateness) engenders voluntary compliance, 
and that compliance in the absence of coercion or self-interest is one of the indicators of a 
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law or institution’s (normative) legitimacy.56 The importance of legitimacy in the 
international human rights system, where there are few sanctions and little incentive for states 
to comply with norms out of self-interest, is immediately apparent.
57
 Over the past decade, 
legitimacy has become a major focus for international law scholars.
58
  
Although they are inter-related, different methods are used to assess legitimacy in its 
subjective and normative senses.
59
 In relation to legitimacy as a subjective concern, what are 
relevant are the perceptions of particular actors or sets of actors about the appropriateness of 
certain rules or institutions in a given context.
60
 Different audiences (civil society 
representatives, rights-holders, states, members of the international community) may have 
different understandings about the legitimacy of rules or institutions. For example, the Terms 
of Reference (TOR) of AICHR state that the institution is ‘inter-governmental’ and 
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‘consultative,’ comprised of state representatives who are ‘accountable to the appointing 
government.’61 One of the conclusions I reach in this dissertation is that the provisions 
undermine the legitimacy of AICHR in the eyes of the region’s civil society members, who 
value institutional independence and powers of enforcement. At the same time, I argue that 
these provisions increase the legitimacy of AICHR in the eyes of (some) representatives of 
ASEAN governments, who value the preservation of sovereignty and the principle of non-
interference. Furthermore, different state actors within the regional grouping hold different 
perceptions of the institution’s legitimacy. The point is that no single assessment of 
legitimacy is likely to capture the various views of the different audiences. The utility of an 
inquiry into (subjective) legitimacy is that it helps to uncover the different perspectives of 
relevant actors.  
In relation to the normative elements of legitimacy, the inquiry is quite different. The 
search is for objective determinants for the moral authority to exercise power.
62
 For example, 
there is a strong argument that in international law, legitimate authority is based on the 
consent of states reflected in international treaties. State consent is itself legitimated by 
national mechanisms that ensure international obligations reflect the will of domestic 
constituents.
63
 From this perspective, the inquiry into the legitimacy of norms and institutions 
is technical, concerned with the democratic processes in different countries (elections, 
parliamentary procedures for passing legislation that adopts or gives effect to international 
treaties). This idea of legitimacy is taken up in Chapter 3, where I discuss the internal 
democratic processes of ASEAN states in ratifying the Charter. Another aspect of normative 
legitimacy relates to the qualities of institutions and the way rules are implemented. If the 
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composition of an institution and its rules are fair and transparent, and the law is applied 
consistently, then this has a legitimising effect in international law (as it does in domestic 
law).
64
 From this perspective, the inquiry is into the decision-making processes of 
institutions, how widely known and understood rules are, and how rules are applied. 
Determinacy (the clarity of a norm’s meaning) is yet another element of legitimacy. As I 
explain in Chapter 3, lack of determinacy has an effect on both actual and perceived 
legitimacy. Deficiencies in normative legitimacy usually effect subjective legitimacy.  
 
1.3. What Conception of Human Rights? 
 
My conception of human rights shapes my approach in this dissertation. Like many others, I 
eschew the traditional, natural law idea of human rights as universal moral rights that we hold 
simply because we are human. There is simply no philosophical basis to support this idea.
65
 I 
adopt what has become known as ‘a political conception of human rights.’66 In contemporary 
moral philosophy, this idea takes various forms. But at its core are two central arguments. 
The first is that ‘human rights protect urgent individual interests against threats to 
which they are vulnerable under typical conditions of life in a modern world order comprised 
of states.’67 Two points arise from this. One is that the list of what these urgent interests are is 
not definite or settled. It is subject to revision or extension. Charles Beitz, employing Rawls’ 
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ideas of ‘reasonable agreement’ and ‘overlapping consensus’, argues that urgent interests are 
ones that most of us would recognise as important in a wide range of lives in contemporary 
society.
68
 The other point is that rights are held against the state and its institutions; they are 
not just innately ‘held.’ Rights are ‘political’ in the sense that they are constrained by what is 
achievable under different circumstances.
69
  
Second, states are important structures for organising society, providing for the self-
determination of people and protecting their interests. For these reasons, state sovereignty 
should be respected. For Rawls, Raz, and Beitz, one of the things that defines a human right 
is that its abuse justifies international action that would otherwise violate sovereignty.
70
 
There are three ways in which this conception of human rights shapes my research. 
First, at the level of method, political conceptions direct attention away from theory and 
metaphysics, towards pragmatism and empirically based assessments of the actual practice of 
human rights in complex societies. For example, in my discussion about the practice of 
polygamy in Chapter 5, I consider the international and domestic law relating to the practice. 
But I also consider the way the practice is experienced by men, women and children in 
communities where it occurs, and the way that these experiences shape responses to the 
efforts of different actors to prevent the practice. Second, the fact that the list of human rights 
is not settled suggests the importance of discourse and debate and focuses our attention on 
ideas about deliberative democracy and the conditions under which people can participate in 
shaping the kind of society in which they live.  
For example, in my discussion of the drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration (Chapter 5), I show how the absence of public participation in the drafting 
process undermines the legitimacy of the Declaration. Third, because I argue that human 
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rights are not innate or ahistorical, but are instead political agreements about what interests 
should be protected, I do not at the outset assume that liberal democracy is a human right or 
that democracy is required for the realisation of human rights. What democracy is, and the 
relationship between democracy and human rights, is discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. At this 
point, it is enough to say that I do not at the outset presume that the political philosophies of 
ASEAN’s communist states (Vietnam and Laos) or its absolute sultanate (Brunei) are 
incompatible with human rights. What matters is the actual way that rights of participation 
are accessed and guaranteed in different political communities. 
 
1.4. Testing the Theory: Why Southeast Asia?  
 
I test my hypothesis using a case study of Southeast Asia. I focus particularly on two of 
ASEAN’s recently established human rights institutions: AICHR, and the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration (2013). AICHR was established in 2009, pursuant to Article 14 of the 
ASEAN Charter (2007). As I have said, the Commission is ‘consultative’ and its 10 
commissioners are ‘accountable to their appointing governments.’ The ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration was adopted in October 2013, as a ‘framework for human rights 
cooperation in the region and contribute to the ASEAN community building process.’71 
The reasons why I approach my research question through a study of these 
institutions, and why I chose Southeast Asia as the region for my case study, are as follows: 
First, my premise is that legitimacy is what gives international norms and institutions 
authority. My theory is that regional institutions may have particular legitimacy for a range of 
reasons that might include, for example, the shared economic and security ties that link states 
and create co-dependencies, or the inter-subjective understandings that arise from shared 
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histories, cultures, borders or political beliefs and interests; or the fact that interaction about 
the meaning and value of rights occurs more effectively between small numbers of states that 
share common values. As I explained earlier, legitimacy has both normative and subjective 
elements. In relation to the subjective aspects of legitimacy, what are relevant are the beliefs 
of relevant actors. Do these actors believe that these particular regional human rights 
institutions are appropriate, given the circumstances and context of Southeast Asia? The 
answer can only be uncovered by asking questions of the actors involved, and by attending to 
the particularistic circumstances of the region. This implies qualitative research and a level of 
detail that suggests a case study method. Southeast Asia is accessible. In the course of my 
research I interviewed four of the ten Commissioners of AICHR (though none would 
formally be recorded), dozens of lawyers and civil society activists, and sat in on several of 
the regional civil society deliberations about the drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration. The views of governments I divined from media reports, statements in 
parliament and official documents. All of this informed my assessment about the (subjective) 
legitimacy of ASEAN’s regional human rights institutions. 
Second, Southeast Asia represents a ‘most difficult case.’ It is politically and 
culturally diverse, and it has a longstanding resistance to the Western liberal cast of the 
classical idea of human rights; ASEAN states have been traditionally reluctant to engage with 
the international human rights treaty monitoring system. To the extent that it might be 
possible to generalise from a single case study to regional institutions more generally, then 
selecting ‘a most difficult case’ strengthens the generalisability of the hypothesis. In other 
words, if I am able to conclude in this project that Southeast Asia’s regional human rights 
institutions possess a particular kind of legitimacy, then this provides a clear path for future 
scholars who may wish to extend the hypothesis to the regional institutions of Europe, or the 
Americas, Africa or the Middle East.  
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Third, the novelty of Southeast Asia’s institutions represents a challenge and an 
opportunity. The challenge is that charting the creation and early years of these institutions 
requires first-hand empirical research. Secondary material is scarce, with the exception of the 
interest shown by some international relations scholars in the question of why, given 
Southeast Asia’s reticence about human rights, the governments of the region decided to 
create human rights institutions at all (a question taken up in Chapter 3). The opportunity lies 
in the fact that elements of legitimacy can be studied closely at the point of creation, 
providing a base line from which future developments can be measured. As I note in the final 
chapter, legitimacy is not static. Institutions and instruments have the potential to garner 
legitimacy, regardless of the circumstances of their creation. 
 
1.5. Structure of the Dissertation 
 
Democracy, in the multiple ways that it can be understood, emerges as the recurring theme of 
this study.  
I begin (in Chapters 2 and 3) by explicating the relationship between democracy and 
human rights and describing the state of democracy in Southeast Asia. I draw conclusions 
about the effect of the lack of democracy within some Southeast Asian states on the 
legitimacy of AICHR. My focus in these chapters is on democracy understood as a system of 
politics, and on the way in which democracy affects the normative elements of the legitimacy 
of AICHR. 
In Chapter 4, in a case study of recent developments in Myanmar, I consider how low 
levels of democracy within a region affect the ability of regional institutions to influence 
‘pariah’ states. I conclude that even in regions that possess low levels of democracy, the 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
20 
 
regional effect on processes of liberalisation and democratic consolidation has some 
significance. 
In Chapter 5, I turn away from democracy at the state-system level. In a study of the 
drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, I consider the importance of processes of 
democratic discourse in the creation of international instruments and in particular, the role of 
civil society in contributing to the creation of instruments that possess the quality of 
legitimacy. I argue that the absence of deliberative democracy in the drafting process for the 
Declaration undermines the instrument’s legitimacy and stymies the emergence of a regional 
conversation about the meaning and value of rights. 
In Chapters 6 and 7, I undertake a comparison of legitimacy at the regional/global 
levels across two different rights: the rights of women, and trafficking in persons. In relation 
to trafficking in persons, I find some evidence of the sorts of regional-level processes that 
support my theory: moral consciousness-raising, argumentation and persuasion amongst 
regional peers by national and regional actors, both governmental and non-governmental, 
coupled with the alignment of interests among states that share instrumental reasons for 
advancing a particular joint project. In relation to the rights of women, however, I find that 
the global level provides a greater level of legitimacy.  
 
1.6. Conclusion  
 
Based on what I have said so far, what would a regional human rights system, possessing the 
quality of legitimacy, look like?  
First, adopting a political conception of what human rights are, we would see 
evidence of a shared understanding of what interests qualify as human rights. Second, we 
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would see a high degree of awareness about how rights violations manifest themselves in 
specific local circumstances. Third, we would see dense interaction between states within a 
particular constrained geographical area, in the form of joint instruments and shared 
institutions created to address the problem. Fourth, we would see all this occurring against a 
backdrop of shared economic, political or security interests.  
This is not what we find in Southeast Asia. Instead, we find little consensus about 
what rights are, and the absence of conditions necessary for fostering effective debate, 
argument and discussion about rights. We find that restrictions on freedom of information in 
several ASEAN countries inhibit regional awareness about rights and their violation in 
different circumstances. We do find evidence of government-level interaction and civil 
society interaction in relation to some human rights issues (such as trafficking in persons) but 
in relation to many issues—particularly sensitive political issues to do with civil rights and 
freedoms—norms of non-interference prevail. In terms of shared economic and security 
interests, regional economic integration is at an embryonic stage. There is some evidence of 
shared security interests in the sense of a joint wish to bolster regional solidarity in relation to 
China, but this is complicated by opposing views within ASEAN about how best to manage 
China’s ambitions.72  
The end result is that I do not prove my hypothesis. My conclusion is that regional 
human rights institutions do not possess a particular kind of legitimacy in circumstances 
where states belong to a region with low levels of democracy. Saul’s intuition is correct: 
‘legitimate regional institutions must be firmly grounded in popular consent, reached through 
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agreement and negotiation with the local communities whose values they purport to represent 
and protect.’73 Democracy (and its deficit in Southeast Asia) is at the heart of my explanation 
about the lack of legitimacy attaching to the region’s new human rights institutions.  
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We must remember that each country is the product of different circumstances, 
opportunities and constraints. Thailand has been at that stage before, when political 
repression was the order of the day. The advances we made towards greater 
democracy and human rights were paid for in tears and blood, here at Thammasat 
University. It is a process that each country must work out for itself, in its own way, at 
its own pace, in its own time.
1
 
 Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan, address at Thammasat University, Bangkok, 
on 12 June 1998. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1, I set out my hypothesis, which is that in the promotion and protection of human 
rights, regional human rights institutions possess a legitimacy that global organisations do 
not. I outlined some of the possible reasons for this: for example, that regional systems 
articulate norms that reflect the aspirations and ideals of a discrete group of states, which are 
refined and redefined through discourse, in a context of awareness of the specific historical 
and political circumstances of different states. I suggested that these things bred legitimacy 
and that for this reason regional organisations may have significant potential to shape the 
discourse about rights protection within states.  
As I foreshadowed in my conclusion to Chapter 1, Southeast Asia presents 
something of a challenge to this hypothesis. The conclusion I reach, at the end of this 
dissertation, is that where the region to which a state belongs lacks a critical mass of 
democracies, then the particular advantages of regionalism in elaborating human rights ideals 
(because of shared history, and bonds of culture, trade and security) may be greatly 
diminished. In this chapter, I begin to set out the reasons why this is the case. At the heart of 
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the explanation is the relationship that exists between democracy and human rights. In the 
course of this dissertation, I show how low levels of democracy undermine regional efforts to 
advance human rights in a number of distinct ways.  
For example, in Chapter 3 I show how the consent of democratic states is viewed as 
a prerequisite for the legitimacy of international law and for the legitimacy of institutions 
such as AICHR. In Chapter 4, I show how the potential for regional-level efforts to 
influence human rights within ‘pariah’ states such as Myanmar is dependent on the 
democratic density of the region. In Chapter 5, I show how prospects for achieving regional-
level discourse about the meaning, value and scope of rights in instruments such as the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration is seriously diminished when the conditions for 
deliberative democracy are absent. Chapter 6 demonstrates how the absence of democracy 
within particular states makes it difficult to negotiate and debate at the regional level sensitive 
issues such as the rights of women. Chapter 7, in contrast, shows how certain human rights 
issues (such as trafficking in persons), which are less intimately connected to democracy, 
have a greater likelihood of being successfully managed at the regional level, even in 
circumstances where the region is not strongly democratic.  
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the relationship between democracy and human rights and 
make the argument for the centrality (and primacy) of democracy. These chapters lay the 
foundation for the arguments made in all later chapters. I begin Chapter 2 by describing the 
difficulty of defining ‘democracy’, and by outlining the inadequacy of definitions, which 
merely adumbrate the specific characteristics of ‘liberal’ democracy (2.2). In the end, I 
propose a definition that is fairly close to the idea of democracy captured in Article 25 of 
the 2003 Vienna Declaration, which provides that ‘democracy is based on the freely 
Chapter 2: Democracy and Human Rights 
 
26 
 
expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural 
systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives.’2  
I then explain the two primary ways in which a relationship between democracy and 
human rights is commonly justified. The first is the Kantian idea that both democracy and 
human rights are necessary for the preservation of peace (2.3.1), and the second is the link 
that is said to exist between democracy, and economic and social rights (2.3.2). This second 
idea has two parts: the first is the idea that development and the just distribution of goods 
depend on democracy; the second connects with Kant’s idea of a liberal economic peace. I 
consider these justifications in light of the particular history and economic order of Southeast 
Asia, and suggest that there are limits to the applicability of these ideas in the Southeast 
Asian regional context.  
Having concluded that the consequentialist justifications for the democracy/human 
rights nexus are implausible in the case of Southeast Asia, I turn to normative justifications 
for linking democracy and human rights (2.4). I consider first the idea that self-determination, 
an entitlement recognised under international law, is the origin of an understanding that 
democracy is itself a human right. I point out the conceptual problems of equating self-
determination with democracy (for example, does a people’s right to self-determination give 
them the right to choose a non-democratic form of governance, or to abrogate the rights of 
minorities within the democracy?)
3
 In the end, I concur with the view of the Human Rights 
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Committee, which is that rights of political participation are ‘related to, but distinct from, the 
right of peoples to self-determination.’4  
I then consider the way in which liberal political philosophers such as John Rawls and 
Joshua Cohen have sought to link democracy and ideas about the freedom and equality of the 
individual, and I trace the development of this type of thinking in the elaboration of a liberal 
idea of democracy by various institutions of the United Nations. Finally, I describe the 
disjuncture that exists between this ideal and the idea of governance that has historically 
predominated in different states in Southeast Asia. All of this points the way to my discussion 
in the first part of Chapter 3, where I explore the reasons why most states within Southeast 
Asia have historically resisted the western idea of liberal democracy. The final part of 
Chapter 3 examines the effect of the disparate and conflicting understandings of democracy 
on the form and legitimacy of the region’s new human rights institutions. 
 
2.2. Defining Democracy  
 
The threshold question is how to define ‘democracy’ for the purpose of this dissertation.5 
Southeast Asia is a region replete with ‘democracies with adjectives’ (‘discipline–flourishing 
democracies’, ‘people’s democracies’, ‘dominant-party democracies’ and ‘emerging 
democracies’).6 A definition of democracy based on the subjective understandings of 
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different ASEAN state governments is unhelpful. But how does one objectively define 
democracy? The word is used promiscuously, across many disciplines,
7
 indeed, so much so 
that some scholars have abandoned attempts at definition. They point, instead, to the 
characteristics of systems of government (usually in ‘Western Europe, North America, India, 
the Antipodes and a few other places’)8 that appear to demonstrate certain features; most 
importantly, the peaceful transfer of power, and governance under and according to law by 
those who are elected by the majority. Certain other guarantees are viewed as being necessary 
for the effective and fair operation of a democratic political system, such as free 
communication and free association.
9
 Other guarantees, such as principles of tolerance of 
dissent, and constitutional safeguards to protect minorities, are viewed as necessary to 
prevent the abuses of majority rule.  
Of paramount importance in all of these accounts is the idea of the periodic election.
10
 
Francis Fukuyama concludes that ‘[a] country is democratic if it grants its people the right to 
choose their own government through periodic, secret-ballot, multi-party elections, on the 
basis of universal and equal adult suffrage.’11 Multi-party elections have come to denote the 
core of liberal democracy.
12
 Since the collapse of communism and single-party states in 
Eastern Europe in 1989, the claim has been made that the world is at a ‘grand historical 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘democracy with adjectives’. See Peter Burnell, 'Democracy Promotion: The Elusive Quest for Grand Strategies' 
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9
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tipping point’ into ‘universal (liberal) democracy.’13 Liberal democracy’s vision is one of free 
and equal individuals who pursue self-chosen ends and personal interests with minimum 
political impediments.
14
 In the ideal liberal democracy, those who govern act for the common 
good (generally held to be the prosperity of society, the security of citizens, order and 
justice).
15
 Prosperity, security, order and justice are held to be desirable because they permit 
the greatest possible degree of individual autonomy and liberty.
16
  
Within most states in Southeast Asia, many resist definitions that elide democracy 
with ‘liberal’ democracy.17 There are several reasons for this. First, some Southeast Asian 
leaders question liberal democracy’s emphasis on values of liberty and autonomy, arguing 
that these values displace equally important values of familial and communitarian obligation, 
social order and harmony.
18
 Second, ‘equality’ as a principle of political order has been set 
against the Confucian idea of rule by wise, benevolent and virtuous guardians, often born into 
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a dynasty of leaders, who represent the interests of the nation for the good of all.
19
 Third, 
there is ambivalence about the idea of liberal democracy because of its association with the 
region’s colonial history.20 Fourth, liberal democracy’s idea of competitive multi-party 
elections sits uneasily with the political philosophies of ASEAN’s communist members, 
Vietnam and Laos.
21
 Finally, it is apparent to some in the region that ‘democracy’ as 
understood by the West is no panacea for inequality, that ‘[r]eal existing constitutional 
democracies privilege the wealthy. As they install, extend, and protect neoliberal capitalism, 
they exclude, exploit, and oppress the poor, all the while promising that everybody wins.’22 
A return to democracy’s etymological root is helpful in negotiating between the two 
poles of ‘universal’ liberal democracy, and complete relativism.23 Democracy derives from 
the Greek kratos (rule or power) and demos (of the people), and references a primary 
normative principle; namely, that it is right that ‘the people rule or have ultimate political 
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authority.’24 In modern society, the means of achieving the authority of the people is through 
political representation, which functions with a maximum level of inclusiveness in the 
systems of power so that there is a level of surety that those who hold authority govern with 
the consent of the governed.
25
 By this, all have the opportunity to ‘assume responsibility for 
shaping the kind of civil society in which they live and work.’26 This understanding of 
democracy is not too far from the idea of democracy captured in Article 25 of the 2003 
Vienna Declaration, to which all ASEAN states have agreed: ‘Democracy is based on the 
freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and 
cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives.’27  
It is necessary to make two points about the broad definition adopted here. First, the 
understanding of democracy outlined above does not list ‘multi-party’ democracy as either a 
requirement for or an indicator of democracy. As Bollen maintains, ‘having a multi-party 
system does not guarantee political rights and liberties ... it is theoretically possible for a one-
party system to respect political rights and political liberties.’28 Thus the definition of 
democracy which I adopt does not at the outset make the assumption that those ASEAN 
states that possess single political parties (Vietnam, Laos), or that in practice have had only 
one political party hold power (Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore), or that do not hold general 
elections (Brunei) are ‘undemocratic.’ 
Second, the definition of ‘democracy’ adopted includes the Vienna Declaration’s 
emphasis on ‘full participation’ as an aspect of democracy. This leads us to ask how such 
                                                 
24
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participation is possible, in societies divided by disparities in the wealth and status of citizens. 
In short, it leads us to the idea of equality. The idea of equality ‘plays a central role in any 
reasonable normative conception of democracy.’29 Yet it is often obfuscated in renderings of 
‘liberal’ democracy that emphasise formal equality, particularly in voting rights.30 The two 
ideas which undergird equality are (1) that each member of society is entitled to be treated 
with equal respect and is entitled to the same basic rights, and that (2) the political system 
reflects this equality, in that (irrespective of class or wealth), individuals are entitled to bring 
their interests and their judgments of what is politically right to bear on political decision-
making.
31
 The aim is ‘a society of equals, with equal rights and equal status, whose members 
relate to one another as equals,’ and where citizens have the freedom and resources to 
participate in decision-making, and there is equal respect for all participants.
32
  
On this view, the questions we would ask in order to determine democracy in any 
given state are not questions about voting rights and the presence of viable alternative 
opposition political parties, but about particular processes of governance, political culture, 
practices of law, formal and informal systems of power and the impediments to equality 
(such as wealth and social status), which inhibit full participation in political life.  
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2.3. The Relationship between Democracy and Human Rights 
 
What is the relationship between democracy and human rights? The view is widespread that 
‘internationally recognized human rights require a liberal regime,’33 that liberal democracy 
and human rights are ‘two sides of the same coin,’34 that ‘human rights, equal rights and 
government under law are important attributes of democracy,’35 and that liberal democracy is 
a necessary precondition for realising human rights.
36
 Much of the literature on both 
democracy and human rights—and many of the statements emanating from the institutions of 
the United Nations—make the assumption that liberal democracy and human rights are co-
dependent.
37
  
In 2002 and 2005, for example, the Commission on Human Rights requested that the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights convene an ‘expert seminar on democracy and the 
rule of law.’38 The first seminar noted the inseparable and interdependent character of 
democracy and human rights as concepts that had spread around the globe, but emphasised 
that there was no single universal model of democracy. The second seminar stated that free, 
fair, and periodic multiparty elections were a key component of democracy, the rule of law 
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and the protection of human rights, and that ‘elections also had an autonomous value as a 
means of self-realization and recognition of human dignity.’39  
Under the definition of democracy adopted in this dissertation, democracy is political 
representation that functions with a maximum level of inclusiveness in the systems of power. 
Inclusiveness might be said to suggest equality in the sense that all are permitted to 
participate on an equal basis in the processes of political power and law-making. Participation 
is only possible in circumstances where basic civil rights (the rights of freedom of expression, 
peaceful assembly, freedom to form and join professional associations) are protected, 
enabling the exercise of political choice. Thus, one can fairly easily establish that human 
rights (at minimum, basic civil ones) are necessary preconditions for any type of genuine 
democracy.  
But is democracy necessary for the realisation of human rights? Three lines of 
argument suggest that it is. First, a long line of liberal thinkers have argued that developed 
democratic states rarely if ever make war upon each other.
40
 This is because democratic 
institutions reflect the preferences of the people who, having to bear the costs of war, will 
oppose it. If these preferences are reflected in foreign policies, states are unlikely to wage 
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wars.
41
 As conditions of war inevitably lead to human rights violations, it follows that 
democracy is necessary to preserve peace and thus protect human rights.  
A second line of argument, based on the work of Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, holds 
that famines do not occur in democracies and thus that the preservation of life and the 
fulfilment of vital social and economic rights requires democratic conditions.
42
 Sen argues 
that democratically elected governments, which are susceptible to criticism from the media 
and the informed public, promote the political incentive for governments to be responsive, 
caring and prompt in addressing deprivation: ‘Democracy and an uncensored press can 
spread the penalty of famines from the destitute to those in authority. There is no surer way of 
making the government responsive to the suffering of famine victims.’43 
Beyond these two consequentialist arguments for democracy as a condition for the 
fulfilment of human rights lies a third idea: that democracy is an autonomous human right 
itself, not just a means for securing the realisation of other rights.
44
 In this vein, it is argued 
that democracy is one of those values that defines our intrinsic humanness and as such should 
be protected and promoted. In the following sections, I consider the degree to which these 
three arguments for linking democracy and human rights resonate in the context of Southeast 
Asia.  
 
2.3.1 Southeast Asia’s Autocratic Peace?  
Underpinning the ‘human rights and democracy’ nexus is the Kantian idea that both are 
necessary for the preservation of peace.
45
 In his Treatise on Perpetual Peace, Kant argued 
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that peace among nations would result from (1) the creation of democratic nations, whose 
republican constitutions eliminated autocratic caprice in waging war, and (2) an 
understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics, as the moral 
foundation for a liberal peace.
 46
  
This idea is captured in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that: 
‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’47 and stated 
even more clearly in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution of The United Nations 
Educational, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): ‘The great and terrible war which 
has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of democratic principle.’48 The 
Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) affirms a ‘profound belief 
in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world 
and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other 
by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon which they 
depend.’49 
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To what extent do these ideas resonate in Southeast Asia? All states in Southeast Asia 
played a role in the Second World War. Laos was more heavily bombed than either Japan or 
Germany.
50
 Thailand was (for a while) an ally of the Japanese, and the Malay states were 
called upon to support the Allied Forces. But the end of the Second World War did not bring 
peace to the region; Southeast Asia’s departing colonial powers left behind them several 
unresolved territorial disputes. Sarawak and Sabah, for example, on the Indonesian island of 
Borneo, were claimed by Indonesia. The British, however, decreed them part of the newly 
formed Malay federation. After Indonesia ended its four-year war to gain independence from 
the Dutch, it commenced its Konfrontasi campaign against Malaysia in an effort to reclaim 
Sarawak and Sabah. The Philippines also lays claim to Sabah. In other parts of the region, 
newly-drawn national borders did not match ethnic borders. As a result of this, there was 
conflict along the Thai-Malay border and the Thai-Burma border and conflict between 
predominantly ethnic Chinese Singapore, which was part of the Malay federation when it 
gained independence from Britain in 1963, and the rest of the Malay federation.  
Singapore was eventually expelled from Malaysia in 1965 and became its own city-
state. Adding to these tensions and to the pervasive sense of regional unrest were communist 
insurgencies in almost every state in Southeast Asia.
51
 In this context, in 1967, the aim of the 
nascent Association of Southeast Asian Nations, comprised at the time of Thailand, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore, was to bring about and preserve peace between the 
fledgling states and to defend the region from the threat of communism. But the 1967 
Bangkok Declaration, drafted and signed by ASEAN’s five original members,52 made no 
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connection between peace, democracy and human rights.
53
 One reason for this is that there 
existed amongst ASEAN’s five founding members no established democracy. 
Democratisation in Southeast Asia did not begin until some twenty years later.
54
  
At the time of ASEAN’s birth, Indonesia was under the authoritarian rule of President 
Suharto.
55
 President Marcos ruled the Philippines and placed the country under martial law 
from 1972 until 1981.
56
 Between 1959 and 1990, Singapore had one Prime Minister and one 
ruling party: Lee Kuan Yew and the People’s Action Party. Until 1973, Thailand’s monarchs 
shared power with predominantly military, or military-backed, governments. Malaysia, 
facing first a challenge from communism and then persistent religious and ethnic tension, was 
dominated by one party that placed the country under successive states of emergency. Thus, 
there was no consolidated democracy able to take the lead in promoting a ‘democratic peace’ 
at the regional level. Other means for peaceful co-existence needed to be found. Non-
interference and mutual respect for sovereignty emerged as Southeast Asia’s pragmatic 
response to the problem of creating and maintaining regional peace. 
It also became clear, particularly after 1967 when Britain announced its withdrawal 
from ‘East of the Suez’, that regional self-reliance was an imperative of the Cold War order. 
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At a press conference in 1966, Thai Foreign Minister Tanat Khanan stated that ‘countries in 
the region had long relied on outside power to save us ... and we seem to have abdicated our 
responsibility for peace-keeping.’57 Indeed, it became apparent to Southeast Asian leaders 
during the Cold War years that not only were ‘outside powers’ unreliable saviours; they were 
also potentially a greater threat to peace than inter-state conflict within the region. From 
China and Vietnam came the threat of interference in the name of Communism, exacerbated 
in 1964 when China undertook a successful nuclear test and in 1978 when Vietnam invaded 
Cambodia. From the West came the threat of interference from the world’s leading 
democracy, the United States, which used its military power to bring democracy to several 
South American nations and attempted to do the same in Vietnam.
58
  
The leaders of Southeast Asia were aware that inter-regional conflict would provide 
an incentive and an excuse for great power intervention in the region. Thus the Philippine’s 
President Ferdinand Marcos exhorted Asians to ‘work together as brothers, not at cross-
purposes but for each other’s prosperity and happiness.’59 ‘Working together’ meant a 
decision to suspend suspicion and hostility, to respect the internal governance of other states, 
and to ‘subordinate dogmatic theories to practical issues.’60 Respect, not political like-
mindedness, became the key to peace. The ‘ASEAN Way’ evolved, of ‘consensualism, 
informality, confidentiality, gradualism, and the ‘front state principle’ (i.e. accepting the lead 
of the member most exposed to specific external developments).’61 These principles became 
the modus operandi of international relations within the region. Following these principles, in 
the first two decades of its existence, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations successfully 
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ended Indonesia’s period of konfrontasi, brought to an end Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, 
and defused other latent conflicts among member states.
62
 
Thus, instead of references to ‘democracy’ as the essential ingredient of peace and 
prosperity, ASEAN’s founding 1967 Bangkok Declaration refers to the importance of 
economic and social cooperation in ‘an increasingly interdependent world’. ‘Democracy’ is 
not mentioned in the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration, 
which notes the ‘right of every country to lead its national existence free from outside 
interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect its freedom, 
independence and integrity’ or in the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, which notes, 
‘The stability of each member state and that of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution 
to international peace and security’ and that ‘The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and 
illiteracy is a primary concern of member states. They shall therefore intensify cooperation in 
economic and social development.’  
The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation underscores commitment to sovereignty 
and non-interference as the hallmarks of peaceful relations. ASEAN’s modus operandi for 
creating and maintaining peace was not encouraging (let alone forcing) members of the 
regional association to adopt democratic political systems; it was, above all else, a policy of 
non-interference between states, few of which could be called ‘democratic.’ The communist 
political systems of Vietnam and Laos were no barrier to the admission of these nations into 
ASEAN in 1995 and 1997. Burma was admitted into ASEAN in 1997, whilst under the 
rulership of a military junta, which had ignored the results of democratic elections in 1990. In 
an article in The Nation focused on relations with Myanmar, Thai Deputy Foreign Minister 
MR Sukhumbhand Paribatra described the non-intervention principle as ‘the glue keeping 
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ASEAN together’. ASEAN, he argued, ‘cannot be the proactive promoter of changes in the 
existing political arrangement of any member country.’63  
The ASEAN theme of maintaining peace despite political disparity through a policy 
of non-interference prevailed in the drafting of the ASEAN Charter (2008). In the ‘Principles’ 
of the ASEAN Charter, the single reference to ‘democracy’ in Article 2(h) is overshadowed 
by the references to sovereignty, non-interference, territorial integrity and national identity, 
which are detailed in Article 2(a), the reference to non-interference in the internal affairs of 
ASEAN Member States outlined in Article 2(e), the principle of respect for the right of every 
Member State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and 
coercion described in Article 2(f), and the principle of abstention from participation in any 
policy or activity, including the use of its territory, pursued by any ASEAN Member State or 
non-ASEAN State or any non-State actor, which threatens the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political and economic stability of ASEAN Member States in Article 2(k). 
We can conclude from ASEAN’s history, and from the Charter, that ASEAN is 
persisting in following what Emmerson terms its ‘autocratic peace theory,’ in which 
authoritarian states ‘jointly and wisely avoided war.’64 Writing at the time of the drafting of 
the Charter, long-time ASEAN-watcher Rizal Sukma argued: 
[I]mposing democracy on a member state and intrusively spreading it throughout the 
region would trigger interstate tensions harmful to security. Therefore, democracy as 
envisaged by the ASC and the Charter is not meant to be the only instrument for 
ensuring or strengthening regional security. Nor is ASEAN being mandated to 
inculcate democracy directly inside member states. Forcing democracy on to the 
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region is something the Association has not done, cannot do, and should not try to 
do.
65
 
 
2.3.2 Democracy and Economic and Social Rights 
The second argument for the link between democracy and human rights is that there is a 
connection between democracy and economic development, which leads to the greater 
enjoyment of human rights.
66
 There are two strands to this argument. The first relates to the 
modes of internal governance that characterise democracies, which (it is argued) lead to 
political accountability regarding distribution of economic goods, and reduce the chance of 
certain groups being excluded from basic economic necessities. In 1998, Amartya Sen 
became a Nobel laureate for a contribution to the economic sciences, which drew attention to 
a connection between (liberal) democracy and the just distribution of essential goods.
67
 The 
second strand develops Kant’s theory of liberal economic interdependence. Proponents of this 
theory argue that fellow democracies trade more with one another and, depending on one 
another for trade, preserve peaceful relationships in order to mutually increase wealth. 
Increased wealth further consolidates democratic reform. In this section, I consider both of 
these arguments in relation to Southeast Asia. 
(a) Liberal democracies and economic development 
Amartya Sen argues that substantial famines do not occur in independent and democratic 
countries that possess a relatively free press, because democratic governments, which face 
elections and criticisms from opposition parties and independent newspapers, are forced to 
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undertake the efforts required to prevent famines.
68
 So it is the case that ‘even the poorest 
democratic countries that have faced terrible droughts or floods or other natural disasters 
(such as India in 1973, or Zimbabwe and Botswana in the early 1980s) have been able to feed 
their people without experiencing a famine’69 and that ‘while India continued to have famines 
under British rule right up to independence ... they disappeared suddenly with the 
establishment of a multiparty democracy and a free press.’70 
Southeast Asia’s modern experience of famine occurred in Cambodia in 1979. The 
Cambodian famine, which resulted in between 1.5-2 million deaths, was the result of civil 
war that lasted from 1970–1975, followed by the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to late 
1978, and then Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979. From this, Southeast Asia drew 
stark lessons about the connection between civil conflict, state insecurity, and starvation. But 
Southeast Asian leaders did not necessarily draw from the Cambodian experience the lesson 
that democracy improved state security, or consequently, economic security. Chew observes 
that the Southeast Asian experience was that order and stability were preconditions for 
economic growth, and growth was the necessary foundation of any political order that 
claimed to advance human dignity.
71
  
Southeast Asia experienced rapid economic development in the post-war period, but 
democratisation – where it occurred – played an insignificant role in generating development, 
or in distributing the benefits of development amongst the region’s peoples. The oldest 
democracy in the region, the Philippines, has been far less successful than the electorally 
authoritarian states of Malaysia and Singapore in providing access to adequate housing, 
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medical care, and economic security.
72
 Indeed, post-Marcos Philippines stands for many 
within the region as an example of the pitfalls of Western-style democratisation. With 
arguably the most democratic constitution in Southeast Asia and one of the region’s first 
independent National Human Rights Institution, the Philippines has one of the worst 
economic records in ASEAN, and is marked by the poverty, insecurity and human rights 
abuses that result from economic instability.
73
 In 1996, Singapore’s then Prime Minister, Lee 
Kuan Yew, asserted that ‘the liberal democracy practiced in the Philippines was an obstacle 
to economic progress, which required collective discipline and firm central control.’74 More 
recently, former ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino has written: 
In ASEAN, for example, some members of the Filipino elite may denigrate the 
restrictions on the rights of assembly and free speech imposed on the people of 
Singapore. On the other hand, many Singaporeans are appalled by the inability of the 
Philippines political system to deliver a better standard of life and social justice for 
the Filipino people. Under the stringent rule of the Vietnamese Communist party, the 
average Vietnamese is increasingly regarded – whether accurately remains to be sees 
– as having better prospects of a higher standard of living than the average Filipino or 
the average Indonesian, who, unlike the Vietnamese, enjoys the right to demonstrate 
on the streets and write freely in the newspapers.
75
 
 
Severino’s comments connect with the ‘Asian values’ debate, discussed in the 
following chapter (3.2.2) and in Chapter 5.
76
 In short, during the 1980s and 1990s, leaders 
such as Indonesia’s President Suharto made the claim that, until prosperity was achieved, 
democracy remained an unaffordable luxury. He (and others)
77
 argued that high national 
                                                 
72
 Juliet Johnson, ‘In Pursuit of a Prosperous International System’, in Peter Schraeder (ed), Exporting 
Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality (2002) Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 31–54.  
73
 Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Dangers of Decadence’ (1993) 72(4) Foreign Affairs 9; Kishore Mahbubani, ‘An Asian 
Perspective on Human Rights and Freedom of the Press’ Paper delivered at the conference ‘Asian and American 
Perspectives on Capitalism and Democracy’ jointly organized by the Asia Society of New York and Singapore's 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, International Foundation, and Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore 
(January 1993). 
74
 Michael Vatikiotis, Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the Banyan Tree (1996) London, 
Routledge, 103. 
75
 Severino, above n 20, 151. See also: Mark Thompson, ‘Pacific Asia after “Asian values”: Authoritarianism, 
Democracy, and “Good governance”’ (2004) 25(6) Third World Quarterly 1079.  
76
 See Section 2.5.2 infra. 
77
 Such as Malaysia’s former President Mahathir, and Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. 
Chapter 2: Democracy and Human Rights 
 
45 
 
economic growth rates required hard work and frugality, which in rapidly developing nations, 
could only be provided by stable and disciplined regimes. Suharto's ‘New Order’ government 
emphasised deliberation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat) as forms of politics, instead 
of the oppositional politics of Western liberal democracies. 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis, which devastated the ‘tiger’ economies of the East 
(and toppled the Suharto regime),
78
 impressed upon the region that their economies were 
inter-related and that crises would need to be addressed in concerted fashion. But the 
financial crisis did little to unseat understandings that the strong state was a driver of 
economic progress. Within Southeast Asia, many did not blame ‘Asian values’ (of 
authoritarian-style government) for the Asian financial crisis.
79
 Writing seven years after the 
crisis, Thomson notes that authoritarian states such as Singapore and Malaysia have emerged 
stronger after the crisis, while the region's new democracies, such as Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand have been politically unstable and slower to recover economically.
80
 
Indeed, leaders in Malaysia and Singapore have attributed to democracy the failure of 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines to take timely steps to address the financial crisis. In 
addition, the onerous loan conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
generated deep resentment amongst many Southeast Asians: many perceived it to be the IMF, 
rather than the crisis, that was the cause of the suffering of Southeast Asians.
81
 
In Malaysia, elections following the financial crisis were held under the banner of 
reformasi. The opposition focused predominantly on issues of ‘governance’ in the sense of 
corruption, cronyism, and nepotism, rather than on human rights and social justice.
82
 In 
Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew insisted that ‘Asian values’ did not necessarily 
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translate into a general lack of transparency: ‘Singapore, despite having both Asian values 
and transparency, could not avoid being hurt by the crisis because of the regional contagion 
effect of the slump in the neighbouring countries.’83 Acharya points out that in the wake of 
the 1997 financial crisis, demonstrators in Indonesia were not demanding ‘greater 
democracy’, but an end to the corruption they saw as intrinsic to Suharto’s rule. From this 
perspective, the solution to Asia’s economic problems did not lie in greater democracy, but in 
‘sound banking laws, rigorous supervision in the financial sector, and proper corporate 
governance.’84  
Even Amartya Sen admits that ‘If all the comparative studies are viewed together, the 
hypothesis that there is no clear relation between economic growth and democracy in either 
direction remains extremely plausible.’85 The argument that democracy is necessary for 
economic development has not accorded with Southeast Asia’s historical experience.86 
Indeed, the contrary proposition is the one that seems to have empirical substance: that 
authoritarianism supports economic development, while democracy hinders it. Even after the 
Asian Financial Crisis, there was (on the part of most ASEAN states) a turn towards a limited 
doctrine of ‘good governance’, rather than a turn toward liberal democracy. Good 
governance, constituted by principles of accountability and transparency, long-term 
orientation by government in deciding policy options, and social justice (meaning equality of 
work opportunity irrespective of race or religion), does not depend on democratic principles 
of inclusiveness and participation in politics; indeed, aspects of good governance run counter 
to such principles. Many ASEAN states would concur with the view put forward by Randall 
Peerenboom. ‘What is clear,’ writes Randall Peerenboom, ‘is that democracy is no panacea. 
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It will not necessarily lead to economic growth or even to a significant improvement in the 
protection of human rights in many cases.’87 
(b) The Liberal Economic Peace 
The Kantian notion of a liberal peace includes the idea that economic interdependence 
between democratic nations leads to a preference (among citizens) against wars with fellow 
democracies, by creating transnational ties that encourage accommodation rather than 
conflict. This idea has become a central tenet of liberal thinking: ‘the security and economic 
growth of one nation is linked to the security and economic growth of others. When 
democratic ideas advance and free markets flourish, so do we. When democracy retreats and 
access to markets is closed, our nation suffers.’88 
The first article of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration appears to reference this idea, when 
it proclaims the purpose of the Association to be: ‘To accelerate the economic growth, social 
progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of 
equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful 
community of South-East Asian Nations.’89 The 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord also 
provides that: ‘The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential 
contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate 
threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN 
resilience.’90 The ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action (1999–2004) and 
succeeding Plans of Action, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), and the Roadmap for 
the Integration of ASEAN (RIA), as well as ASEAN’s many other statements and 
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declarations, all pronounce an imperative for ASEAN to deepen and broaden economic 
integration in order to promote regional peace and stability, security, development and 
prosperity.
91
 For example, part of the ‘ASEAN Vision 2020’ is the creation of an ‘ASEAN 
Economic Community’ in which there is a ‘free flow of goods, services, investment and a 
freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-
economic disparities.’92 The ASEAN Economic Community envisions a single market and 
production base, created through initiatives such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). 
Central to the idea of an ‘ASEAN Economic Community’ is addressing the ‘development 
divide’ between ASEAN’s original members and Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet 
Nam. 
But respect for economic sovereignty and the lack of regional institutions to 
implement and enforce compliance with AFTA, AFAS and AIA have proven to be major 
impediments to achieving an integrated market in Southeast Asia. It remains the case that 
ASEAN states remain in competition with one another for access to outside markets and that 
Southeast Asia lacks a strong economy within the region to act as a foundation for regional 
trade (like the French–German axis in the European Union, and the United States in North 
America). Because of this, the region’s medium to small sized nations continue to value trade 
and investment links with the outside world (recently with China, Japan and South Korea), 
more than intra-regional economic integration.
93
 Thus, ASEAN’s economic interdependence 
has not significantly grown, despite the Association’s many declarations of growing common 
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interests.
94
 In 1967, the year of ASEAN’s birth, 23 per cent of ASEAN exports were directed 
to other ASEAN countries.
95
 By 1974, this figure had dropped to 12 per cent. In 2010, 
ASEAN Chair Surin Pitsuwan noted that trading amongst ASEAN member states still 
accounted for only 25 per cent of their total trade.
96
 The most significant of ASEAN’s outside 
trading partners is China. The intra-regional cooperation that does exist is connected to 
Singapore, which is the richest non-oil producing country in the world that is not a 
democracy. But it has a ‘small economy, limited market and weak democratic credentials.’97  
Acharya also points to informal forms of regional economic cooperation that have 
arisen, the ‘natural economic territories’ (NETS) of growth, between geographically linked 
ASEAN members with economic complementarities: the Singapore-Johor-Riau triangle; the 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand triangle; and the Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines East 
ASEAN Growth Area. Acharya notes the claims of advocates of regional economic 
interdependence; that NETS provide a natural incentive for states to avoid use of force to 
resolve border disputes because of the effect this would have on their economy. But he argues 
that the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis demonstrated the limits of such theories of Pacific 
interdependency in Southeast Asia, by showing how economic disparities among states 
reduce the potential political gains of interdependence, and how interdependence can even 
‘serve as a transmission belt for spreading security problems through the region.’98 
Kant’s idea of a liberal economic peace is contingent upon trading nations being 
‘republics’, representative of the people whose interests and rights are protected. He believed 
that republican forms of government could guarantee that economic interactions proceeded 
based on voluntary exchange, and that the agents of commerce would be accorded physical 
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and legal protection by their foreign host republican governments. On Kant’s view, then, the 
liberal economic peace presupposes respect for human rights and democratic political 
systems within trading nations, which ultimately reinforces peace through friendly 
engagement. As we have seen, ASEAN has never made democracy a criterion for 
membership in the regional Association, and its inter-regional trading links are limited by the 
size of the region’s economies. Therefore, the legitimacy of a human rights regime in 
Southeast Asia cannot plausibly be tied to the notion of regional economic integration and a 
liberal peace.  
 
2.4. Democracy as a Human Right? 
 
In the previous two sections, I pointed to the weakness of consequentialist arguments about 
the merits of democracy vis-à-vis human rights in Southeast Asia (that it preserves peace; that 
it leads to prosperity). There exists a third case for the maintaining a human rights/democracy 
nexus – that democracy is a good in and of itself, of intrinsic value, and thus a human right 
that should be protected and promoted. There are two senses in which democracy might be 
viewed as a human right. The first invokes the opening words of the United Nations Charter, 
‘We the Peoples,’ to suggest an argument that democracy is a grundnorm of international law 
and an overarching normative human rights principle that guides the international 
community’s expectations about the way states should work. The argument here is that 
democracy in its broadest sense is ‘self-determination’ and is a right of all peoples. The 
second sense in which democracy is said to be a human right is via an extension of the very 
premise of human rights—that individuals are free and equal agents in society—to the 
political form that reflects this freedom and equality: universal suffrage and elected 
government under conditions of fair political contestation. I consider these arguments in turn.  
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2.4.1  Self-Determination and Democracy 
In 1992, Thomas Franck argued that ‘both textually and in practice, the international 
community is moving toward a clearly designated democratic entitlement.’99 Franck locates 
the origins of the entitlement in the right of self-determination, which is ‘the right of a people 
organized in an established territory to determine its collective political destiny in a 
democratic fashion.’100 Self-determination is one of the principles of the 1945 Charter of the 
United Nations,
101
 and was incorporated into the identical Articles 1 of the ICCPR
102
 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
103
 
Franck (and others)
104
 argue that self-determination implies democracy, because it 
requires that the will of the people dictate the political form of the nation. The connection 
between self-determination and democracy is supported by the 1970 Friendly Relations 
Declaration of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, which provides that the right to 
self-determination presupposes ‘a government representing the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.’105 Further support for a nexus 
between self-determination and democracy can be found in the Human Rights Commission’s 
1999 Resolution: ‘Promotion of the right to democracy,’106 which links the right of self-
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determination, ‘by virtue of which they [the people] freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ and democracy, which ‘is 
based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic, 
social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives.’107 In 
circumstances where elections have been postponed, the Human Rights Committee has found 
that a people ‘have been unable to exercise their right to self-determination’ under Article 1 
of the Covenants as well as breach of Article 25 rights of political participation.
108
  
Some argue that self-determination is coming to denote, very broadly, a principle of 
respect for ‘the will of the people,’109 a further understanding that it is the will of the people 
that creates sovereignty
110
 and finally, recognition that leaders who do not respect their own 
people’s right to self-determination cannot necessarily rely on the international community to 
abide by a principle of non-intervention.
111
 In the case of Sierra Leone, the Security Council’s 
central demand in Resolution 1132 (1997) was that ‘the military junta take immediate steps to 
relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the democratically 
elected Government and a return to constitutional order.’112 In the case of Haiti (1994), the 
Security Council expressly stated that ‘the goal of the international community remains the 
restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected 
President.’113 In Libya (2011), the international community’s military support for opponents 
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of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime was extended on the basis that Gaddafi’s rule had ‘lost 
legitimacy’ and that ‘aspirations of the Libyan people for freedom, democracy, and dignity 
must be met.’114  
As I discuss in Chapter 5, ASEAN states have a complicated relationship with the 
principle of self-determination. I suggest in Chapter 5 that concerns about the secessionist 
ambitions of minorities might explain why ASEAN states did not include a right of self-
determination in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Yet as I also point out, the 
traditional understanding of self-determination supports the idea of the political self-
determination of states, which is a principle strongly endorsed by ASEAN states. The case of 
East Timor illustrates some of the incongruities of ASEAN attitudes to self-determination. In 
1975, Indonesia acquired East Timor by military conquest. At the time, the Security Council 
passed a resolution calling for Indonesia’s immediate withdrawal from East Timor and ‘for 
all states to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its 
people to self-determination.’115 After twenty-five years of East Timorese agitation for 
independence, a United Nations-administered referendum was conducted, which resulted in 
an overwhelming vote in favour of East Timor’s independence from Indonesia.116 In response 
to the referendum, pro-Indonesian militias and parts of the Indonesian military conducted a 
campaign of violence within East Timor.
117
 The Security Council passed Resolution 1264 
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under Chapter VII, authorising an international intervention ‘to restore peace and security in 
East Timor, to protect and support The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in 
carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance 
operations.’118 The Resolution was supported by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, which all provided military support for The International Force for East Timor 
(INTERFET) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET).
119
 Roland Rich argues that the Security Council’s action was carried out ‘on 
human rights and democracy grounds … The right to self-determination of the people of East 
Timor was being denied following their overwhelming vote for independence.’120 Resolution 
1272 (1999), which established the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, mandated 
‘the development of local democratic institutions.’ 
Self-determination embodies a notion that the people are politically sovereign. The 
region’s experience of colonialism—nine of the ten Southeast Asian nations were former 
colonies—has led to widespread support for the principle that within a territorially defined 
area, a people must be free from external interference and able to govern themselves.
121
 The 
principle of self-determination does not, however, explicate the content of the form of 
political organisation that the people choose. For example, a people could ‘freely determine’ 
to place themselves under non-democratic rule. In the case of East Timor, United Nations 
staff expressed anxiety after the referendum about some of the authoritarian tendencies of the 
overwhelmingly popular Fretelin party that dominated East Timor’s first post-independence 
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elections. Simon Chesterman quotes one UNTAET staff member: ‘I have grave doubts that 
anything democratic will come out of this. Look at Cambodia: everyone regards it as a 
success but it was a disaster—look who we put in to power!’122 
The conceptual problems of equating self-determination and democracy have led the 
Human Rights Committee to state that rights of political participation are ‘related to, but 
distinct from, the right of peoples to self-determination.’123 The Committee’s view is that the 
right of self-determination is a right of peoples; the right of political participation is an 
individual right, which can give rise to claims under the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.  
I turn now to the second of the two understandings of democracy: as an individual 
human right. 
 
2.4.2  Democracy as a Freestanding Human Right? 
That democracy is in itself a human right is an idea that has interested political philosophers 
as well as human rights lawyers (see the discussion in Chapter 5). It is premised on the 
principle described in the first Article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: human 
beings are born ‘free and equal.’ The argument is that once one accepts the idea of the 
freedom and equality of the individual, then it is, in the words of Joshua Cohen, ‘natural to 
conclude that there ought to be widespread suffrage and elected government under conditions 
of political contestation, with protections of the relevant liberties (of participation, expression 
and association).’124 This is because the extension of individual equality and freedom to 
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political arrangements ‘expresses the respect owed to persons as equals, with political 
capacity.’125 A political democracy is a natural concomitant to the idea of equality and equal 
respect, because its design reflects the equality principle in its methods for collective decision 
making by endorsing (1) equal rights of participation, including rights of voting, association 
and office-holding, and rights of political expression; (2) equally weighted votes; (3) equal 
opportunities for effective political influence.
126
  
Dahl calls the extension of the idea of equality to participatory political arrangements 
‘the logic of equality.’127 It is a logic that has been followed in international human rights 
instruments that set out the basis for rights of political participation. Article 21 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that:  
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives;  
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country; 
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures.
128
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Article 25 of the ICCPR, which has been ratified by six of the ten ASEAN states,
129
 
provides that every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:  
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives;  
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the 
free expression of the will of the electors;  
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.130  
 
In his discussion of Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR, written in 
1988, Henry Steiner argued that:  
for a right regarded as foundational, political participation suffers from serious 
infirmities. The norms defining it are either vague or, where explicit, bear sharply 
disputed meanings. Within the framework of human rights law, the right expresses 
less a vital concept meant to universalize certain practices, than a bundle of concepts, 
sometimes complementary but sometimes antagonistic.
131
  
 
Steiner points particularly to: discordant understandings about whether Article 25 
requires political pluralism or can be satisfied in a one-party state; whether, if the absence of 
opposition political parties are inimical to ‘genuine periodic elections’, then what obligations 
rest on states to foster their development and freedom to operate; what ‘direct’ participation 
in the conduct of public affairs actually means, and what measures are required to overcome 
the social and economic barriers that discriminate against some groups of citizens from 
participating in public affairs.
132
  
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 sparked a new enthusiasm on the part of the 
General Assembly, the Human Rights Committee and the Human Rights Commission
133
 to 
develop the meaning of Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR. In 1991, the 
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General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled ‘Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle 
of periodic and genuine elections,’ which reaffirmed and detailed the electoral entitlement 
outlined in the UDHR. The Resolution stressed: 
the member nations’ conviction that periodic and genuine elections are a necessary 
and indispensable element of sustained efforts to protect the rights and interests of the 
governed and that, as a matter of practical experience, the right of everyone to take 
part in the government of his or her country is a crucial factor in the effective 
enjoyment by all of a wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
embracing political, economic, social and cultural rights.
 134
  
 
The resolution also declared:  
 
that determining the will of the people requires an electoral process that provides an 
equal opportunity for all citizens to become candidates and put forward their political 
views, individually and in co-operation with others, as provided in national 
constitutions and laws.
135
  
 
At its next session, the Assembly, with only four dissents, passed Resolution 46/137 
of 17 December 1991, which declared that ‘periodic and genuine elections’ are a ‘necessary 
and indispensable element’ and a ‘crucial factor in the effective enjoyment … of a wide range 
of other human rights.’136  
In 1996, the United Nations Human Rights Committee adopted General Comment 25, 
which explicates the rights set out in Article 25 of the ICCPR. According to this general 
comment, the conduct of public affairs is a broad concept, which relates to the exercise of 
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political power, in particular the exercise of legislative, executive and administrative powers. 
It covers all aspects of public administration, and the formulation and implementation of 
policy at the international, national, regional and local levels. The Comment provides that 
allocation of powers and the means by which individual citizens exercise the right to 
participate in the conduct of public affairs should be established by the Constitution and other 
laws. The General Comment maintains that democracy requires freedom of expression, 
assembly, and association (paragraph 12); enshrines non-discrimination with respect to the 
citizen's right to vote (paragraph 3); rejects any condition of eligibility to vote or stand for 
office based on political affiliation (paragraph 15); calls for voters to be free to support or 
oppose the government without undue influence or coercion of any kind (paragraph 19); and 
requires states reporting under the Covenant to explain how the different political views in 
the community are represented in elected bodies (paragraph 22).
137
 
In 1999, the Human Rights Commission adopted a resolution, sponsored by the 
United States, titled ‘A Right to Democracy’, which stressed the connection between 
democracy and human rights, maintaining that ‘democracy fosters the full realisation of all 
human rights, and vice versa.’ The resolution, which was adopted by 51 votes in favour to 
none against (with two abstentions: China and Cuba), lists a number of specific aspects of the 
‘right of democratic governance.’138 Significant debate accompanied the title of the 
resolution. Cuba, for example, proposed that the words ‘right to democracy’ be removed—
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Cuba’s resolution on the subject was only narrowly rejected.139 China criticised the title as 
‘premature and not balanced,’ and argued that disparate historical backgrounds made 
different forms of democracy possible.
140
 In the end, the words ‘right to democracy’ appear 
only in the title, not in the text. The following year, the Human Rights Commission again 
addressed the issue of democracy in its Resolution 2000/47, ‘Promoting and Consolidating 
Democracy.’ Resolution 2000/47 expanded on the 1999 document,141 adding a new notion: 
the right to vote in ‘a free and fair process ... open to multiple parties.’142 Bhutan, China, 
Congo, Cuba, Pakistan, Qatar, Rwanda and Sudan abstained on the final vote. Cuba, China 
and Pakistan were particularly vocal critics of the Resolution, arguing that ‘it imposed a 
single model of democracy upon member states.’ Nonetheless, the General Assembly 
reviewed and approved this document with only minor modifications.
143
 We can see, in these 
international developments, the progressive move towards an international understanding of 
democracy as popular sovereignty. At its core, this means that the coercive power by the state 
must only be exercised with the consent of citizens. This is most clearly evidenced by 
periodic elections conducted in circumstances where civil and political liberties are protected. 
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2.5. Democracy in Southeast Asia 
 
The model of electoral democracy that has been progressively articulated by the Human 
Rights Committee does not predominate in the Southeast Asian region. For some states, such 
as Vietnam and Laos, such a model is not even an aspiration. It is arguable that Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand aspire to political systems and processes that meet international 
norms of democracy. Indeed, in the eyes of many observers, Indonesia has already 
successfully established a modern liberal democracy.
144
 Yet even those countries that aspire 
to become liberal democracies are constrained by serious impediments to inclusiveness and 
participation, such as high levels of poverty, which militate against political participation, 
particularly in rural areas, the continuing influence of the military and business elites in 
shaping government policy, and corruption and absence of the rule of law, which undermines 
responsible government.  
The unravelling of democracy in Thailand in 2006 and 2014 is a reminder of the 
fragility of democratic gains. In 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra was elected to power under 
Thailand’s 1997 ‘People’s Constitution’ and then re-elected in 2005, introducing a raft of 
policy reforms which challenged, amongst other things, the continuing influence and power 
of three of Thailand’s key (unelected) institutions: the military, the king, and the senior 
bureaucracy.
145
 In 2006, Shinawatra was unseated by a military coup. Thaksin’s sister 
Yingluck Shinawatra became Prime Minister following general elections held in 2011. In 
2014, the Constitutional Court deposed Yingluck on grounds of corruption and two weeks 
later there was (another) military coup d’état. In the wake of the chaos, street protests and 
deaths that followed the two coups, calls came for a return to ‘Thai-style democracy’, based 
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on moral and king-centred politics,
146
 a form of politics different to the Western-style, 
electoral-based democracy, which was perceived (by many) to have failed Thailand.     
In Malaysia and Singapore, competitive multi-party politics is constrained by press 
censorship and by laws that restrict the rights of opposition political parties to associate, 
assemble, and communicate. The use of these laws—in certain cases, to arrest and charge 
opposition leaders—has entrenched single-party dominance in both states since independence 
from Britain in 1957. Ruling party tactics to consolidate power include the intimidation of 
voters, such as the July 2011 arrest of protestors in Malaysia calling for electoral reform prior 
to Malaysian elections.
 147
 Other pervasive strategies for the consolidation of power include 
the exclusion from business enterprises and civil service opportunities of those known not to 
support the ruling party and the perpetuation of a climate of fear through the use of 
informants. Against this backdrop, election results that would normally be seen as a 
resounding victory for the party in power—such as the 52 per cent of the popular vote 
recorded for the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition in Malaysia’s 2008 elections—are instead 
seen as a victory for the opposition.
148
 Malaysia’s 2008 election results were hailed by 
opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim as ‘a defining moment, unprecedented in our nation’s 
history,’ which for the first time left the ruling party without its two-thirds majority; ‘the 
psychological threshold of its political dominance.’149 Similarly, Singapore’s elections in 
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2011 saw the ruling People’s Action Party gain 60 per cent of votes, which in other 
democracies would be considered a convincing win. Yet this result was the People’s Action 
Party (PAP)’s worst poll result in 40 years, throwing the ruling party into ‘a turmoil of 
disappointment and shock.’150 Larry Diamond characterises Singapore and Malaysia as 
‘semi-authoritarian’ states.151  
Of the other ASEAN states, Brunei is an absolute monarchy and does not hold 
elections.
152
 In Cambodia, Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) has ruled since 1993. 
From the time of the 1998 elections, the CPP has used ‘coercion, patronage, media control 
and other means to deny formally legal opposition parties any real chance of competing for 
power.’153 Vietnam and Laos have since 1975 held elections every five years for their 
respective National Assemblies. In both countries, political parties other than the Communist 
Party are not permitted to stand for election, although independent candidates and self-
nominees (either belonging to the party or not) have been permitted to stand. In both 
countries, the communist party maintains a super-majority in the National Assembly and its 
members hold all central decision-making roles. The press is government controlled and 
rights of assembly and association are limited.
154
  
But it is Myanmar that diverges most from the idea of participatory and inclusive 
electoral democracy. In 1990, the results of what were widely recognised as fair elections 
were ignored by the Myanmar’s generals, who began a period of rule by decree and extreme 
                                                 
150
 Catherine Lim, ‘Political Commentary—GE 2011’s Real Winners—The People (But Who are We?)’ (26 
May 2011) available at: <http://catherinelim.sg/2011/05/26/ge-2011%E2%80%99s-real-winners-the-people-but-
who-are-we/> [accessed 13 September 2011]. 
151
 Larry Diamond, ‘Thinking About Hybrid Regimes’ (2002) 13(2) Journal of Democracy 21. 
152
 In 1991, an opposition party was formed, but faded from prominence soon afterwards and was disbanded.  
153
 Duncan McCargo, 'Cambodia: Getting Away with Authoritarianism?' (2005) 16(4) Journal of Democracy 98 
106.  
154
 Ronald St John, Revolution, Reform and Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 
(2005) Routledge.  
Chapter 2: Democracy and Human Rights 
 
64 
 
political repression. On 30 August 2003, Myanmar embarked on its ‘roadmap to democracy.’ 
Step 5 of the Roadmap was the holding of elections under the new 2008 Constitution, which 
reserves a quarter of the seats in the 440 seat Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Assembly) for non-
elected military representatives.
155
 On 7 November 2010, these elections were held. Those 
opposition parties and individuals which were permitted to stand against the military-backed 
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and National Unity Party faced high 
registration fees, restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly (which included an election-
specific injunction against criticism of the Constitution and the polling process) and ‘a 
pervasive environment of fear and intimidation.’156 Amid widespread reports of ‘ballot-
stuffing, voter intimidation, irregular advance voting, obstruction of opposition supporters, 
and other fraud’157 and the boycott of the election by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League 
for Democracy (NLD), the USDP won 80 per cent of the seats in which it stood. ASEAN, 
chaired at the time of the 2010 Myanmar elections by Vietnam, issued a statement 
recognising the 2010 elections as a ‘significant step’ in Myanmar’s ‘seven point road-map for 
democracy.’158  
Myanmar continues to present a conundrum for ASEAN. Most careful observers now 
agree that little would be gained if ASEAN adopted a condemnatory stance toward 
Myanmar.
159
 But tolerating Myanmar’s policies of repression, intimidation, electoral 
irregularities and voter control through violence makes ASEAN’s claim to endorse a regional 
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principle of democracy, highly implausible.
160
 On those few occasions where the regional 
association’s auspices have been used to attempt to influence political action within 
Myanmar, the Association has subsequently retreated to its former position of non-
interference. In September 2007, for example, Singapore’s Foreign Minister and then 
ASEAN Chair, George Yeo, publicly expressed the Association’s ‘revulsion’ at the 
government of Myanmar’s use of violence to suppress the peaceful ‘saffron revolution’ led 
by Myanmar’s monks. Yeo urged Myanmar to ‘work towards a peaceful transition to 
democracy’161 and to ‘cooperate fully and work with’ the UN Secretary-General’s special 
envoy for Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari. But at the East Asian Summit held in Singapore a 
mere two months later, at Myanmar’s request ASEAN cancelled its invitation to Ibrahim 
Gambari to brief the heads of state gathered there on the situation in Myanmar.
162 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
It might be argued that the divergent practices of governance, and the democratic deficits 
which exist within all ASEAN states, sufficiently explain the region’s reluctance to endorse 
the substantive, clearly articulated principles of democracy that have been described in 
section 2.4 of this Chapter. To different extents, all ASEAN states—with the possible 
exception of Indonesia—possess an attitude described by Aung Bwa, Myanmar’s 
representative to the High Level Task Force (HLTF) charged with drafting the ASEAN 
Charter, ‘Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones!’163 But beyond this 
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sentiment, there lies deep currents of resistance to the idea of liberal democracy as promoted 
by the West and by the United Nations. Thus, while the post-World War Two international 
legal order, by upholding the right of self-determination of former colonial peoples, has been 
effective at promoting democracy in Southeast Asia in its broad sense—as the right of a 
people to govern themselves—attempts at the international level to specify the precise form 
of governance have been unsuccessful. Part 1 of Chapter 3 explains the reasons why this is 
the case. Part 2 explains the effects in terms of the legitimacy of Southeast Asia’s regional 
institution for the promotion of human rights.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter draws together the reasons why the model of electoral democracy that has been 
progressively articulated by the Human Rights Committee does not predominate in Southeast 
Asia, focusing particularly on (a) Southeast Asia’s colonial history; (b) the idea that 
Southeast Asia operates in conditions of ‘situational uniqueness’ that debilitates democracy 
(otherwise known as ‘the Asian Values’ debate); and (c) the persistence of communist 
ideology in the regimes of Laos and Vietnam. I conclude this chapter by considering the 
argument that human rights and democracy should be separated, and in this context test the 
ideas of political philosophers such as Rawls and Cohen, who have argued that non-liberal 
states are able to protect human rights, provided they are ‘decent’. I raise the possibility that 
if this is the case, then a regional institution designed to protect human rights, established by 
decent, non-liberal states, might yet possess legitimacy. I explain why, in the case of 
Southeast Asia, the arguments of Rawls and Cohen do not apply. These reasons can be traced 
to the absence within the region of a preponderance of states that possess consultative 
schemes for political decision-making, schemes ‘that permit the expression a range of 
opinions (including political dissent) and ensure representation of the fundamental interests 
of all.’1  
I then consider the question of why, given all this, the word ‘democracy’ was included 
in the ASEAN Charter and in the TOR of AICHR, and I grapple with the question of why 
ASEAN states agreed to include references to ‘democracy and human rights’ in these 
instruments, given the contested understandings of democracy within the region. 
                                                 
1
 Joshua Cohen, 'Is There a Human Right to Democracy?' (2006) in Christine Syprowich (ed), Essays in Honour 
of G.A. Cohen (2006) Oxford, Oxford University Press, 228. 
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Finally, I return to the concept of legitimacy, and consider the implications of the 
foregoing discussion about ‘human rights and democracy’ for the legitimacy of the emerging 
regional human rights regime in Southeast Asia. Following the argument in Chapter 1 that 
both normative and subjective conceptions of legitimacy are important in understanding the 
potential influence of international human rights institutions, I conclude that AICHR lacks 
what is said to be one of the key normative elements of legitimacy, which is the ongoing 
consent of democratic states.
2
 I discuss the implications of this for prospects of states 
complying with the reports and recommendations of AICHR. I also consider whether or not 
the term ‘democracy’ within the ASEAN Charter and the TOR of AICHR lacks 
‘determinacy’, in Thomas Franck’s sense of the word. Franck argues that if a term such as 
‘democracy’ does not convey a clear message, and is not ‘transparent in the sense that one 
can see through the language to the meaning,’3 then the prospect of the norm being 
successfully deployed to regulate the conduct of those to whom it is directed (in Thomas 
Franck’s language, exert a ‘compliance pull’ on state behaviour), is greatly diminished. 
Koskeniemmi views this kind of indeterminacy as inevitable.
4
 My argument in this chapter is 
that because of the symbiotic relationship between democracy and human rights, 
democracy’s indeterminacy has consequences for perceptions about the appropriateness of 
the institution’s mandate and powers to promote and protect human rights. 
 
  
                                                 
2
 At 2.7(a) I consider whether the consent of democratic states as a basis for legitimacy might not be essential 
provided an institution is independent, and establishes by its practices and decisions, a pattern of principled 
decision-making removed from the vicissitudes of politics.  
3
 Thomas Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System' (1988) 82(4) American Journal of International Law 
705. 
4
 Martii Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument Cambridge, UK, 
Cambridge University Press (2005) 591. 
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3.2 Explaining Southeast Asia’s Scepticism about Democracy  
 
This section considers the major themes in Southeast Asia’s opposition to the Western idea of 
democracy. Each theme has roots in the complex political and social history of the region, 
and each is worthy of a dissertation in itself. My aim is simply to trace some of the major 
patterns of resistance to liberal democracy that have emerged in Southeast Asia in the period 
since the end of the Second World War and decolonisation.  
The first theme has its origins in Southeast Asia’s colonial past. For many within 
Southeast Asia, liberal democracy remains associated with the West, and the West was 
responsible for the oppression and atrocities of colonialism.
5
 The charge of ‘hypocrisy’ is the 
one most frequently levelled against Western proponents of liberal democratic ideals by 
leaders within Southeast Asia.
6
 In Sienho Yee’s words, the effect of Asia’s colonial history 
‘is often unelaborated in writing but can hardly be overestimated.’7  
The second theme derives from what are thought to be significant cultural differences 
between the West and Asia, a debate that takes form in arguments about ‘Asian values’. In 
part, ‘Asian values’ has been projected as a rejoinder to the idea that individual liberty and 
autonomy, as conceived by the West, are ‘universal’ standards. Elsewhere, ‘Asian values’ 
have been linked to ideas about the overriding imperative of security for developing nations 
with unstable economies and social unrest.  
                                                 
5
 See Xue Hanqi, ‘Meaningful Dialogue Through a Common Discourse: Law and Values in a Multi-Polar 
World’ (2010) 1 Asian Journal of International Law 13. 
6
 Mahathir Mohamad complained that ‘it would seem that Asians have no right to define and practice their own 
set of values about human rights.’ Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Keynote Address, JUST International Conference, 
‘Rethinking Human Rights’, Kuala Lumpur (1994), 9. 
7
 Sienho Yee, ‘The Role of Law in the Formation of Regional Perspectives in Human Rights and Regional 
Systems for the Protection of Human Rights: the European and Asian Models as Illustrations’ (2004) 8 
Singapore Year Book of International Law 157. 
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The third theme is surprisingly one that has not emerged (in the literature), as an 
obstacle to developing a regional understanding about the meaning of democracy. This is the 
Marxist character of Vietnam and Laos. Both countries, despite embracing an economic 
perestroika since the mid-1990s, still formally uphold principles of communism.  
 
3.2.1 The Legacy of Colonialism 
Authoritarian leaders within Southeast Asia, attempting to deflect Western criticism of their 
non-democratic practices, have often referred to the past human rights violations committed 
by Southeast Asia’s former colonial oppressors.8 They have charged the West with hypocrisy 
in its exhortations that Southeast Asian nations adopt democratic principles of ‘liberty’ and 
‘equality’, because the powers now commending liberty and equality are the same powers 
which once conquered and ruled most of Southeast Asia.
9
 The charge of neo-imperialism 
meets many exogenous attempts at political reform. In 1953, Indonesia’s Vice-President 
Mohammad Hatta wrote that ‘the memory of the colonial status that bound them for centuries 
made them resist anything they consider an attempt to colonise them again, whether by 
economic or ideological domination.’10 In 2004, Myanmar’s Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, U Khin Maung Win, stated that: 
                                                 
8
 In Joanne Bauer and Daniel Bell, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (1999) Cambridge, UK, 
Cambridge University Press, Bauer and Bell quote Onuma Yasuaki, Professor of International Law at the 
University of Tokyo. Yasuaki writes (9) that: ‘For those who have experienced colonial rule and interventions 
under such beautiful slogans as ‘humanity and ‘civilization’, the term ‘human rights’ looks like nothing more 
than another beautiful slogan by which great powers rationalize their interventionist policies.’  
9
 Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, ‘Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability’ (1979) 
in Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab (eds), Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (1979) New 
York, Praeger Publishers, 2–4.  
10
 Mohammad Hatta, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’ (1953) 31(3) Foreign Affairs 451-452. ASEAN’s constituent 
document, the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, made a point of affirming that ‘all foreign bases are temporary and 
remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly 
or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly 
processes of their national development.’ See Association of Southeast Asian States, Bangkok Declaration, 
(1967) Preamble. 
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Myanmar has existed as an independent kingdom for thousands of years. It has always 
been proud of its culture, traditions and values. Therefore, colonisation by Great 
Britain was a great shock to the psyche of the Myanmar people. After the regaining of 
independence in 1948, the Myanmar people are deeply jealous of their independence 
and sovereignty and are determined that they will never be subjugated by an alien 
power. Sense of patriotism and nationalism still runs very deep in Myanmar. A case in 
point, Myanmar became the first nation that refused to join the Commonwealth 
following the regaining of independence due to nationalism that refused to accept the 
British sovereign as head of state.
11
 
 
The significance of colonialism extends beyond its strategic invocation by Southeast 
Asian leaders to quell domestic demand for Western-style reform. Many Southeast Asian 
nations fought wars of independence against their imperial rulers, which had enduring 
consequences for the new nations. The Marxist-Leninist ideology which penetrated much of 
Southeast Asia (successfully taking hold in Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia), was 
explicitly anti-colonialist, drawing on notions of revolutionary liberation as well as economic 
redistribution.
12
 The Communist Party of Vietnam, for example, continues to derive 
legitimacy from its thirty-year struggle against its French colonial rulers, and then from its 
struggle against the United States following the Second World War. Pham writes: ‘The 
Vietnam-American war was the mother’s milk, the school and the testing ground of 
Vietnamese communism. It provides historical justification for the indispensable leadership 
of the Communist Party, endowing it with the “mandate of heaven”.’13 
The practices of colonial powers provided fertile ground for Marxism. In the classic 
Philippine Society and Revolution, Amado Guerrero describes what happened to the 
Philippines under the colonial rule of the United States, ‘the Mighty and Humane North 
                                                 
11
 H.E. U Khin Maung Win, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Myanmar, ‘Myanmar 
Roadmap to Democracy: The Way Forward’ (2004) Paper presented at the Seminar on Understanding Myanmar 
Yangon, 27–28 January 2004, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies. 
12
 See Damien Kingsbury, Southeast Asia: A Political Profile (2001) Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
13
 T.H. Pham, ‘What Remains: Vietnam in My Heart’ (28 April 2005) Open Democracy available at: 
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/node/2464> [accessed 19 October 2005]. 
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American nation’ who had aided the Philippines in gaining independence from the Spanish in 
1898:  
The U.S. imperialist aggressors practised genocide of monstrous proportions. They 
committed various forms of atrocities such as the massacres of captured troops and 
innocent civilians; pillage on women, homes and property; and ruthless employment 
of torture, such as dismemberment, the water cure and the rope torture. Zoning and 
concentration camps were resorted to in order to put civilians and combatants at their 
mercy.
14
 
 
One aspect of the significance of such readings of history lies in their rhetorical power 
to shape opposition to the values and ideals of the former imperialists. This is, perhaps, a 
significance too easily overlooked by those outside the region. But the era of colonialism has 
had other, far-reaching consequences for the states of the region. In many cases, wars of 
liberation were fought in order to gain independence. These wars cemented the central role 
of the military in nation-building and generated extreme forms of nationalism. The role of the 
military in the politics of ASEAN states—in some cases, a role preserved in state 
constitutions
15—has deeply influenced the political evolution of these states. The Philippines, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Myanmar provide particularly strong examples of this, and of the 
deleterious effect of military dominance on democratic development.  
Colonial rule also exacerbated religious and ethnic divides, and leaders of some of 
Southeast Asia’s authoritarian states have continued to connect the region’s colonial legacy to 
problems of national unity and state-building. In the Philippines, for example, the 
geographically orientated north-south divide between the Muslim population (the Moros) and 
the Christians, was reinforced by a US imperial policy that implemented a practice of civilian 
justice for the Christians and military justice for the Muslims, and policies of unequal land 
                                                 
14
 Amado Guerrero, Philippine Society and Revolution (1970), originally published in Mimeograph by the 
Revolutionary School of Mao Tsetung Thought, available at:  
 <http://www.geocities.ws/kabataangmakabayan64/psr.pdf> [accessed 14 September 2011], 12. 
15
 Such as the 2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Chapter 7 ‘Defence Services’. 
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distribution that benefitted Christians. Colonial policies alienated and radicalised Muslim 
populations, who resisted post-colonial efforts directed toward assimilation.
16
 In Malaysia, 
the race riots of 1969 led to the strengthening of security laws such as the Internal Security 
Act, the Official Secrets Act and the Sedition Act, which had originally been introduced by 
the British in the wake of the 1948 ‘State of Emergency’. The history of Myanmar also 
illustrates the effects of colonial rule on ethnic relationships. The British divided ‘Burma 
proper’ from the frontier areas, (‘Scheduled areas’, populated by non-Bamar ethnic groups). 
This had ‘far-reaching implications for the subsequent creation of an independent Myanmar 
state.’17 Indigenous nationalities of Myanmar were denied the opportunity to develop a sense 
of ‘bonding and belonging, culminating in an “imagined community” that could forge a 
modern nation-state out of disparate ethnic “nations”.’18 In the 2010 Myanmar elections, 
voting in some ethnic border states was suspended by the military, on the grounds that ‘free 
and fair elections could not be guaranteed.’19 Myanmar’s Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, His Excellency U Khin Maung Win writes: 
Myanmar is a Union composed of more than one hundred different national races, 
each with its own culture and traditions. Politically, there cannot be lasting peace and 
stability in the country without national unity. Unfortunately, the divide and rule 
policy practiced by the British colonialists resulted in suspicion and discord among 
the national races. This subsequently led to armed insurgency that spread to various 
parts of the country for decades. The question of achieving national unity and 
bringing to an end the armed insurgency are vital issues for any government, past, 
present and future.
20
 
 
                                                 
16
 George notes that the attitudes of the north and south had been ‘poisoned by the fears and hatreds planted in 
their mind by colonial masters.’ TJS George, Revolt in Mindanao: the Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics 
(1980) Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 119. 
17
 Anek Laothamatas (ed), Democratisation in Southeast and East Asia (1997) Singapore, Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies. 
18
 Ibid; see also Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (1991) London, Verso. 
19
 Bernd Musch-Borowska, ‘Myanmar Officials Cancel Vote in Ethnic Minority Areas’ (2011) Deutsche Welle 
available at: <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6196668,00.html> [accessed 27 July 2011]. 
20
 Win, above n 11. 
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As Lawson writes, ‘the memory of the colonial period sustained a continuing 
resentment against “Europe”, partly manifest in the “Asian values debate” as well as in the 
broader phenomenon of “Asianism”.’21 Sienho Yee describes colonialism as ‘the 
overriding/most important reason’ why a human rights system like that in Europe will not be 
established in Asia, as the ‘staunch adherence to the principle of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of another State as a reaction to the experience of being under colonial 
control. This principle is ingrained in the Asian psyche and constitutes an essential part of it 
at the present anyway.’22  
From outside the region, the charge of neo-colonialism is often perceived as a 
strategic invocation by authoritarian rulers to impede democratic reform. But its effects are 
more complex. The shared experience of colonialism has translated into respect for the 
territorial integrity of state borders and for different political systems that exist within states, 
and into a deep suspicion of claims about the moral superiority of Western ethical traditions. 
Colonialism has also had real and enduring effects on the creation of national self-identities, 
and has disrupted autochthonous movements toward democracy. Prospects for achieving 
consensus about ideas of democracy at the regional level are consequently complicated.  
 
3.2.2 Asian Values  
Then there is the school of thought particularly current in ASEAN member nations, 
that says that political stability is something that ought to be protected even more than 
human rights. To this, we say that political stability by itself is meaningless if it is not 
utilized to widen the practice of democracy and to enhance the institutions of civil 
                                                 
21
 Stephanie Lawson, ‘Asia/Europe and Regional Governance’ (2011) in Nicholas Thomas (ed), Governance 
and Regionalism in Asia (2011) London, Routledge, 301 – 320, 310. 
22
 Yee, above n 7, 163. 
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society. If political stability is touted purely on the platform of economic prosperity, 
then autocrats and dictators can get away with murder.
23
 
Lecture by Anwar Ibrahim at the University of the Philippines-Diliman, Manila, 5 
August 2011. 
The idea put forward by some Asian leaders, that economic development is a 
necessary precursor to the realisation of civil and political rights, forms one thread in the 
broad school of thought that has become known as the ‘Asian Values’ debate. The apogee of 
the debate was the Bangkok Declaration, drafted by the leaders of forty Asian governments in 
preparation for the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. The Declaration 
emphasised the right to development,
24
 identified the main obstacles to the realisation of the 
right to development as lying at the international macroeconomic level, reflected in the 
widening gap between the North and the South,
25
 and affirmed that poverty is one of the 
major obstacles hindering the full enjoyment of human rights.
26
 The argument was made that 
‘for the vast number of developing countries, to respect and protect human rights is first and 
foremost the full realization of the right to subsistence and development,’27 and that it was 
permissible for governments to focus on fulfilling economic and social rights before 
addressing issues of civil and political rights. Many Asian leaders agreed with the Chinese 
representative to the Vienna Conference, who argued that ‘human rights is a product of 
                                                 
23
 Anwar Ibrahim, Ibrahim, Anwar, Lecture at the University of the Philippines, (5 August 2011) available at: 
<http://anwaribrahimblog.com/2011/08/06/jose-rizal-and-ninoy-aquino-and-their-impact-on-asean-leadership/> 
[accessed 13 September 2011]. 
24
 Article 17, Bangkok Declaration. The Ministers and representatives of Asian States met at Bangkok from 29 
March to 2 April 1993, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 46/116 of 17 December 1991 in the context of 
preparations for the World Conference on Human Rights, and Adopted the Declaration, ‘Final Declaration of 
the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, Report of the Regional Meeting for 
Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights A/Conf.1 57/ASRM/ 8-A/Conf.157/PC/59 (7 April 1993) 
(Bangkok Declaration). 
25
 Ibid, Article 18. 
26
 Ibid, Article 19. 
27
 Liu Huaqiu, ‘Proposals for human rights protection and promotion’, Vienna (1993), published in The Beijing 
Review (28 June – 4 July 1993), 9, quoted in Joseph Chan, ‘The Asian Challenge to Universal Human Rights’ 
(1995) in James Tang (ed), Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific (1995) London, 
Pinter, 25-53, 38. 
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historical development, closely associated with specific social, political and economic 
conditions’, and that ‘different historical development stages have different human rights 
requirements.’28 Indonesia’s Foreign Minister called for ‘greater recognition of the immense 
complexity of the issue of human rights due to the wide diversity in history, culture, values 
system, geography and phases of development among the nations of the world.’29  
The claim in the Bangkok Declaration which caused most consternation in the West—
that ‘while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a 
dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance 
of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds’30—seems less remarkable in historical perspective. After all, the Bangkok 
Declaration does not challenge the universality of human rights, and the idea of national 
specificity in the implementation of rights is well recognised by the West in doctrines such as 
the ‘margin of appreciation.’31 That the human rights articulated in the Universal Declaration 
and the two Convenants have a historical specificity—for example, that the right to ‘a fair 
trial’ presupposes the establishment of modern institutions—is undeniable. The Bangkok 
Declaration’s claim to specificity is not in fact far removed from the thinking of some liberal 
philosophers. Tasioulas, for example, holds that: 
Human rights enjoy a temporally-constrained form of universality, so that the 
question concerning which human rights exist can only be determined within some 
specified historical context. For us, today, human rights are those possessed in virtue 
of being human and inhabiting a social world that is subject to the constraints of 
modernity. This historical constraint permits very general facts about feasible 
institutional design in the modern world, e.g. forms of legal regulation, political 
                                                 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ali Alatas, ‘Indonesia against dictates on rights and wants better mechanism for rights’, speech by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia given at the Second World Conference on Human 
Rights, Vienna (1993). Quoted in Chan, ibid, 17. 
30
 Bangkok Declaration, above n 24. 
31
 E. Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’ (1988) 31 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Policy 843. 
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participation and economic organization, to play a role in determining which human 
rights we recognise.
32
 
 
What lent such venom to the debate between Asian leaders and ‘the West’ at the time 
of the Vienna World Conference was the charge by Asian governments of Western 
hypocrisy. The leaders of Asian states blamed ‘colonialism, foreign domination and 
poverty’33 for the economic conditions that made it difficult for them to realise full-blown 
civil and political rights, and they resented the West compounding past injustices by insisting 
that Asian states respect rights which the West had ignored during past ages of imperialism, 
exploitation and slavery. Examples of the West’s ‘double standards and politicization’ (in the 
language of the Bangkok Declaration
34
) in 1993 were readily at hand: the United States and 
NATO hesitating in coming to the aid of the Serbs in Yugoslavia, remaining silent over 
events in Algeria, and linking economic aid and trade privileges to worker’s rights in 
Malaysia and Indonesia in circumstances where it benefited United States industry demands 
for protectionism.
35
  
The West, for its part, read the claim that it was poverty that ‘makes a mockery of all 
civil liberties,’36 against a back-drop of events in Asia that included: the Malaysian 
government’s 1987 arrest of opposition political party leaders in 1987; the 1989 massacre of 
protestors in Tiananmen Square; the refusal of Myanmar’s military junta to accept the results 
of the 1990 elections; and the shooting of civilian mourners in an East Timorese cemetery by 
                                                 
32
 John Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’ (2007) in Thomas Pogge (ed), Freedom from Poverty 
as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (2007) Oxford, Oxford University Press, 76-77. 
33
 Chan, above n 27, 31.  
34
 Bangkok Declaration, above n 24, Preamble. 
35
 Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Human Rights, Economic Change and Political Development: a Southeast Asian 
Perspective’ (2001) in James Tang (ed), Human Rights and International Relations in the Asia Pacific (1995) 
London, Pinter, 39-53. See also Yash Ghai, ‘Human Rights and Governance: the Asia Debate’ (2000) 1 Asia-
Pacific Journal of Human Rights and the Law 9, at 42. 
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 Won Kang Sen, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Speech at the UN World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna, reported in the Straits Times (17 June 1993). Quoted in Caballero-Anthony, above n 35, 43.  
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the Indonesian army in November 1991.
37
 Western observers (and many within Asia) viewed 
the idea of an ‘alternative Asian standard’ of human rights as a dangerous capitulation to 
relativism. The West was willing to respect pluralism, a degree of ‘situational uniqueness’38 
and what the Thai Prime Minister called ‘greater recognition of the immense complexity of 
the issue of human rights due to the wide diversity in history, culture, value system, 
geography and phases of development among the nations of the world.’39 But the argument 
that economic development might necessitate restrictions on human rights in order to provide 
a secure political framework in which rights can be pursued appeared to be a thinly disguised 
apology for authoritarianism and oppression.
40
  
Writing in 1999, Frances Fukuyama declared that the Asian Values debate was over.
41
 
He, like many others, consigned the ‘Asian Values’ debate to the dustbin of history in the 
wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. The reasoning was that Asian leaders had rested their case 
for ‘Asian Values’ on the strength of their burgeoning economies, and with these economies 
in ruins, the claim to ‘Asian Values’ was weakened beyond repair.  
Yet the ‘Asian Values’ dispute, politicised and rhetorical though it was, threw into 
sharp relief an unresolved challenge to the legitimacy of international human rights law. As 
Peerenboom writes, it is impossible to dismiss the ‘fundamental reality’ that: 
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 Michael Vatikiotis and Robert Delfs, ‘Cultural Divide: East Asia Claims the Right to Make its Own Rules’ 
(17 June 1993) Far Eastern Economic Review. 
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 Far Eastern Economic Review, (17 June 1993). See also Jakarta Post, 16 and 17 June 1993, and the Straits 
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 Ali Alatas, A Voice for a Just Peace (2001) Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 474.  
40
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differences in values (whether in Asia or Western countries) undermine to some 
degree the universality of the human rights regime as an empirical matter and present 
a challenge to the normative claim that human rights should be interpreted and 
implemented in a similar manner everywhere. In many cases, differences in values 
and other contingent circumstances will and should lead to differences in the ways 
human rights are interpreted and implemented. The overly politicized arguments of 
some Asian governments in the first round should not lead to the premature and false 
conclusions that differences in values either do not exist or do not matter.
42
 
 
This challenge does not lie in the idea that the implementation of rights might need to 
be staggered, or that the mix of economic, social, civil and political rights might vary 
depending on the context of a nation’s development. It lies in a challenge to the idea of 
democracy itself, and to the value and importance of the civil and political rights, which 
democracy supports and democracy presupposes. The debate references what Singapore's 
Senior Minister, Lee, has described as ‘the Asian will to differ’ on questions of democracy, 
human rights, tradition and development:  
We are all in the midst of very rapid change and at the same time we are all groping 
towards a destination which we hope will be identifiable with our past ... It can be 
seen as a working out of collective rights to a cultural heritage. It is the exercise of the 
internationally recognized right to determine one's own system of culture and 
politics.
43
 
 
Some of the themes selected from Asia’s ‘past’ have been inimical to democracy. For 
example, a White Paper produced by the Singapore government in 1991, Shared Values, 
drew on Confucian ideas of political order. In Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity, 
Tu Wei-ming writes, ‘In its political philosophy the Confucian tradition lacks concepts of 
liberty, human rights, privacy, and due process of law.’44 Drawing on such ideas, the White 
Paper questioned the philosophical emphasis of Western liberal democracy on ‘the 
individual’ and the political emphasis on competition and majority rule, which it argued were 
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destructive of harmony and cooperation. Instead, the Paper emphasised the individual’s 
linkages to family, community and nation through notions of obligation and duty. The 
Singapore paper questioned not only the Western means of ordering society, but also its goal 
(individual freedom and the pursuit of individual interests). The White Paper held up an ideal 
of social cohesion and fulfilment of the individual through a chain and hierarchy of duties. It 
drew on a family of philosophical ideas about the nature of man and society, which are linked 
by the idea that the individual is not atomistic and self-interested but is defined in terms of his 
or her connection with others. Ties of kinship and community should be the basis of political 
and social life, the aim of which is stability and the elevation of communitarian interests 
through consensus. Singapore’s Ambassador-At-Large Tommy Koh (Singapore’s member of 
the HLTF which drafted the ASEAN Charter and the Task Force’s chairman from August-
November 2007), states that: 
East Asians do not believe in the extreme form of individualism practiced in the West. 
We agree that every individual is important. However, he or she is not an isolated 
being, but a member of a nuclear and extended family, clan, neighbourhood, 
community, nation and state. East Asians believe that whatever they do or say, they 
must keep in mind the interests of others. Unlike Western society, where an individual 
puts his interest above all others, in Asian society the individual tries to balance his 
interests with those of family and society.
45
  
 
On such a view, elections are (somewhat) important because they select leaders, but 
once elected, it is the task of a governing elite to exercise independent judgement on what is 
in the long-term interest of the people and act on that basis. With the mandate of the people, 
leaders are able to adopt a long-term orientation to policy, rather than for what will please the 
people in the short term, free from the vicissitudes of popular opinion. Singapore’s Prime 
Minister Goh put it this way:  
                                                 
45
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Because the Government has acted as an honest, competent, and successful trustee of 
the people, we have been returned to power in 10 general elections since 1959. With a 
comfortable majority and a strong mandate, we have been able to take a long-term 
view in addressing our economic problems. We are not hostage to the multiplicity of 
narrow interest groups; to the clash and clamour of contending opinions that have 
sometimes made it difficult for countries to have the flexibility to adapt to the rapidly 
changing global economy; and to critics and wiseacres from outside the country.
46
 
 
Leaders from other parts of Southeast Asia have also drawn on religious teachings 
that support the idea of benevolent leaders who act in the best interests of the people. In 
predominantly Muslim Indonesia, President Sukarno outlined an alternative conception of 
democracy to the West’s ‘majoritarian’ or ‘50 per cent plus one’ democracy.47 According to 
Sukarno, ‘true democracy’ was ‘guided democracy’ based on traditional village procedures of 
reaching unanimous decisions (mufakat), through deliberation and consultation 
(musjawarah). The spirit of gotong rojong (mutual aid) was intended to ensure that 
everyone’s views were considered in a spirit of tolerance and generosity, with one’s own 
views put aside in the interests of all.
48
 In Thailand, Buddhism is practiced by 95 per cent of 
the population, and has underpinned both pro-democratic and authoritarian movements 
within Southeast Asia.
49
 Within Myanmar, Buddhism is practised by over 90 per cent of the 
people. H E U Khin Maung Win, Myanmar’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, writes that:  
wealth in Myanmar not only means material affluence but also spiritual advancement, 
especially peace of mind and contentment. The Myanmar people are by nature kind, 
gentle, and tolerant. Moreover, good society to Myanmar is the equilibrium of atta 
(individual desire) and para (working for the good of the community). Thus 
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democracy is not just conferring basic rights but also obligations and duties to the 
state.
50
 
 
Approaching the issue from various perspectives, critics of ‘Asian values’ have 
attacked the idea that there is or should be a separate Asian standard of democracy. At the 
simplest level, critics have pointed to the contradiction between ‘claims of a consensus and 
harmonious society and the extensive arming of the state apparatus’51 in Asian states. In 
relation to the ‘communitarian’ arguments of Asian leaders, Yash Ghai (amongst others) has 
argued that they overstate the individualism of the West’s tradition of democracy (Rousseau, 
for example, strongly asserts the claims of the community) and that Asian governments 
wrongly conflate themselves (or ‘the state’) with ‘the community’.52 Critics have also drawn 
attention to the disingenuous use of religious values to support political authority: as a matter 
of ethnography, for example, Confucianism does not resonate particularly strongly with the 
majority of Singaporeans, and in any regard the regulation of society as in Singapore and 
Malaysia is not particularly Confucian: ‘Confucius argued against reliance on law or 
coercion, and advocated a government of limited powers and functions.’53 Judge of the 
International Court of Justice, Christopher Weeramantry has described values such as 
equality, justice, and peace being present in all religions of the world,
54
 and Amartya Sen has 
pointed out that there is conscious theorising about tolerance and freedom in substantial and 
important parts of most Asian traditions.
55
 From the discipline of political philosophy, Josh 
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Cohen has demonstrated that proponents of Islam and Confucianism can occupy the ‘terrain 
of deliberation’ about the nature and content of human rights (and their basic democratic 
premises).
56
  
Most destructive of the credibility of an ‘Asian values’ approach to democracy have 
been the deep contradictions that have resulted from the economic policies of many Asian 
governments (which uphold the market, capitalism and individual property rights), and 
simultaneous claims that social and economic rights should take precedence over liberal ideas 
of democratic governance. Instead of upholding economic and social rights as a way of 
‘mediating between the market and the community, to soften the impact of market forces, to 
act as a safety net,’57 many Asian governments have in fact restricted social and economic 
rights in order to enhance economic competitiveness.
58
 Left without a democratic voice to 
oppose these restrictions, violations of economic, social and cultural rights continue. 
Consciousness of rights remains low because of poverty, lack of education and social division 
and capacity to challenge systems of oppression remains diminished.
59
  
 
3.2.3 Communism 
The first scholarly work published on AICHR is Tan Hsien-Li’s The ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights: Institutionalising Human Rights in 
Southeast Asia.
60
 Tan’s book concentrates on the five member states of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, ‘as they have been more supportive ASEAN 
members of AICHR’s establishment’ while ‘the political structures of the other five ASEAN 
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states cases—Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Brunei—are at present, relatively 
speaking, not as open to the scrutiny of human rights.’61 Tan hopes that ‘regard for human 
rights will grow within ASEAN and that in time all ASEAN members will agree to adhere to 
human rights in creed and action as AICHR’s operations get underway.’62 But in the 
meantime, conscious that ‘the establishment of a successful human rights system is so tricky,’ 
Tan avoids ‘considering the issue in absolute terms.’63 
Tan is concerned with how states that are constitutionally and practically built upon 
foundations other than liberal democracy can engage with a regional human rights system 
predicated upon a particular vision of Western multi-party liberal democracy. I will 
concentrate here on the two ASEAN countries whose political ideology diverges radically 
from liberal democracy: Vietnam and Laos.
64
 The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic have both, since the mid-1980s, pursued policies of economic 
liberalisation, permitting privatisation of commerce and agriculture, and opening their 
markets to foreign trade, aid and investment. Accompanying these moves toward a capitalist 
market system have been attempts to implement the practices of ‘good governance’: to end 
corruption, increase transparency, separate government from party organs and promote 
respect for the rule of law.  
But Laos and Vietnam remain single party communist states. The Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam provides that the nation ‘adheres to Marxism-Leninism and Ho 
Chi Minh’s thought’ and that the communist party ‘is the force assuming leadership of the 
State and society.’65 Article 5 of the 1991 Laos Constitution notes that the National Assembly 
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and all other state organisations ‘function in accordance with the principle of democratic 
centralism.’66 These strictures refer to the Marxist-Leninist principles that call for open 
discussion within a unit, but demand that the minority accede to the will of the majority, and 
that lower echelons obey the decisions of higher ones. The political systems of Laos and 
Vietnam derive from an understanding of democracy that is based on mass participation 
through local grass-roots organisations, which are responsible for selection of parliamentary 
candidates and for policy implementation at the local level. Within this system, ‘democracy’ 
operates within a single party, not via multiple political parties.
67
 Tolerance of dissent is 
limited and democratic activism is curtailed. During meetings held to discuss the ASEAN 
Charter’s contents, a Vietnamese delegate noted that although his country was not a 
multiparty democracy in the Western sense, it still deserved the title because it practiced 
democracy within its one party system.
68
  
Since 1989, scholars have not been overly concerned with the question of 
communism’s compatibility with international human rights regimes. They seem to have 
assumed, as Tan does, that inevitably all such regimes will succumb to liberal democracy. 
But a study of the legitimacy of a regional human rights regime that includes within its 
geographical parameters single-party states such as Vietnam and Laos, cannot leave to one 
side the question of how such states view the articulation of international human rights 
through a regional framework. If we accept for the purposes of argument in this section that 
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the political systems of Vietnam and Laos satisfy the broad definition of democracy adopted 
in Chapter 2, as political systems that provides for the ultimate authority of the people in 
determining their own political, economic, social and cultural systems, what purchase does 
‘human rights’ have in these countries?69  
The starting point is Marx’s theory of class struggle and capitalism, in which liberal 
ideas about human nature and abstract rights are ‘bourgeois hypocritical moral absolutism.’70 
For Marx, the ‘human right of liberty’ is based not on human relations between individuals, 
but rather on their separation in the marketplace where they are free to compete. Because of 
this (apparent) disrespect for liberty, scholars such as Bertrand Russell are succinct on the 
question of whether communism is democratic: ‘Communism is not democratic. What it calls 
“the dictatorship of the proletariat” is in fact the dictatorship of a small minority, who become 
an oligarchic governing class. ... Communism restricts liberty, particularly intellectual liberty, 
more than any other system except fascism.’71  
More recently, Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly have argued that communist 
regimes are entirely inconsistent with international human rights norms:  
communist society thus rests on a social utilitarianism fundamentally incompatible 
with human rights. The good of the society, as determine by the state/party, always 
takes precedence over all else. Because individual ‘rights’ must always yield to social 
purposes, as enunciated by the state, such ‘rights’ are worthless; no matter what the 
state does, it cannot be guilty of violating them. Whatever the opportunities and 
benefits citizens may (contingently) receive – and they are undeniably substantial in 
some communist regimes – communism represents a thorough denial of human 
rights.
72
 
 
                                                 
69
 Rawls would remind us that there is a difference between states that do not have multiple parties, and states 
that do not permit them. 
70
 Lin Chun, ‘Human rights and Democracy: the Case for Decoupling’ (2001) 5(3) The International Journal of 
Human Rights 19-4, 23.  
71
 Bertrand Russell, In Praise of Idleness (1935) Oxon, Routledge, 73. 
72
 Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly, ‘Human dignity, human rights, and political regimes’ (1986) 80(3) The 
American Political Science Review 801,810. 
Chapter 3: Resisting Democracy 
 
88 
 
Communism is seen as subjugating the liberty and autonomy of the individual to a 
greater socialist purpose, so that the individual is not the respected, rights-bearing, citizen 
imagined by liberal thinking. Under communist regimes, enjoyment of rights is held to be 
contingent on the discharge of social duties, rather than on recognition of the equal and 
inalienable entitlements of all individuals.
73
  
This is indeed a thorough denial of human rights, as Howard and Donnelly claim, if 
human rights are inalienable natural attributes of being human. But the argument I make in 
Chapter 1 is that this is not what human rights are. I argue that human rights are in fact 
evolving political agreements between free and equal citizens about the shape of society and 
the protection that it should offer its members. On this view, it is not sufficient to point out, 
as Bertrand Russell does, the historical evidence that communist regimes use political 
coercion, repression, and pressure to force individuals to conform to behavioural norms 
specified by the state. Nor is it sufficient to point out, as Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly 
do, that the state’s ‘social purpose’, to which individuals must yield under communist 
regimes, is not one that a majority, given freedom, would elect for themselves, because it 
contradicts essentialist human traits. Instead, it is necessary to grapple directly, and in a 
different way, with the question of what it is about single-party states such as Laos and 
Vietnam that inhibits the evolution of regimes that respect human rights.
74
  
 Marx and Engels provide no guidance on the question of multiple political parties in 
socialist societies. They assume that when the transition to socialist society takes place, the 
proletariat will constitute an overwhelming majority of the population, and the ideas and 
ideals of the workers will guide the functions of the state. In their view, different political 
parties are only necessary to represent the different interests of conflicting economic classes 
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within a society. On Marx and Engels’ view, if economic classes are done away with, politics 
and political classes would also be done away with (and of course ultimately the state, as 
well). What is envisaged is a condition of social harmony, where ‘in place of the old 
bourgeoisie society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in 
which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.’75 As 
Robert Dahl points out, this is a vision that sits in paradoxical fashion with Marx and Engels’ 
central idea of the dialectical process of development.
76
 The historical dialectic—the idea of 
development through conflict—is, on Engels’ view, ‘a permanent feature of human history, 
embedded in the very structure of the universe,’ a ‘law of development, nature, history and 
thought, a law which ... holds good in the animal and plant kingdom, in geology, in 
mathematics, in history and philosophy.’77 On this view, even communist or socialist 
societies would contain inner conflicts, forcing continual development. Yet Marx and Engels 
maintained that ‘with adequate knowledge and economic reconstruction social conflict would 
be eliminated.’78  
The importance of opposition political parties is that they liberate discourse about 
social values, their priorities and implementation, by providing political alternatives that 
challenge the policies and values of the ruling party. They provide autonomy in the sense of 
meaningful choice for citizens about the shape of society and their role within it. The 
Communist governments of Vietnam and Laos have not eliminated social conflict (evident in 
ongoing challenges from civil right organisations, when they are permitted to establish 
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themselves),
79
 or economic conflict (resulting from the growing disparities in wealth as a 
consequence of policies of economic liberalisation and market capitalism). In these 
circumstances, it is implausible to prohibit the establishment of political alternatives to 
communist party rule, on the grounds that genuine democracy is practiced ‘within a single 
party structure.’  
 
3.3 Can We Separate Democracy from Human Rights?  
 
In the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, Asian leaders did not resile from the principles of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
80
 But they insisted that all countries have the right 
to determine their political systems and to control and freely utilise their resources, and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development,
81
 and they stressed that the 
promotion of human rights should be encouraged by cooperation and consensus, ‘and not 
through confrontation and the imposition of incompatible values.’82 Thus, it would ‘pre-empt 
the charge of cultural imperialism,’ suggest writers such as Nathan, if there was a separation 
of human rights from democratisation, which would permit a focus on compliance with 
international human rights law (an ‘international idea’) rather than democracy (a Western 
one).
83
 
There would appear to be political advantages in cleaving the linkage between liberal 
democracy and human rights. John Rawls argued that a political society can protect human 
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rights (and be ‘decent’), without being a liberal democracy.84 Some form of participatory 
politics (democracy in its broad sense) is necessary for the protection of core human rights. 
For example, the different voices of rights-holders must be heard in order for their rights to 
be adequately protected; different groups with their diverse interests and opinions must be 
represented; there must be processes for consultation between these groups and those in 
authority; those in authority must respond fairly to the concerns of different groups and their 
ideas about how to realise their own and communal interests; there must be public 
explanation of decisions; and decisions must be motivated by ‘a conception of the common 
good of the whole society.
85
 Such a political society clearly could not be a totalitarian state.
86
 
But it need not necessarily be a ‘liberal’ democracy. That is, human rights—in the abstract—
could exist within such a system. After all, governments representing a very diverse range of 
political systems were involved in drafting (and they eventually signed) the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The drafters imagined (or hoped) that the rights 
articulated in the Declaration were capable of being upheld by communist states, monarchies, 
and religious autocracies, as well as by the democracies of the West.
87
  
The difficulty is that practically, empirically, in what James Griffin describes as 
‘typical modern conditions of highly pervasive government, large population, advanced 
technology, concentration of coercive power at the centre, ethnic diversity, educated 
citizenry, the sort of social cohesion necessary for a tolerably successful democracy,’88 it 
seems that it is very hard for a society to protect human rights unless it is a democracy. The 
essence of Griffin’s argument is that the enjoyment of human rights depends on the certainty 
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and stability of government, which is necessary to ensure the promulgation of human rights, 
their enforcement, their protection and their institutionalisation, not just at the present 
moment, but into the future (when different—perhaps less benevolent and moral leaders than 
the present ones—might rule). Liberal democracies, with institutions and processes for the 
peaceful change of power, ensure this. Langlois captures this idea when he writes:  
A so-called human right within an otherwise authoritarian governmental system, is 
not a right as such. It is a condescension, a privilege, a long leash. Ultimately, it is a 
form of charity that may be withdrawn at the whim of the individual or group in 
authority. Fundamentally, it is not something that can be insisted upon as a claim 
which must be met.
89
 
 
3.4 Why ‘Democracy’ in the ASEAN Charter? 
 
Given the discussion above about the political character of the majority of ASEAN states, 
and the historical and cultural sources of resistance to ideas of liberal democracy, it is 
something of a puzzle that ‘democracy’ was included at all in the ASEAN Charter and TOR 
of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.  
The question has interested international relations scholars.
90
 Those of the realist 
persuasion have suggested that these words are meaningless, an instance of ASEAN states 
appeasing the international community by articulating a commitment to democracy, but at the 
same time ensuring that the institutions they design lack the power to actually challenge 
deep-seated norms which the Association wishes to preserve (sovereignty, non-
                                                 
89
 Anthony Langlois, ‘Human Rights without Democracy? A Critique of the Separationist Thesis’ (2003) 25 
Human Rights Quarterly 990–1019, 1014.  
90
 Yi-hung Chiou, ‘Unravelling the Logic of ASEAN’s Decision-Making: Theoretical Analysis and Case 
Examination’ (2008) 3(2) Asia Politics and Policy 371, 371; Maria-Gabriela Manea, ‘How and Why Interaction 
Matters: ASEAN’s Regional Identity and Human Rights’ (2009) Nordic International Studies Association 
Online Publications available at:  <http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/44/1/27> [accessed 10 July 
2011]; Hiro Katsumata, ‘ASEAN and Human Rights: resisting Western pressure or emulating the West?’ (2009) 
22 The Pacific Review 619, 628. 
Chapter 3: Resisting Democracy 
 
93 
 
intervention).
91
 From this perspective, articulating a commitment to ‘democracy’ is a 
cosmetic move designed to create a more positive international image for ASEAN and a 
largely rhetorical defence to international condemnation for the poor human rights records of 
states such as Myanmar.
92
 On this reading, ASEAN states have been driven to adopt human 
rights policies by pressure from great powers (the United States and the European Union), 
whose material capabilities (economic power and trade capabilities) have provided incentives 
for the spread of democratic norms. On the part of ASEAN states, there is ‘at heart a 
reluctance to implement liberal reform’93 and this disinclination explains the reason why 
there have been few concrete measures to implement reform plans and why the human rights 
institution finally created, is weak.
94
  
If one of ASEAN’s aims in signing the Charter was to enhance the credibility of the 
Association in the eyes of outside observers, particularly the European Union and the United 
States, then it was necessary for ASEAN leaders to make a formal commitment to 
democracy, which is a sine qua non of all the regional arrangements of Europe, Africa and 
the Americas. The human rights conventions and treaties of Europe, the Americas and Africa, 
all affirm a right to democratic participation. The European Court of Human Rights has 
consistently stated that ‘democracy appears to be the only political model contemplated by 
the Convention and accordingly, the only one compatible with it,’95 and has upheld the 
democratic principles expounded in Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
96
 The Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted by the Organization of 
American States in 2001, declares in Article 1 that ‘the peoples of the Americas have a right 
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to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it’97 and the 
Santiago Declaration expresses an explicit commitment to democracy as a key principle of 
regionalism.
98
 The Constitutive Act of African Union declares its objective as being ‘to 
promote democratic principles and institutions.’99 Article 13 of the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights also provides for rights of participation in the government of the 
country, either directly or through chosen representatives and for rights of equal access to the 
public service and public property. The Organization of African Unity has endorsed 
democratic governance as a way of dealing with Africa’s political conflicts and economic 
ills.
100
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In certain respects, the views of some constructivist scholars meet the views of 
realists.
101
 According to Katsumata, for example, ASEAN’s decision to embrace liberal 
human rights values and their concomitant institutions is the result of institutional 
isomorphism. According to this view, those seeking legitimacy adopt or emulate these 
structures that signal legitimacy, in order to secure their identity as ‘legitimate members of 
the community.’102 Katsumata argues that ASEAN states: 
have been ‘mimetically’ adopting the norm of human rights which is championed by 
the advanced industrialised democracies, with the intention of securing ASEAN’s 
identity as a legitimate institution in the community of modern states ... for the same 
reason as cash-strapped developing countries have luxurious national airlines and 
newly independent countries institute national flags.
103
 
 
There is some evidence to support these views from what is known of negotiations 
surrounding the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto 
Romulo, for example, stated that his government called for the creation of a human rights 
body because it would ‘give ASEAN more credibility in the international community’104 and 
Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar expressed the view that ASEAN members 
‘should not be seen to be unsupportive of human rights’ (emphasis added).105 Statements such 
as these provide partial explanations for ASEAN’s new commitment to democracy. But they 
do not adequately capture the extent to which individual ASEAN states—in particular 
Indonesia—lobbied for the inclusion of ideas such as democracy in the Charter in response to 
pressure from domestic constituents.
106
 Rizal Sukma, one of the most influential voices 
within Indonesia’s civil-society sector, stated at the time of the Charter negotiations that: 
‘[T]he inclusion of human rights and democratic principles in the charter is non-negotiable. 
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Indonesia must fight for it because we will have no basis for protecting people’s rights if the 
principles are not included in the charter.’107  
Indonesian Foreign Ministry Director General for ASEAN Affairs, Dian Triansysh 
Djani, confirmed this position by stressing that Indonesia was continuing to insist on the 
inclusion of articles on human rights and democratic values in the ASEAN Charter: ‘The 
substance of the ASEAN Charter will not be far from the recommendation of the Eminent 
Persons Group (EPG), which has highlighted the importance of including human rights and 
democratic values in the charter.’108 Ikrar Nusa Bakti (Indonesian Institute of Sciences) added 
that it was time Indonesia, the biggest country in the region, took the lead in fighting for 
values in which it believes and practices: ‘I think Indonesia now is the most democratic 
country in ASEAN. We should not let ourselves be bogged down by other ASEAN 
members.’109 This sentiment seems to be widely shared among both state and non-state actors 
in Indonesia. 
Indonesia had been advancing the idea of democracy as a regional norm at least since 
June 2003. At the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting held that year, it was Indonesia that 
proposed the creation of an ‘ASEAN Security Community’ (ASC) with five key duties: 
setting norms, preventing conflict, resolving conflict, building peace after conflict, and 
political development. It was this last duty that caused consternation amongst other ASEAN 
members. Indonesia (the world’s third largest democracy) defined the promotion of ‘political 
development,’ as ‘people’s participation, particularly through the conduct of general 
elections’; ‘good governance’; the strengthening of ‘judicial institutions and legal reforms’; 
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and the promotion of ‘human rights and obligations through the establishment of the ASEAN 
Commission on Human Rights.’110 According to Indonesia, the ideological basis of 
ASEAN’s Security Community was to be a commitment to democracy and human rights.111 
This was the first time that an ASEAN state had proposed ‘democracy’ as a principle of the 
regional association.  
Indonesia’s proposal regarding ‘political development’ was unsuccessful. The 
ASEAN Security Community, announced as part of its Concord II at the 9th ASEAN Summit 
in October 2003, contained only four aims: setting norms, preventing conflict, resolving 
conflict and building peace after conflict. The controversial aim of promoting ‘political 
development’ was deleted. Some months later, however, Indonesia achieved a partial victory 
in managing to secure reference to ‘political development’ in order to achieve ‘peace, 
stability, democracy and prosperity in the region’ as part of the ASEAN Security Community 
Plan of Action (ASCPA). The ACSPA stated that ‘human rights and obligations’ were part of 
the strategy for political development and recognised that ‘political and social stability, 
economic prosperity, narrowed development gap, poverty alleviation and reduction of social 
disparity would constitute [a] strong foundation for a sustained ASC,’ rather than one limited 
to ‘a defence pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy.’ ASCPA stated, ‘ASEAN 
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Member Countries shall not condone unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of 
government.’112 
To summarise: the ASEAN Charter is ambiguous about democracy, and as David 
Martin Jones accurately notes, this ambiguity reflects the diversity and ambivalence of its 
authors. On the one hand, the Charter repeats and reinforces principles of non-interference 
and state sovereignty; on the other hand, it supports democracy, transparency and human 
rights—ideas that to an extent abrogate those same principles. The net effect is incoherence, 
or indeterminacy.  
 
3.5 The Legitimacy of a Regional Human Rights Regime sans a Commitment to 
 Democracy 
 
In Chapter 2, I described the connections between ideas of democracy and ideas of human 
rights. In this chapter, I have shown how and why ‘democracy’ in the Western liberal sense 
does not predominate amongst the political systems of Southeast Asia. In this final section, I 
return to the concept of legitimacy, and consider the implications of this discussion about 
‘human rights and democracy’ for the legitimacy of the emerging regional human rights 
regime in Southeast Asia. I consider the extent to which the lack of democracy amongst 
ASEAN states, and the lack of consensus about the idea and value of democracy substantially 
undermine the legitimacy of ASEAN’s emerging regional human rights regime. 
My focus in this section is on two particular aspects of legitimacy identified in 
Chapter 1. The first is the consent of democratic states, as a normative element of the 
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legitimacy of international law. The second is determinacy, as an element of law’s perceived 
and actual legitimacy. Both elements are relevant to prospects for compliance—the likelihood 
that states will implement the reports and recommendations of the regional human rights 
commission. Compliance flows from legitimacy, but as I described in Chapter 1, compliance 
is also in itself an element of legitimacy, in the sense that lack of obeisance to a legal regime 
signals its irrelevancy, and the demise of its legitimacy.  
 
3.5.1 Legitimacy of the ASEAN Charter in the Absence of the Consent of Democratic 
States 
My discussion in this section concerns the legitimacy of the ASEAN Charter, which is now 
the foundation document of the regional order. The ASEAN Charter underpins AICHR, and 
the legitimacy of the former instrument affects the legitimacy of the latter institution. 
In Chapter 1, I suggested that one way in which the power exercised by an 
international institution is justified by the consent of states, which is itself legitimated by 
national mechanisms (elections, parliamentary procedures) that ensure that international 
obligations reflect the will of domestic constituents. The argument is that democratic 
procedures within states have a legitimising effect on international law, because of an 
essential link between democracy and accountability. The idea is that the processes of 
democracy (particularly rule by periodically elected representatives) ensure that 
representatives of states act with the imprimatur of the people when they make international 
law. Democracy within the state is held to be an indicator that the will of domestic 
constituents is reflected in a state’s international obligations. Risse, for example, in his 
discussion of transnational governance and legitimacy, distinguishes between democracies 
and autocratic regimes:  
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The former are internally accountable to their citizens and their elected 
representatives who can sanction governments through the normal mechanisms of 
liberal systems, while the latter have an internal accountability gap by definition. To 
the extent then that international intergovernmental regimes are based on bargains 
between democratically elected governments (as has been mostly the case in trade 
regimes, human rights regimes, less so in the environmental realm or in arms control), 
internal accountability should not be regarded as the main problem of international 
regimes.
113
  
 
 The argument is that without the imprimatur of the majority vis a vis rules and 
institutions which affect them, rules and institutions cannot prima facie claim legitimacy, 
because the will of the people regarding the form and powers of an international institution or 
international law has not been transmitted through representation at the state level.
114
 
Christiano frames the question as: ‘if a state is non-democratic, can its decisions adequately 
reflect the significance of the duties to and burdens imposed on its population?’115  
Scholars have debated the strength of this argument. Andrew Moravcsik has argued 
that endorsement of international institutions by popular mandate is not a prerequisite for 
legitimacy, and that the insulation of independent institutions (such as the courts) from 
political processes in fact enhances legitimacy.
116
 But this argument has less relevance for an 
institution such as AICHR, which is an ‘intergovernmental institution’,117 with 
commissioners ‘responsible to their appointing governments,’118 and, as such, lacks the initial 
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presumption of independence possessed by a court. The authority of Commissioners derives 
from non-democratic ASEAN member states which appoint them, and to which they are 
‘accountable’ under the TOR of AICHR.119  
A stronger response to the democratic consent theory of legitimacy is to point out that 
the bureaucratisation of the modern state means that public consent to governance occurs 
only at a very general level and that because of this, ‘the idea that authority can be delegated 
from the individual to the state and then from the state to an international institution, 
preserving the link of accountability between citizen and the mechanism of global 
governance, is implausible.’120 In most states, the people’s elected representatives (the 
legislature) are not responsible for drafting, negotiating and concluding international 
agreements; this falls within the mandate of the (unelected) executive and their specialist 
bureaucrats.
121
 In most ASEAN states, for example, treaty-making is not within the 
prerogative of parliament. In Singapore, the Constitution does not require the involvement or 
consent of Parliament before an international convention is ratified.
122
 Brunei has no 
parliament with which to consult.
123
 Emmerson writes that in Laos, legislative approval of the 
ASEAN Charter amounted to ‘rubber-stamping what the rulers had decided to do.’124 Even in 
states where public consultations are held and public input into policy issues is sought, 
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interest groups (rather than ‘the people’ more broadly) are often the ones in a position to 
make submissions and contribute to deliberations, particularly in the case of complex policy 
areas such as foreign relations. In modern industrialised liberal democracies, the chain of 
accountability between voters and their representatives is attenuated. Apart from elections, 
the public has only a limited ability to influence policy deliberations.  
For these reasons, it is difficult to accept that the consent of democratic states is 
enough in itself to guarantee the legitimacy of an international institution.
125
 It is more 
convincing to view such consent as merely a necessary pre-requisite for legitimacy. In the 
words of Buchanan and Keohane: ‘the ongoing consent of democratic, rights-respecting, 
states helps to make global governance institutions accountable, by linking them, though 
indirectly, to publics who can hold their own states accountable … ongoing consent by 
rights-respecting democratic states constitutes the democratic channel of accountability.’126  
I maintain, then, that democratic processes within states convey a degree of authority 
to international institutions supported by these states. We can see an example of precisely the 
sort of process I am referring to, in the way that Indonesia went about ratifying the ASEAN 
Charter. In Indonesia, the Derwan Parwakilan Rakyat (DPR), People’s House of 
Representatives, is required to pass a bill authorising ratification of international treaties. 
Prior to the parliamentary vote, the bill is considered and voted upon by the Commission on 
Foreign Affairs of the Indonesian Parliament. On the question of whether or not to support 
the bill for the ratification of the ASEAN Charter, the Commission was divided. The ruling 
government coalition (the Golkar Party and the Democrat Party), who held 17 of the 48 seats 
on the Commission (8 votes short of a simple majority), were of the view that the Charter 
should be ratified. But several prominent members of the ruling party held the view that 
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ratification of the Charter should be delayed until provisions for the protection of human 
rights could be strengthened, and these members threatened to cross the floor of parliament 
and vote with the opposition. Some members of parliament took the view that the lack of 
clarity on the issue of the mandate and powers of the human rights body, as well as 
‘budgeting, the decision-making processes and mechanism, the brutality of the Myanmar 
junta, ASEAN integration, and the idea of ASEAN as a people-centric movement’127 meant 
that the Charter should be rejected outright. They argued that the Charter did not make 
provisions for sanctioning non-complying members, decision-making was still through 
consensus, and enshrining in the Charter on the principle of non-interference might actually 
make it harder for ASEAN states to criticise members on grounds of violation of democratic 
rights, human rights and fundamental freedoms.
128
  
Within Indonesia, the media devoted a significant amount of attention to the 
parliamentary contest between pro-ratification and anti-ratification forces. This attention, 
combined with the series of public hearings on the ASEAN Charter, which were held in 
March 2008, contributed to widespread awareness of the Charter and to a broad public 
discourse on its merits and shortcomings. Commentators reported on the divisions between 
parliamentary members and on claims from members of parliament that Foreign Ministry 
officials were not tough enough in negotiations with their ASEAN counterparts. Djoko 
Susilo, Indonesian Member of Parliament, was told that Indonesian negotiators had 
‘surrendered’ to Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, and had not taken public opinion, or the 
principles in the Bali Concord II, or the EPG Reports, seriously enough. Instead, they had 
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taken an ‘overtly Pajambon’ (Foreign Ministry) position.129 An editorial in the Jakarta Post 
in July 2008 described the Charter as a ‘betrayal’ of the EPG report, and argued that to ratify 
would be to ‘sell out on the values Indonesia stands for, including democracy, freedom and 
human rights.’130 The Head of House Commission on Defence, Security and International 
Affairs, Theo Sambuaga, countered that the difference in views ‘was normal in a democratic 
process.’131 Processes in Indonesia were ‘unlike in some of the other member states of 
ASEAN where governments can rush the ratification process.’132  
Within democracies, the doctrine of separation of powers and the role of the courts 
can also limit the activities of the executive branch of government and bring a further level of 
accountability to different branches of government. Again, Indonesia provides an example for 
this. On 5 May 2011, a coalition of Indonesian NGOs, ‘the Alliance on Global Justice’, filed 
for a judicial review of Law No. 38/2008: ‘Ratification of the Charter of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations’ on the grounds that it contradicted the 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia.
133
 The plaintiffs argued that Articles 1(5) and Article 2(2) of the 
Charter, which are directed toward economic integration and creating a single market and 
production base within the Southeast Asian region, contradict Article 33(1)(2) and (3) of the 
Indonesian Constitution, which provides that: 
the economy shall be organized as a common endeavour based on the principle of the 
family system; that the branches of production which are important for the state and 
which affect the lives of most people shall be controlled by the state; and that land and 
water, and the natural resources found therein, shall be controlled by the state and 
shall be exploited for the maximum benefit of the people.
134
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An opinion piece published in the Jakarta Post characterised the lawsuit as a 
‘dilemma arising from the interplay between international law and domestic law,’ where ‘the 
sovereignty to legislate by a country may be encroached by international agreements … the 
public will question who the government is working for: another government or its own 
constituency?’135  
It is one of the ironies of international law that the apparent concordance between the 
values embraced in the constitutions of liberal democracies and the norms of international 
human rights law, does not necessarily make it easier for liberal democracies to participate in 
international regimes. The parliamentary processes, media scrutiny, public consultations and 
judicial challenges that characterised Indonesia’s domestic negotiation of the Charter, which 
was not evident in the majority of ASEAN states, almost led to Indonesia’s withdrawal from 
the Charter process. The important question for the purposes of this chapter, is the extent to 
which these processes signified public endorsement (democratic consent, and consequently 
legitimacy), of Indonesia’s participation in the regional system.  
It is clear that within Indonesia, on the subject of the Charter and AICHR, there were 
a range of differing opinions and these opinions were published and discussed without 
restriction by a free media. Indonesia’s elected parliamentarians debated and voted upon the 
issue, and it was on the basis of this vote that agreement was made to ratify the ASEAN 
Charter. There was fairly widespread knowledge of the Charter amongst the public, and the 
government sponsored public forums to disseminate information, including different opinions 
about the merits or otherwise of ratification. Indonesia’s active civil society published their 
own opinions and held their own independent forums about ratification. Finally, NGOs issued 
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their own challenge to the legality of the Charter through an independent court system. To the 
extent that legitimacy is a function of the consent of democratic states, then it could be 
argued that these processes did in fact increase the legitimacy of Indonesia’s assent to the 
Charter, and that correspondingly, the absence of such public debate and discussion in other 
ASEAN states, most importantly in their parliaments, signifies a corresponding lack of 
legitimacy. 
 
3.5.2 Democracy in the Charter Drafting Process 
The ASEAN Charter’s lack of a democratic foundation could perhaps have been remedied by 
a determinedly inclusive process in the drafting of the Charter. The EPG, appointed to make 
recommendations on the ASEAN Charter, engaged in a series of consultations and meetings 
with the public and with civil society representatives.
136
 Most agree that these public 
deliberations influenced the Final Recommendations of the EPG and were reflected in its 
Final Report.
137
 In contrast, the drafting process of the HLTF appointed by ASEAN states to 
draft the Charter, was ‘rather obscure, leading to the belief that it lacked legitimacy’138 and 
‘did not reflect public opinion.’139 On the subject of human rights, for example, the EPG 
recommended: 
members states should ultimately advance to form an ASEAN Union comprising the 
three pillars of security, economic and socio-cultural integration, that are closely 
intertwined and mutually reinforcing, in which human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all shall be protected by the rule of law and regional integration, and 
human security is guaranteed to every ASEAN citizen. This would ensure enduring 
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peace, stability, security, equitable prosperity and human dignity for every individual 
to enjoy and to pursue the worthy aspirations of human potential in the 21
st
 century.
140
 
 
The ASEAN Charter merely states that ‘ASEAN shall establish a human rights 
body,’141 which shall operate in accordance with terms of reference to be determined by the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. The TOR are still further removed from the ideal 
described by the EPG. The TOR make clear that AICHR is an inter-governmental body and is 
consultative only.
142
 By specifying the inter-governmental nature of the body, the Foreign 
Ministers delimited aspirations toward ‘regional integration’ in the implementation and 
oversight of human rights. By specifying that AICHR is ‘consultative’, the Foreign Ministers 
made clear that human rights of individuals and groups within the region would not be 
guaranteed by an impartial third party (a court or commission), but would remain at the 
discretion of state parties.  
The process of Charter-drafting, captured in the reflections of the HLTF on the 
Drafting of the ASEAN Charter in The Making of the ASEAN Charter, reflect the extent to 
which the Charter and its provisions relating to a human rights mechanism were a political 
compromise of state interests, which were channelled through representatives beholden to 
their state appointees. As the representative from Brunei Darassalum, Penigran Dato Paduka 
Osman Patra, pointed out, the EPG ‘were given the luxury to be bold and visionary in 
expressing the ASEAN leaders wishes.’143 In contrast, the HLTF, which was comprised 
mainly of practitioners and serving bureaucrats ‘was at the opposite end of the process’ and 
was ‘treading a fine line, particularly in striking an acceptable balance of competing pressures 
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such as the need to conform to the leaders declarations, Ministerial decisions, the EPG Report 
and instructions from capitals.’144 Aung Bwa, Myanmar’s representative on the HLTF, 
described the process of negotiations as ‘give and take,’ but ‘never compromising on the vital 
issues that could be detrimental to the national interests.’145 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, 
special assistant to the Secretary-General of ASEAN, writes that ‘the drafters had to follow 
official instruction from their respective superior’ in a ‘government-to-government 
negotiation exercise’ in which ‘public participation in the drafting was not possible.’146 
In the Charter drafting process, discussion about the proposed human rights body was 
‘of all our debates, the most explosive and tense of all,’147 the ‘most sensitive, controversial 
and difficult subject.’148 Aung Bwa, Myanmar’s representative on the HLTF, describes how 
‘the discussions on the issue were most heated and at times we almost came to blows—
literally speaking.’149 From the reflections of the HLTF members, there appears to have been 
a ‘common understanding that ASEAN needs to establish its own standards for human rights 
protection and promotion, and that human rights should not be left as an excuse for outsiders 
to interfere into ASEAN’s own affairs.’150 Beyond this common understanding, there was 
clearly a division of opinion on the issue of the human rights body, between the members 
from Cambodia, Laos PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV), who ‘got along very well most 
of the time’151 and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, states which had 
already established their own national human rights commissions and were pressing for a 
more robust human rights body.  
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In the end, the issue of a human rights body—whether it should exist and what form it 
should take—was not decided by the HLTF. Members were unable to reach agreement on the 
point. Penigran Dato Paduka Osman Patra states that ‘by the time of the Manila AMM in July 
2007, consensus did not seem possible. They [sic] was no way forward. The Foreign 
Ministers, however, had other views. They grasped the political nettle and they reached a 
consensus that ASEAN should establish such a body.’152 After this, when the ‘battle line 
moved to the question of the TOR of the AHRD, particularly as to whether it should perform 
a consultative or a monitoring role and so on,’ again, the Foreign Ministers removed the issue 
from the HLTF, deciding that ‘they themselves would determine the AHRD’s TOR.’153 In the 
end, the ASEAN Charter merely states that ‘ASEAN shall establish a human rights body’154 
to operate in accordance with terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers Meeting.  
The TOR of AICHR are still further removed from the ideal described by the EPG. 
The TOR made it clear that AICHR is an inter-governmental body and is consultative only.
155
 
By specifying the inter-governmental nature of the body, the Foreign Ministers delimited 
aspirations toward strong regional oversight of human rights. By specifying that AICHR is 
‘consultative’, the Foreign Ministers made clear that human rights of individuals and groups 
within the region would not be guaranteed by operation of the rule of law, overseen by an 
impartial third party (a court or commission), but would remain at the discretion of state 
parties.  
In the absence of democracy within a majority of Southeast Asian states, and in the 
absence of the involvement in treaty-making by representative parliamentarians who are 
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responsive to the wishes of the people, there is a disjuncture between the interests of the 
region’s people, and the form and powers of international institutions such as AICHR. It 
could be argued that this disjuncture undermines the institution’s legitimacy from the 
perspective of the people of the region, and from the perspective of civil society. My 
argument is that at the time of the institution’s creation, the absence of a (democratic) culture 
of debate and deliberation signifies the exclusion of key stakeholders and, because of this, 
undermines perceptions that the institution will be able to meet the need of these groups, thus 
undermining legitimacy.  
But international institutions, once established, are ‘more than instruments of 
statecraft and the products of regional stability.’156 They can shape the boundaries of state 
action, and may have unintended consequences; for example, ‘the weakening of national 
sovereignty and the gradual ceding of authority to supranational institutions were not what 
most of the European leaders sought at the start, but rather were the product of the institutions 
they established.’157 Despite the legitimacy deficit that exists at the birth of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission of Human Rights, it is plausible that the institution could 
garner support through a pattern of principled decisions, which are complied with by a 
majority of ASEAN member states. But as I discuss in the next section, there are several 
problems with prospects for compliance.
158
 
 
                                                 
156
 Simon S.C. Tay, ‘The ASEAN Charter: Between National Sovereignty and the Region's Constitutional 
Moment’ (2008) 12 Singapore Year Book of International Law 151, 164. 
157
 Ibid. 
158
 I canvass these hypothetical possibilities very briefly: it is impossible to say with certainty how human rights 
commissioners might act and how states might respond to their reports. Tom Farer writes of the ‘murderous 
political projects’ of the Latin American regimes, which, to the surprise of governments, were investigated, 
uncovered and condemned by the Inter-American Commission in the early years following its creation. Tom J. 
Farer, ‘The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox’ (1997) 
19(3) Human Rights Quarterly 510, 510. 
Chapter 3: Resisting Democracy 
 
111 
 
3.5.3 Democracy and Compliance 
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I noted that compliance in the absence of coercion is viewed 
as an indicator of legitimacy. In recent years, scholars have argued that democracy improves 
the chances of states complying with international norms, because democratic processes 
provide avenues for civil society to raise political demands about compliance with 
international norms in order to secure domestic policy change.
159
 The freedom granted to 
civil society organisations within democracies permits them to agitate for state compliance 
with international norms. In addition, as many democracies are at a more advanced stage of 
economic evolution and are more prosperous than their authoritarian counterparts, they have 
greater capacity to comply with international law. If we accept these arguments, then given 
the lack of democracy in the region, there would seem to be reduced prospects of ASEAN 
states complying with the reports and recommendations of AICHR. 
One scenario is that the absence of democratic systems of government within most 
ASEAN states will lessen the likelihood of states being successfully pressured via domestic 
politics to comply with the reports and recommendations of AICHR. Because they face little 
electoral pressure to comply with regional or international human rights norms, civil society’s 
ability to leverage compliance through publicity is very limited. Non-compliance has no 
domestic political repercussions and so is avoided when compliance is perceived by states as 
costly.  
Another scenario is that regional members that are democracies, such as Indonesia, 
will devalue the merits of compliance with the regional human rights body, on the grounds 
that the body is primarily composed of non-democracies, and that the states’ own 
constitutional rights guarantees and independent international human rights obligations offer 
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more constructive human rights protection. Why should a democracy support a body that has 
been constituted by a majority of non-democratic states? In these circumstances, a state like 
Indonesia might justifiably resist or avoid compliance on the grounds that the state’s own 
internal, electorally mandated measures to protect rights are superior to those of the regional 
institution. 
We can see some evidence of the extent to which different ASEAN states are likely to 
be responsive to domestic pressure vis-à-vis AICHR by considering the appointments that 
have been made by different states to the regional human rights body. It is notable that most 
states have made extremely conservative appointments, of career diplomats or former 
bureaucrats. Notable exceptions are Indonesia and Thailand, who appointed, respectively, a 
civil society representative (Rafendi Djamin) and an academic and former Human Rights 
Commissioner (Sriphapa). The majority of appointments add to the perception that AICHR is 
not constituted with the will or capacity to challenge states on human rights issues, 
particularly on issues that concern the means by which governments of the region attain 
power and the methods by which they hold on to it. Rafendi Djamin, has already spoken of 
the ‘flaws’ in AICHR, of his concern to make AICHR ‘more effective and credible’ and the 
difficulties he has encountered: ‘Until now, AICHR has never [held a] conference. Why? I 
cannot impose on AICHR members to meet the media [and will] leave it for others to 
judge.’160 
 
3.5.4 Democracy’s Lack of Determinacy  
This chapter is about the link between democracy and human rights, and the extent to which 
limited democracy amongst the states of Southeast Asia affects the legitimacy of ASEAN’s 
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regional human rights institution. So far, I have been concerned with explaining how 
democracy influences the way states order and protect human rights, and by extension, why a 
regional human rights institution constituted by a majority of non-democratic states is 
unlikely to reflect the interests and wishes of a majority of peoples in the region, and so will 
lack legitimacy. The argument is fairly simple. Democracy undergirds human rights, and 
where commitment to democracy is weak and ideas about democracy are incoherent, the 
authority of institutions constructed to promote ‘human rights and democracy’—or human 
rights alone—is extremely weak. 
This section approaches the legitimacy question from a different perspective, focusing 
specifically on the legitimacy of the norm of democracy, as it is referred to in the ASEAN 
Charter and the TOR of AICHR. This section considers whether or not the norm of 
democracy, as described in the Charter and TOR of AICHR, is sufficiently ‘determinate’. 
Thomas Franck argues that one of the elements of the legitimacy of a norm is ‘the ability of 
the text to convey a clear message, to appear transparent in the sense that one can see through 
the language to the meaning.’161  
I will outline at the outset two obvious objections to the following discussion about 
the determinacy of democracy as a regional norm in Southeast Asia. The first objection is that 
it is too early to judge the norm’s determinacy, and that the meaning of the norm will become 
clearer (or not), as regional practice around it develops. About this, I agree, and the 
discussion proceeds with the caveat that state practice, and decisions made by AICHR and 
the ASEAN Summit, will alter evaluations of the norm’s determinacy. It is possible that the 
Commissioners of AICHR will use their mandate to initiate discourse about the meaning and 
value of democracy, and to begin a process of deliberation at the regional and state levels 
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about how to implement principles of equality and justice in circumstances of economic 
uncertainty and political insecurity.  
The second objection is that all norms of international law are indeterminate, and that 
this lack of clarity is fundamental to their nature. Koskeniemmi makes this argument in the 
‘Epilogue’ to From Apology to Utopia, when he contends that inevitable indeterminacy is the 
result of the political processes that create international law, where ‘participants have 
contradictory priorities and rarely know with clarity how such priorities should be turned into 
directives to deal with an uncertain future.’162 For Koskeniemmi, the fact that it is ‘possible to 
defend any course of action—–including deviation from a clear rule—by professionally 
impeccable legal argument that look from rules to their underlying reasons, make choices 
between several rules as well as rules and exceptions, and interpret rules in the context of 
evaluative standards,’ is in no way a ‘deficiency’ of international law, but an ‘absolutely 
central aspect of international law’s acceptability.’163 Koskeniemmi also accepts that 
indeterminacy undermines the force of international law, in a ‘fundamental’ way.164 It is 
acceptable to states because it is weak. Democracy’s ambiguity in the ASEAN Charter is 
certainly, as Koskeniemmi reminds us, the outcome of the region’s complicated politics. It is 
useful nonetheless to investigate the scope and degree of determinacy of ‘democracy’ at the 
beginning of the norm’s regional life. In this way, we can trace its meaning as it evolves 
through practice and discourse.  
On Thomas Franck’s view, if democracy is to function as a basis for the rule of law, it 
must be framed with a degree of precision. Institutions designed to promote the norm—such 
as AICHR and the ASEAN Summit—must be able to communicate its meaning and to shape 
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specific ‘situational commands’. Determinacy is relevant to prospects for compliance. Those 
to whom a principle is addressed need to know precisely what is expected of them, and if a 
principle is broad and vague, then it will be open to different and contradictory 
interpretations, and applied in an arbitrary, and political, manner. In these circumstances, 
those to whom a law is addressed are easily able to justify noncompliance.  
Article 5 of the ASEAN Charter obligates ASEAN Member States to take all 
necessary measures, including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to 
implement the provisions of this Charter effectively and to comply with all obligations of 
membership.
165
 Included among the broad compass of Charter provisions that ASEAN 
Member States are expressly obligated to implement under Article 2(2) of the ASEAN 
Charter are:  
(h) adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and 
constitutional government; 
(i) respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human 
rights, and the promotion of social justice; 
(j) upholding the United Nations Charter and international law, including 
international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States; … 
 
In addition to these specific obligations, the Preamble to the ASEAN Charter refers to 
‘the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ and Article 1 includes amongst the Purposes of 
ASEAN: 
4. To ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with the 
world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment;  
… 
7. To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to 
promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to 
the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN; … 
 
The TOR of AICHR provide that AICHR will be guided by the principles of: 
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d) Adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and 
constitutional government; 
 
e) respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human 
rights, and the promotion of social justice; 
f) upholding the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including 
international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN Member States; … 
 
How determinate is the norm of ‘democracy’ in the ASEAN Charter and the TOR? 
We can seek guidance on this from two sources. The first is the context in which ‘democracy’ 
is placed in the text of the ASEAN Charter and the TOR of AICHR. The second is the way in 
which ASEAN has attributed meaning to the word ‘democracy’ in the past.  
As this chapter has already shown, the context in which the word ‘democracy’ is 
placed leads to contradictory interpretations. On the one hand, the word is placed alongside 
terms such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’, which have an unambiguous meaning and 
a long pedigree in ASEAN discourse and practice. This would suggest that ‘democracy’ 
should be seen as hortatory, and primarily understood as the right of ASEAN states to 
continue to determine for themselves how they realise principles of democratic governance, 
according to their own subjective standards. As to what these standards might be, this chapter 
has described the disparate understandings of democracy in Southeast Asia and the reasons 
for these plural understandings (3.2) and some of the different motivations behind ASEAN 
states including ‘democracy’ in the ASEAN Charter (section 3.4). This discussion points to 
the different attitudes and intentions of states when they were negotiating the Charter and 
TOR of AICHR, which prima facie leads to multiple and contradictory understandings of 
democracy amongst the different ASEAN states, and resulting ambiguity about the meaning 
of the word in the Charter and in the TOR of AICHR.  
Chapter 3: Resisting Democracy 
 
117 
 
On the other hand, the ASEAN Charter also references the United Nations Charter 
and international law, which would seem to support the idea that ASEAN states were 
attempting to import some kind of objective global standard into the regional conception of 
‘democracy’. We return here to the discussion in section 4 of this chapter (3.5.4). Over the 
past twenty years, we have seen elaborated by the various institutions of the United Nations, 
a progressively clearer idea of periodic elections as instrumentally important parts of ensuring 
public influence of governmental action, a means of ensuring that those who exercise power 
are responsible to an electorate who can periodically hold them accountable.  
The second place to look in order to gain an understanding of what democracy means 
is ASEAN’s prior statements and conduct in relation to issues of democracy. As I discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the first time ‘democracy’ was referred to in official ASEAN discourse 
was in the 2004 ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action. In that document, ASEAN 
leaders promised to ‘bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane,’ 
and to this end, stated that they would: 
promote political development in support of ASEAN Leaders’ shared vision and 
common values to achieve peace, stability, democracy and prosperity in the region. 
This is the highest political commitment that would serve as the basis for ASEAN 
political cooperation. In order to better respond to the new dynamics within the 
respective ASEAN Member Countries, ASEAN shall nurture such common socio-
political values and principles. In this context, ASEAN Member Countries shall not 
condone unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of government or the use of their 
territory for any actions undermining peace, security and stability of other ASEAN 
Member Countries. 
 
 The reference to ‘unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of government’ provides 
the kernel of a definition of democracy. From these words, we can deduce that there is 
regional agreement that democracy means, at a minimum, that power should change hands 
according to and under the law of a country, and that elections are the means by which this 
should occur. But this is difficult to reconcile with the fact that in September 2006, a military 
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junta seized power from an elected government in Thailand and at the ASEAN Summit, 
which met in the Philippines in January 2007, no mention was made of Thailand’s very 
recent ‘unconstitutional and undemocratic change of government.’ The case of Myanmar is 
considered in detail in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, and that chapter provides further 
evidence of the contradictory and inconsistent manner in which ASEAN has approached 
issues of ‘democracy.’  
One aspect of determinacy is that there must be an authority capable of resolving 
ambiguity. Franck puts this requirement as the need for ‘an effective, credible, 
institutionalized interpreter of the rules,’ meaning, ‘in various instances.’166 Under the 
ASEAN Charter, this body is the ASEAN Summit, composed of the Heads of State of the 
ASEAN Member States. The ASEAN Summit is the supreme policy-making body of 
ASEAN, with a mandate to decide on key issues pertaining to the realisation of the objectives 
of ASEAN, important matters of interest to Member States and all issues referred to it by the 
ASEAN Coordinating Council, the ASEAN Community Councils, and ASEAN Sectoral 
Ministerial Bodies.
167
 In the case ‘of a serious breach of the Charter or noncompliance,’ the 
matter is referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision.
168
 The Summit possesses broad and 
undefined emergency powers, to address emergency situations affecting ASEAN by taking 
‘appropriate’ actions. Diane Diserato argues that the ASEAN Summit also appears to have 
also been vested with a form of ‘quasi-judicial oversight’, because it is empowered to decide 
on matters referred to it under Chapters VII (Decision-Making) and VIII (Settlement of 
Disputes) of the ASEAN Charter.
169
 Under the Charter, ASEAN continues to observe a strict 
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consultation-and-consensus rule in decision-making (musyawarah-mufakat).
170
 However, the 
Charter also provides that if consensus cannot be achieved, ‘the Summit may decide how a 
specific decision can be made.’171 The Charter does not provide any recourse from an 
ASEAN Summit decision, such as suspension or expulsion of a member who fails to comply 
with a Summit decision. This ambiguity hardly meets the criteria of an ‘effective, credible, 
institutionalized interpreter.’ 
In Chapter 1, I argue that one of the benefits of a regional human rights regime is its 
ability, amongst a limited membership, to create processes through which broad norms 
become progressively more specific, their meaning and applicability sketched in 
ever-increasing detail, until the contours of a norm are apparent to those to whom the norm is 
addressed. The preceding argument in this section would seem to foreshadow difficulties in 
achieving this in Southeast Asia, in relation to the norm of democracy, because of tension 
between the norm of ‘democracy’ and other principles, and the lack of an authoritative 
decision-making institution.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
We in ASEAN never disputed that democracy for the people and opportunity for the 
individual to develop his or her own greatest potentials are indeed important 
principles. We disagree, however, that political systems qualify as democratic only 
when they measure up to certain particular yardsticks. Similarly, the norms and 
precepts for the observance of human rights vary from society to society and from one 
period to another in the same society. Nobody can claim to have the monopoly of 
wisdom to determine what is right and proper for all countries and peoples.
172
 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, quoted in the New Strait Times, 20 
July 1991. 
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The history of Southeast Asia, the nature of relations between states, and the diverse 
political characters of ASEAN’s members, seem to tell against democracy taking hold as a 
regional norm. My aim in this chapter has been to delve deeper into the idea of democracy, 
particularly in relation to human rights norms and the institutions designed to promote and 
protect them. I have examined democracy as a political fact (in terms of the idea that its 
absence in the region abrogates consent and hence legitimacy) and as a norm (the idea that 
democracy’s lack of determinacy undermines the norm’s legitimacy and hence prospects 
for compliance). My conclusion is that democracy’s limitations in the region abrogate (at 
present) the legitimacy of the regional order and that the ambiguity of the term ‘democracy’ 
undermines (again, at present) its legitimacy as a regional norm. Because of the idea of 
human rights put forward in Chapter 1, these conclusions have implications for my 
hypothesis about regional human rights regimes.  
I argue in Chapter 1 that human rights are not ‘grounded in our humanity’, contingent 
on nothing except ‘the laws of nature, the nature of humanity and that the right-holder is a 
human being.’173 I argue that human rights are instead principles of respect and recognition 
that societies agree upon, through deliberative processes, which occur in circumstances of 
liberty and equality. Following Rawls, I argued that these processes require the guarantee of 
certain rights (minimally, rights of political participation, liberty and freedom of speech). 
Without these guarantees, it is not possible to arrive at a fair agreement about human rights 
(what rights should be implemented and how). The consequence of this is that where states 
lack these guarantees, the circumstances do not exist for citizens to formulate freely their 
understanding of rights, to express the social values that they wish to guide governance, and 
to set the limits of state power. It is not possible for a society to deliberate on how it wishes to 
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order the relationship between groups, individuals and the state, and how it wishes to 
prioritise different values.  
My hypothesis that regions possess special significance as purveyors of human rights 
norms assumes that between states and regions, iterative processes of norm-elaboration 
occur. But if the peoples of states within the region are constrained from engaging in 
discourse about the meaning and value of rights, then the role of a regional institution such as 
AICHR in facilitating the processes of norm emergence will be limited. It will be limited 
most particularly in respect of rights that are political, such as rights of association, 
expression and participation. Concomitantly, rights perceived as non-political may meet with 
greater acceptability. In the final chapter of this dissertation, I give an example of a broadly 
non-political norm, the regional movement to end trafficking in persons.  
But given the importance of the relationship between human rights and democracy, 
described in this chapter and in Chapter 1, democracy’s deficits significantly undermine the 
legitimacy of the nascent human rights regime in Southeast Asia, and raise questions about 
the strength of my hypothesis in relation to regions where democracy is not widely practiced 
and no shared meanings attach to the concept. In the following chapter, which involves a case 
study of Myanmar, we see the way in which democracy’s deficit affects the ability of the 
regional order to influence change in ASEAN’s ‘pariah’ state. 
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Chapter 4: Regional Institutions and Democratic Consolidation:  
ASEAN and Myanmar1 
 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 Myanmar: History and Transition to Democracy 
4.2.1 Entering Democracy’s ‘Grey Area’ 
4.2.2 The Architecture of Transformation 
4.3 Regionalism and the Consolidation of Democratic Transformation 
 4.3.1 Modes of Engagement: Myanmar and ASEAN 
4.3.2 Myanmar and the International Community 
4.4  Regional Organisations and the Consolidation of Democracy 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 3, I argued that the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by a regional human rights 
institution depended in part on whether or not the region was comprised of democratic states. 
This is because of the symbiotic relationship that exists between democracy and human 
rights, and the problems that arise in respect of notions such as ‘consent’ and ‘determinacy’ 
in non-democratic regional organisations. I argued that a lack of normative legitimacy leads 
to problems with an institution’s authority, with the consequence that states are less likely to 
act against their own interests in order to comply with the institution’s decisions or 
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recommendations, and more likely to pursue a path of partial, or incomplete compliance. 
Non-compliance further undermines the institution’s authority. For this reason, a (normative) 
legitimacy deficit has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of a regional human rights 
institution. These concerns underpin civil society critiques of AICHR,
2
 and the critiques that 
have emanated from some external audiences.
3
 
 From the arguments in Chapters 2 and 3, we can conclude that AICHR began its life 
with a lack of legitimacy and that the absence of regional democracy is the primary 
explanation for this. The next task is to demonstrate the effect of the lack of democracy and 
the consequent lack of legitimacy on the power of regional institutions to effect change. It is 
difficult to examine this via a study of AICHR’s influence on ASEAN states, because the 
institution is so young. But another way of examining this question, from a broader historical 
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perspective, is to consider past regional efforts to influence human rights and democracy in a 
particular state. That is the task of the present Chapter.  
The arguments in Chapter 2 and 3 about the importance of democracy are consistent 
with a large body of international relations scholarship on the regional organisations of 
Europe, the Americas and Africa, which demonstrates that the effectiveness of regional 
efforts at democracy-promotion and human rights protection depends in large part on the 
existence of prior ideological and institutional commitments to democracy and human rights 
within states themselves.
4
 According to liberal scholars, this is because international 
influence works (whether through sanctions, shaming or ‘co-optation’), by shifting the 
domestic balance of power in favour of reform.
5
 Governments are forced to respond to this 
shift by recalculating their interests along the lines of protection of civil liberties and human 
rights. Thus ‘[w]ithin a community of established Liberal democracies,’ writes Andrew 
Moravcsik, ‘international regimes can contribute to the harmonisation, perfection and 
adjudication of human rights, which can lead, over generations, to the emergence of the 
transnational rule of law.’6  
Following this logic, the success of the European and Inter-American systems lies not 
in the transformation of undemocratic regimes, but in the improvement of already democratic 
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 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe’ 
(1995) 1(2) European Journal of International Relations 157; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a 
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217; Jack Goldsmith, ‘Should International Human Rights Law Trump Domestic US Law?’ (2000) 1 Chicago 
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5
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6
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ones.
7
 In circumstances where political systems do not reflect the popular will, governments 
have no need and no incentive to reshape policy on the basis of domestic demand. Thus we 
find that regional human rights enforcement is least effective when directed against the least 
democratic states and the worst human rights offenders.
8
 Andrew Moravcsik terms this 
phenomenon ‘the tyranny paradox.’9  
If the tyranny paradox is evident, even in relation to engagement between highly 
democratic regional organisations and pariah states (for example, the Council of Europe and 
the Greek military junta, 1967–1974), or moderately democratic regional organisations (the 
Organisation of American States and Haiti, 1991), then we would expect it to be even more 
evident in relation to a non-democratic regional organisation such as ASEAN, and a state 
such as Myanmar, which between 1962 and 2010 was ruled by successive military 
governments. We would expect ASEAN’s influence (and the influence of its nascent 
institutions such as AICHR) on the progress of Myanmar toward popular governance and 
political freedom, to be extremely limited. This is particularly so given the fact that unlike 
these other regional organisations, ASEAN’s original purpose was not to encourage or 
promote democracy among its members. 
Liberal scholars would support the hypothesis about the tyranny paradox and non-
democratic regional organisations with arguments along the following lines. First, non-
democratic regional organisations have only a limited ability to muster the moral opprobrium 
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Ibid, 180. 
8
 Research suggests that this is because the power of a regional human rights regime lies in its ability to either (i) 
expel members, depriving them of the tangible security and economic benefits of membership, or (ii) to ‘shame’ 
offenders, by attaching opprobrium to the actions of norm violators, threatening the reputation of authorities and 
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involves the complete relinquishment of power. Second, suppression of civil society organisations and 
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9
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necessary to ‘shame’ a non-democratic member into altering its behaviour.10 Shaming plays 
to the self-identity of states that see themselves as liberal, democratic, rights-respecting 
nations, who belong to a community of similar nations.
11
 If a member of the community’s 
behaviour is inconsistent with the identity to which they aspire, then (so the argument goes) 
the state will be deeply offended and will (eventually) alter its behaviour. This process cannot 
occur in a context where no community of democratic nations exists.
12
 In short, reputation 
still matters to non-democratic states. But when they are among a group of non-democratic 
peers, it matters less. 
Second, the character of transnational relations within democratic regional 
organisations is thought to support and reinforce the maintenance of democratic norms. 
Keohane and Nye have argued that communication between governmental elites and 
bureaucrats in different liberal states produces complex interdependencies and informal ties 
between actors at different levels of government within different states.
13
 Communication 
between these groups occurs based on a set of assumptions about the ideological and 
structural principles of a liberal state, contributing to a ‘transnational society’ that further 
socialises members to dominant liberal norms. Anne-Marie Slaughter has taken these ideas 
further, showing how the component parts of disaggregated (liberal) states (the legislative, 
executive, administrative and judicial units of the state) interact with one another in ways that 
                                                 
10
 Here, the phrase ‘non-democratic’ means organisations comprised of a majority of non-democratic states, 
rather than referring to the ways in which the organisation functions. 
11
 On shaming , see Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International 
Norms and Domestic Change (1999) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1: 'The Socialization of 
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World Politics, 160–194, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, The 
New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1996) Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
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reinforce social pressures and social incentives to comply with group norms.
14
 Slaughter 
argues that one of the reasons that international organisations are important is because they 
often provide the structures within which these interactions can take place.
15
 Part of my 
theory about regional organisations is that they provide particularly fertile environments 
within which these interactions can occur. But these socialisation effects depend on whether 
or not there exists a reasonably homogenous, liberal, rule-of-law culture amongst the group 
of states.
16
 If such a culture does not exist, then an international organisation will possess 
only a limited ability to foster links between domestic institutions, and to influence and 
ultimately ‘co-opt’ elites within less democratic institutions along a path of liberal reform. 
 Third, political scientists such as Jon C Pevehouse have argued that the increased 
range of common interests and similar preference structures within democratic regional 
organisations means that they are more likely to exert pressure on authoritarian regimes 
(which assists in transitions to democracy) and are more likely to make democracy a 
condition of membership of the regional organisation (which encourages the consolidation of 
democracies).
17
 Furthermore, democratic regional organisations are more likely to enforce 
conditions regarding the democratic practices of members, because of shared understandings 
about the importance of democracy for trade, peace and cooperation with other 
democracies.
18
 The transparency that characterises democracies makes it more difficult for 
them to avoid their responsibility (for example, to impose trade sanctions against an 
offending regime). In summary, outside a community of liberal democracies, ‘the instruments 
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 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004) Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press. 
15
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Worlds’ (2004) in Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004) ibid, 152–161.  
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 Ibid, 198–200. 
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of international human rights statecraft remain more primitive and the results correspondingly 
more modest.’19 
 This chapter examines Myanmar’s tentative transition from military rule to 
democracy, which began (in earnest) in 2008 with the adoption of a new Constitution. It 
focuses specifically on the period 2010–2012, during which political attention was 
concentrated on issues concerning the consolidation of democracy, such as: how to avoid a 
democratic breakdown; how to institutionalise democracy; and how to complete and deepen 
democracy.
20
 I argue that in the context of Myanmar’s uncertain consolidation, and the 
concurrent evolution of ASEAN into a more rules-orientated, more democratically conscious 
and human rights-aware regional grouping, ASEAN possesses a not-insignificant degree of 
power and influence in relation to Myanmar. My argument is not that the regional 
organisation constrains or conditions the behaviour of Myanmar’s leaders through its 
coercive powers (it has none) or normative legitimacy (which is extremely limited). Rather, 
my argument is that ASEAN assists Myanmar’s leaders with the problem of ‘credible 
commitments’ and thus provides crucial legitimisation for the government’s plans for a 
controlled and circumscribed evolution towards democracy.  
I draw attention to two particular causal factors that account for regional effects in the 
Myanmar/ASEAN dynamic. The first factor concerns the nature and character of military 
regimes in general, of which Myanmar’s regime in the period 1962–2010 is a typical 
example. I argue that military regimes are guided by the imperatives of preserving national 
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Moravcsik (1995) above n 4, 184.  
20
 In this chapter, I use ‘consolidation’ to mean avoiding the breakdown of the kind of democracy that Myanmar 
became after the Constitutional referendum in 2008 and the 2010 elections, rather than consolidation in the 
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unity, security and stability. For this reason, military regimes are more likely to initiate 
controlled, gradual processes of democratisation and liberalisation, in which the military 
retains a significant and independent role in politics.
21
 The success of democratic reform led 
by the military depends on bargains struck between the military and opposition forces. Such 
bargains will only be effective if the reform process is perceived by the opposition as 
genuine. In this regard, I suggest that even relatively non-democratic regional organisations 
such as ASEAN play an important role in supporting and legitimising the efforts of 
reformers. Specifically, I argue that ASEAN’s decision to allow Myanmar to take the 
chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014 provided Myanmar’s reformist government with credibility 
at a crucial time in its early democratic consolidation. 
The second factor is the role and influence of ASEAN’s most powerful member and 
leading democracy, Indonesia, in providing an example for Myanmar’s democratic 
consolidation. I suggest that Myanmar’s leaders have taken careful note of the commonalities 
between the two countries (their histories of colonialism, post-war struggles for 
independence, cultures of authoritarianism and military dominance and problems with 
reconciling ethnic communities). Myanmar’s rulers are in certain respects attempting to 
follow the path of limited democratic reform (and rapid economic development) embarked 
upon by Indonesia’s President Suharto in 1971. Myanmar’s leaders hope to avoid Suharto’s 
ignominious end, twenty-six years after he first came to power, by managing expectations 
and change in ‘top-down’ fashion.22 My theory is that even non-democratic regional 
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 ‘Burma eyes Indonesia-style reforms’ (3 October 2011) Radio Free Asia available at: 
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organisations can exert significant influence on the direction taken by regimes in the early 
stages of democratic consolidation, if the region’s ‘leader’ nation is (like Indonesia) strongly 
(and newly) democratic.  
This chapter is structured in the following way. In the first part of this chapter (4.2) I 
describe and explain Myanmar’s transition from authoritarianism to an uncertain semi-
democracy, in the period from the gaining of independence from Britain after the Second 
World War, to the ‘fair and free’ federal by-elections of 2012. I provide an historical 
overview of Myanmar’s political history, drawing attention to the realities that have shaped 
the character of Burmese governance: the nation’s location between China and India; its 
economic underdevelopment; its memories of colonial exploitation; the suffering and 
destruction of the Second World War; its internal political instability; and its ethnic and 
political disunity.
23
 I then (in 4.2.1) describe Myanmar’s recent move toward democracy, and 
offer explanations why, after forty years of authoritarian rule, Myanmar’s generals decided to 
slowly relinquish their grip on power. I argue for a multi-causal explanation that attributes 
‘the well-springs of liberalization’24 to elements of both process and structure. I point 
specifically to the changing economic and security priorities of Myanmar’s elites, and their 
desire to move away from economic dependence on China. Finally (in 4.2.2), I locate these 
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developments within the literature on democratic transitions, considering how ideas about 
democracy’s ‘third’ (or fourth) waves might apply in the case of Myanmar.25  
In the second part of this chapter, I consider the influence of regionalism in 
democratic transitions. First, I survey the political science literature on regionalism and 
democratisation, drawing attention to the conclusion reached by Jon C Pevehouse and others 
that states located within regions with a high democratic density are more likely to transition 
to democracy (4.3). Following on from this, I consider ASEAN’s attempts to influence 
Myanmar’s behaviour (towards liberalisation and democratisation) (4.3.1). I describe how in 
the period from 1997 (the year of Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN) until 2007 (the year in 
which some ASEAN members called for Myanmar’s suspension because of gross violations 
of human rights), ASEAN largely failed in its attempts to change the behaviour of its ‘pariah’ 
state. I suggest that the Association’s few successes in this regard (convincing Myanmar to 
relinquish the chair of ASEAN in 2006, and ASEAN diplomacy in the aftermath of Cyclone 
Nargis in 2008) in general serve to underline Myanmar’s lack of regard for the regional 
association and the association’s consequent ineffectuality. However, I also point out (4.3.2) 
that the influence of the international community was of equally little influence. Next, I 
consider whether and how Myanmar’s responsiveness to ASEAN changed in the period 
spanning the adoption of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution, designed to usher in a ‘discipline 
flourishing democracy,’ to the 2012 by-elections, in which Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD 
participated. I suggest that during this period, ASEAN and its institutions became critically 
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important to key actors within Myanmar’s changing political constellation. I draw particular 
attention to the way that Myanmar looked to the political evolution of the region’s most 
populous nation and most economically powerful member, Indonesia, as a model for its own 
transition from authoritarianism, and the enormous significance attached by Myanmar’s 
leaders to their campaign to have Myanmar take the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014. 
My conclusion is that for states consolidating democracy, even regional institutions 
that possess limited amounts of normative legitimacy can assist in reconfiguring the interests 
of ruling elites towards reform. The turn from normative legitimacy (the ‘supply-side’ of 
regional organisations) to subjective legitimacy (how the organisation is perceived and 
responded to by certain states and various actors within the state) suggests certain 
refinements might be made to existing liberal theory about the power and influence of 
regional organisations. But in the end, I largely concur with Emmerson’s 2008 prediction 
about democratisation in Southeast Asia: 
The key wellsprings of liberalization are likely to remain internal to the countries 
undergoing change. But if democratization does proceed on the ground, one may 
expect ASEAN to play a greater, if still marginal, role both in reflecting and 
facilitating such a trend. Conversely, if Indonesia’s democracy fails to perform, is 
replaced, and thereby sets a negative example for the region, the loss is likely, if again 
marginally, to reinforce the ASEAN Way of privileging sovereignty, non-
interference, and consensus to the benefit of regimes that are less transparent or 
accountable but seemingly more effective.
26
  
 
4.2 Myanmar: History and Transition to Democracy 
 
Most accounts of post-colonial Myanmar present the nation’s history as a sequence of 
defining historical moments: 4 January 1948 and independence from Britain; the coups of 
1958 and 1962; the 8 August 1988 mass demonstrations and their suppression; and the 
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‘Saffron Revolution’ of 2007.27 Through these events, the country’s history is most 
commonly portrayed as a dyadic struggle between democracy (represented by Aung San Suu 
Kyi and the NLD) and authoritarianism (the Generals of the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed 
forces).
28
 The drama and tragedy of this struggle has, in many ways, shaped external attempts 
(by the ‘West’, and less consistently by ASEAN), to influence the course of events in 
Myanmar. Because the aim of this chapter is to understand the reach and limitations of 
regional efforts in this regard, this chapter’s abbreviated account of Myanmar’s history 
inevitably concentrates on the historic events, uprisings and constitutional moments that have 
brought Myanmar into focus for the world.  
This focus, however, risks ignoring deeper readings of the nation’s political history, 
which emphasise intractable divisions between Myanmar’s majority Buddhist Bamar 
population, and ethnic minorities (the Arakanese, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, and 
Mon peoples) who inhabit Myanmar’s outlier regions.29 Praetorianism and the failure of 
representative democracy, which are the recurrent themes of Myanmar’s post-colonial 
history, both in certain senses derive from the core problem of attaining national unity in the 
face of ethnic diversity.
30
 Democracy’s other impediments—economic underdevelopment; 
the years of attempted socialism, the absence of the institutions of democracy (an 
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independent judiciary, a free press)—have exacerbated the destructive consequences of 
disunity.
31
  
The British, who ruled Burma between 1825 and 1948, viewed the country ‘as a 
distant provincial appendage of the Indian empire.’32 The British were concerned primarily 
with the growth of trade, and they found the administrative structure of the pre-colonial 
Burmese kingdom ‘so lacking in uniformity that they experienced great difficulty in 
understanding it.’33 Therefore, they attempted to dismantle it. The colonial government 
‘removed the last Burmese monarch, demobilised the indigenous military forces, ignored 
indigenous social and status distinctions, and abandoned constraints on economic growth as 
well as denigrating Buddhism.’34 The British also redrew the map of Burma, creating ‘Burma 
proper’, inhabited by the majority Bamar population, and the ‘excluded’ or ‘frontier areas’ of 
the surrounding hills, inhabited by ethnic minorities.
35
 Thus, British rule ‘set the stage for a 
future generation of ethnic problems.’36 
The Japanese invasion of Burma in World War II brought British rule to an end. The 
British returned to Burma after the Allied victory in 1945, to find that an indigenous political 
movement had emerged, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), led by General 
Aung San.
37
 The AFPFL won elections held in April 1947, and undertook the drafting of 
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Burma’s first post-independence constitution, the 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma. 
Aung San and six members of the Executive Council were assassinated in July 1947.  
The 1947 Constitution created a central Union government, which ruled the Burman 
heartland and ethnic satellite states, some of which remained uncommitted to unification with 
Burma.
38
 The degree of autonomy held by the states was perceived by them to be grossly 
inadequate, and by the end of Burma’s first parliamentary period, most of the ethnic 
minorities were in open rebellion. This was the response to ‘a growing sense of frustration, 
expressed by virtually all the minority peoples in Burma, with the progressively more 
centralized and Burmanized form of government in Rangoon.’39 The Burmese army, the 
Tatmadaw, were called upon to suppress widespread ethnic (and communist) insurgencies.  
Convinced that Myanmar’s fledgling democracy was unable to prevent the 
balkanisation of the Union, the army executed its first coup d’etat in 1958. In 1962, in the 
face of civil war, General Ne Win carried out a second coup d’etat, declaring that the army 
had no alternative but to take drastic steps in order to avert the impending danger of the 
disintegration of the Union.
40
 Ne Win’s effective rule of Myanmar lasted from 1962 until 
1988.
41
 As leader of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), Ne Win presided over the 
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drafting of the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, which 
provided for a one‐party system of government with nominally autonomous states for the 
non‐Burman nationalities.42 In relation to foreign policy, Ne Win pursued non-alignment.43 In 
terms of domestic policies, his regime employed an indigenous variety of Marxist-Leninist 
socialism. Ne Win undertook the systematic nationalisation of the economy and other 
institutions. Political freedoms of association and expression were extremely limited during 
this period, and the army was used to control ongoing ethnic violence. Nonetheless, ethnic 
rebellion continued, the economy declined, and a democratic opposition to Ne Win’s rule 
began to coalesce around Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of General Aung San.
44
 In the face 
of these challenges, the military’s hold on power grew tighter. Like many leaders in the 
region at that time, Ne Win perceived that to permit internal strife was to invite the external 
intervention of the great powers. On Burma’s eastern border, the People’s Republic of China 
pressed, overtly supporting communist insurgencies.
45
 Meanwhile in the West, the United 
States pursued its catastrophic Cold War policies in Vietnam.  
Yet Burma remained largely ignored by the world until the events of 1988.
46
 Ne 
Win’s decision to devalue the currency threw commercial activity into chaos and wiped out 
savings, leading to a situation of political tension, uncertainty and widespread unrest.
47
 A 
brawl between a small group of students and townspeople over the type of music played in a 
                                                                                                                                                        
Program Party (BSPP), the military‐dominated state party. He resigned at the height of the 1988 popular 
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café ended as widespread rioting in Yangon, Mandalay and the capitals of ethnic states, and 
calls for the overthrow of the Burma Socialist Programme Party.
48
 By early August, hundreds 
of thousands were marching through Rangoon and other cities carrying signs calling for 
‘democracy’ and the removal of the one-party system. General Saw Maung declared martial 
law on August 3, and combat troops were brought from fighting ethnic insurgencies to patrol 
the streets of Rangoon.
49
 The demonstrators were suppressed, and many were killed.
50
 In 
September, under General Saw Maung, the army deposed Ne Win’s successor, took control 
of the government, suppressed the demonstrations, and ended the movement toward 
liberalisation and democracy.
 51
 
In September 1988, General Saw Maung established the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC). In his Annual Armed Forces Day Speech on 27 March 1989, 
Saw Maung declared that the military would help to install ‘a newly elected government 
comprising the elected representatives of the people … we, the members of the Tatmadaw, 
are to go back to our barracks.’52 But the statement of SLORC Secretary, Major General Khin 
Nyunt, was more ambiguous: ‘the military would remain in office after the next elections 
until a new constitution could be drafted and a stable government could be formed.’53 In 
preparation for nationwide multi-party elections, the SLORC permitted the registration of 
political parties to stand in competition with the SLORC‐supported National Unity Party 
(NUP) (a renamed BSPP). The NLD, led by a dissident former general, Tin U, and by Daw 
                                                 
48
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Aung San Suu Kyi, emerged as the leading opposition party.
54
 In elections held on 27 May 
1990, the NLD succeeded in gaining 392 of 485 seats, while the NUP won only 10. A 21‐
party coalition of ethnic parties making up the UNLD (United Nationalities League for 
Democracy) won a total of 66 seats.
55
  
On the eve of a meeting of elected NLD members of the Pyithu Hluttaw (National 
Assembly), at which an amended version of the 1947 Constitution was to be adopted as a 
provisional constitution, the SLORC issued Declaration No. 1/90, stating that it held power 
under martial law, was not bound by any constitution, and would hold power until it had 
ensured that a sufficiently strong constitution was in place.
56
 Under new SLORC chairman 
General Than Shwe, the SLORC put in place a National Convention charged with drafting a 
new constitution. On July 10th 1992 the composition of the National Convention was 
announced. The 702 members had been handpicked by the SLORC and included only 99 
elected representatives from the 1990 elections.
57
 The NLD ultimately boycotted the 
proceedings, and declared its intention to develop its own version of a new constitution. The 
SLORC’s response was to promulgate Law 5/96, which outlawed constitution‐drafting 
activity outside the framework of the National Convention and, in addition, outlawed any 
action that could be regarded as negative towards the National Convention and its work.
58
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55
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There were no further moves towards a new constitution until mid‐2004, when the 
‘moderate’ Khin Nyunt, then Prime Minister, presented a seven-step ‘roadmap’ towards 
constitutional democracy.
59
 The roadmap commenced with reconvening the National 
Convention, which had been adjourned since 1996. This was to be followed by drafting a 
new constitution in accordance with the principles laid down by the National Convention; 
adopting the Constitution through a national referendum; holding free and fair elections for 
the Pyithu Hluttaws; convening the Hluttaws; and finally, building a modern, developed and 
democratic nation.
60
 The NLD maintained its boycott of National Convention proceedings. 
Some ethnic actors, who had signed ceasefires with the regime, decided to participate.
61
  
Under the leadership of Khin Nyunt, in 1997, the SLORC reorganised itself into the 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), with General Than Shwe as Chairman.
62
 But 
any brief glimmerings of glasnost under Khin Nyunt proved to be abortive. On 30 May 2003, 
under orders from General Maung Aye, an NLD convoy carrying Aung San Suu Kyi was 
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attacked, leaving four dead. Suu Kyi herself was taken into protective custody.
63
 In July 
2003, the National Convention was again adjourned.
64
 In 2005, the capital city was suddenly 
and secretly moved from Yangon to Pyinmana, a move that was not advertised to foreign 
diplomats, or even to the government’s own civil servants.  
In August 2007, the junta suddenly and without warning raised fuel prices 500 per 
cent, threatening the livelihoods of much of the country’s population. Protests originating 
with city dwellers spread to the Buddhist sangha (monks), who joined civilians in 
demonstrations against the regime. Selth writes: ‘[s]uch was the popular mood that some 
activists and foreign journalists even began to predict the downfall of the military 
government.’65 Myanmar’s government responded to the ‘Saffron Revolution’ with tear gas, 
baton charges and in Yangon, with machine-gun fire.
66
 Yangon’s Buddhist monasteries were 
raided and thousands of monks were forcibly detained.
67
 The number of political prisoners 
doubled in the wake of the riots and came to include not only members of opposition political 
parties, but also monks, journalists, and community activists. Many were sentenced to 
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lengthy prison terms in closed court proceedings. At the same time, fighting against non-
Burman minorities along the country’s eastern border intensified.68 
The international response to the ‘Saffron Revolution’ was immediate and 
unequivocal. US President George Bush and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
condemned the regime’s suppression of peaceful dissent. UN officials called for the release 
of detained protesters, and for a peaceful dialogue between the SPDC and the civilian 
opposition.
69
 The European Union (EU), the European Parliament and several ASEAN 
countries expressed ‘deep concern’, and China and India were called upon to encourage 
reconciliation between the SPDC and the opposition movement.
70
 
In the shadow of the Saffron Revolution and its suppression, the 2008 Constitution of 
the Union of Myanmar was finally completed. Plans for the constitutional referendum, 
however, were thrown into chaos by Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar’s Irrawaddy 
Delta on 2 May 2008.
71
 The international community offered assistance and relief. But, as 
reported by The New Light of Myanmar, ‘the strings attached to the relief supplies carried by 
warships and military helicopters are not acceptable to the Myanmar people,’ and the 
government at first refused, and then delayed and impeded, the delivery of aid.
72
 The regime 
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confounded observers by its decision to press on with the referendum despite the death, 
suffering and chaos caused by Cyclone Nargis. From the French government, and from some 
within the British parliament, came calls for the implementation of the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’.73 The response of Myanmar’s government was suspicion and propaganda. A cartoon 
published in the May 11th edition of The New Light of Myanmar depicts a group of smiling 
Burmese running toward a ballot box having the following conversation: ‘When we are 
confronted with natural disasters we all cooperate! When internal and external saboteurs 
disturb us we defend ourselves together! It is because the army and the people are on the 
march hands joined!’ In one corner of the picture there are three figures labelled: ‘Nargis, 
Internal and External Saboteurs’.74 
At the end of May 2008, the SPDC announced that 98.12 per cent of qualified voters 
participated in the referendum and the ‘yes’ vote was 92.48 per cent.75 With the constitutional 
referendum completed, the SPDC asked the 17 cease-fire groups to lay down their arms and 
form political parties in order to participate in the election.
76
 
 
4.2.1 Entering Democracy’s ‘Grey Area’ 
Larry Diamond describes a ‘grey’ area of democracy, in which authoritarian regimes make 
some concessions to liberal reform and multi-party politics, but by various means prevent or 
impede the formation of a popularly elected government.
77
 This is the place in which 
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Myanmar found itself in the period 2010–2012. The 2008 Constitution, which Taylor 
describes as the army government’s attempt to address issues that had grown out of 
Myanmar’s post-colonial history (the power and autonomy of the armed forces under the 
Constitution; the issue of political autonomy for ethnically designated groups; the distribution 
of power between the executive, legislature and judiciary at various levels of government) 
installs unelected military representatives in 25 per cent of seats in the new federal 
parliament. Yet the Constitution also opens a certain amount of democratic space for new 
political actors. This space, combined with other acts of liberalisation on the part of the 
government (ending many of the restrictions on the media, permitting the establishment of 
new trade unions and labour associations, enabling the registration of new and previously de-
registered political parties), promises, for many, the beginning of a new political era. Kyaw 
Yin Hlaing, for example, suggests that ‘if fairly and sincerely implemented,’ the 2008 
Constitution could ‘provide both the government and the opposition with an institutional 
framework and political space through which they can work towards gradual democratization 
of the country.’78 
The Constitution of the Union of Myanmar
79
 describes the nation’s political system as 
a ‘genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system’80 employing the ‘union system’.81 The 
administrative power of the state is divided among the central government, and seven states 
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(named after ethnic groups) and seven regions.
82
 There are also five ethnically designated 
Self-Administered Zones, and one Self-Administered Division.
83
 Legislative power, though 
predominantly remaining with the central government, is distributed to the states, regions and 
the Self-Administered Zones and Division.
84
 The approval of a majority of 75 per cent of the 
Pyihtuangsu Hluttaw, both chambers of the national parliament, is necessary in order to 
amend the fundamental principles of the Constitution, its overall structures, and the rules for 
forming the legislature, the judiciary or declaring a state of emergency. Amendment 
proposals must be put to the people in the form of a referendum.
85
 
The President, accorded significant power under the Constitution,
86
 chairs the 
National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), a body comprised of the president, Vice-
Presidents, Speakers of both Hluttaws, the Commander-in-Chief and Deputy-Commander-in-
Chief of the Defence Services, and key Ministers. The NDSC is established as part of the 
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Executive and is responsible for pardons, honours, diplomatic relations, and the declaration 
of war, with or without reference to the Pyihtuangsu Hluttaw. 
The role of the military is central to the governance of the state:
87
 25 per cent of the 
members of the Hluttaw and its two chambers must be serving army officers appointed by the 
Tatmadaw commander-in-chief; the commander-in-chief has a decisive say in the 
appointment of the President and two vice-presidents.
88
 Certain key cabinet positions (such as 
Home Affairs and Defence) are confined to active military personnel, and the army is fiscally 
and administratively autonomous.
89
 During states of emergency, which are declared by the 
President, the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the Union are transferred to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services ‘to enable him to carry out necessary measures 
to speedily restore its original situation in the Union.’90 The Constitution provides immunity 
                                                 
87
 Under Chapter IV of the Constitution, in the states and divisions, as in the national legislature, twenty-five per 
cent of seats are reserved for the Tatmadaw. Thus Military representatives will occupy 110 seats in the 440-seat 
Pyithu Hluttaw, 56 out of 224 seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw and more than 200 seats in the 14 state and regional 
hluttaws. Ibid. 
88
 The President is elected by the Pyihtaungsu Hluttaw meeting in plenary session after three candidates have 
been nominated by the two chambers and the army members meeting separately (Constitution of the Republic of 
the Union of Myanmar, Article 60). Under Article 59, there are exclusionary provisions relating to the position 
of President and Vice-President: the President must be at least 45 years of age and born of parents who were 
both citizens, and must be acquainted with the political, administrative, economic, and military affairs of the 
state. He or she must also have no allegiance to, citizenship of, or rights and privileges availed by a foreign 
power, nor can his or her parents, spouse, children, or their spouses. In addition, like members of the Hluttaw, 
he or she has to have lived in Myanmar for the previous 20 years unless abroad with government permission, 
free from convictions, of sound mind, not destitute, and not in receipt of support from foreign governments or 
religious organisations. Under Article 61, the Presidential term of office is five years and he or she may serve 
for only two terms. Under Article 71, the President can be impeached if charged by 25 per cent of either house 
of the Hluttaw. For his removal, a two thirds vote is required. Reasons for impeachment are: high treason; 
breach of the provisions of the Constitution, misconduct; disqualification; inefficiency (Article 71(a)). Ibid. 
89
 In The New Light of Myanmar, Si Thu Aung argues that presence of the military in parliament serves as a 
‘balancing weight’, or a system of checks and balances, within the fledgling parliamentary democracy. Si Thu 
Aung, ‘To service as balancing weight’ (21 March 2008) New Light of Myanmar, available at:  
<http://burmalibrary.org/docs4/NLM2008-03-21.pdf> [accessed 1 March 2012].  
90
 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), above n 79, Article 418(a). 
Chapter 4: Regional Institutions and Democratic Consolidation: ASEAN and Myanmar 
146 
 
from legal action to the SPDC, and its agents and personnel, for their decisions and activities 
prior to the coming into effect of the Constitution.
91
  
Section XV of the Constitution creates a Constitutional Tribunal, with the primary 
task of interpreting the Constitution and scrutinising laws passed by the various Hluttaws for 
consistency with the Constitution.
92
 The Constitution includes a range of civil and political 
rights (of expression, assembly, association, language, culture, and rights associated with 
habeas corpus), which may be limited for reasons of ‘state security, prevalence of law and 
order, community peace and tranquillity or public order and morality’ and all of which can be 
suspended during periods of emergency. The Constitution also includes social and economic 
rights, such as education and health.
93
  
In November 2010, Myanmar held its first parliamentary elections under the 2008 
constitution. The military-backed political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party 
(USDP), contested the elections, together with several pro-democracy opposition parties. The 
major opposition party, Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD, refused to participate, because of 
regulations that restricted former prisoners (such as Suu Kyi herself) from standing as 
candidates, and because of a provision that required all parliamentarians to ‘defend the 
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constitution.’94 During the election period, in rural areas, voting was irregular, disrupted and 
in cases prevented, by ongoing ethnic conflict. A suspiciously high number of ‘pre-votes’ 
were counted in favour of the USDP. The USDP’s decisive victory surprised no one.  
Observers were greatly surprised, however, by the inaugural address to parliament of 
newly-appointed President Thein Sein, on 30 March 2011.
95
 In it, the President pledged 
legislative reform in areas such as human rights, health-care, press-freedom and 
environmental protection. More surprising still, in the period from March 2011–February 
2012, the government passed a raft of legislation aimed at legalising trade unions, increasing 
the pension rate, allowing public political gatherings, easing press censorship, and permitting 
the teaching of ethnic minority languages in schools across Burma. On 19 August 2011, 
President Thein Sein met with Aung San Suu Kyi. ‘The Lady’, as she is known within 
Myanmar, told foreign diplomats ‘that she is confident about the future and optimistic about 
the possibility of genuine change’ and that ‘Thein Sein can be trusted, he is genuinely trying 
to reform the country, and needs international support.’96 In September 2011, President Thein 
Sein announced the suspension of the Chinese-funded Myitsone dam project in Kachin state, 
responding to broad public concern that the dam threatened the health of the Irrawaddy River.  
Proceedings in parliament also confounded expectations. During the first sitting of 
parliament, the speaker of the Pyitthu Hluttaw (lower house), displayed robust independence, 
demanding that ministers actually answer the questions put to them by the few minority pro-
democracy members of parliament. These questions, and the responses of government 
ministers, were published in The New Light of Myanmar. The second parliamentary sittings, 
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in August 2011, were televised, and local journalists were invited to sit in a press gallery. The 
Irrawaddy reported that ‘The willingness of Burma’s opposition parliamentarians to raise 
sensitive questions over the past year has thus made the Parliament a more relevant arena for 
political debate over the past year than observers had predicted.’97 The parliament’s unelected 
military officers did not vote consistently with the USDP, but on occasion supported the 
opposition in relation to key pieces of legislation.
98
 
Burma’s third session of Parliament, in January 2012, was dedicated primarily to 
discussion of the national budget. As the local media noted, this was the first time in decades 
that a legislative body has discussed a national budget. The 2011–2012 budget, approved by 
the military in secret before the parliament was convened, allocated 23.6 per cent of the 
budget to the military and 5.4 per cent to health and education. The budgetary bill proposed 
by the President for 2012–2103 included a defence budget of 14.94 per cent, an education 
budget of 4.91 per cent, and a health budget of 2.93 per cent.
 99
 
The new government also intensified efforts to sign cease-fire agreements with ethnic 
minorities. An official ceasefire with the Shan State Army-South (SSA-South) was signed at 
the end of 2011.
100
 In early December 2011, President Thein Sein ordered the army not to 
launch attacks on ethnic armed groups in northern Kachin State
101
 and recommenced 
dialogue with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) aimed at ending the 62-year old 
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conflict. On 12 January 2012, the government signed a ceasefire with the 19-member Karen 
National Union (KNU), to end hostilities between the military and the Karen National 
Liberation Army (KNLA).
102
 The government also continued negotiations with the Chin 
National Front (CNF). These negotiations were complicated by decades of mistrust and by 
continuing uncertainty about whether the military was actually under the control of the 
government. Nonetheless, one peace activist within Myanmar wrote that:  
the introduction of democracy in Burma, no matter how fragile and surreal it may 
seem at the moment, has made all the changes—including new peace overtures with 
the ethnic groups—all the more probable … it is now possible for ethnic groups to 
consider peace from a different perspective. First, the Burmese armed forces are no 
longer the only player; there are institutions under the democratic polity that have 
come into the picture in bringing about peace in Burma ... There is a bicameral 
parliament, which has its own peace committee. It is also deeply involved in 
negotiations with the ethnic groups. Then there are state parliaments and 
governments, some of which are spearheading peace efforts in their own respective 
states.
103
 
 
On 5 September 2011, the government announced the establishment of the Myanmar 
National Human Rights Commission (MNHRC), without the prior knowledge or input of 
parliament, media groups, or civil society.
104
 Prior to the MNHRC, there existed for twelve 
years a ‘Human Rights Committee’ within the Ministry of Home Affairs,105 which in 
November 2007 was transformed into the Myanmar Human Rights Body. In 2010, during 
Myanmar’s appearance before the Universal Periodic Review, Myanmar’s delegates 
acknowledged, ‘the Myanmar Human Rights Body is still in its initial stages and its goal is to 
emerge eventually as National Human Rights Commission in line with the Paris Principles.’ 
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Representatives undertook to take steps to establish an independent human rights institution 
in conformity with the Paris Principles.
 106 
 
The MNHRC follows the ‘commission’ model of NHRI which predominates in the 
Asia Pacific, with investigative and protection functions rather than the ‘ombudsman’ or 
‘think-tank’ model of the Americas or of Europe. It has a mandate to receive and investigate 
complaints of violation of the rights set out in the Constitution, and to communicate its 
findings to relevant government departments. Unlike the Indian National Human Rights 
Commission, which is prohibited from investigating the actions of the military, the Tatmadaw 
has no immunity in relation to Commission investigations.
107
 The chairman of the (MNHRC), 
Win Mra, has linked Myanmar’s Commission to the human rights commissions of other 
ASEAN members, stating that: ‘Our Commission is the fifth of its kind in the ten-member 
countries of ASEAN.’ The chairman claims that the MNHRC conforms with the UN ‘Paris 
Principles on the Status of National Institutions’ (the Paris Principles), and is independent and 
autonomous.
108
 The composition of the MNHRC clearly evinces an attempt to satisfy the 
Paris Principles requirement of pluralism.
109
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Since its inception, the MNRHC has received 20–23 complaints a day.110 
Commissioners have made visits to Insein Prison, Hlay Hlaw-Inn Yebet Prison Labour Camp 
and Kachin State, where fighting against ethnic groups continues.
111
 In 2011, the MNHRC 
issued three statements requesting that the government ‘release prisoners of conscience’ from 
Myanmar’s jails,112 so that prisoners ‘who do not pose a threat to the stability of state and 
public tranquillity in the interest of national races will enable them to participate in whatever 
ways they can in the nation-building tasks.’113 These calls were followed by the government’s 
announcement of amnesties and reductions in sentences for many political prisoners. 
For most pro-democracy activists within Myanmar, and for many outside observers, 
the issue of political prisoners was the litmus test of liberalisation. In 2011, Myanmar’s 
prisons contained a large (though disputed) number of prisoners of conscience, some of 
whom had been in jail since the 1988 uprising.
114
 Former junta leader Than Shwe had made it 
clear on at least two occasions—once just after the November's elections and again early in 
2011—that the release of political prisoners was non-negotiable.115 Despite this stricture, 
however, a motion was bought in parliament to free political prisoners. Lower house speaker 
Thura Shwe Mann—the former third top general in the ruling junta—steered the motion 
through parliament, where it was adopted by a majority.
116
 In October 2011, the President 
announced an amnesty for 6359 prisoners.
117
 On 2 January 2012, President Thein Sein signed 
a clemency order, commuting death sentences to life imprisonment and reducing the 
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sentences of other prisoners.
118
 Under this clemency, 6656 people who had already served the 
time of their reduced sentences were released.
119
 On 13 January, Thein Sein’s government 
released a further 651 prisoners, among them ethnic leaders, leaders of the ‘88 Generation’ 
student movement, and other prominent political prisoners.  
On 5 November 2011, President Thein Sein approved two crucial changes to the law 
on political parties. One removed the clause which provided that former prisoners (such as 
Suu Kyi) could not be members of a political party. The second amended the phrasing of a 
condition requiring all political parties to agree to ‘preserve’ the 2008 Constitution.120 In the 
wake of these amendments, the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi decided to contest seats in the 1 
April by-election, when a total of 48 seats would become vacant.
121
 The NLD won all seats, 
and Aung San Suu Kyi herself joined the parliament. 
 
4.2.2 The Architecture of Transformation 
How do we account for the depth, breadth and speed of reform in Myanmar in the period 
2010–2012?122 For almost thirty years, political scientists have analysed the ‘waves’ of 
transformations from authoritarianism to democracy across Europe, South America, Africa 
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and Asia, and certain patterns of transition have been clearly identified.
123
 There remains a 
fundamental divide between theorists who focus on ‘structural’ explanations for change, 
where reform is seen as dictated by the historical constraints of economics, class and the 
shifting distribution of wealth and power, and those who focus on ‘process’ orientated 
explanations, where change is attributed to the strategic moves of actors and their responses 
to particularistic sequences of events. The most plausible theorising has come from scholars 
such as Samuel Huntington, whose work on democratic transition encompasses both 
structural and procedural arguments for change.
124
 Huntington identifies a link between the 
nature of the incumbent political regime (personal dictatorship, single-party system or 
military junta) and the mode of transition, (whether elite-initiated transition, transition by 
‘pact’ or agreement between ruler and opposition, or popular revolt). 
Huntington identifies three models of democratisation. The first is transformation, 
where elites in power take the lead in bringing about democracy. The second is 
‘replacement’, where change is initiated by a powerful opposition group and the authoritarian 
regime collapses or is overthrown. The third is ‘transplacement’, where democratisation 
occurs as a result of joint action by government and opposition. Huntington’s analysis of 
democratisation in the period 1974–1990 found that the most common form of transition 
from military regime to democracy involved transformation or transplacement, rather than 
replacement.
125
 This means that in most cases, in comparison to other forms of undemocratic 
rule, the military themselves are usually responsible for transitioning their country to 
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democracy, and are in effect responsible for their own demise.
126
 However, there is a catch. 
Although military-led transitions to democracy often occur more rapidly and peacefully than 
transitions from one-party rule, or from personal dictatorships, such transformations are often 
impermanent. The military retain the capacity to reacquire power by non-democratic means 
and having done so once, stand capable of doing so again.  
 The explanation for why military rulers are prepared to relinquish power and embark 
upon processes of liberalisation and democratisation lies in the nature of the military as an 
institution, and the character of those who become military leaders. In most cases, as 
Huntington points out, military leaders ‘virtually never defined themselves as the permanent 
rulers of the country.’127 As in the case of Myanmar, military rulers generally claim to be 
temporarily assuming power in order to save the country from disaster (caused by civil war, 
or anarchy, or the misrule of other leaders). The idea is that when these dangers have been 
safely averted, the military will ‘return to the barracks’ and to their normal military functions. 
For military rulers, the return to civilian rule is always a political possibility; the question is 
when this should occur. On this point, there are often differences of opinion within the 
military itself, and liberalisation often occurs after a change in the top leadership of the 
military regime. Three factors seem to hasten the military’s decision to withdraw from power: 
(i) the cooperation of the opposition in the timing and mode of transition; (ii) a guarantee that 
there will be no prosecution of military officers for acts they committed while they were in 
power; and (iii) guarantees about the preservation of the autonomy and role of the military.
128
  
Huntington describes five major phases that occur during transformations from 
military rule. The first four of these, which occur within the authoritarian system, are: (1)  the 
emergence of reformers, who for a variety of reasons become convinced that democracy is 
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necessary and/or desirable;
129
 (2) the gaining of power by reformers, which often occurs only 
when hard-line authoritarian leaders die; (3)  the failure of moderate liberalisation, when it 
becomes clear that ‘liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium’ and that ‘middle 
courses’ between authoritarianism and democracy do not work;130 and (4)  the neutralisation 
of standpatters, either by weakening, reassuring, or converting them.
131
 The fifth and final 
stage of transformation is the co-optation of the opposition, which is essential to the success 
of the transition.
132
  
The democratisation process itself is shaped by interactions between three groups of 
actors: reformers within government, standpatters, and members of the opposition. Within 
these different groups, there are likely to be diverse opinions about possibilities and prospects 
of reform. These opinions often evolve as reforms get underway, and the dynamics of 
relationships between various actors evolves further as opinions (and power) shifts. For 
example, standpatters within the military who oppose reform may come to accept democracy, 
if it transpires that moves toward democracy do not produce the dangers that they feared. 
Members of opposition groups, initially opposed to government-led reforms, may come to 
accept opportunities to participate in government if it appears to them that reformers within 
the military government are genuine. Huntington writes that in all transitions, three central 
interactions play a role: (i) those between government and opposition; (ii) between reformers 
and standpatters in the governing coalition; (iii) between moderates and extremists in 
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opposition.
133
 The conflictual or cooperative character of these interactions colours the 
democratisation process.  
One of the few points of agreement amongst analysts of Myanmar’s democratic 
reforms is that they were the result of indigenous top down change, and not the result of 
pressure applied in the form of sanctions and trade embargoes by the US and the EU,
134
 nor 
by the inconstant ‘moral pressure’ applied by ASEAN (discussed later in this chapter), nor 
by an un-opposable groundswell of popular opposition to the former military government,
135
 
nor by the efforts of the political opposition. It is reasonably clear that Myanmar’s 
government-led, tightly managed process of liberalisation and democratisation is ‘liberation 
from above’ or ‘regime-initiated liberalisation’. In Huntington’s taxonomy, this is a 
‘transformation’. All of the elements in Huntington’s theory of transformation appear in the 
case of Myanmar in the period 2008–2010.  
 First, there appears to have been a decision on the part of military leaders, most 
importantly on the part of long-time ruler Than Shwe, to effect an orderly transition from 
power.
136
 A number of plausible explanations have been offered to explain Than Shwe’s 
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decision to relinquish power. Some analysts point to the likelihood of self-interested 
motives, such as the increased security of a controlled transition to power-sharing managed 
by someone trusted (such as Thein Sein), rather than the uncertainty (and the occasionally 
dire consequences) of less certain transitions (such as revolution, or internal coup d’etat).137  
Other analysts attribute changes to the frustration of Myanmar’s leaders with Chinese 
dominance of their economy, military acquisitions, and infrastructure. Myanmar’s leaders 
have described tacit Chinese control of the economy as encroaching on Myanmar’s 
sovereignty and are reportedly galled by the description of Myanmar as a Chinese ‘economic 
colony’, or as the unofficial twenty-third province of China.138 Thus in order to lessen 
dependence in China, Myanmar’s military leaders embarked on a program of reform 
sufficient to generate rapprochement with the West and to encourage Western interest in 
economic re-engagement. A final set of reasons attribute to Thein Sein and like-minded 
reformers a genuine wish to guide the political and economic reform the country toward a 
system that betters the lives of Myanmar’s citizens.139 
Than Shwe’s choice of Thein Sein as President is significant in this regard. Thein 
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Sein carries the reputation of being someone ‘less corrupt than most of the former junta 
leaders and a good listener’140—that is, someone who might conceivably carry some 
credibility with Myanmar’s people (and the outside world) as a spearhead of reform. But 
Thein Sein also served as Prime Minister for the junta, and proved himself to be a loyal 
officer to Than Shwe—that is, ‘someone unlikely to turn against Than Shwe and his 
family.’141 Thein Sein is also a leader near retirement, at the end of his career—thus, one 
might think, someone unlikely to embark upon an extreme path of reform that delegitimises 
the work of his own generation of rulers. As Geddes writes, military officers known for 
‘correctness, adherence to rules, fairness, lack of personal ambition, and low charisma’ are 
often seen (by the military) as excellent choices to lead military governments, ‘because they 
are less likely than their more ambitious and aggressive colleagues to consolidate personal 
power or personalize the regime.’142 
In relation to the third of Huntington’s stages, Myanmar’s period of ‘moderate 
liberalisation’, of uncertainty about whether the early glimmerings of reform would translate 
into full-blown liberalisation, was relatively short-lived. By the time of Myanmar’s second 
parliamentary sittings in August 2011, the balance of public opinion about the genuineness of 
government efforts at reform had shifted, from cynicism about the 2010 elections,
143
 to a 
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palpable sense of inevitability about further reform and optimism about prospects for 
democracy.
144
 This change seems to have come about less as a result of the roll-back of 
repressive laws, or the speeches of political leaders about their democratic intentions, than 
from the easing of bureaucratic restrictions on free communication and political discourse, 
much of which occurred without prior announcement and without requiring legislative 
reform. Until 2011, for example, the government blocked the websites of exiled Burmese 
media. Without fanfare, these sites were made accessible in 2011. On Democracy Day, 15 
September 2011, the government unblocked many previously censored international news 
sites, including the BBC, Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), and Burmese language 
broadcasts of Radio Free Asia and Voice of America.
145
 The move followed an earlier 
relaxation of blocks on Skype, Yahoo! and YouTube.
146
 In 2011, it was possible to display 
and sell pictures of Aung San Suu Kyi, an activity that a short time beforehand would have 
risked a jail sentence. The effect was something of a collective political sigh of relief, where 
people ‘talk more freely; they no longer lower their voices when discussing politics; and one 
hears alarm-bell words—democracy, elections, dictatorship—bandied about with an 
uncharacteristic ease.’147  
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A complicated politics surrounds the fourth stage of transformation, which is the 
neutralisation of standpatters. First, Thein Sein and fellow reformers seem to have engaged in 
a conscious process of reassuring the military about the army’s continuing independence and 
power. The terms written into the new Constitution about the continuing importance and 
centrality of the armed forces in the new life of the country, and the provisions relating to the 
non-prosecution of army officers, are a central part of this. On 4 January 2012, Myanmar’s 
Independence Day, President Thein Sein delivered a speech, which was directed squarely at 
reassuring the military of their continuing importance. The speech reiterated the central role 
of the Tatmadaw in the life of the nation. President Thein Sein referred to the ‘divide and 
rule’ racial policy of the British colonial imperialists, who had discriminated between 
Myanmar’s ethnic peoples, ‘casting doubts among the national brethren with intent to 
disintegrate national unity.’148 He reminded Myanmars that it was the Tatmadaw that had 
delivered independence to the nation in 1948, the Tatmadaw that had rebuilt the nation after 
the 1988 uprisings, and the Tatmadaw that had laid down the seven-step roadmap to 
democracy that had resulted in the new ‘people’s government’ that had emerged after the 
2010 elections. He stated that without the Tatmadaw the nation would disintegrate ‘and again 
fall under foreign subjugation.’149 It seems likely that for as long as the commitment of the 
senior military to full-blown democratisation remains uncertain, government reforms will be 
punctuated by substantial acts of reassurance to the military. 
Second, reformers gambled on the economic and diplomatic achievements of the new 
government being enough to convince waverers that support for reform would place them on 
the winning side of history. According to Railway Minister, Aung Min, within parliament, 
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‘some 20% of ministers are liberal and 20% are hardline, with 60% sitting on the fence 
waiting to see who wins.’150 Standpatters within government, such Vice-President Tin Aung 
Myint Oo,
151
 were reported to have fought hard against reformers on key issues such as the 
release of political prisoners.
152
 One analyst credits the President’s courage in persisting with 
liberalisation in the face of standpatter resistance, to the success of peace talks with the ethnic 
minorities.
153
 Around such successes, momentum for further reform gathered, and moves 
toward liberalisation drew yet more support, increasing the sense of inevitability about the 
process toward democratisation. International approbation for the President’s reform program 
also played a part in emboldening reformers to undertake further measures in the face of 
opposition.
154
 The state-run media reported prominently on visits to Myanmar by US 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, former presidential candidate John McCain, former vice-
presidential candidate Joe Lieberman and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, French 
Foreign Minister Alain Juppe and British Foreign Secretary William Hague. Myanmar’s 
politicians referred frequently to world leader’s cautious expressions of optimism about the 
prospects for political reform in Burma:  
The US and the European Union have expressed recognition and support of the 
democratic reforms. Now there are signs that they are willing to review and 
reconsider to lift the sanctions and restrictions that they have unilaterally imposed 
upon Myanmar in the last 20 years.
155
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Despite these internal and external indicators of confidence in Myanmar’s democratic 
future, in the period 2010–2012, great uncertainty remained. Any failure on the part of the 
government would inevitably have emboldened standpatters. As civil society leader Nay Win 
Maung maintained in 2011: ‘Thein Sein means change, but it’s just as likely the situation 
ends in a military coup.’156 
The final stage of transformation, the cooptation of the opposition, resulted from the 
decision on the part of the NLD, and its key leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to soften their stance 
towards the regime, and to accept the government’s overtures to work together toward the 
goal of multi-party democracy.
157
 The new government’s strongest claim to credibility—–
both internally and externally—was Aung San Suu Kyi’s endorsement of the government’s 
path of reform. As opposition leader and former political prisoner, Ms. Cho Cho Kyaw Nyein 
said: ‘[w]hen I talk to Aung San Suu Kyi, she says, “Forget the past.” She says, “Have faith 
in Thein Sein.” If she says that, we must have faith in him.’158  
Suu Kyi’s endorsement of a path of gradual reform, without accountability for the acts 
of the former military rulers, was critical to the success of transformation. It indicated to the 
military that the opposition would behave ‘responsibly’ in the transition toward democracy. 
In the past, Suu Kyi had openly defied the government by orchestrating unlawful gatherings 
and rallies and organising campaigns of civil disobedience.
159
 If the military held the view 
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that ‘Burma’s Gandhi’160 intended to return to these tactics, then the potential for 
derailment—a return to power by hardliners—would have substantially increased. The NLD 
appears to have been aware of this, and adopted policies of moderation and co-operation with 
the government, agreeing to be involved as a junior partner in the process of democratic 
reform. For example, the NLD ended its twenty-year old demand for a reinstatement of the 
1990 election results. Instead, it made demands which aligned with the government’s own 
interests and which the government was able to fulfil without fundamentally weakening its 
grip on power, such as pressuring the military to end ethnic conflict, and calling for the 
release of political prisoners. In doing so, the NLD managed to contain the demands of its 
own hardliners, who consistently argued against any collaboration with the government. At 
the end of 2012, the result was an intricate dialectical relationship between Thein Sein’s 
government and the NLD.  
Given the experiences of how other military regimes have ended, Myanmar’s rapid 
experience of democratisation ought not to be surprising. Moves towards democratisation 
from military regimes end in one of two ways: with rapid democratisation, or with the 
reassertion of rule by the military. Indeed, so familiar is the pattern of democratisation in the 
wake of military dictatorship that Huntington has provided a set of ‘Guidelines for 
Democratizers’ during transformations, which include the following: 
1. Secure your political base. As quickly as possible place supporters of 
democratisation in key power positions in the government, the party, and the 
military; 
2. Maintain ‘backward legitimacy’, that is, make changes through the established 
procedures of the nondemocratic regime and reassure standpatter groups with 
symbolic concessions, following a course of two steps forward, one step 
backward; 
3. Gradually shift your own constituency so as to reduce your dependence on 
government groups opposing change and to broaden your constituency in the 
direction of opposition groups supporting democracy; 
                                                 
160
 The London Times, 8 August 1989, quoted in Kreager, ibid.  
Chapter 4: Regional Institutions and Democratic Consolidation: ASEAN and Myanmar 
164 
 
4. Be prepared for the standpatters to take some extreme action to stop change (for 
example, a coup attempt)—possibly even stimulate them to do so—and then 
crack down on them ruthlessly, isolating and discrediting the more extreme 
opponents of change; 
5. Seize and keep control of the initiative in the democratisation process. Only lead 
from strength and never introduce democratisation measures in response to 
obvious pressure from more extreme radical opposition groups; 
6. Keep expectations low as to how far change can go; talk in terms of maintaining 
an ongoing process rather than achieving some fully elaborated democratic 
utopia; 
7. Encourage the development of a responsible, moderate opposition party, which 
the key groups in society (including the military) will accept as a plausible 
non-threatening alternative government; 
8. Create a sense of inevitability about the process of democratisation so that it 
becomes widely accepted as a necessary and natural course of development (even 
if to some people it remains an undesirable one).
161
 
 
Of these guidelines, the final is perhaps the most important. On this count, Thein Sein 
and his advisers have moved quickly, through the speeches of the President and his ministers, 
and through the state-run media, to create a narrative of inexorable reform. Before domestic 
and international audiences, reform has been described as ‘irreversible’,162 ‘incremental, 
systematic and dynamic.’163 Myanmar is described by President Thein Sein as being ‘on the 
right track’ where democracy ‘can only move forward’ without ‘any intention to draw 
back,’164 so that democracy can give ‘a brighter future for our people.’165 On 4 January 2012, 
the New Light of Myanmar claimed that Myanmar’s reforms were ‘inevitable in light of the 
mainstream of international politics’ where ‘about 60 per cent of world nations are 
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democracies that have chosen their governments through elections.’ Present shortcomings in 
Myanmar’s democracy, the editorial implied, would be progressively addressed as the 
political system evolved.
166
 Regarding the Constitution, for example, the editorial reported 
that: ‘[t]here is no constitution in the world that does not need to be amended at all. The 
constitution of Myanmar will be amended in accord with the law if necessary depending on 
necessary time and circumstances.’167  
The editorial in the New Light of Myanmar on 4 January 2012 also contrasted the 
‘violent conflicts, protests and bloodshed’ that have marked other country’s transitions to 
democracy, with Myanmar’s ‘rapid, peaceful transition with mutual understanding and trust 
and negotiations as directed by its former rulers.’ The editorial asked:  
Can there be a more efficient, correct way? Hence, the Myanmar government can 
daringly disclose that there is no way to deviate from its democratic transition. The 
President and other responsible leaders have reassured the international community 
that they will never turn back from the country’s changes and reforms.168  
 
4.3 Regionalism and the Consolidation of Democratic Transformation  
 
Regionalism influences the democratisation of authoritarian states in two possible ways. The 
first is when the state is located within a geographic zone that is experiencing rapid 
revolutionary political change, and the state becomes swept up in ‘the contagion’ effect of 
democracy.
169
 The second is where, as in the case of Europe and to a lesser extent the 
Americas, the region possesses organisations which set democracy as a condition of 
membership, and the desirability of membership provides an incentive for reform. Neither of 
these applies in the case of Myanmar’s democratic transformation. 
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 In the previous section, I emphasised the endogenous causes of democratisation in 
Myanmar. I explained Myanmar’s transformation in the period 2010–2012, primarily on the 
basis of re-calculations of the economic and security interests of Myanmar’s military elites.170 
This finding would come as no surprise to scholars of Southeast Asia. While theories of 
democratic ‘contagion’ have helped to explain the temporal and spatial clustering of third-
wave democratic transitions in post-communist Eastern Europe (1989–2003), or fourth wave 
uprisings in the ‘Arab Spring’ (2008–),171 there has been no strong evidence of a similar 
pattern of democratic diffusion amongst Myanmar’s neighbours.172 Myanmar has been 
impervious, for example, to any influence towards democratisation from Thailand, even 
though the countries share a long border, a national religion (Buddhism), and deep economic 
and military ties. One can conclude that a ‘neighbourhood effect’ as a direct causal element 
of Myanmar’s democratic transformation is negligible.173  
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 At the end of this chapter, however, I argue that there is some evidence that Indonesia 
was influential on the course of Myanmar’s democratisation, because of historical parallels 
between the two countries, and the position Indonesia occupies as a highly legitimated 
international actor. This is a different argument to that concerning diffusion. The latter 
references a kind of democratic zeitgeist, which shapes the expectations of actors at all levels 
within the state, particularly ‘the masses’. The former refers to specific processes of 
interaction that occur between bureaucrats, legislators and members of the executive in 
different countries, leading to the adoption of similar policies and institutions within a 
particular temporal frame. 
Regarding regional organisations and democratic conditions of membership 
promoting reform, we will see in the following section that the low levels of democracy 
amongst ASEAN’s members, the fact that the Association has not made democracy a 
condition of membership, and Myanmar’s lack of economic and security dependence on 
ASEAN because of its strong relationship with China (and to a lesser extent India), severely 
limited ASEAN’s ability to influence Myanmar along a path toward democratisation.  
My argument in this chapter is that the causal factors relevant to democratic 
transitions are not the same as those relevant to the consolidation and survival of democracy. 
In the case of Myanmar’s transition to democracy (meaning the movement from a system of 
authoritarian rule to one of institutionalised, multi-party governance), regional influences 
were negligible. But in the case of Myanmar’s democratic consolidation, I suggest that 
regional influences are not negligible—even where the regional organisation in question is, 
as in the case of ASEAN, not highly democratic. The explanation for this lies mainly in the 
problem of new democracies and credible commitments.  
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Newly installed democratic institutions are extremely fragile, and not all new 
democracies take root. Reversions to authoritarianism are common.
174
 Indeed, Power and 
Gasiorowski estimate that one-third of all new democracies fail within the first five years of 
their establishment.
175
 In some cases, newly elected democratic leaders exploit their power at 
the expense of democratic institutions (as in the case of the democratically elected Suharto, in 
Indonesia).
176
 In other cases, those left out of power seek to regain control by attempting to 
destroy the new institutions (as has the military in Thailand, on multiple occasions).
177
 The 
uncertainties of the transition period (how power will be shared, and who the players are) 
exacerbate these threats to democracy.  
Where the transitioning regime is a former military dictatorship, as in the case of 
Myanmar, the military stands as the most obvious potential spoiler of a nascent democracy.
178
 
Pevehouse describes two dynamics that can induce the military to reassert itself in the wake 
of democratic transition. The first is where the military feels that the new democracy’s 
leaders and institutions are too weak or disorganised to protect the state, and steps in to 
protect the stability and unity of the nation. The second is where attempts to establish civilian 
supremacy threaten the military, either by decreasing the military budget or by prosecuting 
members of the military for crimes committed during past periods of military rule.
179
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Pevehouse writes that a ‘delicate balance’ is required, between ‘controlling a post-
authoritarian military force while simultaneously holding their loyalty to the new regime.’180  
This balance is extremely difficult to achieve, because at the same time, in order to 
consolidate the democracy, the new government must convince ‘the people’ that it is 
genuinely committed to reform.
181
 Actions which reassure the military—such as maintaining 
the military’s budget and desisting from prosecution for offences under the old regime—are 
actions unlikely to convince the masses that the new government is genuine about reform. All 
new governments suffer to an extent from problems of credibility and low expectations about 
their intention and capacity to effect reform. But this is especially the case where the new 
government is composed largely of officers of the old order, and where the old order has a 
track record of making limited moves toward liberalisation, which are then followed by 
rollbacks. Negative perceptions undermine prospects for consolidation. They ‘perpetuate the 
condition of fragility’ by decreasing the level of trust between political sectors, and reducing 
the motivation for full democratisation.
182
 According to Gunther, Puhle and Diamandouros, 
this kind of dynamic explains why so many leaders in new democracies turn quickly to 
authoritarianism. It is not because of preferences or greed, but because of the instability that 
results from inability to make credible commitments about democracy in the consolidation 
phase.
183
  
In this chapter, I argue that ASEAN holds significant power to assist the consolidation 
of Myanmar’s democracy. First, I argue that ASEAN, post-Charter, is in a position to assist 
Myanmar in making credible commitments about democracy and hence increase the 
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confidence of two key groups—the public, and the opposition—about the prospects for 
successful consolidation. Second, I argue that ASEAN, and particularly its leading 
democracy, Indonesia, is the primary ‘reference group’ to which Myanmar’s leaders will turn 
when seeking models for new democratic institutions. Before I develop these arguments, 
however, it is necessary to traverse the history of Myanmar’s engagement with ASEAN, and 
to note the limited influence of the regional Association in encouraging democratic transition. 
I pay particular attention to the pressure exerted on Myanmar not to take the chair of ASEAN 
in 2006, and the consequences of this.  
 
4.3.1 Modes of Engagement: Myanmar and ASEAN 
ASEAN leaders are wont to characterise the association as a ‘family’. The trope is in some 
ways a useful descriptor of relations between Myanmar and the regional organisation. For 
ASEAN, the potential value of having Myanmar within the family has always been very 
clear; because of Myanmar’s location within the region, its geostrategic importance and its 
rich natural resources. But since joining ASEAN in 1997, Myanmar has been ASEAN’s 
errant adolescent child; wayward, obstinate, immune to parental influence or censure, and 
something of a blight on the reputation of the family.  
Having little economic leverage over Myanmar, ASEAN has attempted to use the 
‘moral influence’ of its relationship to persuade Myanmar’s leaders to govern with decency. 
Individually and as an Association, ASEAN members have cajoled, encouraged, and 
supported Myanmar to become less overtly authoritarian. At times, pressure on ASEAN from 
the EU and the US has forced ASEAN to explicitly condemn Myanmar. But there has never 
been any real doubt on the part of ASEAN that Myanmar should remain part of the family, 
and that—in its own time—Myanmar would grow into responsible adulthood. This is because 
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of ASEAN’s belief that Myanmar ‘would rather remain a part of the ASEAN family than be 
by itself a buffer state sandwiched between two rising powers.’184 The Association has never 
endorsed the sanctions policy implemented by Western countries at the behest of Aung San 
Suu Kyi and her supporters within their domestic constituencies.
185
 Indeed, apart from the 
Association’s outburst of opprobrium after the suppression of the Saffron revolution, it is 
difficult to discern any real moral condemnation on the part of ASEAN of Myanmar’s 
generals. For which ASEAN country has not struggled to resolve issues of historical 
authoritarianism, the role of the military within the state, the reconciliation of restless ethnic 
minorities, or the management of development and democracy?
186
 The lesson learnt by 
ASEAN nations is that the source of liberalisation and democratisation is indigenous, and that 
external pressure is at best irrelevant, and at worst counter-productive. 
ASEAN’s original five members had long held the view that all geographically 
proximate members of the region should belong to the regional association.
187
 Only then, it 
was thought, could the Association truly represent ‘one Southeast Asia’ on the international 
stage.
188
 Burma was offered membership of ASEAN at the time of its creation, but declined. 
From Burma’s perspective, in 1967, ASEAN was an anti-communist organisation, comprised 
wholly of anti-communist regimes, the institutional heir to the explicitly anti-communist 
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Colombo Plan (1951) and the Association of Southeast Asia (1961) and an integral part of 
Washington’s strategy for containing communism, outlined in the Nixon Doctrine.189 China 
had declared that ASEAN was a tool of United States imperialists aiming at containing China 
and other communist powers.
190
 Burma, committed to a precarious policy of non-alignment, 
had no wish to antagonise her powerful neighbour to the North by joining ASEAN. The end 
of the Cold War, and the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam, mitigated regional 
tensions and led to Myanmar’s entry into ASEAN in 1997, together with Laos and Vietnam. 
For Myanmar, closer association with ASEAN offered Myanmar’s government, the SLORC, 
the benefits of legitimacy, a degree of protection from external criticism, and the prospect of 
greater economic interaction with Southeast Asian states.  
ASEAN, for its part, hoped that membership in the Association would encourage 
Myanmar’s regime along a path of controlled liberalisation through trade and interaction.191 
Between 1990 and 1997, ASEAN employed a strategy of ‘constructive engagement’ with 
Myanmar, meaning a mode of dialogue and persuasion, and the pursuit of strategic and 
economic interests, with concomitant encouragement of ‘moderate’ reform along the lines of 
liberal democracy.
192
 Constructive engagement meant access for Thai, Malaysian, 
Singaporean and Indonesian businesses to Myanmar’s raw materials and markets. The 
‘constructive’ aspect of engagement was intended to be two-pronged: (i) the socialisation of 
Myanmar’s elite toward good governance and gradual liberal reform; and (ii) financial 
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investment, hopefully leading to socio-economic development and the creation of a 
democratically-disposed middle class. ‘Constructive engagement’ stood in marked contrast to 
the outright disapprobation, threats and sanctions employed by the United States and the 
European Union.
193
 Underpinning the policy was ASEAN’s uncertainty about China’s 
growing power and regional ambitions
 
and the imperative of bringing Myanmar within 
ASEAN’s sphere of influence, rather than leaving her to China.194  
From the perspective of Myanmar’s ruling elite, ‘constructive engagement’ and even 
‘enhanced interaction’ was perfectly suited to achieving the goals of increasing regional 
investment in the country, while deflecting criticism from its internal politics. Myanmar saw 
the benefits of broadening its economic relationships, rather than limiting itself to an uneven 
dependence on China. The SPDC did not accept that the goal of constructive engagement was 
to change Myanmar. According to Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw, constructive 
engagement meant that ‘ASEAN would see Myanmar as an equal.’195  
ASEAN faced strong pressure from the US and the EU to refuse Myanmar’s 
admission to the Association until the regime had fulfilled certain conditions towards the 
restoration of democracy.
196
 Outwardly, ASEAN’s existing members strongly rejected 
external attempts to steer the course of ASEAN policy,
197
 and it is possible that these 
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attempts, and the desire of Southeast Asian leaders to be seen to resist them, in fact 
encouraged ASEAN’s admission of Myanmar.198 In his opening keynote address to the 
Annual Ministerial Meeting in 1997, welcoming new ASEAN members Myanmar and Laos, 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir referred directly to the pressure that had been put on 
ASEAN by the US and the EU to ‘pass judgement, deny membership and apply pressure on a 
potential candidate so as to force that country to remain poor and therefore unstable.’ He said, 
‘ASEAN must resist and reject such attempts at coercion’ which are ‘not a part of the 
ASEAN way’ and that ‘No one, but no one, should assume that only they know the solutions 
to all problems. They have failed far too often for us to be convinced that only they know 
what is right and what is wrong.’199  
Responding to Mahathir’s speech, Myanmar’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, U Ohn 
Gyaw, emphasised Myanmar’s commitment to ‘the principles and objectives of the 
Association’ and Myanmar’s national goal of achieving a ‘peaceful, prosperous, modern and 
developed Myanmar’ via ‘harmony in political development, social cohesiveness and 
economic growth.’200 Not all ASEAN members were as supportive of Myanmar’s admission 
as Malaysia, which together with Singapore had pushed domestic firms to invest in Myanmar 
in the hope that ‘ASEAN capital would lift the country up.’201 In October 1996, for example, 
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Thailand’s Foreign Minister suggested that the SLORC should bring democracy to Myanmar 
before it was admitted as a member of ASEAN.
202
  
Nonetheless, in July 1997, Myanmar did become a member of ASEAN.
203
 On 
balance, most of ASEAN’s original members held the view that constructive engagement 
would be enhanced if Myanmar were a member. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad was a particularly strong proponent of Myanmar’s inclusion in ASEAN, which he 
viewed as a way of ‘hav[ing] a very positive effect on them,’ exposing them to ‘how 
Malaysia manages its free market and its system of democracy,’ which would make them less 
‘afraid of the democratic process’ and ‘over time, they will tend to give more voice to the 
people ... [T]hey become a member first, then put their house in order.’204 Mahathir argued 
that foreign investment and economic development would change the generals’ ‘attitude and 
perception’ regarding democratic transformation.205 Indonesia, under President Suharto, 
largely shared Malaysia’s view in this regard.  
In the period 1997–2012, Myanmar’s engagement with ASEAN constituted its most 
important and sustained multilateral engagement. Bilateral relations with China, India and 
Bangladesh, though of consequence economically and for Myanmar’s security, did not 
generate the web of institutional and diplomatic linkages spawned by Myanmar’s ASEAN 
membership. In October 1996, even before she became a member of ASEAN, Myanmar had 
formed a ‘Steering Committee on ASEAN Affairs’ under the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
After assuming membership, Myanmars participated in almost all activities at various 
institutional levels as required by ASEAN from the summits to ministerial meetings to 
officials meetings. This included ‘first track’ diplomacy (between government officials) and 
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‘second-track’ engagement (between ‘think-tanks’ such as the Myanmar Institute of Strategic 
and International Studies (Myanmar ISIS) and its regional counterparts). First track 
engagement included the establishment, within each of Myanmar’s Ministries, of an ‘ASEAN 
Unit’ to coordinate ASEAN-related activities and to liaise with other ministries on ASEAN 
matters.  
Kyaw Tint Swe and Aung Htoo write: ‘These units are backbones of the senior 
officials who participate in various ASEAN fora.’206 Indeed, ASEAN membership 
necessitated the establishment of scores of government committees and sub-committees to 
assist Myanmar’s ministers in the cooperation and coordination of work in areas such as the 
ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Schemes (AICO)
207
 and the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). Myanmar set up a National Committee on Informational and Culture, a National 
Committee on Science and Technology, and a National Committee on Social Development, a 
National Commission for Environmental Affairs, the Central Committee of Drug Abuse and 
Control, and the Public Service Selection and Training Board, to ‘be in line with existing 
ASEAN committees.’208 The work of these units, committees and sub-committees was to 
coordinate with the relevant ASEAN committees and sub-committees. ‘Second track’ 
engagement, between the region’s analysts, policy advisers, civil servants, academics and 
military officials, led to participation in workshops, conferences and meetings between 
ASEAN state representatives.  
Yet the dividends of ‘constructive engagement’, in terms of reform within Myanmar, 
were difficult to discern. In 1998, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, Thailand (under a 
new liberal government) moved to reorient ASEAN policy toward Myanmar. This occurred 
against a backdrop of recurrent clashes along the Thai-Myanmar border, growing numbers of 
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political and ethnic minority refugees, the unchecked flow of drugs from Myanmar into 
Thailand,
209
 and the fact that, from 1988 onwards, Thailand became the theatre of choice for 
Myanmar’s dissidents attempting to draw the world’s attention to their plight.210 In this 
context, Thailand called for a new policy of ‘flexible engagement’, meaning a new 
permissiveness to publicly comment on and collectively discuss fellow ASEAN members’ 
domestic policies where these have either regional implications or the potential to adversely 
affect other ASEAN members.
211
 The Philippines supported the Thai proposal, but the 
perception of other ASEAN members was that the policy was ambiguous and lacked criteria 
for its application, and would in likelihood lead only to mistrust and resentment. To most 
members, it seemed a policy that would have precisely the opposite effect of an adherence to 
the ‘ASEAN way’, to which some ASEAN leaders attributed three decades of peace and 
stability in Southeast Asia.
212
 Thus, the policy of constructive engagement was maintained 
with an additional element: ‘enhanced interaction’. ‘Enhanced interaction’ meant that 
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individual member states could comment on the domestic policies of other members, but not 
under the auspices of ASEAN.
213
 
‘Enhanced interaction’ characterised ASEAN–Myanmar interaction between 2000 
and 2003. Within Myanmar, the ascension of relatively moderate General Khin Nyunt meant 
that Myanmar was receptive to encouragement from ASEAN to engage with the NLD and 
even to accept a visit from an EU ‘troika’. During this period, a new Special Envoy was 
appointed, Razali Ismail, a close associate of Malaysia’s President Mahathir. Razali achieved 
some success, facilitating the resumption of SPDC–NLD talks in September 2000 and the 
release of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2002. In January 2001, Mahathir visited Rangoon as 
ASEAN’s representative, and returned home to announce that Myanmar would hold elections 
‘in a few years.’ But he warned, ‘[W]hen elections are held, people must understand that 
elections have limits. And not to use elections to undermine authority.’ Asked to reconcile his 
involvement in Myanmar with ASEAN’s supposed non-interference policy, Mahathir 
explained: 
Myanmar is a special case. The West is trying to pressure Myanmar, pressure 
ASEAN. While we do not want to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, 
we feel that the benefits of the kind of liberal democracy that we have in ASEAN 
countries should be exposed ... to the people and Government of Myanmar so they 
will not reject the system.
214
 
 
ASEAN held an Informal Foreign Ministers meeting in Rangoon in April 2001, 
during which the Philippine Foreign Minister claimed that Myanmar was moving in a 
positive direction: ‘because there is non-interference, we can encourage, we can persuade, but 
we cannot do it with publicity … they know they have to find a solution and they know they 
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ultimately have to follow the democratic process.’215 In August 2002, Malaysia’s Foreign 
minister, Syed Hamid Albar, stated that Burma had promised to follow ASEAN’s lead into 
the mainstream of the international community by ‘moving to the political and democratic 
process.’216 The joint communique of the 34th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 2001 
noted ‘encouraging developments in the Union of Myanmar and appreciated the efforts of the 
Government of Myanmar towards these developments and reiterated our support to the on-
going process of national reconciliation in this country.’217 These sentiments were repeated in 
2002.
218
  
 But the Depayin incident of 2003 showed the limits of ‘enhanced interaction’.219 In 
May 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade was ambushed by members of the pro-military 
Union Solidarity and Development Association. At least four people were killed and Aung 
San Suu Kyi was arrested, together with her entourage. For ASEAN, the incident was deeply 
embarrassing. After the June 2003 Ministerial Meeting Retreat, Singapore’s Foreign 
Minister, S. Jayakumar reported that: 
it [Depayin]was a setback. It's a setback not only for Myanmar but the Myanmar 
foreign minister was also told that it was a setback for ASEAN. It's a setback for 
ASEAN because ASEAN had admitted Myanmar and the other Indochinese 
countries, particularly Myanmar, despite strong opposition from some of the Western 
countries because we felt that it's better that Myanmar be part of ASEAN and we have 
constructive engagement … So we have urged the Myanmar foreign minister to stay 
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on the course with national reconciliation and dialogue, with Aung San Suu Kyi and 
her party, and we also expressed concerns on the safety of Aung San Suu Kyi.
220
  
 
In response, Myanmar’s Foreign Ministry’s Director of Political Affairs, Thaung Tun, 
asked for ‘breathing space’ in order to ‘create democracy and stability.’221 At the 2005 
Annual Ministers Meeting, Myanmar’s representative accepted an Indonesian proposal to 
send a delegation to Myanmar to encourage the junta to hasten democratic reforms, using the 
experience of the other ASEAN countries that have gone through a similar struggle. 
Philippine Foreign Secretary Blas Ople stated that: ‘The goal is not merely the release of 
Madame Suu Kyi, but the release of the entire people of Burma from a regime of oppression 
and repression.’222 Despite these efforts, Lee Jones marks the Depayin incident as the 
beginning of ASEAN’s drift towards ‘critical disengagement’ with Myanmar.223 The clearest 
example of the change in attitude was the Philippines’ support for a resolution against 
Myanmar in the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2006. When Burma asked for ASEAN’s 
support in voting against the resolution, at the December 2005 summit, Myanmar’s 
Secretary-General, Ong, was told, ‘ASEAN has lost the credibility and ability to defend 
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Myanmar.’224 When the issue of Myanmar was put to a vote in the United Nations General 
Assembly in November 2006, the Indochinese states voted against the EU draft resolution, 
but the other ASEAN states merely abstained.
225
  
In 2006, ASEAN’s envoy to Myanmar, Syed Hamid, returned from a visit to 
Myanmar and publicly vented ASEAN’s frustration with Myanmar’s government. In a Wall 
Street Journal editorial entitled ‘It is Not Possible to Defend Myanmar’, Hamid outlined the 
conditional nature of ASEAN’s support for Myanmar and the practice of non-interference, 
explaining that ASEAN had only ‘stood together with Myanmar to endure international 
criticism because we were assured that a ‘step-by-step’ transition process was in place.’ 
Hamid explained that ‘the majority of ASEAN members’ now felt that Burma’s intransigence 
was ‘putting into question ASEAN’s credibility and image,’ denying it the ‘maximum 
benefits’ of cooperation with partners by holding external relations ‘hostage’. Hamid 
concluded that ‘Myanmar does not want us to stand with them ... it is best that it is handled 
by the UN.’ He said that ASEAN expected Burma to ‘be more responsive to the damage done 
to ASEAN by the Myanmar issue,’ rather than ‘digging in and maintaining that they should 
not be subjected to pressure from ASEAN or anybody else.’ According to Hamid, ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers felt that they had ‘been taken for a ride ... they are not getting what they 
want, and they are really losing their patience.’226 
Myanmar had been scheduled to take the 2006–07 chairmanship of ASEAN, but 
ASEAN states faced intense pressure to prevent this from happening, from two quarters. The 
first was the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar (AIPMC), formed in 2004 and 
based in Malaysia, which lobbied to prevent Myanmar from assuming the chairmanship. The 
second was the European Union and the United States, who made clear that they would 
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boycott a Burma-chaired ASEAN. Although Laos and Cambodia provided some muted 
support for Myanmar, all ASEAN states were largely in agreement that irrevocable damage 
would be done to the prestige and credibility of the Association if Myanmar took the chair. 
These views were made clear to Myanmar in the lead-up to and at the 2005 ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers meeting in Vientiane. The official statement issued at that meeting announced that 
Myanmar had decided to relinquish its turn to be the Chair of ASEAN in 2006, because it 
wanted to focus its attention on the ongoing national reconciliation and democratisation 
process, in what was a critical year for the country. The statement expressed ASEAN’s 
‘sincere appreciation’ to Myanmar’s government ‘for not allowing its national preoccupation 
to affect ASEAN’s solidarity and cohesiveness’ and assured Myanmar that once ‘it is ready 
to take its turn to be the ASEAN Chair, it can do so.’227 In Myanmar, preparations and 
construction for assuming the chairmanship of ASEAN, and hosting the hundreds of 
ASEAN-related diplomatic meetings that were associated with the chairmanship, were 
already underway. The response of Myanmar’s government to ASEAN’s announcement was 
a week-long news blackout of the decision.
228
  
Later that year, in the wake of the Saffron Revolution and its suppression, ASEAN’s 
Foreign Ministers gathered in New York in September 2007 for the UN General Assembly. 
There, they had a ‘full and frank discussion on the situation in Myanmar.’229 Afterwards, the 
Foreign Ministers issued a statement expressing their ‘revulsion’230 over reports that 
demonstrations in Myanmar were being suppressed by violent force and that there had been a 
number of fatalities. The statement, delivered by Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo, 
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stated that Ministers were ‘appalled’231 at reports of automatic weapons being used against 
demonstrators, and demanded that Myanmar’s government immediately desist from the use 
of violence. It strongly urged Myanmar to exercise utmost restraint and seek a political 
solution, to resume its efforts at national reconciliation with all parties concerned, to work 
towards a peaceful transition to democracy, and to release all political detainees, including 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. ASEAN endorsed the decision of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon to send Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari to Myanmar, and welcomed the assurances of 
Myanmar’s Foreign Minister that a visa would be issued to Mr Gambari in Singapore.232  
George Yeo discussed ASEAN’s September 2007 statement in an interview The 
Straits Times the following month.
233
 According to Yeo, ASEAN had decided ‘about a year 
and a half ago’ that it was no longer in a position to defend Myanmar internationally, ‘in the 
UN or the International Labour Organisation (ILO) or anywhere else.’ Yeo described the 
meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in New York in the hour before they were due to meet 
the UN Secretary General, and the common feeling amongst them that they had no choice but 
to express ASEAN’s condemnation of events in Myanmar: ‘If here at the UN we had no 
common response, how could we face the Secretary-General? Or what do we say to the other 
countries? We would have lost all credibility.’234 Yeo explained that when he read out the 
statement, all the Foreign Ministers were with him ‘to show everyone that they associated 
themselves with the statement.’ He referred to the gathering as: 
a family meeting where we had to confront one member who had behaved badly. It 
was unpleasant but unavoidable. Whatever others may say, it remains for us that 
Myanmar is a member of the ASEAN family and, good or bad, we can't avoid a 
certain association, a certain responsibility, a certain connection with the fate of that 
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country. But we have very little leverage over the internal development there. What 
we have is moral influence as members of the ASEAN family.
235
  
 
Yeo admitted that the turmoil in Myanmar had tested the group's cohesion and unity, 
and that if ASEAN avoided the issue of Myanmar: 
it stood to lose all credibility and respect … When we talked about ASEAN 
integration in the future, the international community would ignore us. We would feel 
ashamed when we looked ourselves in the mirror. So, the ministers were determined 
to look the challenge in the eyes and respond. We had to hold our heads up high. 
When we assembled that morning, each of us had this feeling in himself but we were 
not sure about others. However, when we started talking, it became quickly clear that 
all of us felt the same way. For this reason, achieving consensus that morning was not 
difficult.
236
 
 
The strength of ASEAN’s September 2007 statement took many by surprise.237 
ASEAN’s traditional methods of ‘quiet persuasion’ appeared to have been replaced by strong 
public condemnation. Writing at the time of ASEAN’s denunciation of Myanmar, Emmerson 
wondered whether the statement might signal an unravelling of the ‘ASEAN Way’, and its 
foundational commitment to sovereignty, non-interference and consensus as the basis for 
decision-making.
238
 Emmerson’s hope was that: ‘Even if Yeo’s statement had more to do 
with diplomatic damage control than with any principled commitment to democracy, it raised 
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a question for ASEAN and suggested a hope for the future. The question was whether 
regionalism in Southeast Asia should remain indifferent to democracy.’239  
ASEAN’s response to Cyclone Nargis, which devastated Myanmar’s Irrawaddy 
region in November 2008, perhaps represents the high point of the Association’s engagement 
with the regime. In the aftermath of the cyclone, there were calls from the French Foreign 
Minister (and others) for the UN Security Council to invoke the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
doctrine to authorise the delivery of aid without the consent of the Myanmar government.
240
 
The ASEAN Secretary-General, Surin, was able to convince Myanmar’s government to 
accept aid, and ‘to establish a space, a humanitarian space, however small to engage with the 
Myanmar authorities.’241 Surin told an audience in Washington that ASEAN was ‘trying to 
work around a very, very strict resistance and mentality and mindset that have been there for 
a long, long time.’242 ASEAN certainly enjoyed a degree of success in this regard. The 
Association was granted more access than any other international or regional organisation. 
The United Nations Secretary-General was unable to contact the military leadership in 
Myanmar, but ASEAN Ministers enjoyed high-level discussions with Myanmar’s rulers. 
While access by Western aid workers was carefully monitored, a Tripartite Core Group 
initiated by ASEAN and composed of representatives from Myanmar, ASEAN, and the 
United Nations, was formed to create a mechanism for channelling international assistance 
into Myanmar.  
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 Haacke summarises the history of ASEAN’s limited ability to influence Myanmar in 
the following way:  
Myanmar was admitted to ASEAN in part to lessen Myanmar’s dependence on China. 
That rationale retained its salience. Furthermore, Myanmar always had the option in 
the last resort of leaving ASEAN. Both calculations constrained what the Association 
could do to influence Myanmar. If Myanmar left ASEAN, ASEAN could no longer 
claim to represent Southeast Asia as a whole. Such a step would damage ASEAN 
more than Myanmar.
243
  
 
4.3.2  Myanmar and the International Community 
The preceding tale of ASEAN’s limited influence on Myanmar should not convey the 
impression that some other (more robust) course of action on the part of ASEAN, such as 
suspending Myanmar (if such as thing were possible in an organisation which is required to 
make its decisions through consensus) might have led more quickly to Myanmar’s 
democratisation. Between 1988 and 2010, Suu Kyi maintained her call for Western states to 
continue a policy of sanctions against Myanmar, and in 2012 continued to assert that 
sanctions were effective in weakening the regime and ending the rule of Myanmar’s 
generals.
244
 Most careful scholars and policy analysts strongly disagree with her.
245
 Buffered 
by its military, diplomatic and economic ties with China and India, Myanmar’s leaders 
proved impervious to the sanctions and embargoes of the United States and the European 
Union, which included trade restrictions and denying visas to Myanmar’s military leaders, 
ministers and senior officials of Myanmar.
246
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 India had expanded trade relations with Myanmar and provided military assistance 
(training and weapon sales) to Myanmar’s generals from 1991 onwards, as part of its ‘Look 
East’ policy. India’s influence in Myanmar, however, could not rival China’s. From the mid-
1980s, China was a critical element of the economic and military (and hence political) 
survival of the military regime. China was involved in the economic reconstruction of 
northern Myanmar, by building power stations, roads, bridges and telecommunication 
facilities. Myanmar, in return, agreed to the exploitation by Chinese companies of 
Myanmar’s natural resources. At the same time, the arms deals negotiated with China 
allowed Myanmar’s military to regain control of fighting in the ethnic-minority areas.247 As 
Western criticism intensified after the 1988 crackdown on pro-democracy protestors, the 
United States and the European Union imposed increasingly stringent sanctions on 
Myanmar.
248
  
 Beijing’s political support for the regime became correspondingly more important. At 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1990, Beijing prevented the adoption of 
the first draft resolution on the human-rights situation in Myanmar.
249
 When Premier Li Peng 
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visited Myanmar in 1994, the SLORC referred to China as its ‘most trusted friend’.250 In 
2005, observers noted the symbolic significance of Myanmar’s decision to move the capital 
closer to China and India, and away from Southeast Asia and the West.
251
  
The efforts of the United Nations to effect reform in Myanmar have been generally 
unproductive. Attempts in 2005 to have Myanmar placed on the Security Council’s agenda 
were blocked by Russia, China and Algeria.
252
 In May 2006, the UN sent Ibrahim Gambari to 
Burma to raise human rights issues and the prospects for restoring democracy. Gambari met 
with the three senior SPDC Generals—Than Shwe, Maung Aye and Soe Win, but also met 
with Aung San Suu Kyi. This diplomatic thaw between the UN and Myanmar—which many 
believed had taken place on the advice of China, as a way of forestalling a Security Council 
resolution – was short-lived. Upon Gambari’s return to the UN, Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan appealed to Than Shwe to release Suu Kyi. The following day, the SPDC extended 
her detention. When the Security Council finally voted on Myanmar in January 2007, 
Indonesia, then a non-permanent member, abstained (together with Congo and Qatar).
253
 
China, South Africa and the Russian Federation voted against the resolution. China and 
Russia’s consistent defence of Myanmar in the Security Council also diminished the prospect 
of establishing a Commission of Inquiry (COI) into alleged crimes against humanity 
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committed by the country’s military rulers, as recommended by United Nations human-rights 
rapporteur, Tomas Ojea Quintana.  
It is fairly clear that stronger measures by the international community, Western 
states, or ASEAN, would not have resulted in any positive change in Myanmar. Indeed, it is 
likely that stronger measures would only have increased the paranoia and xenophobia of the 
regime, and caused further impoverishment to the people of Myanmar.
254
  
 
4.4 Regional Organisations and the Consolidation of Democracy 
 
Section 4.3.1 demonstrated the ineffectiveness of ASEAN in encouraging Myanmar’s 
transition to democracy. In this section, I suggest that ASEAN is nonetheless important to 
Myanmar during the period of its democratic consolidation. There are two reasons for this. 
First, Myanmar’s presence within ASEAN increases her ability to make credible 
commitments (to domestic and international audiences) about reform. Under duress from the 
United States and the European Union, in 2006 ASEAN effectively denied Myanmar the 
chairmanship of the Association, because of the anti-democratic and oppressive practices of 
Myanmar’s government. In 2011, Myanmar was awarded the 2014 chairmanship of the 
Association because of ASEAN’s confidence in her program of reform. The prestige attached 
to the chairmanship significantly increases the costs for Myanmar of backtracking on reform. 
Because of this, the promises made by Myanmar’s leaders about reform are more credible. 
Second, ASEAN represents a group of states which share histories of colonialism, 
conflict and difficult (and in some cases incomplete) transitions to democracy. Because of 
this, and because of the facts of proximity and geography, it is to examples within the region 
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that Myanmar turns when looking for precedents for democratic consolidation. We see this 
most clearly in Myanmar’s relationship with Indonesia. In this final section, I consider these 
two ideas. 
Were Myanmar’s generals humiliated, or merely disappointed, when they were forced 
to renounce the 2006–2007 Chairmanship of ASEAN?255 The chairmanship involves hosting 
not just the annual ASEAN Summit, but also scores of ASEAN ministerial meetings, the 
Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN PMC) meetings with the ASEAN Dialogue Partners, 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asian Summit (EAS), the latter of which 
includes Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United 
States and Russia. Myanmar strongly resisted early calls from the United States and the 
European Union to give up the chairmanship.
256
 At the time she renounced the chairmanship, 
at the July 2005 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2005, construction work had already 
commenced in Yangon and Naypidaw, to prepare the city for the hundreds of government 
representatives, dignitaries and journalists who would inevitably flock to the city.
257
 When 
the announcement of Myanmar’s ‘decision’ to forgo the chairmanship was made, there was a 
week-long black-out of the news in Myanmar.
258
  
All of this suggests that General Than Shwe’s government would have enjoyed the 
prestige and legitimacy that flowed from hosting such an important diplomatic event, and 
would have used the chairmanship to improve the domestic legitimacy of the government. If 
this is the case, then being constructively denied the chairmanship would have been a source 
of (a) embarrassment to the generals (b) vindication for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, 
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both of whom had lobbied ASEAN parliamentarians, and the US and the EU, to pressure 
ASEAN into refusing Myanmar the chair. 
Rodolfo Severino, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, posited that Myanmar would 
have been brought more quickly to the path of reform if it had assumed the chairmanship of 
ASEAN in 2006. He argues that the regime in likelihood would have taken measures of 
reform sufficient to enable it to fulfil its duties as host of important diplomatic events, such as 
the Post-Ministerial Conference and the ASEAN Regional Forum, events usually attended by 
representatives from the United States.
259
 Severino is not alone in this view. AFP reported 
that Myanmar’s foreign diplomatic community was disappointed that Myanmar had not taken 
the ASEAN chair in 2006. One diplomat was quoted as saying that the result was ‘a hollow 
victory, … not serving the causes of democratization.’260 Another diplomat told Agence 
France-Presse that ‘perhaps, it was a lost opportunity.’261 These sentiments, from those on 
the ground in Myanmar, have been echoed by scholars such as Kyaw Yin Hlaing, who argue 
that Myanmar’s relinquishment of the ASEAN chair in 2006 did not speed reform inside 
Myanmar and indeed lessened whatever leverage ASEAN might have had over the state.
262
 If 
Myanmar were chair of ASEAN in 2006–2007, it would have had to grant visas to American, 
European and other foreign journalists. Hlaing asks whether Myanmar’s generals would have 
so brutally suppressed the Saffron Revolution in 2007 in full view of the world’s foreign 
correspondents.
263
  
What, then, can we make of ASEAN’s decision in 2011 to support Myanmar’s 
assumption of the chairmanship in 2014? It is important not to overdraw the significance of 
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the chairmanship narrative. After years of benign constructive engagement, ASEAN is not 
perceived by the people of Myanmar to be a bastion of democracy.
264
 Nonetheless, ASEAN’s 
wholehearted support for Myanmar taking the chair in 2014, in light of its earlier 
unwillingness for this to occur, was a powerful signal of the regional association’s confidence 
in Myanmar’s reforms. In 2005, the regional leaders publicised their views that Myanmar 
was not ready to assume the chairmanship of ASEAN, because of the nation’s domestic 
problems, such as lack of reconciliation with ethnic minorities and the imprisonment of 
democratic leaders. One of their concerns was that Myanmar’s chairmanship would 
jeopardise ASEAN’s relations with the US and the EU. By 2011, regional leaders had 
reversed their view about Myanmar’s assumption of the chair, indicating a belief that reforms 
were genuine and irreversible, and that Myanmar’s government was no longer an impediment 
to good relations between ASEAN and the West.
265
  
The principle causal link between regional organisations and the consolidation of 
democracy, as described by Pevehouse, occurs when membership in a regional organisation 
is made conditional upon democratic institutions.
266
 The Council of Europe provides the best 
example of the democratising effect of conditional membership.
267
 Membership assists in 
consolidation in a number of ways. First, membership enables the regime to make credible 
commitments about democracy, because ‘regimes would incur significant economic and 
political costs by joining regional international organisations and then violating the 
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conditions of their membership, making reversals of democracy costly to winners.’268 
Second, membership also provides ‘a public and highly visible external validation of the new 
regime that increases the probability that the masses will commit to the new democracy,’ 
which legitimises the new regime. Third, membership binds ‘distributional losers’ in the 
same way that it binds winners—by raising the cost of reneging on membership (which will 
result in loss of ‘trade, economic aid, military assistance, international status, military 
protection’). Fourth, regional organisations can ‘bribe’ losers into complying, through 
economic assistance.  
Because democracy is not a condition for membership in ASEAN, these mechanisms 
do not directly apply to the consolidation of democracy in Myanmar. My argument, however, 
is that we can see a weaker version of these mechanisms at play in the issue of Myanmar’s 
chairmanship of ASEAN, and that the decision to allow Myanmar to assume the chair in 
2014 had a non-trivial effect on stabilising politics during Myanmar’s uncertain post–
transition period, and helping to lock in democratic reform.  
Myanmar’s renunciation of the chair in 2005—whether voluntarily or as a result of 
pressure from her ASEAN neighbours—was an admission, to domestic and international 
audiences, of the nation’s political problems. In 2011, Myanmar’s apparent readiness to 
assume the chair, and the enthusiastic support for this plan by its ASEAN neighbours (and the 
lack of significant opposition from the US or the EU) was a strong signal of the new regime’s 
intentions about political, social and economic reform and peace-building. Any back-tracking 
on reforms—particularly, for example, the reintroduction of censorship or the re-arrest of 
pro-democracy activists—could mean that Myanmar would be forced to again surrender the 
chairmanship, and her leaders would pay a high political and diplomatic cost for doing so.  
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On Pevehouse’s theory, this cost is enough to encourage those in power to press 
ahead with reforms, not only because they stand to benefit from the prestige of having 
secured the chair, and to discourage those who might stand in the way of reforms, but also 
because they would be blamed for the national humiliation of being deprived of the chair. 
The ‘cost’ issue so important to those in power is as relevant to the losers (the standpatters in 
the military) and is possibly enough to dissuade them from upsetting the path of reform. The 
net effect of Myanmar being awarded the 2014 chairmanship is to bolster the credibility of 
reform policies domestically, encouraging confidence in the new regime amongst the people, 
who see that an organisation that once shunned their nation, is now embracing it. This lends a 
degree of legitimacy to the regime at a crucial time in the process of consolidation. In sum, 
the decision on the 2014 chairmanship was a victory for Thein Sein’s middle-way of reform, 
and reinforced a view (for those inside and outside Myanmar) that history was on the side of 
those operating under the 2008 Constitution. It is also, of course, relevant that ASEAN 
members (and others) have with alacrity rushed to support Myanmar’s economic reforms and 
development plans, holding out substantial ‘bribes’, in the form of aid and investment, for 
Myanmar to continue along the path of democratisation. 
There is one final way in which Myanmar’s membership of ASEAN assists the 
government in overcoming problems about credible commitments. Because of historical 
parallels between Myanmar and Indonesia, the path of Indonesia’s democratisation provides 
Myanmar’s leaders with a plausible precedent for Myanmar’s own democratisation. 
Myanmar’s leaders are able to use the Indonesian example as evidence about Myanmar’s 
potential to achieve successful reform, and to convince sceptics that the government’s goals 
in relation to development and liberalisation are achievable.  
Historians have drawn parallels between Indonesia and Myanmar since colonial 
times. In Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands 
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India, J S Furnivall argued that Burma and Netherlands India (as Indonesia was then known), 
shared the character of a ‘plural society’, which means that: 
In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of 
peoples—European, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, 
for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own 
culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in 
the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different 
sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political 
unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labour along racial lines.
269
  
 
For Furnivall, the plural society was one of the by-products of colonialism, which had 
imposed laissez-faire capitalism upon traditional societies with devastating results. Furnivall 
argued that in both Burma and Netherlands India, capitalism increased the nation’s wealth, 
but contributed to the people’s poverty and powerlessness. In his view, the effects of 
colonialism were more devastating for Burma than for Netherlands India, because in Burma, 
the British retained (or gave to immigrant Indians) the bulk of commercial and administrative 
power, and imposed alien institutions upon an unwilling race. The Dutch, by contrast, ‘tried 
to conserve and adapt to modern use the tropical principles of custom and authority [through 
indirect rule].’270 For Furnivall, the prescription for the plural society was self-government 
and autonomy, geared to a nationalistic form of socialism that would reintegrate post-colonial 
societies.
271
 
In different ways, both Burma and Netherlands India adhered to Furnivall’s 
prescription. After the Second World War, both nations freed themselves from the shackles 
of colonialism and cleaved to extreme forms of nationalism. Both adopted variants of 
                                                 
269
 J.S Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (1948) 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
270
 Ibid, 10. 
271
 Robert Taylor, 'Disaster or Release? JS Furnivall and the Bankruptcy of Burma' (1995) 29(1) Modern Asian 
Studies 45. 
Chapter 4: Regional Institutions and Democratic Consolidation: ASEAN and Myanmar 
196 
 
socialism at different stages of their development.
272
 Furnivall did not, however, account for 
the historical consequences of the central role played by the army, in both nations, in the 
(difficult and bloody) liberations from colonialism, and the formation of the modern states of 
Burma and Indonesia. In both nations, the army became a key actor in the fields of politics, 
administration, and the economy. In both nations, early efforts to establish parliamentary 
democracy collapsed in the face of rebellion in outlying ethnic areas, and in both nations, 
martial law was introduced and re-introduced.
273
 In both nations, opposition movements 
coalesced around the daughters of the heroes of the post-World War II independence 
movements: in Indonesia, Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of President Sukarno; in 
Myanmar, Aung San Su Kyi, daughter of General Aung San.  
Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution was drafted in just twenty days, following the surrender 
of Japan and Indonesia’s declaration of independence.274 Although it was intended to be 
merely an interim constitution, the 1945 Constitution nonetheless survived, substantially 
amended in 1999 in a series of post-Suharto reforms.
275
 Until these reforms, Indonesia’s 1945 
Constitution guaranteed seats for the military in the parliamentary bodies and provided no 
limit on the number of terms a president could serve. Thus for thirty-two years under 
President Suharto, the military continued to exert significant authority within domestic 
politics. During this period, Indonesia also achieved rapid economic growth. It was not until 
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1997 that Suharto’s New Order finally crumbled, under the pressure of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. Suharto resigned in May 1998. 
Throughout the 1990s, President Suharto’s New Order provided a reassuring political 
reference point for Myanmar’s SLORC.276 The SLORC approved of the dual function 
ascribed to the military under President Suharto, as both defender of the state and as political 
actor.
277
 The Indonesian national ideology of Pancasila, which provided a spiritual 
foundation for a strong and unified state, became a model (of sorts) for the SLORC’s attempt 
to garner political legitimacy by welding its governance to the philosophy of Buddhism.
278
 
On many occasions, The New Light of Myanmar praised economic and political 
developments in Indonesia, and declared that Indonesia and Burma were ‘two nations with 
common identity’279 In the 1990s, the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia was published in 
Burmese, and Myanmar’s generals asked delegates to the National Convention on the 
drafting of Myanmar’s Constitution to learn from the Indonesian example.280 Members of the 
SLORC visited Jakarta on many occasions for briefings about the Indonesian constitutional 
order. In September 1995, The New Light of Myanmar stated that:  
In this new Constitution, the military wish to follow the Indonesian Constitutional 
model... While there has been little global, public outcry about Indonesia's system, no 
doubt Myanmar's current military government will continue to be bashed for their 
temerity in thinking that they too should continue to be involved in their country's 
government ... 
281
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The New Light of Myanmar, however, published almost nothing about the tumultuous 
overthrow of President Suharto in 1997, and his resignation in 1998.  
In 1998, responding to popular pressure for reform, Indonesia began a successful 
transition to constitutional democracy. The parliament elected in 1999 proceeded to enact a 
series of constitutional amendments, bringing the Indonesian Constitution closer to that of a 
Western-style liberal constitutional democracy.
282
 One of the centrepieces of Indonesia’s 
reforms was the Constitutional Court. In 2000, a new chapter added an extensive Bill of 
Rights to the Constitution. In 2003, Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission was 
established by legislation. By 2010, commentators were hailing Indonesia’s transition as ‘a 
story that can provide inspiration and encouragement for constitutional projects elsewhere in 
Asia.’283 But it is worth remembering that in the early years of Indonesia’s transition, there 
were few optimists.
284
 Indonesia’s reformers faced problems of entrenched militarism, 
economic underdevelopment, endemic corruption, ethnic and religious tensions, and demands 
for secession in Aceh and Papua. For this reason, for Myanmar’s new government, Indonesia 
is a useful illustration of how Southeast Asian states might evolve beyond their post-colonial 
authoritarian origins, to liberal democracy.  
Are there any deeper reasons why Indonesia might be significant to the consolidation 
of Myanmar’s democracy? Is it possible, for example, to sustain an argument that Myanmar 
has been ‘socialised’ into democratic norms by its ‘elder brother’ in ASEAN?285 In Chapter 
1, I drew attention to the phenomenon of socialisation, where decision makers align their 
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country's policies with those of geographically, historically, politically and culturally 
proximate nations.
286
 The idea is that identification with a reference group generates varying 
degrees of cognitive and social pressures to conform. Pressure is both internal and social. 
Internal pressures include social-psychological costs of nonconformity, such as anxiety, 
regret, and guilt, when a state’s behaviour is inconsistent with the self-concept endorsed by 
the reference group. Social pressures include: (1) the imposition of social-psychological costs 
through shaming or shunning and; (2) the conferral of social-psychological benefits through 
‘back-patting’ and other displays of public approval. One consequence is that actors seek 
reliable models of appropriate behaviour, and then ‘mimic’ the behaviour of these highly 
legitimated actors.
287
 Goodman and Jinks describe these processes as ‘acculturation’.288  
Indonesia is, for Myanmar and within ASEAN, a highly legitimated actor. 
Socialisation theories predict that states will adopt institutional models that have authority 
and legitimacy within the states of their key reference group. We know that from 1993, 
Myanmar’s Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, and high-ranking SLORC members, visited 
Indonesia frequently. SLORC Chairman, General Than Shwe, visited Jakarta in June 1995 
and met President Suharto. Indonesian officials and high-profile businessmen, including 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and Defence Minister Edi Sudrajat, visited Yangon throughout 
1994 and 1995.
289
 Burma’s embassy in Jakarta is the largest in Southeast Asia. If we were 
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seeking evidence of acculturation, we might point to these indicia of interaction, and then 
point to the way that Myanmar’s leaders structured their new Constitution to allot certain 
seats to military officers (as did the Indonesian Constitution prior to the post-Suharto 
amendments), established a Constitutional Tribunal (similar to Indonesia’s Constitutional 
Court) and a National Human Rights Institution, similar to that set up by Indonesia (and the 
other three ‘most progressive’ ASEAN states, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand). We 
might note the comments of the Indonesian ambassador to Myanmar in 1997, who claimed 
that ‘the SLORC would like to imitate the New Order in three key areas: the Indonesian state 
ideology, Pancasila; the 1945 Constitution; and the dual function of the military’290 and 
within Myanmar, the state-sponsored media releases highlighting political similarities 
between the two countries.
291
 But without further evidence, such as the transcripts of the 
National Convention drafting meetings and interviews with constitutional draftsmen and 
politicians, it is difficult to make a strong case for acculturation.
292
  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The focus in this Chapter has been squarely on democracy and the regional influence on 
Myanmar’s democratisation. The underlying concern, of course, is with the human rights 
violations that have accompanied non-democratic rule in Myanmar: for example, the violent 
suppression of political protest; the holding of political prisoners; the curtailment of freedoms 
of speech and association. This chapter has demonstrated that one of the effects of low levels 
of democracy in Southeast Asia is to limit the regional body’s power to influence democracy 
(and human rights) in a non-democratic member. In the decade following Myanmar’s 
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admission to ASEAN, the regional body played no significant role in encouraging transition 
to democracy in Myanmar. How could it? ASEAN lacked (and lacks) the military or 
economic power to bribe, or the moral stature to persuade, recalcitrant members. What this 
chapter has sought to demonstrate, however, is that since 2010, Myanmar has been in a 
process of democratic consolidation. Because the dynamics of consolidation are different to 
the dynamics of transition, ASEAN’s influence on Myanmar in relation to the consolidation 
of democracy is significant.  
The primary explanation for this significance lies in the idea of ‘credible 
commitments’. I have sought to argue that by effectively withholding the ASEAN 
chairmanship from Myanmar in 2006/2007, and then by later endorsing Myanmar’s claim to 
the chairmanship for 2014, ASEAN sent a strong signal to internal and external audiences 
about confidence in Myanmar’s process of democratisation. I have also suggested that the 
historical parallels between Indonesia and Myanmar, and Indonesia’s successful transition to 
democracy, has increased the plausibility of claims by Myanmar’s government that it is 
genuinely concerned with liberalisation. Both indicators of confidence are crucial to 
Myanmar’s new government during the early stages of democratic consolidation, when the 
government is vulnerable to destabilisation from: (i) standpatters, who object to reform 
altogether; and (ii) from sections of the opposition, who doubt the credibility of government-
led reform, or see reform as not going far enough.
293
 
In terms of the theory put forward in this dissertation about the importance of regional 
effects in international human rights law, this chapter supports the arguments made in 
Chapter 2 about human rights, democracy, and the limitations of regional organisations that 
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are not comprised of a majority of democratic states. Yet it also points to the role played by 
newly-democratised and economically successful nations within a region, such as Indonesia 
within ASEAN, in setting an example for other democratising nations. This example is more 
effective, I would suggest, because it is provided by a nation within a geographically 
constrained zone of similar nations, who have shared experiences of colonialism, disunity, 
authoritarianism and underdevelopment. Myanmar turns to Indonesia as a democratic 
precedent not just because doing so adds credibility to its democratic commitments in the 
eyes of domestic and international audiences. Myanmar also, in the words of Foreign 
Minister Ohn Gyaw, believes that ASEAN’s members see it as ‘an equal.’294 The approbation 
(or disapproval) of one’s peers and equals is important, which is why so much significance 
was attached by Myanmar to the issue of ASEAN’s chairmanship. 
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5.1 Introduction 
5.2 The Drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
5.3 The Content of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
 5.3.1 The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: Overview 
 5.3.2 Self-determination and Indigenous Rights 
 5.3.3 Preamble 
 5.3.4 Article 1: ‘Free and Equal in Dignity and Rights’ 
 5.3.5 Article 2: Non-discrimination 
 5.3.6 Article 6: Duties 
 5.3.7 Article 7: 'Universal, Indivisible, Interdependent and Interrelated’ 
 5.3.8 Article 8: Limitations 
 5.3.9 Article 9: Particularisation 
 5.3.10 Solidarity Rights: Peace, the Environment and Development 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
My hypothesis is that regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human 
rights possess a particular kind of legitimacy in the implementation of international human 
rights law. In Chapter 1, I put forward two separate propositions about why this might be the 
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case. The first concerns the nature of the relationship that exists between states within a 
particular geographic zone and the interdependencies between these states, which (I argue) 
under certain historical conditions, can lead to changes in the way governments behave. In 
Chapter 4, I examined this hypothesis in relation to ASEAN and the region’s ‘pariah’ state, 
Myanmar. The conclusion was that although there is some evidence of regional-level 
influence on the consolidation of Myanmar’s democracy, in general, the lack of 
representative democracy among ASEAN’s members constrained regional level influences.  
The second proposition outlined in Chapter 1 concerns the nature of regions as sites 
for deliberating about the meaning and importance of rights. My idea is that regions operate 
as a via media between the state level (where the realisation of rights can be constrained by 
politics and parochial prejudices) and the global level (which is too far removed from the 
particularistic concerns that govern social, cultural and political practice within different 
states). This chapter sets out to explore this second proposition. Does proximity enable more 
useful scrutiny of local issues? Does geography or contiguity breed a shared sense of the 
importance of certain issues? In this chapter, I consider these questions in relation to the 
drafting and final content of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (‘the Declaration’), 
which was adopted by ASEAN Heads of State in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 18 November 
2012. Whereas the discussion in Chapter 4 turned on the role of democracy (or its absence) in 
terms of macro-level relations between states, discussion in this chapter turns on the micro-
level processes of communication that occur between actors within states. The focus is on the 
idea of deliberative democracy.  
The first part of this chapter examines the drafting process for the Declaration, which 
took place between 2009, when AICHR was provided with a mandate to draft the Declaration 
in its TOR, and 18 November 2012, when the Declaration was adopted. The second part of 
this chapter considers the extent to which the Declaration be said, at this early stage of its life, 
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to reflect the cultural, social and economic commonalities of the region. Are the rights set out 
in the Declaration grounded in and cognisant of the actual regional context in which these 
rights will be operationalised? To what extent does the Declaration map the specific needs of 
ASEAN’s diverse and developing nations, and provide scope for the future elaboration and 
specification of the precise content of rights within ASEAN states? To what extent does the 
Declaration meet the standards set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)? I evaluate the content of the Declaration, comparing it with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and with the instrument that has come to symbolise the high 
water mark of the ‘Asian values’ debate and cultural relativism—the 1993 Bangkok 
Declaration. Other relevant instruments are the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action (Vienna Declaration),
1
 and the 1993 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Human Rights.
2
 
The latter instrument was drafted by parliamentarians from Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Singapore and the Philippines, directly after the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. 
In this chapter, I argue that the text of the Declaration, like AICHR itself, reflects the 
division between the more liberal and democratic ASEAN states, which have to different 
extents embraced the discourse of international human rights, and those states that are not 
liberal democracies, which have not. I point to evidence that shows how in the drafting of the 
Declaration, in relation to several key points, the views of the more liberal ASEAN states 
prevailed, and that overall, the Declaration evinces a clear intent to avoid the serious 
concessions to relativism which marred the Bangkok Declaration. However, this chapter also 
shows how the absence of deliberative democracy undermines the legitimacy of the 
instrument and limits its potential. This was demonstrated, in dramatic fashion, on the eve of 
the Declaration’s signing, in November 2012. Indonesian civil society organisations publicly 
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demanded that their government refuse to sign the AHRD,
3
 and the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called for a delay of the signing, until broad public consultations 
could be carried out.
4
  
 
5.2 The Drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
 
In 2009, when ASEAN’s newly appointed human rights commissioners announced their 
mandate to prepare an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration for the region,
5
 few people were 
optimistic that the product would be a muscular statement of rights which met international 
standards. There were sound reasons for scepticism. 
First, there was the political diversity of the region, described in Chapter 2, which led 
many to doubt that political agreement could be reached on the content of core human rights 
principles.
6
 Many regional human rights systems, at their inception, have included politically 
diverse systems of government.
7
 Nonetheless, the fear of many was that ASEAN’s political 
diversity would make it impossible for states to agree on anything other than a vacuous 
Declaration , which described rights at a level of generality which permitted multiple and 
conflicting interpretations, or worse, that the Declaration would explicitly constrain the rights 
                                                 
3
 ‘Civil society rejects flawed ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ (15 November 2012) International 
Federation for Human Rights, available at: <http://www.fidh.org/Civil-society-rejects-flawed-ASEAN-12429> 
[accessed 13 December 2012]. 
4
 ABC Australian Network News, ‘ASEAN declaration falls short on human rights: UN’ (9 November 2012) 
ABC available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-11-09/an-un-hr-high-commissioner-warns-on-asean-
declaration/4364384> [accessed 13 December 2012]. 
5
 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), TOR of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights, July 2009, available at:  <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a6d87f22.html> [accessed 22 
December 2012], Article 4.2: ‘To develop an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration with a view to establishing a 
framework for human rights cooperation through various ASEAN conventions and other instruments dealing 
with human rights’.  
6
 Interview with Yuyun Wahyuningrum, Senior Advisor Human Rights Working Group, Jakarta, 12 December 
2012, Canberra, copy on file with author. 
7
 Burns Weston, Robin Lukes and Kelly Hnatt, ‘Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and 
Appraisal’(1987) 20 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 585.  
Chapter 5: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
207 
 
of individuals and groups in favour of a broad discretion permitting states to limit freedoms 
on grounds such as public security, public health or public morality.
8
 As we have seen, 
responsibility for drafting the Declaration lay in the hands of the Commissioners of AICHR 
who were accountable to their appointing states
9
 and who must make decisions through 
consensus.
10
  
Second, the low level of engagement of the ten ASEAN states with the international 
human rights treaty monitoring system suggests a lack of regional consensus about 
international human rights. Of the seven major international human rights treaties, only the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) had been signed by all ASEAN 
member states.
11
 Even in relation to these treaties, several ASEAN states have entered 
substantial reservations.
12
 Only the Philippines had signed the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR, allowing its citizens the right of individual petition to the Human Rights 
Committee.
13
 The reluctance to engage in the international treaty system suggests, at the 
least, a region-wide ambivalence about subjecting government action to external scrutiny, 
and at the most, ongoing state-level resistance to the international human rights project 
altogether.  
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Third, there were concerns that the Declaration would revive old debates about the 
philosophical foundation and political utility of ‘international human rights’ as an idea. 
During the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, some Asian leaders, several of 
whom were from Southeast Asia, raised questions about the central premise of human rights: 
the principle of universality. These representatives asked how is could really be the case, as 
the UDHR asserted, that human rights were applicable to all people, at all times, regardless 
of a state’s economic development and social context. At the Vienna World Conference, 
Asian leaders made an observation which had also been made forty-five years earlier, by 
philosophers and scientists at the time of the drafting of the UDHR. This was that rights have 
a cultural and historical specificity: rights and duties cannot be absolute but are always 
relative to milieu.
14
 Representatives of United Nations human rights bodies, and many civil 
society activists in Southeast Asia, were dismayed at the prospect of re-opening the question 
of universality. In their view, the rhetorical power of ‘the universal’ was an essential bulwark 
against slippage in state commitment to human rights protection.
15
  
An antidote to all of these fears might have been a drafting process for the Declaration 
that was transparent, fair, broad, participatory, inclusive and wide-ranging, and in which the 
marginalised and vulnerable people of the region, who were after all the primary intended 
beneficiaries of the Declaration, participated. In such a scheme, drafts of the Declaration 
would have been translated into the languages of the region and disseminated widely, 
including in rural areas. The opinions of religious leaders and philosophers would have been 
sought, as well as the views of legal experts and politicians, and these figures would have 
engaged with one another—and with ordinary people—in public forums, about the scope and 
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content of the Declaration. In short, the ideal of deliberative democracy, which is in modern 
times understood as a central element of the legitimacy of law created within the political 
confines of the state, would have been employed throughout the process of the creation of the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.
16
 When the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Navi Pillay, warned those responsible for drafting the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration that: ‘The process through which this crucial Declaration is adopted is almost as 
important as the content of the Declaration itself’ and asked AICHR to recognise the value of 
holding ‘meaningful consultations with people from all walks of life, in every country across 
the South-East Asia region,’17 she was referring to precisely this sort of engagement. In May 
2012, Pillay observed that: ‘No discussion of human rights can be complete or credible 
without significant input from civil society and national human rights institutions.’18  
To civil society organisations (CSOs), and to UN actors such as Navi Pillay, it was 
self-evident that CSOs should play an important role in the drafting of the Declaration. Yet 
the central role accorded to civil society in international law-making is a relatively modern 
phenomenon. In 1949, for example, at the time of the drafting of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR), a very different ethic of public involvement prevailed. The ECHR 
was largely the work of a handful of bureaucrats; it was certainly not drafted with the 
considered input of civil society organisations; nor was there any expectation that it should 
be.
19
 The different expectations about the necessity of CSO involvement is, largely, one of 
the by-products of globalisation. Discussion, debate, the resolution of conflicting positions, 
the drafting of submissions, the creation of consensus and the identification of positions of 
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opposition, no longer require physical contact between interested parties. Advances in 
technology mean that communication between CSOs, governments, representatives of 
international organisations, and others in different parts of the world, is possible on a scale 
and at a level of intensity that was unimaginable at the time when Europe and the Americas 
were producing the first regional human rights agreements. It was extraordinary, therefore, in 
June 2012, when the Cambodian AICHR representative, Om Yintieng, stated that there 
would be no public circulation of the AHRD prior to its adoption by ASEAN Heads of State: 
‘NGOs want to write it instead of us, but they don’t know their duties. The declaration is for 
all 800 million ASEAN people, so if those 800 million people want to help, in 800 million 
years we will not be able to finish it.’20 
There were a number of specific reasons why CSOs in Southeast Asia considered it 
imperative that their submissions and views be taken into consideration in the drafting 
process of the AHRD. First, CSOs hoped that the Declaration would eventually evolve into a 
legally binding Convention, in the same way that the UDHR had eventually evolved into the 
ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
21
 
CSOs hoped to see the transformation of AICHR into a judicial body with powers of 
enforcement, as a parallel development. The Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, pronounced in 2009 at the time of the 
announcement of the Commission’s TOR, provided that AICHR would be reviewed every 
five years after its entry into force ‘to strengthen the mandate and functions of AICHR in 
order to further develop mechanisms on both the protection and promotion of human 
                                                 
20
 Chhay Channyda, ‘NGOs Don’t Need to See Rights Doc Draft: official’ (14 June 2012) The Phnom Penh 
Post  available at: <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.php/2012061456802/National-news/ngos-dont-need-
to-see-rights-doc-draft-official.html> [accessed 20 July 2012].  
21
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, entered 
into force 3 November 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, entered into force 3 January 1976).  
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rights.’22 The Commission’s Five-year Workplan, which was never publicly released, also 
provided that AICHR would ‘Work towards the ASEAN Convention on Human Rights upon 
the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.’23 Optimists hoped that by the time 
of AICHR’s first five-year review, in 2014, there might be sufficient momentum amongst 
ASEAN states to support the transformation of the Declaration into a formal convention. 
CSOs feared that a weak declaration, which failed to meet international standards for human 
rights protection, would be a precursor to a weak convention.  
Second, it was hoped that the Declaration would provide AICHR with a clearer 
mandate. Under the TOR of AICHR, one of the purposes of the Commission is to ‘uphold 
international human rights standards as prescribed by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and international human rights 
instruments to which ASEAN Member States are parties.’24 The TOR also states that AICHR 
is to be guided by the principle of ‘upholding the Charter of the United Nations and 
international law, including international humanitarian law, subscribed to by ASEAN 
Member States.’25 Because of the references to ‘human rights instruments to which ASEAN 
Member States are parties’ and ‘international law…. subscribed to by ASEAN Member 
States’ (emphasis added) it was unclear whether or not the Commission’s mandate was 
limited to upholding only those human rights to which all ASEAN states had formally 
                                                 
22
 Article 7, Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration on the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 2009, 
Fifteenth ASEAN Summit, Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand (23 October 2009).  
23
 Copy on file with author. This document was leaked to the public mid-2011. At 4.2, the Workplan discusses 
the drafting of the ASEAN Declaration, and lists as items to be completed: ‘1. Set up an ad hoc task force on 
drafting an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) with the TOR to be prepared by AICHR. 2. Take stock 
of and assess status of existing human rights mechanisms and instruments in ASEAN. 3. Work towards the 
ASEAN Convention on Human Rights upon the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. 4. Support 
the development of other ASEAN legal instruments on human rights undertaken by other ASEAN sectorial 
bodies. Support and strengthen the framework of legal cooperation on ASEAN Human Rights.’  
24
 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), TOR of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights, July 2009, available at:  <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a6d87f22.html> [accessed 22 
December 2012] Article 1.6. 
25
 Ibid, Article 2.1(f). 
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subscribed, either in international conventions, or regional instruments. It confounded CSOs, 
for example, that AICHR had made no statements of condemnation on human rights issues 
that arose throughout the region during its first term in office, in relation to violations of 
rights of: freedom of speech (Thailand);
26
 freedom of association (Malaysia);
27
 freedom of 
expression and association (Singapore);
28
 the right to life (the Philippines);
29
 freedom of 
expression (Vietnam and Laos);
30
 the right to life, freedom of expression and freedom of 
association (Cambodia);
31
 freedom of expression, freedom of association, right to political 
                                                 
26
 For example, on 25 July 2011, Somyot Pruksakasemsuk, journalist and editor of the Voice of Thaksin 
magazine, was charged for publishing and distributing the magazines containing articles that violated Thailand’s 
lese majeste law. At the time of writing, Somyot is still imprisoned.  
27
 For example, on 17 September 2012, 136 Malaysian non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) wrote an open 
letter protesting against the actions of the Malaysian government in relation to one of the country’s leading 
NGOs, Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM). The NGOs claimed that the government had carried out ongoing 
harassment of SUARAM through investigations, public vilification and threats to charge the NGO for alleged 
financial irregularities, non-registration as a society, and receipt of foreign funds. See: ‘Malaysian and 
International Human Rights Groups Urge Malaysian Government to End Harassment against SUARAM’ (17 
September, 2012) Forum-Asia available at:  <http://www.forum-asia.org/?p=1538> [accessed 21 September 
2012]. 
28
 See: Parameswaran Ponnudurai, ‘ASEAN Wavers On Rights: An Analysis’ (10 January 2012) available at: 
<http://www.rfa.org/english/east-asia-beat/rights-01102012201819.html> [accessed 20 December 2012]. 
29
 For example, on 23 November 2009, what appeared to be a politically-motivated massacre occurred, in the 
Philippine town of Ampatuan, in Maguindanao. Among the 58 dead were journalists, lawyers and political 
aides. Relatives of the dead bought a complaint to AICHR, urging the Commission to call on the Philippine 
government to ensure that the perpetrators of the massacre were brought to justice and adequate reparations 
were made to the heirs of the victims under international law. AICHR passed the complaint to the ASEAN 
Secretariat, after the Arroyo government declared it was a ‘domestic issue’. Allen V. Estabillo, ‘Ampatuan 
Massacre, Other Cases ‘Gathering Dust’ at ASEAN Rights Commission’ (31 March 2012) Minda News 
available at: <http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2012/03/31/ampatuan-massacre-other-cases-gathering-
dust-at-asean-rights-commission/> [accessed 23 November 2012]. 
30
 James C. McKinley jr., ‘Vietnam Sentences 2 Musicians to Prison Terms on Propaganda Charges’ (30 
October 2012) The New York Times (Arts Beat) available at: 
 <http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/vietnam-sentences-2-musicians-to-prison-terms-on-propaganda-
charges/> [accessed 23 November 2012]. In this case, a court in Vietnam sentenced two musicians to prison for 
writing and distributing protest songs. The musicians, Vo Minh Tri and Tran Vu Anh Binh, were convicted of 
spreading propaganda against the state after a half-day trial in Ho Chi Minh City. Mr Tri received four years in 
prison; Mr Binh, six years. In neighbouring Laos, student leaders who were arrested in 1999 remain in gaol: see 
Universal Periodic Review, ‘List of recommendations contained in Section II of the Report of the Working 
Group to Lao PDR’ A/HRC/15/5 available at: 
 <http://www.upr-info.org/IMG/pdf/recommendations_to_laos_2010.pdf > [accessed 20 December 2012]. 
31
 On 26 April 2012 Mr Chhut Wuthy, the President of Environmental and Natural Resource Protection 
Organization, was shot dead when he entered into a prohibited logging area. On 16 May 2012, a 14-year-old 
girl, Heng Chantha, was shot by Cambodia’s armed forces in Kampong Damrei commune, Chhlong district, 
Kratie province, during a displacement mission by the authorities, which provoked a protest from the local 
community. On 24 May 2012, the Phnom Penh municipal court issued arrest warrants to detain 15 
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participation, right to life, (Myanmar);
32
 freedom from torture (Indonesia).
33
 CSOs believed 
that the Declaration needed to provide a clear statement of the rights that AICHR was 
mandated to take action upon (even if action only amounted to oral condemnation).  
Third, the Declaration was seen as a gauge of the extent to which the institutional 
limitations of AICHR would prevent it from operating to protect and promote human rights 
within the region. Observers were keen to assess the Declaration, which was the 
Commission’s first task, given that: the Commission was only required to meet twice a year; 
decisions were required to be made by consensus;
34
 Commissioners were appointed by their 
government and were ‘accountable to the government.’35 There remained the hope amongst 
some CSOs that despite these limitations, independent-minded and courageous 
commissioners might yet be able to speak out on human rights violations within the region, 
and so by a combination of awareness-raising and ‘shaming’, change the way governments in 
the region dealt with questions of human rights. The Declaration came to be seen as the 
crucible for this hope. As one coalition of NGOs put it: ‘[t]he drafting of the AHRD is a 
litmus test of AICHR’s willingness to constitute a credible, respected, and effective regional 
human rights body.’36  
                                                                                                                                                        
representatives of Boeng Kak Lake community, who were protesting the recent seizure of their land plots by 
Shukaku Inc Co, Ltd. For a report on the Chhut Wuthy case, see: Fran Lambrick, ‘Who is Responsible for the 
Death of Cambodia's Foremost Forest Activist?’ (1 May 2012) The Guardian available at:  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2012/may/01/death-cambodian-forest-activist-chut-wutty> 
[accessed 12 December 2012]. 
32
 See Chapter 4. 
33
 In October 2010, video footage of West Papuan villagers being tortured by members of the Indonesian 
Security Forces was seen around the world. The incident was believed to have been filmed on the mobile phone 
of one of the soldiers as a ‘trophy’. See: Survival, ‘Shocking Video of Papuan Torture Prompts Calls for 
Inquiry’ (20 October 2010) available at:  <http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/6598> [accessed 20 
December 2012]. 
34
 TOR, above n 9. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Joint Statement NGOs, ‘NGOs Call for the Drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration to be 
Transparent and Subject to Meaningful Consultations with Civil Society’ (2 May 2012) available at:  
<http://www.fidh.org/The-ASEAN-Human-Rights-Declaration> [accessed 20 June 2012]. 
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For these reasons, CSOs attached significant importance to the Declaration, and were 
determined to ensure that its fate would be different to the hundreds of hortatory declarations, 
statements and ‘visions’ that each year emanated from ASEAN, few of which ever come to 
fruition, or altered the way states behaved, or penetrated the consciousness of the people of 
the region. CSOs recognised that the Declaration would be more effective as a tool for 
lobbying if it was perceived as legitimate, and they also recognised that the legitimacy of the 
Declaration would be enhanced by the involvement of civil society in its creation, and to the 
greatest degree possible, by the involvement of the broader public as well.  
The means for broad public engagement were certainly available. In Southeast Asia, 
of the many thousands of civil society organisations, many possess sophisticated, transparent, 
and highly democratic processes for engaging with one another, and with governments and 
international organisations. Many CSOs had been active in lobbying for the creation of a 
regional human rights mechanism back at the time when the ASEAN Charter was drafted, 
and possessed well-organised national and regional networks. Using the Internet to promote 
discussion, debate, and to include the many grass-roots NGOs whose views would otherwise 
have been overlooked, CSOs were well-prepared to play an active and constructive part in the 
drafting of the Declaration. Several joint CSO recommendations were prepared through 
participative processes at the national level, engaging diverse groups of national and regional 
NGOs.
37
 The two most prominent networks of CSOs, which functioned as umbrella 
organisations, bringing together small and grass-roots NGOs, were the Solidarity for Asian 
                                                 
37
 For example, in September 2012, Indonesian NGOs submitted a joint proposal which included seven ‘priority 
issues’ which AICHR must consider in the Declaration, such as the issue of limitation of rights (including 
whether ‘public morality’ should be included as a permissible limitation), principles of self-determination, 
indigenous peoples rights, the right to an impartial and independent judiciary, and sexual and reproductive 
health and rights. See: LBH Apik, Arus Pelangi, SAPA Indonesia, Demos, Human Rights Resource Center, I for 
Humans, Solidaritas Perempuan, Imparsial, Human Rights Working Group (HRWG), LBH Jakarta (Jakarta 
Legal Aid Institute), Kalyanamitra, Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN), ‘AHRD is 
Hijacked by Narrow-minded National Interests’ (13 September 2012) available at:  
<http://www.burmapartnership.org/2012/09/ahrd-is-hijacked-by-narrow-minded-national-interests> [accessed 2 
December 2012].  
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People’s Advocacy (SAPA), which represents around 80 civil society organisations from 
across Southeast Asia; and the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism 
(HRWG). As well as holding workshops on the Declaration and disseminating information 
about it, these networks drafted several joint submissions on the content of the Declaration to 
AICHR and later, to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. Several CSOs dedicated to specific 
issues, such as the Southeast Asia Women’s Caucus on ASEAN (Women’s Caucus) and 
Earthrights International, also made submissions on the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.  
Despite repeated calls from these groups for consultation and dialogue about the 
Declaration,
38
 and the exhortations of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, AICHR 
held only two, day-long regional consultations with civil society. Both of these occurred in 
the latter half of 2012, when the Declaration was already largely completed. The first regional 
consultation took place on 22 June 2012, at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Kuala Lumpur, one day 
before AICHR held its final meeting on the draft Declaration.
39
 The second meeting took 
place on 12 September 2012, in Manila, at a time when the Declaration had already been 
submitted to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers for review. Only four CSOs from each country 
were permitted to attend each of these consultations. How these four were selected was the 
subject of controversy. Each Commissioner selected the representatives from his or her 
country, and in the case of Laos and Vietnam, the CSOs selected were affiliated with the 
government.
40
 For these reasons alone, from the perspective of civil society organisations, the 
consultations were manifestly inadequate.  
                                                 
38
 In April 2011, prior to the 4th meeting of AICHR, 136 civil society organizations released a joint statement 
calling for the immediate release of the draft Declaration and for AICHR to engage in full and meaningful 
consultations with civil society. These calls continued throughout 2011 until finally, AICHR announced that it 
will hold the 22 June consultation with civil society on the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. The region’s 
national human rights institutions were not invited to participate in the consultation.  
39
 The Declaration was due to be submitted to ASEAN’s Foreign Ministers on July 9, 2012.  
40
 The modalities for the second regional consultation were discussed during the 6
th
 AICHR Meeting on the 
Declaration, held in Yangon, Myanmar on 3-6 June 2012. It was during that meeting that it was decided that 
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The June consultation in Kuala Lumpur involved little dialogue and debate between 
CSOs and Commissioners. CSO representatives read out prepared statements; the 
Commissioners listened without responding. After the first consultation, CSOs released a 
joint statement saying that they ‘were appalled that AICHR hopes to finalize such an 
important regional document, that is supposed to enshrine the rights of the peoples in the 
region, by holding merely one consultation with civil society at this late hour.’41 They 
described the 22 June consultation as a symbolic ‘box-ticking’ exercise so that AICHR could 
claim to have consulted civil society, rather than a meaningful engagement with civil 
society.
42
 The Malaysian Bar Association labelled the drafting process ‘secretive and opaque’ 
and demanded that the submission of the draft Declaration to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
should be delayed in order for comprehensive consultations to be carried out: ‘Since the 
intention is for the AHRD to be a foundational document that captures the hopes and 
aspirations of the peoples of ASEAN, then their voices must be heard.’43 On the other hand, 
AICHR’s press release described the 22 June consultation as ‘engaging, constructive and 
productive as it brought many fresh ideas and different perspectives for AICHR's 
consideration for the further enrichment of the draft AHRD.’44  
                                                                                                                                                        
each Representative could select which 4 NGOs were to be invited. Each NGO was permitted to bring two 
persons to the consultation. AICHR also discussed regional and international NGOs that could be invited. 
41
 Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights Watch, the International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Dignity International, and ARTICLE 19, ‘Less than Adequate: AICHR 
Consultation on ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ (21 June 2012) available at: 
<http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3338/en/less-than-adequate:-aichr-consultation-on-asean-
human-rights-declaration> [accessed 22 December 2012]; ‘ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights Urged to Hold Meaningful Consultations with CSOs’ (2012) 
9 Asia Pacific Update 8.  
42
 Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights Watch, the International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Dignity International, and ARTICLE 19, Ibid. 
43
 Lim Chee Wee, President, Malaysian Bar Council, ‘ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: Hear the Voices of 
the Peoples of ASEAN’ (12 April 2012) available at: 
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/press_statements/press_release_asean_human_rights_declaration_hear_the_v
oices_of_the_peoples_of_asean.html> [accessed 12 July 2012]. 
44
 ASEAN Press Release, ‘The Seventh Meeting of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR) on an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) and the Second Regional Consultation of 
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The second consultation was, in the words of Indonesian CSO delegate Yuyun 
Wahyuningrum, ‘a step forward for ASEAN in engaging with the civil society.’45 CSOs had 
learnt from the July experience, and were determined that the September consultation ‘should 
be more interactive. No more listening mode, but rather to answer our questions.’46 
Indonesian NGOs collaborated to prepare a joint approach on eight ‘priority issues’ for the 
AHRD, which had apparently still not been agreed upon by AICHR Commissioners: 
limitation of rights (including public morality); principles of self-determination; non-
derogable rights; indigenous peoples rights; right to an impartial and independent judiciary; 
migrant workers; sexual and reproductive rights.
47
 
In Manila, CSOs used their allocated presentation time—which was 15 minutes for 
each country—to present specific proposals on areas where there was still debate and 
contention. CSOs demanded responses from AICHR commissioners on specific submissions, 
and in some instances, illuminating exchanges occurred. For example, in response to the 
submission from representatives of the Women’s Caucus, that ‘public morality’ should be 
removed as a limitation on rights, the Malaysian Commissioner told NGOs that Malaysia, as 
well as Singapore and Brunei, possessed legal systems which included ideas of public 
morality as a limitation on the exercise of freedoms, and that because of this, public morality 
must remain as a limitation in the Declaration.
48
 On the question of including indigenous 
                                                                                                                                                        
AICHR on the AHRD, Kuala Lumpur’ (25 June 2012) available at: <http://www.asean.org/27044.php> 
[accessed 21 November 2012]. In this release, AICHR reaffirmed that the draft AHRD would be submitted to 
the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM) in July 2012 and adopted by the ASEAN Leaders in November 
2012 in Cambodia. 
45
 Human Rights Working Group, ‘CSOs Indonesia Highlight 8 Priority Issues on Improving AHRD’ (9 
September 2012) available at:  <http://www.hrwg.org/en/hrwg/press-release/item/3917-csos-indonesia-
highlight-8-priority-issues-on-improving-ahrd> [accessed 21 November 2012]. 
46
 Email distribution briefing letter from Yuyun Wahyuningrum, senior advisor to the HRWG, 7 September 
2012. Copy on file with author. 
47
 These recommendations were prepared at the national level by Indonesian CSOs and finalized by the Human 
Rights Working Group (HRWG), Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN), Jakarta Legal Aid 
(LBH Jakarta), and Kalyanamitra.  
48
 See ‘AHRD is Hijacked by Narrow-Minded Interests’, above n 37. 
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rights in the Declaration, the Lao PDR representative was reported as saying that ‘the concept 
was not appropriate for countries that have no indigenous peoples, including Lao PDR.’49 On 
the question of whether rights to sexual orientation and gender identity should be included, 
AICHR Representative from Malaysia stated that LGBTIQ rights were incompatible with the 
legal systems of those ASEAN countries that applied Shari’a law.50  
At the national level, in some countries, (Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Malaysia), individual Commissioners held a number of meetings with CSOs 
on the Declaration.
51
 CSO submissions to commissioners generally exhorted the same basic 
principle: that the Declaration should enshrine the human rights principles found in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the other major human rights treaties.
52
 In Brunei, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, there was virtually no engagement between AICHR 
and CSOs on the Declaration. Indeed, in these countries, the identity of AICHR country 
                                                 
49
 Ibid.  
50
 Ibid. 
51
 On 26 May 2012, in Bangkok, prior to the 22 June meeting, AICHR representatives from Thailand and 
Malaysia held an Informal Consultation on the Declaration. In the course of that meeting, the Thai and 
Malaysian Commissioners reported that the draft they were working on was ‘progressive’, and consisted of: a) 
Preamble, b) General Principles, c) Catalogue of Rights, and d) Rights and Responsibilities. The Commissioners 
claimed that the draft followed and adopted all articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and also 
contained the ‘added value’ of the right to development and the right to peace. The Commissioners reported that 
they were still deliberating on the inclusion of issues relating to: an independent judiciary; self-determination; 
right to protection of personal data; rights of migrant workers; rights concerned with sexual orientation and 
gender identity; statelessness; corporate social responsibility; the protection of human rights defenders; non-
refoulement for refugees; enforced disappearances; right to peace. The Commissioners also suggested that 
perhaps civil society should consider drafting its own ASEAN Peoples’ Human Rights Declaration, to provide a 
counter-point to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, if the text of the latter document proved to be deficient 
in the eyes of CSOs. Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, ‘News and Updates’ (undated) 
available at: <http://www.aseanhrmech.org/news/phil-aichr-rep-dialogues-with-cso-of-aseanhrd.htm> [accessed 
21 November 2012]. 
52
 The SAPA Task Force On ASEAN And Human Rights, ‘Civil Society’s Position Paper on ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration’ (21 June 2011) available at:  
<http://forum-asia.org/documents/SAPA TFAHR Position Paper AHRD final.pdf> [accessed 21 November 
2012]. In May 2012, the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative produced a seventy page ‘Experts 
Note on the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD)’. Written by a group of international legal experts, the 
note was published as part of an effort ‘to share expertise and promote dialogue regarding the purpose and 
content of the AHRD.’  
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representative was not widely known. Few CSOs within these countries contributed 
submissions on the Declaration. As the Malaysian Bar Association noted: ‘Discussion of the 
draft AHRD between AICHR representative and civil society of each ASEAN country has 
not been consistent or widespread, depending very much on individual initiatives, and 
varying from country to country.’53 
When meetings between Commissioners and CSOs did occur, it is difficult to say 
what effect they had. For example, after the first CSO-AICHR consultation, the Philippines’ 
Commissioner announced that she had become convinced that the public morality limitation 
should be removed from the draft; the Malaysian Representative undertook to include the 
rights and concerns of Indigenous Peoples’ in the draft; some Commissioners undertook to 
adopt in the Declaration the formulation of the right to self-determination as it is included in 
Article 1 of the ICCPR (with the proviso that the right to self-determination would not be 
applicable to the territorial jurisdiction of the state); many AICHR representatives agreed that 
the limitation of rights provision in the Declaration should follow international standards.
54
 
Yet none of these undertakings were realised in the final Declaration. One reason for this is 
that after January 2012, AICHR was no longer in control of the drafting process. After a draft 
of the Declaration was leaked to the public in January 2012, the task of drafting the 
Declaration was taken out of the hands of AICHR and given to the ASEAN Secretariat. This 
means that during consultations that occurred after this point, those who were responsible for 
actually drafting the Declaration were not the ones engaging in the debate, argumentation and 
justification about how the Declaration should be framed and what rights it should include, or 
what limitations it should exclude.  
                                                 
53
 Lim Chee Wee, ‘Press Release ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: Hear the Voices of the Peoples of 
ASEAN’ 12 April 2012, above n 43. 
54
 The Human Rights Working Group produced a detailed account of what transpired at the First Consultation: 
Human Rights Working Group, The 2nd Regional Consultation on ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
(AHRD), Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (22 June 2012). Copy on file with author. 
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The draft leaked in January 2012 contains some instructive insights into the different 
priorities and concerns of ASEAN states. The draft was the creation of a drafting group, 
comprised of one representative from each ASEAN Member State, which had been 
established to assist AICHR in creating the Declaration.
55
 The draft was sufficient to confirm 
the fears of civil society activists that the Declaration would reflect a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ approach to articulating rights in Southeast Asia. It contained 100 clauses, most 
of which were bracketed, indicating that agreement had yet to be reached on the final form of 
that clause.
56
 Contentious clauses were footnoted, with the notes indicating which country 
was proposing the clause or had reservations about its form or inclusion. It is notable that 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines (referred to as ‘ThaiIndoPhils’ in the draft) presented 
a united position on almost all clauses, and this position was, by and large, a progressive and 
liberal one. Little can be learnt from the draft on the stance of Singapore, Myanmar, Brunei 
and Malaysia, although we know that Malaysia and Brunei objected to expanding the 
prohibition on discrimination to include ‘sexual identity’. Vietnam and Laos, however, 
provided some illuminating contributions. In the section on civil and political rights, Vietnam 
objected to the inclusion of the word ‘freely’ in the clause, ‘Every citizen has the right to 
participate freely in the government of his or her country.’57 Laos also proposed a limitation 
clause, which stated:  
The exclusive insistence on rights can result in conflict, division, and endless dispute 
and can lead to lawlessness and chaos. Nothing in this Declaration may therefore be 
                                                 
55
 AICHR did not release to the public the TOR that it had supplied to the drafting team. According to a press 
release issued by AICHR, the Drafting Group was instructed to prepare a draft of the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration, and ‘in particular take into account the values and principles in the ASEAN Charter, the TOR of 
AICHR as well as international human rights instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.’ See:  <http://aichr.org/press-release/press-release-of-the-fifth-asean-intergovernmental-commission-on-
human-rights-asean-secretariat/> [accessed 21 November 2012]. 
56
 The draft makes reference to non-discrimination and recognition before the law, most of the major civil and 
political rights found in the ICCPR, and the full range of economic and social rights set out in ICESCR. The 
draft also contained a section on the ‘right to development’ and a section on the duties and responsibilities of 
corporations.  
57
 Article 56, draft of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, 9 January 2012. Copy on file with author. 
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interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any 
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein.
58
  
 
The significance of the draft should not be overstated, given that it was prepared 
solely by the drafting group and at the time it was leaked, it had not yet been reviewed by 
AICHR or by the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM). Nonetheless, from the leaked 
draft, it appeared to CSOs that concessions to regional exceptionalism may have been 
winning out over the imperative towards universalism. From January 2012, therefore, most of 
the submissions put forward by CSOs cautioned against a failure to meet ‘international 
standards’ in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. A submission by the International 
Commission of Jurists, for example, stated that the ICJ ‘shared the apprehension expressed 
by numerous human rights stakeholders that the outcome of this drafting process may be a 
document with provisions falling below international human rights standards and even 
unduly limiting rights that have been set out in international human rights instruments to 
which ASEAN members are parties.’59 The ICJ reminded AICHR that it must uphold the 
principle of universality of human rights embodied in those instruments.
60
 But in the end, the 
result was disappointment. ‘We see our expectation on AHRD becoming smaller and smaller 
in the due course of drafting process,’ said Febionesta, the Director of Jakarta Legal Aid. ‘We 
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 Laos also recommended a clause relating to freedom of religion, which included the following provision: ‘No 
one shall use religion as the pretext to violate the law and order of the State. Advocacy or dissemination of 
religions or beliefs shall be in compliance with national law of each ASEAN Member State.’ Several of the 
potential limitations clauses contained in the Draft permitted derogations from rights on the grounds such as 
national security and respect for the reputations of others, as well as (the commonly accepted grounds) of public 
order, public health, public morality, and the general welfare of the peoples in a democratic society. In light of 
this, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and a joint submission by the Mekong 
Lawyers Network, Earthrights International and the Sydney Centre for International Law, all recommended that 
reference be made to the international law principle of non-derogability of fundamental human rights. They 
hoped that, if adopted, this reference would be sufficient to displace the usual presumption that the rules of 
international law did not apply to ‘soft law’ such as Declarations. 
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 International Commission of Jurists, ‘The ICJ Urges Broad­based Civil Society Consultations and Respect for 
the Principle of Universality in Elaboration of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’ (13 March 2012) 
available at: <http://www.enable.org.tw/iss/pdf/20120821-3.pdf> [accessed 23 October 2012]. 
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doubt that AHRD will be at par with the international human rights standard as AICHR’s 
earlier promises. For Indonesia, there is no point of return. The country should stand firm 
with its civil society to only accept AHRD at par with the international standard. Period.’61 
 
5.3 The Content of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
 
On several occasions, AICHR Commissioners informed audiences that their aim was to draft 
a human rights declaration ‘that met international standards for the protection of human 
rights’ and that also contained an ‘added value’ for Southeast Asia.62 This section measures 
the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration against these goals. Section 1 provides an overview 
of the contents of the Declaration, noting the major similarities and divergences between the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the ‘parent’ of all human rights instruments, the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Section 2 considers two rights not included in the 
ASEAN Declaration: the right to self-determination and the rights of indigenous peoples. 
Section 3 discusses the Preamble to the Declaration. Section 4 considers the dimensions and 
significance of Article 1 of the Declaration, which leads to an excursus about universalism 
and its significance in the Southeast Asian context. Section 5 discusses Article 2, the non-
discrimination provision, and the decision not to include gender identity and sexual 
orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination. Section 6 discusses Article 6, the 
‘duties’ provision. Section 7 analyses Article 7, and the claims that human rights are 
‘indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.’ Section 8 considers Article 8, the limitations 
provision, and specifically, the implications of the ‘public morality’ limitation in the context 
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 ‘AHRD is Hijacked by Narrow-Minded National Interests, above n 37. 
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 Tassia Sipahutar and Yohanna Ririhena, ‘ASEAN Declaration Should be ‘Equally Powerful’ to UN’s’ (28 
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of same-sex rights in Malaysia. Section 9 discusses Article 9, which concerns the avoidance 
of ‘double standards and politicisation.’ Section 10 provides an overview of the ‘solidarity 
rights’ contained in the Declaration: rights to peace, the environment and development.  
 
5.3.1 The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: Overview 
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration states that ASEAN Member States affirm all the 
civil and political rights, and all of the economic, social and cultural rights, in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the specific rights listed in the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration.
63
 From this, we can assume that the Declaration was intended to meet the 
standard of the UDHR in relation to the protection of all rights listed there, and that any 
divergences between the two texts were not intended to have significance.
64
 Articles 3 and 5 
of the Declaration, concerning the right to recognition before the law
65
 and the right to an 
enforceable remedy,
66
 mirror Articles 6 and 8 of the UDHR. In an Article, which has no 
counterpart in the UDHR, Article 4 of the Declaration draws special attention to the rights of 
women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, migrant workers, and vulnerable and 
marginalised groups, as ‘inalienable, integral and indivisible part of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.’  
Nonetheless, despite the Declaration’s stated intention to include all of the rights in 
the UDHR, there are some potentially significant differences between the Declaration and the 
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 AHRD, Article 10; AHRD, Article 26. 
64
 It is notable that the Declaration does not contain amongst the specific rights listed, Article 24 in the UDHR, 
which provides a right to ‘rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic 
holidays with pay.’ 
65
 Article 3 of the Declaration states: ‘Every person is equal before the law. Evert person is entitled without 
discrimination to equal protection of the law.’ 
66
 Article 5 of the Declaration states that: ‘Every person has the right to an effective and enforceable remedy, to 
be determined by a court or other competent authorities, for acts violating the rights granted to that person by 
the constitution or by law.’ The equivalent provision in the UDHR, Article 8, states that: ‘Everyone has the right 
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him 
by the constitution or by law.’ 
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UDHR, both in relation to civil and political rights, and in relation to economic, social and 
cultural rights.  
In relation to civil and political rights, many of the rights contained in the Declaration 
are copied directly from the UDHR; the prohibition on torture, for example, is a direct replica 
of the provision in the UDHR.
67
 In relation to certain other rights, the Declaration actually 
expands and clarifies rights. In relation to the prohibition on slavery and servitude, for 
example, along with the general prohibition on these things, the Declaration includes 
references to ‘smuggling or trafficking in persons, including for the purpose of trafficking in 
human organs.’68 In other cases, the Declaration adopts a slightly different expression to the 
one used in the UDHR, but the difference is inconsequential. For example, the provisions on 
freedom of movement in the Declaration and the UDHR are identical, save that the 
Declaration is more gender inclusive, adding ‘or her’ to the UDHR’s ‘his’.69 In relation to 
some articles, however, the Declaration provisions are different to the UDHR provisions in 
small but not necessarily trivial ways. In relation to several articles, the Declaration modifies 
the UDHR by adding the phrase ‘in accordance with state law.’  
In relation to the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution, for example (UDHR Article 14), the Declaration also includes this right, but 
adds a phrase at the end: ‘in accordance with the laws of such State and applicable 
international agreements.’70 In relation to the right to a nationality (UDHR, article 15), the 
Declaration adds the phrase: ‘as prescribed by law’ (Declaration, Article 18). The 
                                                 
67
 Article 14 of the Declaration states that: ‘No person shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’ Article 5 of the UDHR states that: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ There is no significance to the deletion of the ‘ed’ in 
‘subjected’ in the Declaration formulation of this Article.  
68
 AHRD, Article 13. The UDHR, Article 4, merely refers to slavery and servitude and the prohibition of the 
slave trade. 
69
 AHRD, Article 15; UDHR, Article 13. 
70
 AHRD, Article 16. 
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Declaration’s right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which includes a strong 
statement that ‘All forms of intolerance, discrimination and incitement of hatred based on 
religion and beliefs shall be eliminated,’71 does not contain the UDHR’s expansive right to 
change religion, and to manifest religion in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
72
 The 
UDHR provisions would have troubled some followers of Islam in countries such as 
Malaysia, Brunei and in parts of Indonesia. Islam does not permit Muslims to change 
religion; the manifestation of religions other than Islam is controversial in Islamic society.
73
 
In a final example, the UDHR contains the right to peaceful assembly and association.
74
 The 
Declaration also contains a right to freedom of assembly, but not, oddly—or perhaps 
ominously—a right to freedom of association.75 
In relation to economic, social and cultural rights, the right to found a family, 
guaranteed in the UDHR to men and women of full age without limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion,
76
 is circumscribed in the Declaration by the addition of the phrase ‘as 
prescribed by law’ and does not contain the UDHR’s prohibition about discrimination.77 The 
right to work in the UDHR is more expansive than in the Declaration. The UDHR provides 
for the right to equal pay for equal work, without discrimination; it also provides that 
everyone who works has the right to remuneration which will give he and his family an 
existence worthy of human dignity, and that it will be supplemented, if necessary, by other 
means of social protection.
78
 The Declaration merely states that every person has the right to 
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 AHRD, Article 22. 
72
 UDHR, Article 18. 
73
 Tad Stahnke, 'Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights Law' (1999) 
Bingham Young University Law Review 251. 
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 UDHR, Article 20. 
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 AHRD, Article 24. According to Yuyun Wahyuningrum, senior legal advisor to the Working Group for an 
ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, reference to freedom of association was removed at the insistence of 
Vietnam. Interview with Yuyun Wahyuningrum, 12 December 2012, above n 6. 
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 UDHR, Article 16. 
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 AHRD, Article 19. 
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work, to the free choice of employment, to enjoy just, decent and favourable conditions of 
work and to have access to assistance schemes for the unemployed.
79 
On the other hand, the 
Declaration includes a clause not found in the UDHR, and one that relates specifically to the 
problem of child labour, prevalent in Southeast Asia:  
No child or any young person shall be subjected to economic and social exploitation. 
Those who employ children and young people in work harmful to their morals or 
health, dangerous to life, or likely to hamper their normal development, including 
their education should be punished by law. ASEAN Member States should also set 
age limits below which the paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and 
punished by law.
80
 
 
Other rights included referred to in the Declaration but not in the UDHR, are the 
rights of those suffering from communicable diseases, including HIV/AIDS,
81
 and the right to 
reproductive health, within the broad ‘right to health.’82 The right to development, discussed 
below, is also present in the Declaration.
83
 
 
5.3.2 Self-Determination and Indigenous Rights? 
Two rights which are notably not present in the Declaration are the right to self-determination 
and the rights of indigenous peoples. These rights are not contained in the UDHR or in the 
regional human rights instruments of Europe or the Americas
84
 However, the right to self-
determination is found in Article 1 of both the ICCPR and ICESCR, and in the United 
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 AHRD, Article 27. Both the AHRD and the UDHR provide that everyone has the right to form trade unions 
and join the trade union of his or her choice for the protection of his or her interests; but the AHRD adds the 
phrase ‘in accordance with national laws and regulations.’ AHRD, Article 27(2); UDHR, Article 23(4). 
80
 AHRD, Article 26(3). 
81
 AHRD, Article 29(2).  
82
 AHRD, Article 29(1). 
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 AHRD, Articles 35-37. 
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 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 2, 
entered into force 3 September 1953), as amended by Protocol 11 (1998) and Protocol 14 (2010); American 
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Nations Charter, Articles 1(2) and 55.
85
 In relation to the rights of indigenous peoples, it is 
notable that all ASEAN states voted in favour of the adoption by the United Nations of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
86
 as a right by virtue of which ‘a peoples’ 
may ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.’87  
The traditional understanding of the principle of self-determination is a right of states 
to determine, without external interference, their own political status.
88
 The principle is most 
commonly invoked in the context of decolonisation. At first blush, therefore, we might 
assume that self-determination would be a principle that appealed to ASEAN states, with 
their diverse political systems and histories of colonialism (Chapters 2 and 3). Why were 
governments within Southeast Asia averse to including these rights in the Declaration? 
It is possible that some ASEAN governments perceived self-determination as 
suggesting a right to secession, and hence as a threat to unity, stability, and order.
89
 Within 
many Southeast Asian states, there are groups who deny, on historical, cultural, sociological, 
anthropological, economic or political grounds, that they belong to the state where they 
reside. Many of these groups have sought recognition and/or independence for decades, often 
through violent conflict. 
One notable example is Myanmar. Chapter 4 of this dissertation draws attention to the 
ethnic conflict within Myanmar and to the efforts—in some cases, the violent struggles—of 
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 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, entered into force 24 October 1945). 
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 UNGA Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007). 
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 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ibid, Article 3. 
88
 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, U.N.G.A.Res.2625 (XXV) 24 Oct. 1970. Martii Koskenniemi, ‘National 
Self Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice’ 43 International and Comparative Law 
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 Klabbers, however, argues that recent decisions of the International Court of Justice support the reconception 
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several ethnic groups for self-government. The 1948 Constitution of Burma provided for a 
right of secession for the Shan and Kayah peoples.
90
 The 2008 Constitution, however, 
specifically provides that: ‘No part of the territory constituted in the Union such as Regions, 
States, Union Territories and Self-Administered Areas shall ever secede from the Union.’91 
Under the 2008 Constitution, ethnic groups are arranged into states, which possess some 
powers of self-government.
92
 But it is, at the time of writing, unclear precisely how self-
government will work; how autonomous the states and self-administered zones will be; and 
whether the different ethnic groups will be satisfied with the degree of independence which 
they have been given. Myanmar’s government, which has long struggled to forge unity and 
cooperation among the various ethnic groups in the country, and which still fears the 
balkanisation of the Union, would be hardly likely to endorse a regionally mandated concept 
as potentially unsettling as ‘the right to self-determination.’  
Such a right is equally unappealing to the government of the Philippines. In October 
2012, the Philippines announced a peace agreement between the Republic and the Muslim 
Moro peoples of Mindanao, in the country’s south. The decades-old conflict between the 
government of the Philippines and Moro peoples has its origins in the nation’s colonial 
history. In 1946, when the United States granted independence to the Philippines, it 
incorporated into the new Republic two previously independent Muslim sultanates. These 
Sultanates specifically stated, in the 1935 Dansalan Declaration, that they desired to be 
excluded from the proposed Republic.
93
 The Dansalan Declaration predicted that if 
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 Josef Silverstein, ‘Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession from the Union of Burma’ (1958) 
18(1) The Journal of Asian Studies 43. 
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 Constitution of the Union of the Republic of Myanmar (2008), Article 10. The Constitution sets out as basic 
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Chapter 5: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
229 
 
incorporation proceeded, the result would be unrest, suffering and misery.
94
 And so it proved 
to be.  
The Mindanao conflict has taken various forms since 1946: agitation within 
parliament for self-government; calls for secession; armed struggle by the Muslim 
Independence Movement and later the Muslim National Liberation Front; and calls for a 
jihad (holy war) to defend the Moro homeland. In 1972, there was full-scale civil war in the 
southern Philippines. The Bangsamoro’s long-standing demand has been for full political 
autonomy from the Philippines, or a separate Islamic State. The 2012 agreement paves the 
way for the establishment of a new autonomous region, the ‘Bangsamoro new autonomous 
political entity,’ by 2016. But again, as in the case of Myanmar, it is unclear at the time of 
writing whether or not this will answer the people’s demands for autonomy, and if it does not, 
whether peace will last. 
The situation is different for the indigenous inhabitants of the Cordillera region of the 
Philippines, the Igorot peoples. The Igorot have long called for the right to maintain control 
over their land and resources, practice and develop their own cultures, and determine their 
own path of development. But there has been deep disagreement amongst the Igorot people 
themselves about precisely what political form self-determination should take. The militant 
Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army has called for the establishment of an independent 
‘Cordillera Nation’. The Cordillera People’s Alliance has called for the establishment of a 
‘Cordillera Autonomous Region’ within the Republic of the Philippines. At the core of both 
sets of demands is the right to recognition of indigenous control over ancestral lands and a 
degree of territorial sovereignty, together with self-rule, which would enable collective 
control, management and development of indigenous territories and resources. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
from time immemorial these two peoples have not lived harmoniously together. Our public land must not be 
given to people other than the Moros.’ 
94
 Ibid.  
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government of the Philippines proposed two Organic Acts to recognise the right of self-
determination of the Cordillera indigenous peoples, but both were defeated in plebiscites held 
in 1990 and 1997, for a number of reasons: mistrust in the national government; fear of 
discrimination by non-indigenous residents; the view that the Organic Acts did not truly 
recognise indigenous rights, largely because both Acts contained a clause limiting the actual 
exercise of regional autonomy where it is in the interests of the Republic’s ‘national interest, 
security and development.’95  
At the time of writing, the Congress of the Philippines is deliberating on House Bill 
No. 5595 and Senate Bill No. 3115, which seek a third Organic Act to create the Cordillera 
Autonomous Region. The measures will allow the regional government to control its 
resources and oblige the national government to augment yearly revenues. But one 
commentator has noted that ‘[An autonomous government] is inherently a power of the 
central government, given to [the region], which means at any time, that power can be taken 
back by the state … Don’t expect to be liberated from the central government. That will 
never happen.’96 Whether the people of the Cordilleras will be satisfied with these most 
recent measures is unclear. 
Finally, there is the case of Indonesia. Since gaining independence from the Dutch 
after the Second World War, Indonesia has engaged in several armed conflicts with ethnic 
groups, who have all claimed a right to independence from the Republic of Indonesia. These 
include: the Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front; the movement of the Republic of South 
Moluccas; the Independence Movement of West Papua; and the Fretelin of East Timor. East 
Timor gained independence from Indonesia in 1999, following a United Nations-sponsored 
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referendum. The Free Aceh Movement signed a peace accord with Indonesia in 2005, in the 
wake of the Asian Tsunami.
97
 The largely Christian inhabitants of the Moluccas, which were 
part of the Netherlands East Indies, but only formed part of Indonesia after decolonisation, 
continue to agitate for independence from Indonesia.
98
 West Papua also continues to call for 
independence, and for the reversal of the 1969 United Nations Resolution concerning the 
handover of then-West New Guinea—now Papua and West Papua—from the Netherlands to 
Indonesia.
99
  
In relation to the rights of indigenous peoples, AICHR representative from Laos 
stated that the right was ‘not appropriate for countries that have no indigenous populations, 
such as Laos.’100 This statement is not a reflection of reality. Laos and Vietnam classify 
indigenous populations as ‘minorities’. Laos, together with Vietnam, Indonesia and most 
other countries in Southeast Asia, still possess autochthonous populations.
101
 These 
populations exist in relative poverty and are politically underrepresented at local, regional 
and national levels. Because they are often geographically located in remote and regional 
areas, they are vulnerable to the effects of development projects and natural resource 
exploitation (logging, damming and mining), which impact heavily (and largely negatively) 
upon them.
102
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former colonial territory of the Dutch East Indies to the sovereign state of the Federal Republic of Indonesia, 
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5.3.3 Preamble  
In early drafts of the Declaration, the Preamble contained broad statements about the nature 
and value of rights.
103
 In the final Declaration, these sorts of clauses are found in the body of 
the Declaration proper, in the first ‘General Principles’ section of the Declaration. In the final 
draft, the Preamble simply reaffirms adherence to: 
the purposes and principles of ASEAN as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, in 
particular the respect for and promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, as well as the principles of democracy, the rule of law and 
good governance  
 
And:  
a commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and other 
international human rights instruments to which ASEAN Member States are parties 
 
It is perhaps significant that the ‘object’ clause in the preamble of the Declaration 
changed significantly throughout the course of the drafting. The original preamble, in the 
January 2012 draft Declaration, included a broad and ambitious ‘purpose’ clause, which 
envisaged the Declaration as: 
a foundational instrument to manifest common values, commitments and aspirations 
in the field of human rights promotion and protection for the peoples of ASEAN, and 
as a shared vision of ASEAN for the fulfilment of the goals and objectives set forth 
herein, including establishing a framework for human rights cooperation through 
various ASEAN conventions and other instruments dealing with human rights.
104
  
 
                                                 
103
 For example, in the January 2012 draft, the preamble stated:  
viii. STRESSING the indivisibility of human rights and that civil and political rights, economic, social 
and cultural rights and right to development should be treated on equal footing with a view to creating 
conducive environment to achieve the betterment of human rights in the region, and ASEAN’s 
commitment to progressively narrow the development gap among ASEAN Member States through 
relevant mechanisms; 
and: 
ix. EMPHASIZING the interrelatedness of rights, duties and responsibilities of the human person and 
the ASEAN common values in the spirit of unity in diversity in the promotion and protection of human 
rights, while ensuring the balance between such rights, duties and responsibilities, and the primary 
responsibility to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, which rests with each 
Member State. 
104
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The final draft of the Declaration is much less ambitious: 
CONVINCED that this Declaration will help establish a framework for human rights 
cooperation in the region and contribute to the ASEAN community building 
process
105
 
 
Unlike the UDHR, which begins with only one general article, a philosophical 
statement about the universal nature of rights, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
contains many more broad ‘general principles.’106 The following section considers the 
significance of these.  
 
5.3.4 Article 1: ‘Free and Equal in Dignity and Rights …’  
Article 1 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration provides that:  
all persons are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of humanity. 
 
Article 1 of the Declaration mirrors Article 1 of the UDHR.
107
 The drafters of the 
UDHR drew their text from the 1948 Pan-American Declaration of Human Rights and Duties 
(the Bogota Declaration),
108
 which was itself drawn from the French 1789 Déclaration des 
Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen.
109
 The 1993 Vienna Declaration of Human Rights and 
Program of Action reaffirms Article 1 of the UDHR in its own Article 1: ‘Human Rights and 
fundamental freedoms are the birth-right of all human beings; their protection and promotion 
is the first responsibility of Government.’ The Preamble to the 1993 Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration, drafted by the five ASEAN member states after the Vienna World Conference, 
states that: ‘all human beings are created by the Almighty, and possess fundamental rights 
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which are universal, indivisible and inalienable’ and that ‘the peoples of ASEAN are born 
free and equal with full dignity and rights and are endowed with reasoning and conscience 
enabling them to act responsibly and humanely towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.’110 
Neither ASEAN’s human rights commissioners, nor the drafting working group, 
debated or discussed Article 1 to any significant extent, and Article 1 was one of the few 
which civil society did not query or quibble with, accepting its inclusion in the form proposed 
in the various drafts of the Declaration. Article 1 was subject to only one amendment 
throughout the drafting process of the Declaration. In the January 2012 draft, Article 1 begins 
with the word ‘Everyone’. Representatives from Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, 
jointly suggested changing the word ‘Everyone’ to ‘All persons’. This amendment does not 
appear to have been the subject of debate or controversy: in the June 23 draft, the September 
draft and in the final version, Article 1 begins with ‘All persons.’ 111 
This is not, perhaps, as minor a change as one might think. The American Declaration 
on the Rights and Duties of Man begins its statement about ‘the freedom and equality of all’ 
with the phrase ‘all men’. In the drafting of the American Convention, the words ‘all men’ 
were changed to ‘All persons.’ Clearly, ‘All persons’ is the more inclusive in gender terms, 
but there is perhaps a more significant difference between ‘all men’ and ‘all persons.’ ‘All 
men’ denotes ‘all mankind’, or ‘all human beings’: it is a general reference to humanity. The 
concept of ‘person’ is a legal concept—a person is someone who is recognised under law and 
who is accorded a particular bundle of rights. From this perspective, the shift from ‘all men’ 
to ‘all persons’ in the American instruments can be viewed as a consequence of the shift from 
a non-binding declaration to an enforceable convention. On the other hand, Article 1 of the 
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UDHR begins with the words ‘All human beings’.112 When the UDHR was finally 
transformed into the two Conventions, the broader references to ‘human beings’ and to 
‘everyone’ was preserved.113  
Martha Nussbaum has pointed out that the notion of ‘person’ has been historically 
used to provide a restricted normative conception of what ethical obligations are owed to 
specific social groups, and that the concept of ‘person’ has often been applied and withheld 
capriciously.
114
 Nussbaum contrasts the legal concept of the ‘person’, to whom specific rights 
might attach, with the broader and more inclusive concept of the human being. Nussbaum 
argues that the notion of ‘human being’ leaves less room for denying the moral obligation to 
provide others with what they need in order to survive and flourish. In contrast, ‘persons’ 
might belong to a legally classified class or group who might legitimately, in the view of a 
majority in a political society, be denied some rights (the stateless person; the refugee; the 
ethnic minority).  
In relation to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, the suggestion that ‘all persons’ 
be substituted for ‘everyone’ was proposed by representatives of Thailand, the Philippines 
and Indonesia, and supported by some civil society organisations.
115
 From this, one might 
assume that ‘all persons’ was not substituted because it was (potentially) a more legally 
restrictive phrase than ‘everyone’, but instead, because ‘all persons’ conveys a stronger aura 
of legality, which might imply more enforceable protection of rights than the less specific 
‘everyone.’ The change from ‘everyone’ to ‘all persons’ was not the subject of discussion in 
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either of the two regional consultations, or amongst civil society groups who prepared 
submissions on the Declaration.  
I turn now to the claim made in Article 1 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
about the nature of human beings as (i) rational (ii) of equal moral worth, and (iii) born equal 
in dignity and rights. This article affirms the principle of universality: all human beings have 
rights simply by virtue of being born human. What does this acknowledgment mean, given 
the region’s longstanding resistance to a Western dominated discourse of rights, the 
contention which accompanied debate about universality during the 1993 Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights, and the profound diversity of religious beliefs within 
Southeast Asia?  
At the time of the drafting of the UDHR, Jacques Maritain noted the importance of a 
shared ‘philosophy of life’ to provide a common platform for a statement about human 
rights.
116
 There is a question about whether or not there is congruence between the belief 
about the nature of human beings, which is articulated in Article 1 of the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration, and the various other philosophical beliefs that exist in Southeast Asia. 
To illustrate: is there congruence between Article 1, and the Confucian idea that individuals 
do not exist as free, autonomous, independent selves, with rights which attach to them simply 
because they are born human, but instead exist in a context of social relationships, and it is 
these relationships which define the rights and obligations owed?
117
 Or between Article 1 and 
the Buddhist idea that no one is born equal (because of past karma) and that one’s duty is to 
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strive towards a more equal existence in the next life?
118
 Or between Article 1 and the caste 
system within the Hindu tradition, which denies the equal worth of all human beings?
119
 Or 
between Article 1 and the differentiated legal rights allotted to women under Islamic 
Shari’a?120 All of these religious beliefs exist within Southeast Asia, and profoundly shape 
the lives and value patterns of many Southeast Asians. If the philosophy articulated in Article 
1 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration does not reflect the deeply held convictions of 
those subject to the Declaration, then what does this mean for the legitimacy of the regional 
human rights regime? 
The drafters of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration viewed questions about the 
metaphysical basis of human rights as being of limited importance and value.
121
 This is not an 
indefensible position. After all, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
drafted, the conclusion to long and acrimonious disputes about the philosophical basis of 
human rights was simply to adopt what Jacques Maritain described as a ‘practical viewpoint 
and concern ourselves no longer with seeking the basis and philosophic significance of 
human rights but only their statement and enumeration.’122 Maritain’s lead has been followed 
by several contemporary philosophers. Charles Beitz, for example, argues that what matters 
is how human rights operate as a discursive and political practice, and not as a philosophical 
doctrine.
123
 Richard Rorty suggests that the metaphysical basis of human rights is less 
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important than its rhetorical role in stirring sympathy for those who might be suffering.
124
 
Thomas Nagel suggests that the violation of basic human rights is devoid of philosophical 
interest: 
The maintenance of power by the torture and execution of political dissidents or 
religious minorities, denial of civil rights to women, total censorship, and so forth 
demand denunciation and practical opposition, not theoretical discussion. One could 
be pardoned for thinking that the philosophical interest of an issue is inversely 
proportional to its real-life significance.
125
 
 
Nonetheless, many other philosophers have considered it important to demonstrate 
that at the core of Asian philosophies and religions are values compatible with the modern 
doctrine of human rights. Within the Confucian tradition, for example, scholars have pointed 
to the fact that although ‘human rights’ do not exist as a concept in Confucian thought (or as 
words in the Chinese language),
126
 one can find in the works of Confucian and Mencius a 
focus on humanity and human dignity that is entirely compatible with the philosophy of 
contemporary international human rights.
127
 In Thailand, scholars such as Sivaraksa have 
drawn on the central Buddhist notions of individual responsibility for Enlightenment, to 
formulate a new application of the doctrine of non-violence that calls for respect for the 
autonomy of each person, and a minimal use of coercion in human affairs.
128
 Even the Hindu 
caste system has been described by one scholar as a ‘traditional, multidimensional view[s] of 
human rights.’129 Panikkar argues that the Indian view of social order captured in Hinduism 
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provides an account of human dignity that conforms with human rights standards. He argues 
that the individual exists and has meaning within a social order, and this order defines the 
individual’s entitlements and duties in relation to others within the order.130  
Simon Jones describes these approaches as ‘continuous’ strategies—they attempt to 
establish continuity between the theory of human rights and the various doctrines to which 
people are committed.
131
 Onuma Yasuaki calls them a ‘theory of universal origin’, a way for 
intellectuals and human right advocates in diverse societies to argue: ‘look, human rights are 
not alien. They are already in our religion (culture, customs, etc).’132 The argument is, in 
essence, that if all societies, in all ages, have seen the human person as holding a certain 
value and deserving respect, then we can take this as justification for a doctrine of human 
rights. The Western bias of human rights, and its basis in natural law, is removed. Some 
scholars, however, such as Alison Dundes Renteln, question the integrity of any hunt to find 
common values in all cultures. Renteln argues that it is not possible to pluck values from a 
complex culture and still have those values retain their original meaning. In Renteln’s view, 
what matters within any particular culture is how values relate to one another and rank beside 
each other.
133
 
It is also difficult to identify with precision what these things are that all cultures 
respect and value. The answer is more easily given in the negative, in terms of things that all 
cultures abhor. Charles Taylor identifies genocide, murder, torture and slavery as things that 
all cultures condemn.
134
 In a similar vein, Donnelly suggests that there are certain things 
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which simply cannot legitimately be done to human beings (such as chattel slavery and the 
caste system), and some things which seem to be accepted as binding by virtually all cultures 
(such as prohibition of torture and requirements of procedural due process in imposing and 
executing legal punishments).
135
 These are the same types of things that Bernard Williams 
recognises as ‘abuses of power that almost everyone everywhere has been in a position to 
recognise.’136  
Thomas Nagel believes that such things constitute a ‘core of inviolability’ to which no 
cost-benefit analysis applies, and which are wrong regardless of culture or circumstance, and 
which demand ‘denunciation and practical opposition, not theoretical discussion.’137 These 
inviolable rights seem, for most who have written in this vein, to be the non-derogable rights 
listed in the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights: the right to life; freedom 
from torture, slavery, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment; recognition before the law; and 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. But from an empirical perspective, it is difficult 
to argue that even these basic rights are universal: that is, that they have been accepted, at all 
times, by all cultures.
138
  
 Values assumed to be cross-culturally valid because they are found in every culture 
are often either very vague or very meagre. Some scholars, for example, have found in the 
concept of ‘dignity’ the necessary element of commonality to ground a common universal 
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system of value.
139
 But attempts to give meaning to the word diminish its practical utility. In 
Pannikar’s conception of the caste system, for example, dignity might derive from one’s role 
in a social order, and one’s rights might be the rights that attach to a person as ruler, wife, 
mother, or street-sweeper. In such an order, there is manifest dignity in a wife’s fulfilment of 
sati after the death of her husband. But Western observers would find it difficult to see how 
in these circumstances the wife could be said to possess freedom and equality in the same 
way that her husband does.  
In essence, the question is not really whether different cultures are capable of 
supporting a doctrine of human rights. Clearly they are, if human rights are broadly 
understood and cultures are sympathetically interpreted. The question is; why should they? 
Why should a moral community be built around an understanding of human beings as 
rational, and free and equal? It might be the case that norms of freedom and equality do in 
fact best protect those things that some societies hold most dear. Strong arguments have been 
made about the instrumental value of individual freedoms in terms of the large contribution to 
the common good made by protection and promotion of these rights.
140
 But this cannot just 
be assumed. 
What follows from this is that the values and principles that undergird international 
human rights require justification. In modern times, in democratic societies, it is understood 
that justification occurs through processes of public deliberation.
141
 Part of my hypothesis is 
that regions are particularly useful and fruitful sites within which these kinds of conversations 
might occur, and that the transcripts of regional conversations—which take the form, 
sometimes, of texts such as the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration—carry a particular 
legitimacy because of this. My hypothesis rests on the idea that the processes for deliberating 
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on the value and meaning of rights might occur effectively at a regional level because of the 
proximity, and awareness of differences, understandings and shared histories that link states 
and peoples within a region. What this chapter shows, however, in the case of the drafting of 
the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, is a conversation that was truncated and partial. This 
was the result of political impediments to free and unencumbered discourse in a majority of 
ASEAN states.  
 
5.3.5 Article 2: Non-Discrimination 
Article 2 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration again replicates the UDHR. It contains 
the essential principle of non-discrimination, entitling everyone to all the rights and freedoms 
set forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, gender, age, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, 
disability, or other status. 
In the 8 January 2012 draft Declaration, the prohibited grounds of discrimination 
included ‘sexual identity’, which in the text was enclosed in brackets, signifying that at that 
stage there was lack of agreement among the drafters on the inclusion of this ground. The 
June 2012 draft Declaration makes no reference to rights of sexual orientation or gender 
identity, indicating that by June 2012, the question had been resolved. Article 2, and the issue 
of whether sexual orientation and gender identity should be included as a prohibited ground 
of discrimination, represented one of the few occasions on which the Declaration became the 
subject of broad debate in the public arena. 
In the debate about the inclusion of ‘sexual orientation and gender identity’ (SOGI) 
rights in the Declaration, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) whose work focused on 
SOGI played a leading role. These NGOs participated in the ASEAN Civil Society 
Conference, held in April 2012, and agitated there among other CSOs for recognition of 
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SOGI rights in the Declaration. After the April 2012 conference, one of the key regional civil 
society organisations, the ASEAN People’s Forum, agreed to press for the inclusion in the 
Declaration of equality rights relating to sexual orientation and gender identity.
142
 AICHR 
representatives of Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, supported the inclusion of SOGI 
in Article 2. However, AICHR representatives from Malaysia and Brunei, states with 
majority Islamic populations and which apply Shari’a law, and some prominent social and 
religious actors within these countries, strongly objected to the inclusion of rights of sexual 
orientation and gender identity. Singapore’s AICHR representative did not support the 
inclusion of SOGI rights. 
It is useful to consider the exchange of viewpoints on this issue in some detail, as it 
illustrates the sort of regional dialogue about rights, which (I argue) has the potential to lead 
to new understandings about the scope and value of rights. The International Gay and 
Lesbian Rights Human Rights Commission began the public debate by publishing online 
some of the reasons that in their view justified inclusion of SOGI rights in the Declaration: 
In Brunei, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore colonial laws that criminalize SOGI are 
used to harass, extort money and demand sexual favours, arrest, detain and persecute 
LGBTIQ persons. In the Philippines and Indonesia, anti-trafficking or pornographic 
laws are used to conduct illegal raids at gay establishments and detain LGBTIQ 
people. The anti-kidnapping law in the Philippines is used to forcibly break apart 
lesbian couples in legitimate and consensual relationships. In Cambodia, a lesbian 
was imprisoned following a homophobic complaint by the family of her partner 
because of their relationship. In Thailand, the negligence of the state is clearly 
manifested in the refusal to investigate the killings of fifteen lesbians and gender-
variant women. The existence of the pornographic law in Indonesia, which 
haphazardly included SOGI as pornography, is used by several internet providers to 
block websites of legitimate LGBTIQ organization such as the International Gay 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGHLRC) and the International Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Association (ILGA) websites. In Malaysia, 
Seksualiti Merdeka, an annual sexuality festival was disrupted and banned by the 
police as the festival was deemed a ‘threat to national security’. Basic human rights, 
such as right to healthcare, housing and education, are denied on the basis our SOGI. 
This has contributed to the steep rise in HIV infection amongst most at risk 
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populations: men who have sex with men and transgendered people. Archaic laws that 
criminalize SOGI make it even more difficult in implementing life-saving 
interventions to at-risk groups.
143
 
 
This statement was picked up by the media in several states across the region, and 
formed the subject of much online discussion. The Vice-President of the Muslim Lawyers 
Association of Malaysia, Azril Mohd Amin, responded to the suggestion that SOGI rights 
should be included in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in the following way:  
Were ASEAN to endorse such rights in the final declaration, Malaysia as a Muslim-
majority country would have to reiterate her strong objections; as such a policy 
clearly contradicts the principles enshrined in the religion of Islam … The 12 
September 2012 Regional Consultation is expected to submit a revised draft of an 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration for Leaders' signing at the 21st ASEAN Summit 
to be held in November 2012. In it, you will see the disregard for medical opinion, the 
politicisation of all gender issues, and demands for recognition for public behaviour 
that has never been publically endorsed in most previous cultures, and certainly not in 
any major religion. You will see the immense pressure on ASEAN governments, 
particularly on the Malaysian government, to subscribe and submit to the ‘Yogyakarta 
Principles’ of 2006, in fear of the upcoming 2013 United Nations' Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR) of Malaysia's Human Rights situation, which will inevitably be a 
review of Malaysia's LGBT policy and rights. If Malaysians and their friends do not 
take a firm stand against deviation from the teachings of all major and revealed 
religions, they may well suffer the punishment of others who have disregarded the 
Quranic principles at some point on the stage of human organisation … What is to be 
done? Muslim scholars and leaders, Islamic NGO activists and government 
representatives to the forthcoming Regional Consultation must make it clear that 
Malaysia has already expressed an unalterable position on LGBTs. Malaysia, together 
with OIC member states objected to the 17/19 UN Resolution on LGBTs, as well as 
objecting directly to the Human Rights Council Chair in Geneva … It will be 
difficult, but the test of our faith is that we must nevertheless defend the veracity of 
Divine Laws among us. We must witness this veracity to the entire human race. 
Therefore, the upcoming UPR of Human Rights in Geneva may be the one of the real 
tests for Muslims living in this so-called ‘modern world’. May Allah help us all, and 
witness our intention to defend His Presence and the presence of His Laws, among us, 
AMIN.
144
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The juxtaposition of these two alternate views served an important public purpose in 
identifying the parameters of the debate on whether or not discrimination on the basis of 
SOGI should be recognised in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. The difficulty was 
that ASEAN’s human rights commissioners, who were ‘accountable to their appointing 
governments’, did not act, in meetings and consultations about the AHRD, as independent 
agents whose interests were in furthering debate and testing ideas through reasoned 
discourse. This was made clear during the second regional consultation on the AHRD, in 
Manila in June 2012, when the issue of including reference to sexual orientation and gender 
identity was again raised. NGOs who attended the conference reported that Malaysia’s 
Commissioner, Muhammad Shafee Abdullah, said: ‘I cannot use my personal decision since 
together with Brunei and Singapore, we have strict instructions from the government to 
oppose LGBT rights inclusion in the declaration.’145  
The second difficulty was that too little time was given to exploring what are complex 
questions of religion, sexuality and morality. During the Manila consultation, for example, 
there was a heated exchange between the member of a Malaysian Muslim Youth Group, who 
had been invited to the consultation by the Malaysian government, and Ging Cristobal, an 
LGBT activist from the Philippines. The Muslim Youth Group member declared his 
opposition to recognition of sexual orientation and gender identity recognition, stating: ‘Even 
if we agree that LGBT persons should not be discriminated against, they are abnormals and 
should not be in the declaration and should be deleted …’ Cristobal responded that ‘this is 
clearly what inequality and discrimination looks like—maligning LGBT persons by claiming 
we are ‘abnormals’ and by denying our rightful space in the declaration.’146 
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In an example of the mistrust that existed between civil society and the governments 
of the region in the processes of drafting the Declaration, Yuyun Wahyuningrum, senior 
advisor on ASEAN and Human Rights at the Human Rights Working Groups (HRWG), 
suggests that AICHR Commissioners (or their governments) deliberately invited to the 
consultation civil society representatives whose views were in violent opposition to one 
another, so that they would be able to point to the lack of consensus that exists among civil 
society itself, and civil society’s disorderliness, as evidence that their views should be 
discounted.
147
 
The truncated conversation that occurred in relation to recognition of SOGI rights, to 
which this chapter returns in the discussion below on the ‘public morality’ limitation, shows 
that not all debate leads to consensus. In his critique of Rorty’s ironic liberalism, Peerenboom 
writes of a point where reconciliation between different positions is simply impossible, and 
where liberal stories could be told ‘until the cows come home, and the edifying conversation 
could go on forever’ and yet there would still be disagreement, because ‘[a]t the end of the 
day, we do not all share the same values, we do not all have the same vision of the good life. 
Nor need we.’148 Peerenboom questions Rorty’s assumption that ‘everyone would be better 
off with bourgeois freedoms and our culture of rights.’149 Yet in the end Peerenboom agrees 
that ‘as a practical matter, there seems little alternative to reasoned discussion.’150 Discussion 
brings then, if not agreement, the kind of understanding of the other’s views, which 
eventually, one hopes, leads to respect and to tolerance. For example, civil society leader 
Wahyuningrum, who supported the inclusion of SOGI rights in the Declaration, does not 
view it as a defeat that they were not ultimately included. Wahyuningrum considers it 
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progress that in the course of the drafting of the Declaration, states such as Malaysia, Brunei 
and Singapore, were forced to acknowledge the position of proponents for SOGI rights and to 
listen to their arguments.  
We return again to the importance of free inquiry and debate, and to the civil liberties 
that are necessary in order for these things to occur. My argument is not that free inquiry and 
debate will necessarily lead to consensus on questions about the relative importance of values 
such as individual autonomy, liberty and social cohesion. On the issue of sexual autonomy, 
liberals might follow Nagel’s simple proposition: ‘it is essential that we learn to live together 
without trying to stifle one another’s deepest feelings.’151 For others, the answer may be more 
complex, and the scales may be tilted in favour of social cohesion over individual self-
expression. What I argue is that these sorts of conversations are a necessary step towards 
clarifying the positions of people who fundamentally disagree on important issues, and 
helping the respective parties to understand where the differences lie. The debate itself works 
towards ensuring that the common public life reflects the views of all its members, so that all 
members stand a chance of achieving self-realisation as part of a community. One of the 
central difficulties of the Article 2 exchange was that SOGI activists attempted to put forward 
rational arguments for recognition of their rights, but these were met with arguments from 
religion, which proponents did not think required justification. The difficulty with a discourse 
of justification where one of the parties to the conversation is arguing on the basis of religion 
is discussed below, in the context of the ‘public morality’ clause in the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration. 
 
5.3.6 Article 6: Duties 
Article 6 states that:  
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The enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be balanced with the 
performance of corresponding duties as every person has responsibilities to all other 
individuals, the community and the society where one lives. It is ultimately the 
primary responsibility of all ASEAN Member States to promote and protect all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
The 9 January 2012 ‘working draft’ of the Declaration contains ten alternative 
formulations of a ‘duties’ provision, suggesting that this Article was one which caused 
significant difficulties for the working group originally tasked with creating the Declaration. 
Several of these draft provisions were along the following lines:  
Everyone must respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others as it 
contributes to the State, society and their own development. Duties and 
responsibilities are implicit in the understanding of good citizens and responsible 
members of the ASEAN Community.
152
  
 
The Preamble to the January draft of the Declaration also contains a reference to 
duties, emphasising: 
the interrelatedness of rights, duties and responsibilities of the human person and the 
ASEAN common values in the spirit of unity in diversity in the promotion and 
protection of human rights, while ensuring the balance between such rights, duties and 
responsibilities, and the primary responsibility to promote and protect human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, which rests with each Member State.
153
 
 
The June 2012 draft contained what was to become the final formulation of the duties 
provision, and remained unchanged.  
Civil society organisations objected very strongly to any reference to ‘balancing’ 
rights with duties. The HRWG, for example, argued that: ‘the notion of ‘balancing’ duties 
against human rights is alien to the concept of ‘inalienable’ human rights.’154 In her statement 
to the Bali Democracy Forum on 7 November 2012, the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, as well as (again) criticising civil society’s exclusion from the drafting process for the 
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ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, specifically stated that: ‘the balancing of human rights 
with individual duties was not a part of international human rights law, misrepresents the 
positive dynamic between rights and duties and should not be included in a human rights 
instrument.’155  
The idea of ‘duties’ has a pedigree in international human rights instruments.156 In the 
lead-up to the drafting of the UDHR, for example, the importance of including duties was 
emphasised by participants from China, Latin America, the Soviet Union, and France.
157
 The 
result was the provision in Article 29(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
stating that: ‘Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible.’158 Regional human rights instruments such as the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
159
 the American Convention on 
Human Rights,
160
 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights161 also contain 
references to duties. Indeed nearly all of the human rights instruments created since World 
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War II have provided express or implied recognition of duties. Writing in the Harvard 
Human Rights Journal twenty years ago, Jordan J Paust advised a shift from theoretical 
inquiries about whether duties existed in international human rights law, to questions about 
what sorts of duty correspond to what sorts of rights in what contexts, how competing rights 
should be accommodated, and how these ultimately affect public responsibility.
162
 
The idea of duties as an important and natural part of a theory of rights seems entirely 
unremarkable to modern philosophers of rights.
163
 For example, Hohfeld’s conception of 
rights distinguishes between claims, liberties, authorities and immunities. Each type of right 
possesses a correlative legal consequence for others.
164
 Joseph Raz employs the notion of 
duties to identify whether or not something is a right at all. Raz argues that a person has a 
right if some aspect of her wellbeing (some ‘interest’) is sufficiently important to justify 
holding another person or persons to be under a duty to respect and fulfil that right. A’s right 
to free speech, for example, is sufficiently important from a moral point of view to justify 
holding other people (particularly the government) to have duties not to place A under 
restrictions or penalties in this regard.
165
 Amartya Sen has explored the scope of duties in 
international human rights law, without questioning that the idea of duty belongs in the 
theory of human rights that he proposes. For Sen, all of us have a basic general obligation (a 
duty) to engage in an act of deliberative reasoning in order to work out what should be done, 
given the parameters of a particular case, to prevent the human rights of others from being 
violated or to aid their enjoyment of rights.
166
 Thomas Pogge has offered a more specific and 
demanding idea of duty, arguing that every person has a duty not to cooperate in imposing an 
unjust institutional scheme upon others, one that might violate their rights in indirect ways, 
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and that continued participation in an unjust institutional scheme, triggers obligations to 
promote feasible reforms of this scheme.
167
 In his (very brief) contribution to the UNESCO 
Committee on the Drafting of the UDHR, Mahatma Gandhi suggested that instead of a list of 
rights, it might be better for the Committee to ‘define the duties of every Man and Woman 
and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be first performed. Every other right 
can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for.’168 
Some scholars, however, have drawn attention to the dangers of advancing a notion of 
duties within a framework of human rights. Saul, for example, in his critique of the 1997 
Draft Declaration of Human Responsibilities, created by the Inter-Action Council, argues 
persuasively that: (1) duties cannot be defined with sufficient clarity and precision to make 
them useful legal concepts; (2) duties involve subtle and particularistic matters of custom and 
lore, better suited to local systems of morality rather than codification at the international 
level; (3) historically, the concept of human duties has proven open to abuse and 
manipulation.
169
 This last argument is particularly telling in the context of Southeast Asia, 
where a very particular conception of duty has prevailed among governments in the region. 
This idea of duty was most clearly set out in the 1991 Singapore government’s White Paper, 
‘Shared Values,’ discussed in Chapter 3.170 The White Paper, presented as a pan-Singaporean 
national ideology, identifies five key values of Singaporean society.
171
 The ﬁrst value is 
‘nation before community and society before self.’ This is projected as the foundational value 
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upon which the other four values (family as the basic unit of society; community support and 
respect for the individual; consensus, not conﬂict; racial and religious harmony) are built. 
‘Nation before community’ means that no ethnic or religious group should place its own 
interests above those of other groups; all subgroups should support the national interest above 
all. ‘Society before self’ means that individuals should pursue the common good and not 
selﬁshly prioritise their own interests and beneﬁts. The White Paper states: ‘If Singaporeans 
had insisted on their individual rights and prerogatives, and refused to compromise these for 
the greater interests of the nation, they would have restricted the options available for solving 
these problems.’172 
The White Paper endorses a uniquely East/Southeast Asian version of 
communitarianism, one that preferences collectivism over individualism, especially the 
individual’s freedom.173 The community is exalted in the formation and shaping of the 
individual’s values, behaviour, and identity. For example, in the White Paper, Singaporeans 
are exhorted to compromise their selﬁsh individual interests, beneﬁts, and rights for the 
common good and to perform their duties as members of their family and community. 
Personal rights and civil and political liberties are less important than fulﬁlling duties and 
responsibilities toward family and community. The Singapore White Paper does not base a 
commitment to upholding rights on the needs and interests of each individual, but on a 
calculus that relates the importance of that interest to the importance of every other interest, 
such as social stability or national security. In Malaysia, Mahathir pronounced similar 
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philosophies to the ones set out in the White Paper, about the duty of citizens to put the 
interests of the state before their individual desires. Consider the following speech:  
For Asians, the community, the majority comes first. The individual and minority 
must have their rights but not at the unreasonable expense of the majority. The 
individuals and the majority must conform to the mores of society. A little deviation 
may be allowed but unrestrained exhibition of personal freedom which disturbs the 
peace or threatens to undermine society is not what Asians expect from democracy.
174
  
 
As Yash Ghai notes, in the hands of some governments, the concept of duty becomes 
a justification for, as well as an instrument of, authoritarianism.
175
 Ghai points out that in 
societies where ideas of duty predominate is that ‘the system becomes reminiscent of 
feudalism with persons at the top of the hierarchy having rights and those at the lower 
reaches, duties.’176 He notes that the fulfilment of duties frequently betokens social, 
economic, or political subordination, tends towards conservatism and the perpetuation of 
inequalities. The emphasis on duties which permeated the policies and rhetoric of leaders 
such as Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir and Suharto, essentialised citizens as people who are 
obedient and devoted to the community; and civic and national virtue as demanding an 
orientation away from ‘individualistic’ demands such as a free press or habeas corpus.177 The 
political logic following from an emphasis on duty was a constraint of civil and political 
rights in the name of order, harmony and control. 
There is a clear strand of utilitarian thinking in this kind of philosophy about duties: 
an idea that individual rights might justifiably be ‘traded-off’ against a greater good. This is 
the very notion that the idea of rights was supposed to resist, in Ronald Dworkin’s idea of 
                                                 
174
 Mohamad Mahathir, ‘Speech to World Youth Foundation’ (1999) in Human Rights: Views of Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad Kuala Lumpur, Melaka: World Youth Foundation.  
175
 Yash Ghai, ‘Human Rights and Governance: the Asia Debate’ (2000) 1 Asia-Pacific Journal of Human 
Rights and the Law 9, 33. 
176
 Ibid. 
177
 Neil Englehart, ‘Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument: the Rise and Fall of Confucian Ethics in 
Singapore’ (2000) 22(2) Human Rights Quarterly 548. 
Chapter 5: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
254 
 
rights as ‘trump cards’, which protect the basics of our individual freedom and liberty against 
other imperatives.
178
 Jeremy Waldron argues that rights are supposed to impose limits on the 
sacrifices that can be demanded from individuals as contributions to the general good: 
‘designed to pick out those interests of ours that are not to be traded off against the interests 
of others in this way.’ 179  
In relation to ASEAN’s communist members, Vietnam and Laos, the idea of 
balancing duties with rights is inherently problematic. In communist societies, the possession 
of rights is contingent on the performance of duties. Because of this element of contingency, 
many argue that in communist societies, rights are not the equal and inalienable entitlements 
that the UDHR envisions.
180
 The argument is that if the state can bestow or remove rights 
based on its assessments of citizen’s contributions to the state, then entitlements are not held 
as rights. In Chapter 3, I discussed Jack Donnelly and Rhoda Howard’s argument that the 
duty to build society according to a particular communist vision will inevitably lead to the 
denial of civil and political rights, because the exercise of personal autonomy and civil 
liberties is almost certain to undermine that vision.
181
 Article 51 of the Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, modelled on Article 59 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, 
states: ‘The citizen's rights are inseparable from his duties. The State guarantees the rights of 
the citizen; the citizen must fulfil his duties to the State and society.’182 
CSOs involved in advocacy around the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration were not 
opposed to a reference to duties. The draft declaration prepared by the ASEAN Working 
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Group for a Human Rights Mechanism, for example, itself includes an article on duties.
183
 It 
was the idea of ‘balancing’ rights and duties that many found to be problematic.184 CSOs 
feared that the conception of balance favoured by Southeast Asian governments would be a 
balance between individual liberty, and the duty of citizens to preserve the existing social 
order. CSOs feared that an individual’s duty to ensure the cohesion and security of the state 
would prevail over individual liberty. In circumstances where the existing social order 
subjugates the rights of women, or ethnic minorities, or indigenous peoples, this was viewed 
as unacceptable. 
In her discussion on the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Glendon comments in relation to Article 29, the ‘duties’ article, that the duties are meant to 
apply in ‘a certain kind of community, where the free and full development of his personality 
is possible.’185 The UDHR does actually not say this. The UDHR states that it is ‘the 
community alone in which the free and full development of his personality is possible’ and 
this is why the individual owes the community duties. But Glendon is trying to make the 
point that we cannot owe duties to communities in which we are not free and equal members, 
in which our views about balancing rights, and the relationship between rights and duties, are 
ignored or subjugated. Put simply, civil society actors in Southeast Asia did not trust that the 
governments of the region would carry out any balancing act in an even-handed way. 
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5.3.7 Article 7: ‘Indivisible, Interdependent and Interrelated’ 
Article 7 provides that: 
All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. All human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in this declaration must be treated in a fair and equal 
manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. At the same time, the 
realisation of human rights must be considered in the regional and national context 
bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and 
religious backgrounds. 
 
This article also closely follows the formulation of Article 5 of the Vienna 
Declaration: 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, 
on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national 
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds 
must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic 
and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.
186
  
 
The phrase ‘indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’ is ritually invoked in the 
statements, speeches and reports of United Nations human rights actors and institutions. Only 
recently have scholars attempted to unpack the meaning and potential of the phrase.
187
 
Initially, the idea was born from the desire of developing nations to emphasise economic and 
social rights, in contradistinction to the perceived emphasis placed on civil and political 
rights, and to make the point that social and economic rights are as essential to a life with 
dignity as rights connected to individual liberties. The 1968 Proclamation of Teheran states: 
‘Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of civil and 
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political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is 
impossible.’188  
It is surely the case that economic and social rights, and civil and political rights, are 
interrelated. The work of Amartya Sen links rights of political participation to the fulfilment 
of economic and social rights: in democracies, the exercise of one’s civil and political 
liberties (for example, to protest against the government’s economic and social policies) 
assists political communities in avoiding the severest forms of economic deprivation 
(famines).
189
 Sen argues that egregious social injustices are less likely to prevail in societies 
that practice liberal democracy.
190
 Viewed from the alternative perspective, jurisprudence 
from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has established that there is a link 
between economic and social conditions and the ability to exercise rights of political 
participation: poor, less educated and marginalised people are less able to access systems of 
power and more likely to be excluded from decision-making processes.
191
 In this way, rights 
are clearly interdependent and interrelated, both amongst civil and political rights (for 
example, in the way the right to freedom of expression supports the right to political 
participation), amongst social, economic and cultural rights (for example, in the way the right 
to food supports the right to work, and vice versa), and between civil and political rights and 
economic, social and cultural rights (in the way, for example, that equality rights support the 
right to education).  
All rights are clearly interdependent and interrelated, but are they all indivisible? And 
if they are not, then are indivisible rights, without which other rights cannot exist, more 
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important than other rights? And if some are more important, how much weight can we give 
to the statement that ‘all rights must be treated on the same footing and with the same 
emphasis’? These questions bring us to the vexed issue of whether or not there is a hierarchy 
of human rights. Is the right to life, protected in Article 11 of the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration, equally as important as the right to ‘freely take part in cultural life, to enjoy the 
arts and the benefits of scientific progress,’ protected in Article 33 of the Declaration? It is 
certainly arguable that cultural life is extremely important, that it is essential to self-identity 
and fulfilment, and even that it is necessary in order for an individual to fulfil his or her 
potential to lead a fully ‘human’ life. But is it as important as being alive, or not being a 
slave? Death or enslavement precludes the possibility of enjoying any other rights at all. Is it 
helpful to the realisation of all rights to argue that these rights are thus of a different and more 
important order than other rights, and that their realisation should be prioritised in 
government policy?  
In relation to questions such as these, James Nickel has argued that indivisibility 
should be viewed differently to interdependence and interrelatedness. His argument is that 
indivisibility is a very strong form of interdependence, where one right cannot exist in the 
absence of another. Interdependence and interrelatedness mean merely that one right supports 
the other, without being essential to its survival. He uses the analogy of human biology. The 
heart and the liver are indivisible: one cannot function without the other. A person’s two 
hands, in contrast, are merely mutually supportive, not indivisible.
192
 
In most countries in Southeast Asia, governments have very limited resources and the 
prioritisation of some pressing social needs over others is inevitable. There may indeed be 
utility in counting some core rights as indivisible, and prioritising their realisation over other 
rights, which are merely interdependent and interrelated. International customary law 
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recognises certain rights as peremptory norms of international law, from which no derogation 
is possible. International human rights treaties—and indeed the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration itself—implicitly acknowledge that there is a hierarchy of rights, in the sense that 
they demand immediate protection for some rights (‘negative’ civil and political rights) and 
provide that other (‘positive’ social and economic rights) may be realised progressively.193 
The second sentence of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, about the realisation 
of rights ‘in the regional and national context bearing in mind different political, economic, 
legal, social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds’ generated significant protests 
from civil society organisations. Civil society organisations identified this sentence as one of 
the Declaration’s key shortcomings, which would ‘allow ASEAN member states to not 
respect human rights’ and, in the words of Human Rights Watch Thailand, render the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration ‘a tragedy’ for the 600 million people of Southeast 
Asia.
194
  
Yet by itself, the article is unobjectionable. Nothing of any consequence flows from 
the difference between Article 7 in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and Article 5 in 
the Vienna Declaration. True, Article 5 of the Vienna Declaration provides that regardless of 
historical, cultural backgrounds (which can be born in mind) it is the state’s duty to promote 
and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, while the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration does not make this clear, and instead merely draws attention to the fact that 
different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds 
should be born in mind. But the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration contains an expansive 
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provision about state responsibility in Article 6, when it states, ‘It is ultimately the primary 
responsibility of all ASEAN Member States to promote and protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.’ Why then did Article 7 cause so much ire? 
The response of civil society can only be explained in the context of the Asian Values 
debate and the secretive drafting process of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. The 8 
January 2012 version of the Declaration includes a preambular clause, which states: 
‘Reaffirming that the Declaration adheres to the purposes and principles of the ASEAN 
Charter, and international human rights standards, taking into account national and regional 
particularities.’ The phrase ‘taking into account national and regional particularities,’ echoes 
Article 8 of the 1993 Bangkok Declaration: 
while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a 
dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds.
195
 
 
The word in the Bangkok Declaration that greatly troubled human rights activists and 
Western leaders at the time of the Vienna World Conference was: ‘while’: ‘ 
while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a 
dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds’ (emphasis added). 
 
After tortuous negotiation, in the Vienna Declaration, the qualifying ‘while’ was 
placed in relation to the claim for particularism, rather than the claim for universalism, 
translating into an uneasy compromise between universalism and relativism. 
The 1993 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Human Rights, which was prepared by 
ASEAN member states (which at the time were Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the 
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Philippines and Singapore) after the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, evades the 
universalist/relativist controversy, merely stating that: ‘the peoples of ASEAN accept that 
human rights exist in a dynamic and evolving context and that each country has inherent 
historical experiences, and changing economic, social, political, and cultural realities and 
value systems which should be taken into account.’196 
Given this background, we can see more clearly the reasons behind the strong 
objection of CSOs to the inclusion of the phrase ‘national and regional particularities’ in the 
January 2012 draft of the Declaration. CSOs viewed it as an attempt to revive the ‘Asian 
Values’ debate and an opening to future concessions to relativism. The views of CSOs 
prevailed, in terms of removing the phrase ‘national and regional particularities’ from the 
Preamble. 
The contention surrounding Article 7 of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration is 
again one that is born of civil society’s distrust of the governments of the region, and the 
particular histories of authoritarianism and oppression that have shaped post-colonial 
Southeast Asia. For on one reading, the statement that human rights must be realised ‘in the 
regional and national context bearing in mind different political, economic, legal, social, 
cultural, historical and religious backgrounds’ is entirely unremarkable. As long as one 
accepts that human rights are universal, indicating that there is at some level a common 
global standard in the way a right is understood, defined and interpreted, then there is little 
problem in acknowledging that rights will be realised in different regional and national 
contexts, where different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious 
backgrounds exist. Indeed, the effective realisation of rights demands that the different 
political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds of different 
societies must be considered. The action required to ensure that a woman living in a rural 
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areas of the Philippines can attain ‘the highest attainable standard of reproductive health’197 is 
different to what is required to ensure this same right to a woman living in Singapore. The 
fear of civil society was that permitting the consideration of particular historical, political and 
cultural elements in different societies, would allow states to defer to culture, religion and 
political background, in the interpretation and implementation of rights, in ways that denied 
that there was any common global standard in the way a right was understood, defined and 
interpreted.  
 
5.3.8 Article 8 Limitations: ‘Public Morality’ 
Article 8 contains a limitations clause, which provides that:  
The human rights and fundamental freedoms of every person shall be exercised with 
due regard to the rights and duties of others. The exercise of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by 
law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition for the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of others and to meet the just requirements of national security, 
public order, public health and public morality and the general welfare of the peoples 
in a democratic society.
198
  
 
 The limitations clause in the UDHR, Article 29(2), permits limitations on the basis of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. It is not, in any 
substantive way, different to the limitations clause contained in the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration.
199
 Nonetheless, some civil society organisations objected to the limitations 
clause, on the grounds that it was placed in the ‘General Principles’ section of the text, 
meaning (in the view of these organisations) that limitations could potentially apply to all 
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rights, including rights that are non-derogable under international law. For this reason, some 
NGOs, some Western governments, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, were 
very critical of the limitations provision within the Declaration. 
Some were also highly critical of the inclusion of ‘public morality’ as a limitation on 
the exercise of rights and freedoms. This criticism requires some explication, as most 
international human rights instruments include a provision that permits states to limit certain 
rights and freedoms on the basis of public morality. The UDHR contains a provision very 
similar to that of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration;
200
 the European Convention on 
Human Rights permits limitations on certain rights (privacy, freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, expression and assembly) on grounds of public morality;
201
 the American 
Convention on Human Rights largely follows the European model;
202
 the African Charter 
permits certain rights to be limited or circumscribed by reference to national law;
203
 the Arab 
Charter permits limitations on rights to political participation and information on the basis of 
morality.
204
 The constitutions of most ASEAN states, in one form or another, provide for the 
limitation of rights based on public morality.
205
  
                                                 
200
 UDHR, Article 29(2): ‘In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in 
a democratic society.’ 
201
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 
1950, 213 UNTS 2, entered into force 3 September 1953), as amended by Protocol 11 (1998) and Protocol 14 
(2010). 
202
 American Convention on Human Rights, above n 160. 
203
 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) (adopted 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217, 
entered into force 21 October 1986). 
204
 Arab Charter on Human Rights (adopted 15 September 1994, entered into force 15 March 2008), Articles 24 
and 31. 
205
 For example, Article 41 of the 1993 Constitution of Cambodia provides in relation to Freedom of Expression, 
that: (1) Khmer citizens have freedom of expression, press, publication, and assembly. No one may exercise this 
right to infringe upon the rights of others, to affect the good traditions of the society, or to violate public law and 
order and national security; Article 28J of the 2002 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia permits the 
limitation of some rights on the basis of: ‘morality, religious values, security and public order in a democratic 
society’; Article 44 of the Amended Constitution of the Lao’s Peoples Democratic Republic provides that Lao 
citizens have the right and freedom of speech, press and assembly; and have the right to set up associations and 
Chapter 5: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
264 
 
Nonetheless, several civil society organisations—particularly those representing 
women’s organisations—argued against the inclusion of this limitation. The fear of civil 
society organisations was that states would use the public morality limitation to justify 
domestic laws and practices that subjugate women and sexual minorities. The Southeast Asia 
Women’s Caucus on ASEAN released a submission which argued that in Southeast Asia, the 
‘public morality’ justification permitted the survival of cultural practices that were harmful to 
women, such as: female genital mutilation as a sign of chastity in Indonesia; discrimination 
against married woman who commit adultery in the Philippines; traditional birth practices in 
Cambodia and Laos; prohibition against same-sex relationships in Malaysia. The Caucus 
argued that the interpretation of ‘public morality’ was based on the perspective of the 
dominant patriarchal and religious hierarchies, and that the experiences of women and girls 
were excluded from these popular understandings of public morality, by the realities of 
patriarchy, family responsibilities, education, religion, land acquisition and trading systems, 
militarisation, labour and migration.  
For these reasons, the Caucus argued that ‘public morality’ should not be permitted to 
limit rights and freedoms: to do so would further exclude and subjugate women and sexual 
minorities.
206
 The Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development agreed that: 
‘morality clauses have the potential to undermine women’s rights and should not be used in 
the AHRD.’207 The Forum argued that ‘morality’ reflected the dominant culture that tended to 
favour some, who were mostly men in power, and marginalise others, mostly women. They 
argued that in Southeast Asia, political and religious hierarchies made women the subject of 
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patriarchal and hetero-normative standards, and excluded the narratives and perspectives of 
minorities, denying them access to the processes of deliberation and decision-making within 
societies. They pointed, again, to the non-inclusive, non-transparent way in which the 
Declaration had been drafted.
208
 
Where there is no common position on a particular moral issue within a state or 
region, the practice of the European Court of Human Rights is to defer to the state’s views on 
the necessity of a public morality limitation.
209
 On matters of public morality, states are seen, 
‘[B]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries as 
being ‘in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the 
exact content of these requirements.’210 The difficulty perceived by Southeast Asian critics of 
a public morality limitation in the Declaration, was that the diversity of opinion on issues of 
public morality within the region would provide states with a wide latitude to determine 
themselves whether or not freedoms should be restricted in the interests of preserving the 
prevailing morality.  
Within Southeast Asia, there is no common position on morality issues such as 
adultery, solicitation, obscenity, abortion, same-sex relations, censorship and pornography. 
For example, in Indonesia, homosexuality is not illegal except under regional ordinances in 
South Sumatra and Palembang.
211
 In Laos, adultery is punishable by imprisonment or ‘re-
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education’;212 for monks or novices who commit sexual acts, the punishment is imprisonment 
and a fine;
213
 the dissemination of pornography and objects that are ‘contrary to fine 
tradition’ carries a penalty of imprisonment and/or a fine.214 Yet in Laos, same-sex relations 
are not prohibited. In Cambodia, the Law on Marriage and the Family prohibits marriage 
between persons of the same gender, and prohibits men who are impotent to marry.
215
 
Indonesia does not criminalise homosexuality, but the federal government has allowed certain 
municipal governments to adopt Shari’a law, which forbids homosexual relations and 
adultery. In the Philippines, homosexuality is not illegal, but attempts to legislate for 
protection from discrimination for sexual minorities have been resisted by the Catholic 
Church and thus far have been unsuccessful.
216
  
Under Vietnam’s Constitution, the family is ‘the cell of society’ and marriage is 
required to conform to ‘the principles of free consent, progressive union, monogamy and 
equality between husband and wife.’217 In 2012, Vietnam’s Justice Minister proposed 
amending Vietnam’s marriage laws to include same-sex couples. Singapore’s penal code no 
longer prohibits consensual anal and oral sex, but it retains a provision that criminalises 
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‘outrages of decency’ between male homosexuals.218 Brunei’s Penal Code criminalises 
obscene acts and songs,
219
 uttering words with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings
220
 
and also ‘unnatural acts.’221 There is no anti-discrimination protection in Brunei. In 
Myanmar, same-sex relations are criminalised under the nation’s colonial penal code, and 
although it is not strictly enforced, activists say the law is still used by authorities to 
discriminate and extort.
222
  
In Malaysia, the Constitution declares Islam to be the religion of the Federation.
223
 
The Malaysian government uses Islam as a justification for the criminalisation of anal and 
oral sex, for which the Penal Code provides a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison, with 
fines and lashes.
224
 In addition, states within Malaysia have enacted Islamic Shari’a laws, 
promulgated by local fatwas, which apply to all Muslims. These laws also criminalise certain 
sexual acts (such as sodomy) and punish them by imprisonment and whipping. The Shari’a 
Penal law in the Malaysian state of Syriah, for example, prescribes penalties for sodomy 
(Liwat) and lesbian relations (Musahaqat) with fines of RM5,000.00, three years 
imprisonment and six lashes of the whip.
225
  
Malaysia’s role in preserving the ‘public morality’ limitation within the Declaration 
merits special attention. Reports from the Second Public Consultation on the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration were that the Malaysian representative to AICHR, Datuk Seri Muhammad 
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Shafee Abdullah, strongly defended the public morality limitation in the Declaration on the 
basis that Malaysia’s own constitution permitted limitations on the grounds of public 
morality. He argued that it would therefore be inconsistent if the regional instrument did not 
permit similar limitations. In a public statement issued on 19 November 2012, the Southeast 
Asian Women´s Caucus on ASEAN claimed that while representatives of some of other 
ASEAN nations seemed prepared to abandon a ‘public morality’ limitation, Malaysia insisted 
on preserving it.
226
  
 In Malaysia, the government’s view is that the character of Malaysian society as 
Islamic precludes tolerance of homosexuality. This is because of the view that homosexuality 
is profoundly at odds with Islam, to the extent that tolerance of homosexuality threatens the 
shared morality upon which the survival of Islamic society depends. Homosexuality is 
forbidden in Islam: it is seen as a crime worse than murder.
227
 Because Islam is viewed as a 
‘complete system of life and perceives life as an integrated whole … sexuality, reproduction 
and [the] family system are also parts of the whole Islamic system of life, not outside it.’228 
The Human Rights Committee of the Malaysian Bar Council has reported, ‘The LGBTIQ 
community is frequently perceived as breaching social codes, fomenting dissent and 
advocating “deviancy” and in particular the perception that they are not “normal”.’229  
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On July 2012, Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Najib Razak, gave a public 
address in which he stated that ‘LGBTs, pluralism, liberalism—all these “isms”—were 
against Islam and it is compulsory for us to fight these.’230 He said that the government 
supported human rights, but that ‘it must do so within the boundaries set by Islam’ and he 
told Muslims to avoid discord which could threaten those who safeguard Islamic 
principles.
231 
That same day, Malaysian opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, who was convicted 
in 1998 under Malaysia’s sodomy laws and spent six years in prison, released a statement 
which averred that: ‘vice activities’ such as homosexuality, free sex and gambling, were 
prohibited in the Quran and Hadith; Islamic law did not distinguish whether these activities 
were carried out in the public domain or in private places; and the government had a 
responsibility to enforce these types of laws where they were committed by individuals in the 
public domain.
232
 Both Razak and Ibrahim, in their views on homosexuality, follow in the 
footsteps of former Prime Minister Mohammad Mahathir, who throughout the course of his 
22 year rule, placed sexual freedom at the core of what Malaysia stood against in terms of the 
West: 
Our minds, our culture, our religion, and other things will become the target. In the 
cultural and social fields they want to see unlimited freedom for the individual ... they 
accept the practice of free sex, including sodomy, as a right … the cultures and values 
which they will force us to accept will be hedonism, unlimited quest for pleasure, the 
satisfaction of basic desires, particularly sexual desires.
233
 
 
Where religious beliefs form the foundation of the state’s idea about what public 
morality consists of, it is particularly difficult for proponents of new ideas to open up areas 
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for debate and discourse. Specifically, religious arguments present difficulties for those who 
would try to champion individual liberties in the face of what appears to be a moral 
consensus, because an appeal to a deity is a principled moral reason for holding a particular 
moral viewpoint, and it is often offered by religious authorities against whose teachings 
criticism is discouraged, if not forbidden.
234
  
The question of what threatens the survival of society was addressed in what has 
become a famous exchange between Professor H.L.A. Hart and Lords Devlin on the subject 
of public morality and the criminalisation of homosexuality, prostitution, and pornography. 
Lord Devlin, objecting to the Wolfenden Report, which recommended the decriminalisation 
of homosexuality in Britain, argued that a degree of moral conformity was essential to 
society, and that every society has a right to preserve its own existence by insisting on some 
such conformity. Lord Devlin acknowledged that individual freedom was important, and that 
a society must be cautious about concluding that a practice is profoundly immoral to the 
extent that it forbids it. Nonetheless, he maintained that when public feeling in relation to an 
issue rises to the level of ‘intolerance, indignation and disgust,’ and if the broad popular 
feeling was genuinely that a particular practice is an abominable vice, then society's right to 
eradicate that practice could not be denied.
235
  
Professor Hart’s response was that society was not as fragile as Lord Devlin imagined 
it to be, and that Lord Devlin offered no evidence to support his claim that the tolerance of 
individuals practices which ran against the moral grain of society jeopardised society’s 
survival. Hart suggested that Lord Devlin was adopting a definition of society that was highly 
artificial—as a particular complex of moral ideas and attitudes, which its members happen to 
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hold at a particular moment in time. Why (argued Professor Hart) should such a moral status 
quo have the right to preserve its precarious existence by force?
236
  
For my purpose here, the critical issue is how we determine when the danger 
presented to society by a particular practice is sufficiently clear and present to justify 
prohibition. Some of the difficulties surrounding this question have been addressed by 
Ronald Dworkin.
237
 Dworkin considers Devlin’s point about public condemnation, and 
whether in and of itself, it justified making an act a crime, and whether if public 
condemnation was not sufficient, what more might be needed. Dworkin wonders whether 
there must be some demonstration of present harm to particular persons directly affected by 
the practice in question, or whether it might be sufficient to show some effect on social 
customs and institutions which alters the social environment, and thus affects all members of 
society indirectly. Applying these questions to Lord Devlin’s argument that society’s 
abhorrence of homosexuality justified its prohibition, Dworkin notes that Lord Devlin offered 
no evidence that homosexuality presents any danger at all to society’s existence, beyond the 
naked claim that all ‘deviations from a society's shared morality ... are capable in their nature 
of threatening the existence of society.’238 Dworkin concludes that Lord Devlin simply 
believed that the ordinary man in the street thought that homosexuality was an abominable 
vice and that society was therefore justified in outlawing it, leaving homosexuals to choose, 
in Dworkin’s words, ‘between the miseries of frustration and persecution.’239 
Dworkin argues strongly that public condemnation by itself ought not to be enough to 
justify restricting the liberties of individuals. This is because public feeling might not be 
based on good reasons, but might instead be based on prejudices, personal aversions and 
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rationalisations, which do not in themselves justify restricting important individual freedoms. 
In Dworkin’s view, legislators have a responsibility to test claims about the existence of a 
moral consensus, by studying the community’s reactions to practices, participating in and 
encouraging public debate, and studying the views contained in editorial columns, the 
speeches of colleagues, the testimony of interested groups, and the view of constituents. 
These arguments and positions must be sifted in order to determine which are prejudices or 
rationalisations, and which represent a genuine reasoned moral consensus.
240
 
What might this process look like? In relation to homosexuality and Islam in 
Southeast Asia, consider the following exchange. In 2008, the Jakarta Post reported on the 
discussions held during a public forum on Islam and homosexuality. The forum, organised by 
nongovernmental organisation Arus Pelangi, was attended by activists, Islamic scholars and 
teachers, and members of the media. The article in the Jakarta Post, titled ‘Islam recognizes 
homosexuality,’241 reported the views of moderate Muslim scholars, who put forward the 
view that ‘there were no reasons to reject homosexuals under Islam, and that the 
condemnation of homosexuals and homosexuality by mainstream ulema and many other 
Muslims was based on narrow-minded interpretations of Islamic teachings.’242 The 
newspaper also reported the views of scholars such as Siti Musdah Mulia, who argued that 
homosexuals and homosexuality was created by God, and was natural, and thus permissible 
within Islam, and that the Koran's al-Hujurat (49:3) should be interpreted as meaning that all 
men and women are equal, regardless of ethnicity, wealth, social positions or sexual 
orientation. The paper reported Mulia’s view that ‘[i]n the eyes of God, people are valued 
based on their piety,’ which is ‘God's prerogative to judge’ and that ‘[t]he essence of the 
religion (Islam) is to humanise humans, respect and dignify them.’ The paper also reported 
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the views of participants who emphasised ijtihad (the process of making a legal decision by 
independent interpretation of the Koran and the Sunnah) as a path to avoiding ‘old paradigms 
without developing open-minded interpretations’ and the views of others who pointed to parts 
of Indonesia where homosexuality within Islam had been acknowledged, such as Ponorogo 
(East Java). However, the views of conservative Muslim groups such as the Indonesian 
Ulema Council (MUI) and Hizbut Thahir Indonesia (HTI) were also reported. Deputy 
Chairman of MUI, Amir Syarifuddin, was reported as saying, ‘It’s a sin. We will not consider 
homosexuals an enemy, but we will make them aware that what they are doing is wrong.’ 
Rokhmat, of the HTI, several times asked homosexual participants in attendance to repent 
and force themselves to gradually return to the right path.
243 
 
Here we can see conflict between a religious view which is supported by the state and 
which lays claim to representing a ‘public morality’, and individual claims about the right to 
liberty in matters of sexuality. We see this conflict in almost all societies within the region. In 
the Philippines, for example, over 81 per cent of the population claims to belong to the 
Roman Catholic faith.
244
 During the period of the drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration, there was intense public debate in the Philippines around the passage of House 
Bill 5043, the ‘Reproductive Health and Population Development’ Bill. The Bill aimed to 
improve reproductive health choices through compulsory school sex education, and by 
enabling access to contraception, reproductive health services, and ‘post-abortive’ health-care 
for women. Proponents of the bill argued that these measures were necessary in order to 
realise women’s autonomy and liberty. They also argued that the measures would serve the 
interests of the state in curbing population growth, particularly among the poor.  
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The position of the Catholic Church in the Philippines is that legislation should be 
consistent with traditional church teachings on sexual morality and family planning. The 
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines has consistently rejected the Bill, not on the 
basis that it contradicts specifically Catholic religious teachings, but on the basis that it 
contradicts ‘the fundamental ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people.’ In this regard, the 
Bishops cite Article 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: 
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the 
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the 
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
245
  
 
In their 2010 encyclical, the Bishops declared, ‘it would be morally corrupt to 
disregard the moral implications of the RH bill,’ which ‘is a major attack on authentic human 
values and on Filipino cultural values regarding human life that all of us have cherished since 
time immemorial.’ They argued that the Bill: 
does not respect moral sense that is central to Filipino cultures. It is the product of the 
spirit of this world, a secularist, materialistic spirit that considers morality as a set of 
teachings from which one can choose, according to the spirit of the age. Some it 
accepts, others it does not accept. Unfortunately, we see the subtle spread of this post-
modern spirit in our own Filipino society.
246
 
 
 In relation to the claim of the Bill’s proponents that the Bill would empower women, 
the Bishops stated that: 
Advocates also assert that the RH Bill empowers women with ownership of their own 
bodies. This is in line with the post-modern spirit declaring that women have power 
over their own bodies without the dictation of any religion. How misguided this so-
called ‘new truth’ is! For, indeed, as created by God our bodies are given to us to keep 
and nourish. We are stewards of our own bodies and we must follow God’s will on 
this matter according to an informed and right conscience. Such a conscience must 
certainly be enlightened and guided by religious and moral teachings provided by 
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various religious and cultural traditions regarding the fundamental dignity and worth 
of human life.
247
 
 
The idea that access to technologies of reproductive choice contravenes not merely 
Catholic morality, but the morality of the nation, is a powerful ideological argument, one that 
is difficult for religious people, or patriots, to refute. Nonetheless, there were dissident voices 
within the Catholic Church.
248
 In 2007, during a symposium on population and development, 
three Jesuit priests, Fathers Gernilo, Carroll and Echica, argued that there was space within 
the Catholic Church to accommodate use of artificial contraception, and that, in the context of 
a conjugal relationship, sexuality need not be subordinate to the procreative value of sex. 
These priests acknowledged the realities of the lives of working Filipinos, many of whom 
live in poverty, in circumstances where feeding and raising many children is a terrible 
struggle, and where many men work as contractual labourers, making only periodic returns to 
the family home, and thus making natural family planning impossible. These views emanated 
from what one researcher called ‘a more acute consideration of the circumstances in which 
married couples must decide on their reproductive well-being in light of their financial and 
other non-doctrinal considerations.’249  
These sorts of conversations are a necessary step towards clarifying the positions of 
people who fundamentally disagree on important issues, and helping the respective parties to 
understand where the differences lie. The debate itself works towards ensuring that the 
common public life reflects the views of all its members, so that all members stand a chance 
of achieving self-realisation as part of a community. In this sense, we see that at the heart of 
civil society’s concerns about permitting states in Southeast Asia to limit freedoms on the 
grounds of public morality, lies a concern about the regional absence of democracy, in its 
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broad deliberative sense—about the lack of real freedom within societies in Southeast Asia 
for people to voice their concerns about liberties and restraints—to participate in dialogue 
and debate about what their society is and what they would like it to be.  
It is impossible to understand issues such as the acceptance of homosexuality, or 
contraception, and its effect on a community, without considering the details of precisely how 
liberalising sexual relations might harm a particular society. It is at this point that regional 
attitudes to particular moral issues become important. As Saul notes, regional instruments are 
a potential means by which local differences can be particularised, and regional particularity 
acknowledged and protected from erosion by the ‘excessive, arguably imperialistic, effects of 
the expanding global consumer economy.’250 If the work of the state is to balance people’s 
wish to pursue their own ends, with the goal of social solidarity and the formation of a 
common good, then the experience of one’s neighbouring states in striking this balance 
should be highly relevant, particularly if these neighbours share similar histories, emphasise 
religious values in similar ways, or have similar cultures. In this sense, regional human rights 
arrangements provide ‘a certain distance’ necessary to make objective judgements about the 
balance between liberty and social stability, in a context of cognisance of local conditions. A 
state may have, for example, neighbours who have found it possible for a government to 
support solidarity and a richer public life, without unduly restricting an individual's 
opportunities for self-creation. These regional instances stand as points of resistance to the 
inherent conservatism of states, their propensity to maintain the status quo, their interest in 
the preservation of power and their eye to the appetites of the majority, all of which inhibit a 
government’s willingness to open a particular contentious issue to broad dialogue and debate. 
Engaging regional views permits the inflection of the dialogue—particularly where some 
members of the region are democracies that encourage free and fair debate between diverse 
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participants. As we saw in the first part of this chapter, the kind of comparative dialogue that 
I am describing did not take place in relation to the drafting of the Declaration. It might be 
concluded that the countries of Southeast Asia possesses insufficient commonality (of 
religion, culture, political tradition) to ground a regional discourse on the meaning and value 
of rights. In this regard, as the discussion in Chapter 2 foreshadowed, the absence of a 
common understanding of democracy is perhaps the most obvious limitation on the evolution 
of a regional human rights community. Democracy’s absence is relevant in at least two ways. 
In the first place, without democratic conditions permitting free discourse, there is a 
diminished ability for actors to forge shared understandings around human rights concerns. 
Second, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, the conception we hold of democracy shapes our 
conception of the meaning and value of human rights. Without a common understanding of 
democracy, therefore, the prospect of reaching common understanding about the meaning 
and value of rights is greatly diminished.   
 
5.3.9 Article 9: Particularisation 
Article 9 of the Declaration provides that:  
In the realisation of the human rights and freedoms contained in this Declaration, the 
principles of impartiality, objectivity, non-selectivity, non-discrimination, non-
confrontation and avoidance of double standards and politicisation, should always be 
upheld. The process of such realisation shall take into account peoples’ participation, 
inclusivity and the need for accountability. 
 
The principles listed in the first part of Article 9 are the same as those listed in 
Articles 3 and 7 of the 1993 Bangkok Declaration.
251
 They reflect the view held by some 
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Asian governments, at the time of the 1993 Vienna World Conference, that Western states 
were guilty of hypocrisy in their exhortations to other states about human rights. Asian 
governments argued that it was not so very long ago that the West were plundering colonial 
possessions, practicing slavery, and denying the vote to women and people of colour. It 
seemed outrageous to Asian governments that the West should now try to call Asian 
governments to account, under the authority of this new secular religion of ‘human rights’.  
The final form of this article in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration was the result 
of two important and very late changes. First, when the article was originally drafted, and 
right up until September 2012, the word ‘paramount’ was included before the word 
‘principles’. That is, Article 9 provided that: ‘the paramount principles of impartiality, 
objectivity, non-selectivity, non-discrimination, non-confrontation and avoidance of double 
standards and politicisation, should always be upheld’ (italics added). During the Manila 
consultations, civil society organisations objected to the inclusion of the word ‘paramount’, 
on the grounds that it implied that these considerations were capable of overriding other 
principles (such as the universality of all human rights). The word ‘paramount’ was 
removed.
252
 
Second, the final sentence of this article was not originally included in the drafting, 
and was only added after the Manila consultation. The sentence, emphasising participation, 
inclusivity and accountability, speaks to precisely the concerns about participatory 
democracy with which this chapter has been concerned. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and non-confrontational approach in addressing and realizing all aspects of human rights’; Article 7: ‘Stress the 
universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of all human rights and the need to avoid the application of double 
standards in the implementation of human rights and its politicization, and that no violation of human rights can 
be justified’. 
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5.3.10 Solidarity Rights: Peace, the Environment and Development  
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration contains three ‘solidarity’ rights: the right to a safe, 
clean and sustainable environment,
253
 the right to development,
254
 and the right to peace.
255
 
The wording of these rights in the Declaration largely tracks their formulation in international 
human rights treaties and declarations. Civil society organisations and the governments of 
Southeast Asian nations were largely in agreement about the inclusion of these ‘solidarity 
rights.’ This is unsurprising. The environment, peace and development, represent genuinely 
cross-border ‘regional’ issues, where the actions of individual states impact on regional 
neighbours, and where the effects in terms of human rights of environmental degradation, 
war and poverty, are obvious to citizens and governments alike. For example, the haze arising 
from forest fires in Indonesia in 1997 affected the health of people as far afield as Thailand, 
Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Irian Jaya.  
Deforestation, overfishing, and the pollution of urban air and waterways, threaten not 
just the communities in states where these activities occur, but also in neighbouring states. 
Large-scale development projects such as dams, in places like the Lower Mekong, affect 
communities along the river, in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar. Conflict in nations 
such as Myanmar, spills across the border to Thailand.  
Furthermore, peace, development and environmental concerns have been prominently 
articulated in Southeast Asian regional instruments. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration, 
announcing the establishment of ASEAN, put peace as the raison d’être of the association’s 
existence.
256
 The first Article of the 2008 ASEAN Charter confirms that the purpose of 
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ASEAN is to ‘maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further strengthen peace 
oriented values in the region.’257 Of the 14 ‘Principles’ set out in the ASEAN Charter, eight 
are concerned with the preservation of peace, largely through respect for sovereignty. 
Concerns with development and the environment are also prominent in the Charter. The 
Preamble to the ASEAN Charter resolves ‘to ensure sustainable development for the benefit 
of present and future generations and to place the well-being, livelihood and welfare of the 
peoples at the centre of the ASEAN community building process’ and Article 1(9) of the 
Charter lists as one of the ‘purposes’ of ASEAN promoting ‘sustainable development so as to 
ensure the protection of the region's environment, the sustainability of its natural resources, 
the preservation of its cultural heritage and the high quality of life of its peoples.’258  
It is interesting to note, from the working papers of the drafting group of the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration, that some debate surrounded the issue of where in the Declaration 
certain solidarity rights—such as the right to peace—should be located. Some representatives 
proposed putting the right to peace in the Declaration’s ‘General Principles’, before the right 
to life, indicating that peace was perceived as an individual right. Others within the drafting 
group argued for having the provisions included near the right to development, aligning it 
with other collective rights. In the end, as we have seen, the right to peace was placed with 
collective rights. But the text of the AHRD nonetheless states that peace is a right of every 
individual.
259
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in 
the region.’ 
257
 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (adopted 20 
November 2007, entered into force 15 December 2008), Article 1.  
258
 ASEAN Charter, ibid., Article 1(9). 
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5.4 Conclusion  
 
This dissertation is about the legitimacy and potential of a regional approach to international 
human rights law in Southeast Asia. In this chapter, I have examined the process of the 
creation of the 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, and the content of the Declaration, 
as a means of explicating a number of questions relevant to my hypothesis. These include the 
following: To what extent is there consensus within Southeast Asia on the nature and value of 
human rights? How do different actors within the region (governments, civil society groups, 
religious groups, rights-holders) view the nature and value of rights? What degree of 
legitimacy attaches to the work of AICHR in drafting the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration, and what legitimacy does the instrument itself possess, as ‘a framework for 
human rights cooperation in the region,’260 and a contribution ‘to the ASEAN community 
building process’261?  
In the course of tracing the drafting of the Declaration, and analysing its contents, this 
chapter has demonstrated the importance of deliberative democracy in the realisation of an 
effective regional human rights system in Southeast Asia. This chapter shows how the 
absence of debate, argumentation and justification, and the exclusion of key stakeholders 
from the drafting process, shut down opportunities for a regional conversation on how and 
why rights mattered. AICHR’s Commissioners, who have an express mandate to engage with 
civil society, did little (as a group) to promote meaningful discourse. It is notable, however, 
that in those ASEAN states that possess political systems closer to the model of liberal 
democracy (Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) processes of public deliberation about 
what the Declaration should include and whether and how rights should be limited did occur, 
and that some exchanges on the justification of different rights served an important public 
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purpose in clarifying the scope of conflicting views. But overall, in relation to my hypothesis, 
this chapter shows how the absence of deliberative democracy in the drafting of the 
Declaration constrains the emergence of a regional understanding of human rights and limits 
the legitimacy of the nascent regional human rights system. 
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Chapter 6: The Rights of Women at the Global, 
Regional and Local Levels 
 
6.1 Introduction 
6.2 The Global Level: CEDAW 
6.3 ASEAN States and CEDAW 
6.4 The Emerging Regional Order 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1, I described how the original post-World War II vision of a legalised 
international human rights order (with judicial oversight, mechanisms for enforcement and 
sanctions for non-compliance) has faded, and how less muscular ideas about ‘norm 
awareness’ and ‘gradual socialisation’ have moved to the foreground. Today, it is (by and 
large) accepted that international human rights law ‘works’ by enabling domestic 
constituencies (and in some cases the international community) to make political demands of 
governments. In propitious circumstances (for example, where there is an active civil society, 
democratic conditions enabling freedom of expression, and a politically responsive 
government), then international human rights law can play a constraining role, changing 
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expectations about what constitutes appropriate behaviour for governments.
1
 Scholars have 
various ways of describing the processes that bring about change: norm socialisation,
2
 
acculturation,
3
 mobilisation through discursive interaction and political communication,
4
 the 
translation of global law into the vernacular.
5
  
A feature of all of these processes is communicative action in the form of persuasion, 
discourse and learning. In Chapter 1, I put forward the hypothesis that these communicative 
processes, in general, occur more readily between and amongst states (and other actors) 
within regions, and that this was part of the explanation for the particular kind of legitimacy 
which (I argue) underpins and pervades regional human rights systems, vis-à-vis the global 
regime for the promotion and protection of human rights. Communicative processes within 
regions sometimes occur in the form of juridification of human rights norms, as we see in the 
European human rights system.
6
 Sometimes, however, they take place via less formal means, 
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 Thomas Risse, C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to 
Compliance (2013) Cambridge University Press, New York. 
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 Thomas Risse, C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change (1999) Cambridge University Press, New York,. The authors describe a ‘spiral model’ of progressive 
change towards rights-respecting behaviour by states, where international and transnational networks of civil 
society actors use the language and standards of international human rights norms to draw attention to and 
ultimately change the repressive behaviour of governments. This leads first to denial by the oppressing state; 
then to tactical concessions by the oppressor; then to the norms assuming prescriptive status (including the 
signing of treaties); and finally to rights consistent behaviour.  
3
 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights 
Law’ (2004) 54(3) Duke Law Journal 621.  
4
 Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (2011) Cambridge 
University Press, New York. Charles Beitz draws on a similar idea of human rights norms as ‘political values’ 
that ‘inform and motivate action by nongovernmental group agents with both indigenous and external 
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fact matters of international concern.’ Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (2009) Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 195. For Beitz, something can only be an ‘international human right’ if international action or 
intervention can effect positive change. 
5
 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’ (2006) 108(1) 
American Anthropologist 38. 
6
 Juridification—used here in the Habermasian sense of ‘a tendency towards an increase in formal (or positive, 
written) law.’ Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2 (1987) Beacon Press, Boston, 
359. 
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such as diplomatic interactions and public debate between neighbouring governments and 
regional civil society organisations and networks.  
In this chapter and the next chapter, I set out to test the proposition that 
communicative processes that take place within regional settings lead, or are capable of 
leading to, greater commitment to human rights than those that occur at the global level.  
How might this proposition be tested? One way would be to examine rights from a 
comparative regional/global perspective, and to ask how states within a region have 
responded to the promotion of a particular issue at the global level, as compared to the 
regional level. In this way, we could adduce whether there was (1) greater propensity to 
commit to norms promoted at the regional level, and (2) greater levels of compliance with 
norms, evidenced by rule-consistent behaviour.  
At the centre of this inquiry is the question of how abstract general principles are 
applied to particularistic and unique local contexts. I return here to the hypothesis set out in 
Chapter 1, about the greater propensity for regional organisations to contextualise rights and 
specify their meaning with a degree of precision. This propensity, I argue, has two important 
consequences. First, it results in a greater willingness on the part of states to subscribe to 
regional norms. The reason for this is that (in general) states are reluctant to subscribe to 
international law when it is not clear what the effect will be on domestic laws, regulations 
and policy. Second, specificity is relevant to the question of compliance, because states 
justify interpretive discretion by referring to the imprecision of texts, and justify ignoring or 
avoiding the advice, recommendations and reports of treaty monitoring bodies or oversight 
bodies on the grounds that these bodies have an incomplete and inadequate understanding of 
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how a right should be interpreted in a specific local context.
7
 For these reasons, I argue, 
within regional communities we should find a greater propensity to commit to norms and a 
greater degree of compliance (both of which are elements of legitimacy). 
There is in the first place an empirical question here, about whether or not norms 
articulated at the regional level do in fact evidence a higher degree of specificity, leading to 
greater acceptability, which in turn leads to greater commitment and greater compliance. 
There are also a raft of deeper questions that go to determining what the reasons for this 
might be, and whether it is the case across all states within a region (given their political, 
ethnic, socio-cultural and economic differentiations) and finally, whether it is the case across 
different kinds of rights. There is also a temporal element to all of this. It is possible that the 
logic that guides state subscription to norms (which occurs at the beginning of the norm life 
cycle) is different to the logic that guides rule-consistent behaviour (which occurs at the end 
of the norms life cycle), and that the regional or global effect is more significant at one stage 
than at another. 
Clearly, there is no room in this dissertation to run a comparative regional/global 
legitimacy study of all civil and political, and all economic, social and cultural rights. Indeed, 
given the complexity of the undertaking, it might seem a sufficiently large endeavour to 
examine a single right in global/regional comparative perspective. One of my intuitions, 
however, is that the regional and global levels operate differently (with different degrees of 
legitimacy) in relation to different rights.
8
 If this is so, then it is important to find a basis for 
arbitrating among the different reasons for this, which can only be done by comparing 
different rights at both the global and regional levels.  
                                                 
7
 We saw an example of this in the case of the United States’ defence of the use of water-boarding, on the 
grounds that the practice does not meet the definition of ‘torture’. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, The Persistent 
Power of Human Rights (2013) above n 1, 12; Oona Hathaway, 'Testing Conventional Wisdom' (2003) 14(1) 
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The idea I am getting at here is that state responsiveness to human rights might have 
something to do with the nature of the right itself. This has been hinted at in some of the 
academic literature.
9
 Keck and Sikkink, for example, in their work on transnational activism, 
have noted that rights that relate to bodily integrity, prevention of bodily harm for ‘innocent 
groups’, and equality of opportunity, are particularly effective transnationally and cross-
culturally.
10
 In a later study, Lutz and Sikkink compare three areas of human rights law 
(torture, disappearance, and democratic governance) and find the least compliance in the 
most ‘legalised’ area (torture), and the most compliance in the least ‘legalised’ area 
(democratic governance).
11
 Simmons’ work on compliance traverses a range of rights: civil 
rights, women’s equality rights, torture, and the rights of the child. Her theory is that 
international human rights law assists the mobilisation of domestic constituencies, and she 
discerns a marked difference in the ability of domestic pressure groups to galvanise action, 
based on the different kinds of rights they are dealing with. Simmons writes, ‘[S]ome issues 
and some constituencies are much easier to rally around than others. Just look at the 
difference between issues that are perceived to be connected with national (or at least regime) 
security and those that are not.’12 
Nonetheless, the relationship between the particular character of a right and the 
dynamics that underpin state commitment to the right and compliance with obligation to 
respect it remains generally unexamined and under-theorised. Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp 
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 However, the question of whether or not there is a distinction between commitment and compliance at the 
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 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (1998) Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge; Daniel A. Bell, ‘The East Asian Challenge to Human 
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 Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America’ (2000) 
54(3) International Organization 633. Lutz and Sikkink conclude that legalization (precision and delegation) 
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and Kathryn Sikkink, for example, in their book The Persistent Power of Human Rights, 
identify five ‘scope conditions’ for compliance: (1) democratic vs authoritarian regimes; (2) 
consolidated vs limited statehood; (3) centralised vs decentralised rule implementation; (4) 
material vulnerability; (5) social vulnerability. I agree with all of these, and throughout the 
final two chapters of this dissertation, I give several examples of the ways some of these 
conditions influence the responsiveness of ASEAN states. But I argue that the character of a 
norm also has a marked effect on state responsiveness, not just because of the different 
degrees to which different rights are legalised (Lutz and Sikkink) or the level of appeal of a 
particular right to domestic activists (Simmons), but because of more fundamental reasons to 
do with the character and scope of the right itself. Does the right fall within what Michael 
Walzer describes as ‘the minimal and universal moral code’ on which all states agree, and 
which includes rights against murder, slavery, torture, and genocide?
13
 Or does it fall within 
the ‘grey area’ of human rights, involving complex questions of family law, criminal law, 
religious values, social and economic rights?
14
 My intuition is that even if regional systems 
for the promotion and protection of human rights possess a particular legitimacy, they may 
not do so under all conditions. The juxtaposition of different rights in these final two chapters 
helps to illuminate the degree to which the nature and character of the right under 
consideration is a relevant factor in determining whether or not a particular level of 
governance (regional or global) is more appropriate. 
In the final two chapters of this dissertation, I examine and compare two rights: (1) 
the rights of women; and (2) the issue of trafficking in persons. The reasons why these two 
rights are selected requires some explanation. First, at the simplest level, in Southeast Asia 
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 Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (1987) Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 24. 
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there are only a limited number of rights that have been the subject of both regional and 
global approaches.
15
 Women’s rights and trafficking in persons are both issues in relation to 
which all ASEAN states have engaged (though not all to the same extent) at both the regional 
and the global levels. 
Second, it is important that I select two rights that are somewhat similar or related. It 
would be difficult to draw strong conclusions about the relative responsiveness of states to 
different levels of governance from a comparison of very dissimilar rights. For example, an 
attempt to compare state commitment at the regional and global levels on the issue of the 
prohibition on torture, and commitment to the right to a clean environment, would throw up 
multiple explanatory factors for different states, ranging from domestic governance issues 
concerning capacity, to the degree of state sensitivity to international approbation on the 
issue. Different rights that share a degree of coterminous matter make for a more useful 
comparison because these kinds of variables are more likely to be similar for both rights. 
Although the rights of women and trafficking in persons are highly particularistic issues, 
occurring in specific economic and cultural contexts of disempowerment, discrimination and 
deprivation, they are both inked to a broader concern about women’s rights, in the sense that 
both issues have at their core ideas about physical and material security, capacity for self-
direction (autonomy) and equality.  
Third, women’s rights are fundamentally matters of domestic politics. No direct 
benefits flow to states from multilateral coordination in relation to promoting and protecting 
the equality rights of women. There are no pragmatic or utilitarian reasons to explain why 
states decide to take joint action on the issue of women’s rights at the regional or global level. 
On the other hand, human trafficking is an issue with obvious inter-state ramifications. It is a 
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problem that can readily be framed as a security issue, concerning international crime, the 
protection of borders and illegal migration. Multilateral approaches are the only logical 
method of addressing the problem. This chapter and the next examine the extent to which this 
factor is a determinant in the legitimacy and effectiveness of global or regional approaches. 
Finally, women’s rights and human trafficking both illuminate the role of culture and 
the issue of cultural relativism, which I have identified as an ongoing issue in the debate 
about human rights in Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, as in other regions, moral beliefs 
and cultural practices that influence the enjoyment of individual rights have proven 
particularly resistant to change. An enduring question is the degree of deference that should 
be shown to these beliefs and practices. It is clear that change, particularly where it concerns 
culture, must occur from within societies themselves, through intra-cultural contestation, and 
not be imposed from outside. One of the questions I ask in this chapter and the next, 
therefore, is whether or not regional and global regimes differ in the way that they permit 
domestic audiences to navigate questions of culture and how this plays out in assessments of 
comparative global and regional legitimacy.  
Broadly, my theory is that in relation to many rights, the global level is too far 
removed from the actual circumstances that prompt rights violations to occur. The regional 
level of governance provides a via media between the particularistic nature of rights 
violations in their local contexts and the ideal of universalism. Up to this point, much of this 
dissertation has demonstrated that in Southeast Asia, this is not in fact the case; or that only a 
weak version of this theory stands. My central explanation for this turns on limited levels of 
democracy within the region (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3).  
These final two chapters move my dissertation forward and in a slightly different 
direction. In these chapters, I return to some of the ideas with which I began this dissertation, 
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namely the socialising mechanisms at play in the contemporary international human rights 
regime (coercion, rewards, persuasion and discourse, capacity building), and the interplay 
between these mechanisms at different stages of the socialisation process (from repressive 
societies that initially deny human rights abuses and contest the validity of human rights 
norms, to the making of tactical concessions by states, to the prescriptive status of norms, and 
finally, to rule-consistent behaviour). Given what we know about these mechanisms and 
stages, does the global or regional level of engagement offer better prospects for positively 
influencing the behaviour of states in Southeast Asia?  
My intuition is that the answer to this question might be different in relation to 
different rights, and the conclusions reached in this chapter and the next confirm this. In 
relation to human trafficking, it does seem to be the case that regional approaches possess a 
legitimacy that global approaches do not. One reason for this concerns the actual geography 
of trafficking, which occurs not merely across borders, but in the interstices that exist 
between states in Southeast Asia and within states themselves. The global approach to 
trafficking, which is focused almost entirely on sovereignty and borders, is simply not fine 
grained enough to capture the shifting movements of the human trafficking processes. 
Another reason for the comparative legitimacy of regional approaches concerns the nature of 
the global anti-trafficking movement itself, which has been shaped by ideological concerns, 
many emanating from the United States, that do not sit easily with the actual experiences of 
Southeast Asian women or the reality of trafficking. 
I find that the issue of women’s rights, however, does not appear to be one in relation 
to which regional discourse and regional institutions possess a greater legitimacy than global 
ones. The reasons for this, I argue, have to do with the nature of ASEAN states commitment 
to women’s rights, which in terms of the norm life cycle, remains largely at a stage of 
‘tactical concessions’ (in the form of ratification of CEDAW) rather than prescriptive status 
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(for example, the transposition of commitments into domestic law). It seems that at the 
tactical concession stage of the spiral model, the invocation of global norms by civil society 
and rights advocates is more effective than appeal to regional norms: in Southeast Asia at 
least, civil society activists find that an appeal to global norms has greater legitimacy as a 
source of influence, and engenders greater state responsiveness. Interestingly, while this line 
of argument holds in relation to women’s equality rights (particularly when they are posited 
against religious norms) it does not appear to be the same across all aspects of women’s 
rights. For example, in relation to the issue of violence against women, we see a move in 
Southeast Asia from tactical concession to prescriptive status: all ASEAN states have laws 
that criminalise violence against women, and the issue of violence against women has 
emerged as a regional issue, with regional dynamics reinforcing and supporting compliance.  
One final introductory point should be made. Earlier in this dissertation, I noted the 
ways in which the global and regional levels of governance influenced one another, and I 
drew attention to the dangers of attempting to artificially distinguish between and isolate 
regional and global norms (Chapter 1). These final chapters show how the form of regional 
texts and the shape of regional institutions are inevitably marked by global influences and 
how the nature and design of a regional system, including its evolution and purpose, cannot 
be considered in isolation from developments at the global level.
16
 The global influence on 
regional developments may be positive (as in the case of the drafting of the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration, where the pull towards universal standards served as a counter-weight to 
the insistence by some states of relative standards), or negative (as we see in the next chapter 
                                                 
16
 In some cases, of course, regional instruments influence global developments. A good example of this is the 
way that the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, agreed to by Asian states in the lead-up to the 1993 Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights, influenced the final version of the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights. 
(Hereinafter ‘Vienna Declaration’); Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World 
Conference on Human Rights, Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human 
Rights A/Conf.1 57/ASRM/ 8-A/Conf.157/PC/59 (7 April 1993) (‘hereinafter ‘Bangkok Declaration’).  
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on human trafficking, where the domestic policies of states are driven by the need to maintain 
levels of aid and support from the United States).  
 
6.2 The Global Level: CEDAW 
 
In 1979, the General Assembly, by 130 votes to none, adopted the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (the Convention).
17
 The aim of 
the Convention is radical: to bring about ‘a change in the traditional role of men as well as the 
role of women in society and in the family’ in order to achieve ‘full equality between men 
and women.’18 Simmons argues that only in the final years of the 1970s could such an 
ambitious enterprise have been accepted by almost all of the world’s governments: the Cold 
War, which for more than thirty years had stymied the evolution of multilateral human rights 
endeavours, had been mitigated by détente; women’s groups were in the ascendancy during 
the United Nations ‘Decade for Women’ (1975–1985); religious fundamentalism, as a 
political force, was (temporarily) absent.
19
 Today, the Convention remains the centrepiece of 
global efforts to obtain equality for women.
20
 
                                                 
17
 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 
December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 , available at:  <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3970.html> [accessed 27 
October 2013] (hereinafter, ‘the Convention’). There were 10 abstentions; the Convention entered into force in 
1981. 
18
 Ibid, Preamble, the Convention.  
19
 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, above n 4, 205–206. 
20
 Equality between men and women is, of course, mentioned in other post-war human rights instruments. The 
Preamble to the United Nations Charter reaffirms ‘…faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.’ Charter of the 
United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, entered into force 24 October 1945). The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights contains three provisions that focus on women: the general provision which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of a number of attributes, one being sex (Article 2); the provision relating 
to family life (Article 16); and the provision on ‘motherhood and childhood’ (Article 25(2)) (UNGA Res. 217 A 
(III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A/810 (10 December 1948)). The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), affirms these rights, with ICESCR additionally recognising women’s equality in relation to work 
rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 
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It is important for my argument in this chapter to understand the strength and scope of 
the international regime to protect the rights of women. The Convention’s anti-discrimination 
provision prohibits ‘any distinction’ on the basis of sex which has the ‘effect or purpose’ of 
impairing or restricting the exercise or enjoyment by women of human rights ‘in the political, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field’ (Article 1). The Convention’s most notable provisions 
are contained in Article 2, which as well as prohibiting discrimination, places an obligation 
on states to ‘take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing 
law, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women.’21 
Article 5(a) requires parties ‘to modify social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes 
or stereotyped roles for men and women.’ Article 9 provides equal rights in relation to 
nationality; Article 15 accords women equality with men before the law; Article 16 sets out a 
range of measures required to ensure equality in marriage and family relations, such as equal 
rights for men and women to: enter marriage; choose a spouse; end marriage on equal terms; 
decide on the number and spacing of children and exercise equal rights in relation to care and 
guardianship or children.  
The Convention’s monitoring body, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination 
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has stated that Articles 2 and 16 
are core provisions of the Convention, in relation to which reservations are impermissible.
22
 
CEDAW has also stated that States parties should move towards withdrawing all 
                                                                                                                                                        
entered into force 3 November 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 
16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, entered into force 3 January 1976).  
21
 The Convention, above n 13, Art 2(f). 
22
 CEDAW, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Sessions, A/53/38/Rev.1 (14 May 1998), 6. 
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reservations, particularly to Articles 9, 15 and 16 of the Convention. Particular attention has 
been drawn to the importance of withdrawing reservations to Article 16.
23
 
The Convention provides for optional jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice, but general oversight of compliance is provided by CEDAW, which publishes 
‘General Recommendations’ that clarify and in some cases broaden the scope of the 
Convention. For example, the Convention itself does not explicitly mention a prohibition on 
violence against women.
24
 But General Recommendations 12 and 19 provide that: 
‘discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is violence that is directed at a woman 
because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately’ and that ‘includes acts that 
inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other 
deprivation of liberty.’25 In 1999, an Optional Protocol, to which reservations are not 
allowed, gave individuals and groups a right to complain about their government’s violation 
of the treaty provisions, and enables CEDAW to commence an inquiry procedure where there 
is reliable information of ‘grave or systematic violations.’26  
Since the Convention opened for signature, international instruments focusing on 
women’s rights have multiplied. Women’s rights are prominent in the 1993 Declaration and 
                                                 
23
 United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Reservations to CEDAW, available at:  
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm> [accessed 27 October 2013]. 
24
 CEDAW passed a resolution at its eighth session in Vienna in 1989, expressing concern that this issue be on 
its agenda and instructing states to include in their periodic reports information about statistics, legislation, 
and support services in this area. CEDAW Newsletter, 3rd Issue, A/44/38 (13 April 1989), 2 (Summary of U.N. 
Report on the Eighth Session, UN Doc. A/44/38, 14 April 1989). 
25
 UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General Recommendations 
Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, adopted at the Eighth Session, A/44/38 (1989) available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/453882aa10.html> [accessed 27 October 2013]; UN Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General Recommendations Nos. 19 and 
20, adopted at the Eleventh Session, A/47/38 (1992) available at: 
 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/453882a422.html> [accessed 27 October 2013].  
26
 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(adopted 6 October 1999, 2131 UNTS 83 entered into force 22 December 2000). 
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Program of Action adopted at the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights.
27
 That 
same year, the United Nations General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence Against Women.
28
 In 1994, a Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women 
was appointed by the UN Commission on Human Rights. The United Nations sponsored a 
series of World Conferences on Women, held every five years, which became platforms for 
activism on women’s rights across the world.29 The 1999 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court includes crimes against women as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
in some instances, genocide.
30
 In 2000 and 2008, the Security Council passed Resolutions 
1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security.
31
  
The sum of these efforts, argue many scholars, signals ‘a sustained feminist presence 
in the international realm, and one that has challenged the depiction of international law as 
concerned exclusively with a narrow range of matters related to affairs among states.’32 The 
architecture of women’s rights at the global level is built upon the common understanding 
that inequality between men and women is a great evil and should be abolished, and that 
culture is not a justification for tolerating inequality. The 1993 Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence Against Women, for example, states at Article 4 that: ‘States should condemn 
                                                 
27
 Vienna Declaration, above n 16, Art. 18. 
28
 UNGA Res. 48/104, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, A/RES/48/104 (20 
December 1993).  
29
 See Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics, above n 4, 208. 
30
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, entered into force 1 
July 2002), Article 7(1)(g). 
31
 UN Security Council, Resolution 1820 (2008) on acts of sexual violence against civilians in armed conflicts, 
S/RES/1820 (2008) (19 June 2008) available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f4672e.html> [accessed 
11 November 2013]; UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1820 (2008) [on acts of sexual violence 
against civilians in armed conflicts], 19 June 2008, S/RES/1820 (2008), available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/485bbca72.html> [accessed 11 November 2013]. 
32
 Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji, ‘Introduction’ in Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji International Law: 
Modern Feminist Approaches (2005) Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 1–16.  
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violence against women and should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious 
consideration to avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination.’33 
 
6.3 ASEAN States and CEDAW 
 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines and Vietnam were among the Convention’s first 
signatories, although Cambodia did not accede until 1992.
34
 Laos and the Philippines ratified 
the Convention in 1981; Vietnam in 1982; Indonesia in 1984. Thailand acceded to the 
Convention in 1985, and Singapore and Malaysia did so a decade later, in 1995. Myanmar 
acceded in 1997. Brunei was the last of the ASEAN states to join the Convention, acceding in 
2006. CEDAW’s Optional Protocol, which permits the CEDAW Committee to receive 
communications from individuals where domestic remedies have been exhausted, has been 
ratified by Cambodia, the Philippines and Thailand.
35
  
Given the radical nature of CEDAW and its potential to unsettle cultural practices, 
coupled with the reluctance of some ASEAN states to sign other major international human 
rights treaties, it is somewhat surprising that all ASEAN states have ratified CEDAW. It 
should be borne in mind that Malaysia and Singapore acceded to CEDAW at the height of the 
Asian Values debate.
36
 You will recall from Chapter 3 that this was a time when the leaders 
                                                 
33
 UNGA Res. 48/104, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, A/RES/48/104 (20 
December 1993).  
34
 Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam signed the Convention in 1980; Laos PDR signed in 1981.  
35
 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(adopted 6 October 1999, 2131 UNTS 83 entered into force 22 December 2000). Indonesia has signed but not 
ratified the Protocol. 
36
 See: Government of Singapore, ‘The Singapore White Paper on Shared Values’ (1991) available at: 
www.academia.edu/1740666/White_paper_on_shared_values_1991_[accessed 27 October 2013]. At paragraph 
44, discussing Confucianism, the paper states that ‘traditional Confucian family relationships are strictly 
hierarchical. Sons owe an absolute duty of unquestioning piety and filial obedience to fathers. Males take 
precedence over females, brothers over sisters, and the first-born over younger sons. But in Singapore, the 
parent-child relationship is more one of respect rather than absolute subordination. Sons and daughters are 
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of both Singapore and Malaysia were extolling neo-traditionalist idea of ‘the family’, 
particularly ‘the Asian family’, based on conservative interpretations on Islam and 
Confucianism that imply a subordinate role for women and emphasise conventional authority 
relations and traditional gender roles.
37
 
How do we explain the ratification of CEDAW by ASEAN states? We can see that 
ratification occurs in temporal clusters around three points. The first is the period when 
CEDAW opened for signature, which was the middle of the United Nations Decade for 
Women (1976–1985), immediately before the Second World Conference on Women, which 
was held in Copenhagen in 1980. Half the ASEAN states signed the Convention at this point 
and all (except Cambodia) ratified soon after the Copenhagen Conference. The second is the 
time of the Third World Conference on Women, which took place in Nairobi in July 1985. 
Thailand’s accession to CEDAW took place on 9 August 1985, one month after the Nairobi 
Conference. The third is around the time of the Fourth World Conference on Women, which 
took place in Beijing in 1995. Malaysia and Singapore acceded to CEDAW within months of 
this conference taking place. Myanmar acceded two years later.  
As an explanatory factor, this perspective leads us towards a conclusion that 
emphasises the role of socialisation, acculturation, identification, and status maximisation. 
Several scholars have noted that ‘world events’ such as the Women’s Conferences provide 
excellent opportunities for states and other international actors such as transnational non-
government organisations to persuade other states to ratify human rights treaties, or to make 
proclamations that affirm the state’s reputation as a rights-respecting actor in the international 
                                                                                                                                                        
increasingly treated equally. The relationship between younger and older siblings is less authoritarian. In all 
these respects Singaporean practices must continue, without eroding cohesion and loyalty within the family 
unit.’ 
37
 See Chapter 5 of this dissertation; also, see: Maila Stivens, ‘Family Values’ and Islamic Revival: Gender, 
Rights and State Moral Projects in Malaysia’ (2006) 29 Women's Studies International Forum 354.  
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community.
38
 Accession to human rights treaties in anticipation of conferences, or 
announcements at the conference itself that accession will occur, enables a state to present 
itself favourably to its peers. The role of civil society (which was prominent in the Women’s 
Conferences) amplifies the reputational stakes, by drawing attention to a state’s 
shortcomings, by encouraging ratification and by disseminating information to the 
international community and to domestic audiences. In this way, civil society brings national 
constituencies into the calculation of the benefit that states might expect to gain from 
accession to a human rights treaty.  
The temporal clustering also makes it possible to draw conclusions about diffusion—
particularly regional diffusion. As I explained in Chapter 1, there is often a tendency for 
states to follow other states in ratification as part of a ‘contagion’ effect.39 Contagion operates 
in the sense that one state’s ratification increases the probability of another state within a 
particular spatial clustering ratifying within a fairly circumscribed period of time. It is 
reasonable to assume that half of all ASEAN states ratifying CEDAW within its first five 
years acted as a spur to the remaining ASEAN states. 
We find no correlation between level of economic development and speed of 
ratification. Malaysia and Singapore, which are among ASEAN’s more developed states, 
were among the last to ratify. There is, however, a degree of correlation between the political 
systems of particular ASEAN states and alacrity in ratification of CEDAW. Brunei, an 
Islamic Sultanate, was the last to ratify the Convention. It is notable that ASEAN’s two 
communist states, Vietnam and Laos, were among CEDAW’s first signatories. In Vietnam 
and Laos, the ‘woman question’ in the classic works of Engels helped to shape a state 
                                                 
38
 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights 
Law' (2004), above n 1. 
39
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998) 52 
International Organization 887. 
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ideology of feminism that has been generally overlooked. In the 1970s and early 1980s, in 
these two countries, the position of women, in terms of political representation, decision-
making, and participation in the work force, was higher than in other ASEAN states.
40
 In 
Vietnam and Laos, before the economic ‘renovation’ that began in 1986, there was accessible 
childcare; women were paid a subsidy to raise children; and there was considerable flexibility 
in the employment market because of the goal of full employment. In relation to Vietnam, 
Turley writes, ‘undoubtedly, women’s relative position improved under communism, with a 
reduction of early forced marriages, the public condemnation of wife-beating, free childcare 
and the recognition of housework.’41 Turley notes that the ‘three submissions’ to which 
Vietnamese women had traditionally been subjected (to father, husband, and eldest son) lost 
their authority in the wake of women’s prolonged contribution to the Vietnam War effort, and 
equality-inspired legislation passed by the Communist government. Despite the existence of 
gaps between traditions or laws on the one hand, and practices on the other, there would have 
been no official dissonance between the terms of the Convention and the official state 
ideologies of Vietnam and Laos.  
How can we tell whether or not ratification is a ‘tactical concession’ or evidence of a 
state’s genuine desire to work towards the realisation of rights?42 We can glean part of the 
answer to this question by considering the nature and extent of state’s reservations to the 
Convention. We can assume, for instance, that genuine commitment is diminished to the 
extent that reservations undercut the purpose and effect of the treaty. In relation to CEDAW, 
all states except Laos, Cambodia and the Philippines have entered reservations in respect of 
                                                 
40
 Steffanie Scott and Truong Thi Kim Chuyen, 'Gender research in Vietnam: Traditional approaches and 
emerging trajectories', Paper presented at the Women's Studies International Forum (2007). Stephanie Fahey, 
‘Vietnam’s Women in the Renovation era’ in Krishna Sen and Maila Stivens (eds) Gender and Power in 
Affluent Asia (1988) Routledge, New York, 222–249. 
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 William Turley, 'Women in the communist revolution in Vietnam' (1972) 12(9) Asian Survey 793, 799. 
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 Beth Simmons, ‘From Ratification to Compliance’ (2013) in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn 
Sikkink (eds) The Persistent Power of Human Rights (2013) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 43-59, 
52. 
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the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. ASEAN states with Islamic populations 
(Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore) have entered general reservations regarding provisions of 
CEDAW that may be contrary to religious beliefs. Malaysia and Singapore have entered 
reservations in relation to granting women equal rights with men in respect of the nationality 
of their children (Article 9(2)). Singapore has reserved the right not to apply the provisions of 
Article 2 (the cornerstone anti-discrimination provision, which exhorts states to embody the 
principle of equality) or Article 16, relating to marriage, in its entirety. Thailand, as well, has 
entered a reservation in respect of the whole of Article 16.
 43
 
Malaysia has been particularly obdurate in relation to reservations. Malaysia has 
indicated that it does not consider itself bound by: Article 5(a), the key article concerning 
state obligations to take measures measures to modify social and cultural patterns with a view 
to achieving the elimination of prejudices; Article 7(b), which obliges states to take 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public 
life, by providing them with the right to participate in the formulation of government policy 
and the implementation and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels 
of government; Article 9, which provides that states parties shall grant women equal rights 
with men to acquire, change or retain their nationality, particularly in marriage; and Article 
16, which provides women with equal rights to enter marriage; possess the same rights and 
responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; have the same rights and 
responsibilities with regard to guardianship of children; possess the same personal rights as 
husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an 
occupation. In 1988, Malaysia withdrew its reservations to some provisions of Article 16.  
                                                 
43
 On reservations generally see: Jennifer Riddle ‘Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique of CEDAW’s 
Reservation Regime Under Art 28 and the Effectiveness of the Reporting Process’ (2002) 34 George 
Washington International Law Review 625–28; on ASEAN states reservations specifically, see: Susan Linton, 
'ASEAN states, their reservations to human rights treaties and the proposed ASEAN Commission on Women 
and Children' (2008) 30(2) Human Rights Quarterly 436. 
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It could be argued that conscientious adherence to reporting obligations provide 
another form of evidence about genuine commitment vs tactical concession. ASEAN states 
have been tardy in their obligation to submit their initial and then four-yearly reports to 
CEDAW (Lao PDR failed to submit its initial report until twelve years after ratification
44
 and 
Brunei has never submitted a report).
45
 Yet this should not be overstated. Capacity to comply 
with reporting is an issue for many states, particularly developing ones, and has been so since 
CEDAW’s inception.46 
What follows from a finding that for most ASEAN states, ratification of CEDAW was 
merely a tactical concession? The point made by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink in The Power of 
Human Rights is that even tactical concessions have power, because states can be forced to 
translate these concessions into actual reform. This will occur when civil society or the 
international community puts pressure on the state to adhere to the promise of change implied 
in accession to the treaty. Regardless of original intentions, by the mere fact of accession, 
states are forced to accept the validity of international human rights and may ultimately be 
cajoled or corralled into adjusting domestic law to bring it into conformity with international 
obligations. Between the stage of ‘tactical concession’ and ‘behavioral change’ is a stage 
where norms assume ‘prescriptive status’. Simmons notes that the ‘prescriptive status’ stage 
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 Laos submitted a combined initial, second, third, fourth, and fifth periodic reports in 2003 (reviewed in the 
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of the spiral model is the most unexamined and the least tested: ‘it is standard to skip any 
attention to rhetoric and skip straight to behavioural outcomes—dependent variables 
indicative of improved rights practices.’47 
What evidence is there of the prescriptive status of Convention norms in the national 
legal systems of ASEAN? As CEDAW frequently points out, the status of the Convention in 
the domestic legal systems of ASEAN states is unclear.
48
 The constitutions of Cambodia, 
Laos, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, recognise treaty law. Nonetheless, in 
Cambodia and Laos, I have found no cases where CEDAW has been invoked in judicial 
proceedings as an actionable source of rights. Most judges, it seems, believe that 
implementing legislation is required.
49
 This is not the case in Indonesia and the Philippines. 
In 1988, Indonesia informed CEDAW that the Convention has been cited before the courts.
50
 
The Convention has been cited in several cases before the Supreme Court of the 
Philippines.
51
 In Malaysia, the position seems to be changing. In July 2011, in a case 
involving a woman who had her job offer retracted by the Education Ministry because she 
was pregnant, the High Court of Malaysia held that the Convention had ‘the force of law.’52  
This case is worth considering in some detail, as it provides an illustration of precisely 
what we are looking for in relation to the move to prescriptive status of international norms 
on domestic law in Southeast Asia: a correlation between accession to the Convention, the 
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48
 See in relation to Laos, CEDAW/C/LAO/CO/7 para 9; See in relation to the Philippines, 
CEDAW/C/PHI/CO/6. 
49
 This is so, even though in Cambodia, the Constitution stipulates recognition of and respect for international 
human rights agreements. Article 45.1 of the Constitution calls for the abolition of all forms of discrimination 
against women, and under the Constitution the Convention takes precedence over domestic law. Yet there is no 
evidence in practice that the Convention is regarded as self-executing. 
50
 CEDAW, Indonesia: Concluding Comments, A/53/38/Rev.1 (1998), [276]. 
51
 See, for example, Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, GR. No. 119976 (18 September 1995). 
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activation of domestic pressure groups, ‘speech acts’ and rights improvement: evidence, in 
fact, ‘of the importance of rhetorical entrapment in explaining eventual rule-consistent 
behaviour.’53 Moreover, it is an example taken from Malaysia, which, as we saw in Chapter 
3, is a country that can be characterised as a ‘partial democracy’. In Mobilizing for Human 
Rights, Simmons predicts that the spiral model is most likely to work its way to a positive 
conclusion in a country that is transitioning to, backsliding from or in a state of partial 
democracy, because these are the circumstances where pressure ‘from below’ is most likely 
to be exercised. In repressive autocracies, fear will often prevent mobilisation, whereas in 
stable democracies, generally responsive government reduces the motivation for 
mobilisation.
54
 
The facts of the Malaysian case, Chayed bin Basirun & Ors v Noorfadilla bt Ahmad 
Saikin (‘Noorfadilla’) are these. In 2009, Malaysia’s Ministry of Education withdrew an offer 
of employment that had been made to Noorfadilla Binit Ahmad Saikin, after Noorfadilla 
informed the Ministry that she was three months pregnant. The Ministry explained its 
decision on the following basis: (i) the period between the time of delivery and ‘full health’ 
was too long (an estimated 2 months); (ii) pregnant women were frequently unable to attend 
work because of various health reasons; (iii) after the birth, Noorfadilla would have to be 
replaced, and the replacement would require training. 
Article 8(2) of Malaysia’s 1953 Federal Constitution prohibits discrimination against 
citizens on the ground of religion, gender, race, descent or place of birth.
55
 ‘Gender’ was 
added as an amendment to the Constitution in 2001, following lobbying by the Malaysian 
Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM), the Ministry of Women, Family and Community 
                                                 
53
 Simmons, ‘From Ratification to Compliance’, above n 42, 53. 
54
 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights, above n 4. 
55
 The Article stipulates that the prohibition applies in relation to the holding or disposition of property or 
establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment. 
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Development, and women’s NGOs. These groups argued that amendment was necessary in 
order to ensure Malaysia’s compliance with its obligations under the Convention, which it 
had ratified some six years earlier.
56
 In the Noorfadilla case, which was decided in the High 
Court of Malaysia, Justice Zaleha held that the Convention was relevant to the interpretation 
of Article 8(2) of the Constitution.
57
 In her decision, her Honour referred to: the Convention 
definition of discrimination (Article 1); the obligation on states to take measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of employment (Article 11(1)(b)); the obligation on 
states to take measures to prohibit dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy (Article 11(2)(a)).
58
 
Justice Zaleha also referred to the ‘Bangalore Principles,’ which emanated from a high level 
judicial colloquium on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms, held 
in India in 1988. Noting that the Chief Justice of Malaysia had participated in the colloquium, 
Justice Zaleha drew attention to the inclusion of ‘equality’ as one of the Bangalore Principles 
to which judges should adhere in carrying out their duties.
59
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 Constitution (Amendment) Act 2001 Act A1130. See: SUHAKAM, ‘Report on the Status of Women’s Rights 
in Malaysia’, Selangor Darul Ehsan (2010) available at: <http://www.suhakam.org.my/wp-
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CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2 (14 April 2004) available at: 
<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/309/80/PDF/N0430980.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 4 
November 2013]. 
57
 In the court hierarchy, the High Court of Malaysia sits below the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal.  
58
 The Court in Noorfadilla took note of recent correspondence between the Malaysian government and the 
United Nations, in which the government pledged its continued commitment to CEDAW. 
59
 The Bangalore Principles provide that: ‘it is within the proper nature of judicial process and established 
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The Court also referred to several cases from other jurisdictions: the Australian case Minister 
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh,
60
 in which the Australian High Court held that 
statutes are to be interpreted and applied, as far as language permitted, so as to conform with 
the established rules of international law, particularly conventions to which states are a party; 
and the Indian case Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR,
61
 in which the Court had interpreted 
the Indian constitution in light of the government’s support of the Beijing Statement of 
Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary and the Fourth World Conference on Women 
in Beijing. The Court’s conclusion, in the Noorfadilla case, was that Noorfadilla had suffered 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and that this discrimination was a prohibited form of 
gender discrimination. 
The Malaysian government initially appealed the decision. However, it withdrew its 
appeal in July 2013, urged to do so by the Malaysian Bar Council and civil society 
organisations (CSOs). In the wake of the announcement that the appeal was withdrawn, the 
Bar Council and CSOs called upon the government to enact specific anti-discrimination law, 
pointing out that the CEDAW Committee had advised the Malaysian government to do this in 
its 2006 report.
62
 
The approach taken in Noorfadilla is notably different to that taken by the Federal 
Court of Malaysia in the case of Beatrice Fernandez, which was decided seven years earlier. 
In the Fernandez case, an airline steward was forced to resign after becoming pregnant.
63
 The 
court held that the constitutional amendment prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of 
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 Isabelle Law, ‘Malaysian Bar Wants Specific Anti-gender Discrimination Laws’ (30 June 2013) The Nation 
available at:  <http://www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2013/06/30/Malaysian-Bar-wants-specific-anti-gender-
discrimination-laws.aspx> [accessed 7 November 2013]. 
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 Beatrice Fernandez v Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia & Anor, Civil Appeal No: W-02–186-96 (5 October 
2004). In the Fernandez case, a clause in the steward’s employment contract required the steward to resign on 
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gender had not yet taken effect, but that in any event, it would not have found that an 
employment provision allowing for termination on grounds of pregnancy was discriminatory: 
‘just as it cannot reasonably be argued that the provision of the law giving maternity leave 
only to women is discriminatory as against men.’64 The court held that guarantees of equality 
under the Constitution only related to infringements perpetrated by the State, and not by other 
individuals or private companies. This was because (in the court’s view) constitutional law 
deals only with the contravention of individual rights by the State itself or its agencies:  
The very concept of a 'fundamental right' involves State action. It is a right guaranteed 
by the State for the protection of an individual against arbitrary invasion of such right 
by the State. Where the invasion is by another private individual, the aggrieved 
individual may have his remedies under private law, but the constitutional remedy 
would not be available.
65
 
 
Perhaps the most marked difference between the Fernandez case and the Noorfadilla 
case is the openness of the court in Noorfadilla to the idea of employing, as Anne-Marie 
Slaughter puts it in her discussion of transnational judicial networks, ‘the common values that 
all judges share in guaranteeing litigant rights while also safeguarding an efficient and 
effective system.’66 The court in Fernandez was entirely dismissive of counsel’s attempts to 
rely on comparable discrimination cases from other jurisdictions, such as India.
67
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& Anor 2004 [CA]’ (5 October 2004) available at:  
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Litigation is not the only method for drawing international law into the domestic 
arena and instigating discourse with government on rights issues. Consider the example of 
polygamy, which is permitted for Islamic men in Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore 
under provisions of the Koran, and provides that a husband has a right to four simultaneous 
marriages.
68
 In July 2013, in an attempt to address the plight of the ‘25,000 single women 
under 60 still eligible for marriage’ in Kelantan State in Malaysia, the Kelantan Government 
introduced an ‘Ideal Polygamist’ programme, involving publicising happy polygamous 
marriages and providing rewards for men who treat their wives well.
69
 
The international Islamic feminist organisation Sisters in Islam (SIS) has a 
longstanding objection to the practice of polygamy, on the grounds that it undermines 
women’s equality and dignity. In relation to the ‘ideal polygamist’ programme, however, 
Sisters in Islam did not call for a prohibition on polygamy. Instead, they interrogated the 
program based on concepts of fairness and justice that exist within Shari’a law itself. SIS 
pointed out that Section 23 of the Kelantan Islamic Family Law Enactment (2002) lists four 
requirements that a husband has to satisfy in order to get permission from the Syariah Court 
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to commit polygamy: (a) that the proposed marriage is just or necessary; (b) that the husband 
has the means to enable him to support his wives and dependants; (c) that the husband is able 
to treat his all his wives fairly, and (d) that the proposed marriage does not cause darar syarie 
(harm to a wife’s religion, life, body, mind, dignity or property). SIS raised the question of 
whether fairness should be judged from the husband’s point of view, the wives’ point of 
view, or that of the children.
70
 Relevant in the debate was Malaysia’s statement before 
CEDAW in 2006, where it advised CEDAW that polygamy required the permission of the 
Shari’a court, which would only be granted ‘if it is satisfied that the proposed marriage is just 
and necessary, having regard to such circumstances as sterility, physical infirmity, physical 
unfitness for conjugal relations, wilful avoidance of an order for restitution of conjugal rights 
or insanity on the part of the existing wife or wives.’71  
The advocacy of SIS attempts to insert the Convention idea of equality into the 
Shari’a idea of justice, in order to construct the notion that polygamy is incompatible with 
both sets of ideas.
72
 This is no abstract undertaking. In publicising the issue and in public 
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discussions, SIS fleshed out the Convention idea of equality with reference to specific 
examples of how the practice of polygamy actually operates: for example, by coercing 
women into accepting polygamous relationships or into consenting to become additional 
wives; by keeping women powerless in what invariably becomes ‘an emotionally charged 
shift in the terms of the marriage contract;’ by denying women dignity by placing them in 
circumstances where they are highly likely to be degraded or belittled; by contributing to 
women’s economic and psychological powerlessness, exacerbating inequality.73  
Underpinning all of this are broader points: (1) that culture, customs and practices are 
dynamic and can change in accordance with the changing realities of time and place; (2) that 
cultural and religious elements of practices such as polygamy can be dissociated form one 
another; (3) that the historical context in which certain practices began and were tolerated (in 
the case of polygamy, for example, in post-conflict conditions where it was necessary to 
provide for the welfare of widows and orphaned children), no longer exist.
74
 Crucial to the 
discursive process of engaging state and religious institutions on the issue, however, is: 
broad-based consultation among all those who have a stake in and influence on the 
development of national laws and policies. In each context, this will include a variety 
of actors such as women’s rights advocates, sociologists, counsellors, lawyers and 
constitutional experts, religious and traditional leaders, and women on the ground. In 
this way, the State party can gather information not only on religion and culture, but 
also on constitutional guarantees and lived realities, and determine how all of these 
interact with the CEDAW and other international human rights standards. The issue 
of representation is crucial, as Muslim governments very often tend to regard only 
those in religious authority as having the right to engage on matters of religion.
75
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What matters is drawing the parties into a principled argument based on some shared 
understandings (for example, that the goal is a just and fair result for all involved), on the 
basis that the parties are open to being convinced by the better argument.
76
 ‘Arguing matters,’ 
believe constructivist scholars such as Thomas Risse.
77
 There is some evidence that states 
believe that arguing matters, too. At the stage of norm denial, for example, states often refuse 
or are reluctant to engage in any kind of arguing or justification, because they recognise the 
danger that the discursive opening of arguing represents.  
We see a recent example of this in Brunei, in relation to the announcement, in 2013, 
that the Sultan of Brunei intends to introduce a new penal code, based on a strict 
interpretation of Shari’a law, which includes stoning as a punishment for adultery. The law is 
to take effect in April 2014.
78
 Civil society organisations, including Islamic women’s groups 
based in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, argue that stoning is a violation of CEDAW (as 
well as being a human rights violation on other grounds) because it affects women 
disproportionately, and because it is justified by rules and practices that impair or negate the 
exercise by women of their human rights. In relation to the Sultan’s edict, two principle 
demands were made of the government of Brunei by women’s groups:  
(1) That Brunei submit its long overdue report to the UN CEDAW Committee in  
 fulfilment of its State obligations under CEDAW to which it is a State party  
 since 2006;  
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(2) That Brunei sign and ratify the ICCPR and the UN Convention Against  
 Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  
 (United Nations Convention Against Torture).
79
 
 
Brunei has expressed a reservation to the Convention in relation to provisions that 
may be contrary to the Constitution of Brunei Darussalam and to the beliefs and principles of 
Islam. Twenty-two states objected to Brunei’s reservation, on the grounds that it is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. Brunei would doubtless argue 
that the 2013 Penal Code, which applies only to Muslims, would fall within the scope of its 
reservation. Nonetheless, if Brunei submitted its report to CEDAW, it would be called on to 
withdraw its reservation, and asked to explain its failure to undertake legislative changes 
necessary to comply with its Convention obligations. CEDAW would doubtless express 
grave concern about the new penal code. In essence, Brunei would be called upon to justify 
its interests and preferences, which would then open these to the discursive challenge of other 
actors, whose perception of the situation would be different to the one held by the Sultan and 
his family. Engagement in the treaty monitoring process would amplify the voices of those 
calling for change. The fundamental question would become how Brunei constitutively 
identifies itself: as an Islamic state, or as a human rights-respecting member of the 
community of nations? In his speech introducing the new penal code, the Sultan stated that 
the new law ‘does not in any way change our policies ... as a member of the family of 
nations.’80 There is in this statement an expression of understanding about what is at stake. 
I have already written about the way that Indonesia has recast its identity as a rights-
respecting nation and a moral leader within ASEAN (Chapter 4). Because of this, Indonesia 
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is particularly sensitive about protecting its rights credentials and easily drawn into 
argumentation. For example, in Indonesia, policies of decentralisation, in place since 2004, 
have granted progressively greater degrees of autonomy to provinces and districts, 
particularly in the area of religious and traditional or adat law. Some of these laws and 
policies discriminate against women. In Aceh Province, for example, Law No 11 of 2006 
establishes the Ulama’s Consultative Assembly, a Shari’a Court, and Shari’a police. In June 
2013, Indonesia’s National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan), 
identified 15 regulations and by-laws passed by the Ulama Assembly which discriminate 
against women.
81
 Punishments for violations of these regulations can include beating, caning, 
being bathed in sewage water and forced marriage.
82
 Although Indonesia’s federal 
government possesses power to strike down discriminatory provisions inconsistent with the 
Convention, it has not done so.
83
 
In its 2012 response to CEDAW’s urging that Indonesia strike down laws in the 
provinces that ‘severely discriminate’ against women, Indonesia took umbrage, writing to the 
Committee at the conclusion of the session (an unusual step) in the following terms:  
the term ‘severely discriminate against women’ is not accurate, as such laws and 
policies are only in a limited number and have impact in the enjoyment of certain 
women’s rights, while at the same time, in the same provinces or districts, there are 
more laws and policies which are aimed to empower women and protect women’s 
rights.
84
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What is notable about this response is that Indonesia finds it necessary to justify its 
position on the meaning of ‘severely discriminate against women.’ Risse observes a striking 
development towards arguing as the validity of international norms becomes more accepted. 
When human rights norms are no longer denied (evidenced, for example, by a state ratifying 
a human rights convention) then ‘a discursive opening is created for their critics to challenge 
them further: If you say that you accept human rights, then why do you systematically violate 
them? The usual response is that such violations either did not occur or are marginal 
developments.’ Risse writes:  
The discourse then shifts toward the issue of whether norm violations constitute 
isolated incidents or are systematic in character. At this point during the tactical 
concession phase, the arguments of both sides become more and more detailed and 
also more legalistic. It is no longer a discourse on the validity of the norm, but on the 
interpretation of the law of the land. At the same time, the two sides gradually accept 
each other as valid interlocutors. They no longer denounce each other as ignorant 
foreigners or pariah states. Arguments that would not have been acceptable in earlier 
stages of the debate are now treated as valid points.
85
  
 
The logic of argumentation in public discourse implies that participants are open to 
being persuaded by the better argument.
86
  
Despite the opportunities presented by international human rights law via litigation or 
lobbying and discursive engagement before CEDAW, the end game remains the enactment of 
domestic legislation to protect rights. To return then to the prescriptive status of CEDAW 
norms: in 2006, both Vietnam and Laos passed legislation aimed at implementing CEDAW;
87
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in 2008, the Philippines enacted the ‘Magna Carta for Women’ Act; in Thailand, a law to 
create a new legal instrument specifically addressing the issue of elimination of 
discrimination against women is at the time of writing being drafted. In 2006, CEDAW urged 
Cambodia to pass a comprehensive gender equality legislation, which at the time of writing it 
has yet to do. Malaysia, as we have learnt, has not passed implementing legislation for 
CEDAW and neither has Brunei, Myanmar or Singapore. In Indonesia, a federal Bill on 
Gender Equality, drafted to conform to the provisions of CEDAW, has been under 
consideration since 2012. Debate on the Bill stalled after opposition from major Islamic 
organisations, which formally objected on the grounds that some articles opposed Islamic 
values.
88
 
It is interesting to note, though, that on the general issue of violence against women, 
there is significant evidence of the prescriptive status of the norm in most ASEAN states. All 
ASEAN states endorsed the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women.
89
 All states but Myanmar have passed laws prohibiting violence against 
women, including violence that occurs within the home.
90
 This would tend to confirm the 
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observation of Keck and Sikkink (and others) that norms concerning bodily integrity are 
particularly effective transnationally and cross-culturally.
91
 A report by the United Nations 
Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) points out that 
the Philippine and Indonesian laws refer explicitly to the Convention (and other international 
human rights instruments) as the normative framework in the statement of objectives and that 
the language in the Lao legislation also reﬂects the Convention commitments.92 Concordance 
between international norms and prescriptive status in domestic law is not perfect. For 
example, neither Indonesia nor Malaysia’s domestic violence laws include an offence of 
marital rape. In 2006, before the CEDAW Committee, Malaysia stated that marital rape could 
not be an offence because this would be inconsistent with Shari’a law.93 
To sum up: in Southeast Asia, as in many other regions, there is a significant gulf 
between the provisions of the Convention, and the actual realisation of women’s rights to 
equality. Nonetheless, the global ideal of equality between men and women, as captured in 
CEDAW, has in some cases provided civil society with an effective means of agitating for 
change. In relation to some aspects of women’s rights (violence against women) there has 
been significant advancement. Yet the translation of global norms to domestic law is 
incomplete, and to the extent that opportunities for engagement and participation are denied 
to effected actors (as in Brunei) then the potential for global regime to effect change is 
stymied. Things remain either at the stage of ‘tactical concession’ (of which Brunei is an 
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example) or ‘prescriptive status’ (which is closer to the position in which Indonesia finds 
itself and towards which Malaysia is moving). 
 
6.4 The Emerging Regional Order 
 
One aspect of my hypothesis is that for a variety of reasons, the regional level of governance 
is important in moving states from a stage of accepting the ‘prescriptive status’ of norms to a 
stage of ‘rule consistent behaviour’. Part of the argument can be made from a managerial 
perspective.
94
 Compliance requires, amongst other things, a certain level of state capacity. 
The institutional and administrative capabilities of a state are as important in enforcing 
human rights standards as a state’s general willingness to abide by standards.95 In the final 
chapter of this dissertation, which deals with trafficking in persons, I show how the work of 
national human rights institutions (NHRIs), which have been established in the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar, and the establishment of a regional network of 
these institutions, works to assist the move from prescription to compliance, through 
education, information dissemination and training. I argue that the sharing of expertise and 
experience among neighbouring states that face the same problems drives regional 
understandings about how best to strengthen approaches to managing particular rights issues. 
The managerial approach, however, is not directly relevant to the issue of women’s rights. As 
I explained at the beginning of this chapter, the issue of women’s equality rights is different 
to the issue of trafficking in persons, in the sense that the issue of women’s rights does not 
possess the same imperative for transnational cooperation, driven by the cross-border nature 
of trafficking in persons.  
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There is another sense, however, in which I argue that the regional level is critical. 
This is in the negotiation of social and cultural attitudes that affect the way women are 
treated. In Southeast Asia, there are dramatic examples of the disjuncture between the 
Convention and the treatment of women, in the persistence of practices such as female genital 
cutting, female infanticide, child betrothal and early marriage. More quotidian and more 
pervasive examples also exist: the disparity in wealth and income between men and women 
and disproportionate numbers of men and women in positions of power in government and 
business. The reason why this state of affairs persists, despite the global pressure towards 
gender equality, is because the values that underpin the Convention run contra to 
longstanding and deeply embedded cultural norms. These norms are perceived as providing 
structure, order and stability to society and are very resistant to change. Indonesia, for 
example, in explaining to CEDAW why the practice of child marriage persists, argued that 
the most significant reason was ‘the prevailing sociocultural norms of society which 
encourage the belief that marriage at a later age amounts to shameful conduct and therefore 
should be prevented.’96 
Culture and tradition are of course intertwined with religious beliefs. In the 
Philippines, the teachings and practice of Catholicism foreground marriage stability over 
sexual rights, and the rights of the foetus over women’s right to bodily integrity. In Thailand, 
being born a woman is still viewed in Buddhist belief as the result of previous bad karma. 
Buddhist texts such as the Pali Canon, the Anguttara Nikaya III and the Jatakas, portray the 
character of women as venal, duplicitous and sub-intelligent.
97
 In Singapore, Confucianism 
historically attributes an exalted position to men and an inferior status to women (nan sun nu 
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bei).
98
 In Islam, as we have already seen, it is impossible to escape the way that religion 
imbricates itself in the discourse on rights. As a delegate from Thailand explained to the 
CEDAW Committee, ‘[t]he issue of Islamic law was a sensitive one. The situation was 
unique because Islam was considered to be not only a religion but a way of life, and the laws 
related to marriage were considered to be the laws of God, which could not be replaced by 
the laws of man.’99 In Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Singapore, and in countries with 
minority Islamic populations, such as the Philippines and Thailand, women’s sexual freedom, 
reproductive autonomy and marriage equality are constrained on the basis of incompatibility 
with Islam. Generally, evidence from Southeast Asia supports the findings from Ronald 
Inglehart and Pippa Norris’s study on the relationship between religion and woman’s rights: 
strongly religious societies have a marked tendency to resist embracing norms of female 
equality associated with secularism.
100
  
As I explained in Chapter 1, it is often difficult for those within a culture to scrutinise 
their own norms and beliefs, because of the difficulties of transcending a positionally limited 
vision.
101
 For this reason, political philosophers such as Amartya Sen have stressed the 
importance of examination and scrutiny of local practices from outside the society in 
question. The observations and experiences of other societies are essential, Sen argues, 
because they ‘broaden the class and type of questions that are considered in that scrutiny, and 
because the factual presumptions that lie behind particular ethical and political judgments can 
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be questioned with the help of the experience of other countries or societies.’102 In Chapter 1, 
I argue that regional institutions work as platforms for providing outside scrutiny in a way 
that global institutions cannot, because they are better able to specify the meaning of rights in 
particular circumstances, particularly circumstances dominated by strong local 
understandings that might run counter to the normative content of human rights standards. I 
suggest that in the inevitable balancing act that must be done between individual rights and 
community rights and between different rights themselves, the regional level provides a 
crucial point of balance between the universal and the local.  
Do we find evidence of unique and productive regional approach to negotiating 
women’s rights in Southeast Asia, in a way that would support my hypothesis? If not, why 
not?  
The historical perspective is important here. In December 1975, leaders and 
government representatives from ASEAN nations met in Jakarta to discuss a regional 
response to the United Nations International Women’s Year Conference, which took place in 
Mexico in June of that year.
103
 The World Conference approved a ten year ‘World Plan of 
Action’ to advance the status of women across the world and to achieve equality, 
development and peace, and urged cooperation at the regional and sub-regional levels in 
order to achieve these goals.
104
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The ASEAN Women’s Leaders Conference was opened by Roesiah Sardjoro, 
Secretary-General of Indonesia’s Department of Social Affairs, who began by quoting the 
aim of the World Plan of Action: 
to launch an international action program including short and long term measures 
aimed at achieving the integration of women as full and equal partners with men in 
the total development effort and at eliminating discriminations against women, at 
achieving the widest involvement of women at strengthening international peace and 
eliminating racism and racial discrimination.
105
 
 
The response from ASEAN Ministers from Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, was 
hostile. ASEAN Secretary-General, Umarjadi Mjotowijono of Indonesia, stated that:  
the fact should not be overlooked that the situation and conditions in the ASEAN 
region differ from those in the advanced industrial countries. Whereas in developed 
countries the striving is towards greater equality of opportunity and treatment of 
women in economic and social life, and towards the elimination of persistent 
discriminatory practices, in the ASEAN region the first priority should not be to raise 
the status of women but efforts in the first place should be directed towards the 
improvement the standards of living of the ASEAN peoples which represent the chief 
guarantee of the political and regional independence of ASEAN. ASEAN member 
countries are facing difficulties and serious problems accentuated by the crisis of 
underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty; the pressure of action, therefore, is 
not improving the status of women but improving the status of the people in general 
which can be brought by increased and active participation of women of the ASEAN 
women in development.
106
  
                                                                                                                                                        
on women, particularly the effect of market reforms and economic development. This Report references the 
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 The position of Singapore was that: ‘Singapore women have no need for militant 
women’s liberation movements ... a quiet but effective transformation has taken place 
resulting in a gradual and steady integration of women in the whole process of 
modernization.’ Malaysia’s concern was that ‘the best traditions of our social and cultural 
values that give special meaning to our quality of life in our countries and a recognition of the 
uniqueness of womanhood’ should not be ‘eroded or destroyed in our pursuit for progress.’107 
Doubts about the legitimacy of the women’s movement did not only emanate from states. 
Many women’s rights activists across Southeast Asia were also worried about the divisive 
effects of recognising the primacy of women’s issues over class-based problems.108 They 
argued that the ‘woman question’ was ‘vague, abstract, and does not have a material base,’ a 
‘middle class perception with which the majority of women find no identification.’109  
On this last point, consider, for example, the vexed question of how to deal with 
gender specific violations perpetrated by ‘private’ agents (for example, in family situations, 
within the home). Many Western feminists argue that the corpus of human rights must be 
expanded to include the experiences of women wherever they occurred, even in what was 
traditionally seen as the ‘natural’, private, invisible domain outside politics and the public 
sphere.
110
 Yet for women’s rights activists in Southeast Asia, this led to some troubling 
questions. As several anthropologists noted, the concepts of ‘public’ and ‘private’ are 
products of liberal modernity in the West. In many traditional cultures, there is no clear 
                                                 
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Carolyn I. Sobritchea, ‘Women’s Movement in the Philippines and the Politics of Critical Collaboration with 
the State’ (2004) in Lee Hock Guan (ed) Civil Society in Southeast Asia (2004) Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore, 101–121. 
109
 Aida F. Santos, ‘The Philippine Women’s Movement: Problems of Perception’ Paper presented at the 
Seminar to Prepare the Alternative Philippine Report on the Impact of the Decade for Women, Quezon City 
(1984). Quoted in Sobritchea, ibid, 103–104. 
110
 See: Claire Cutler, 'Artifice, ideology and paradox: the public/private distinction in international law' (1997) 
4(2) Review of International Political Economy 261. 
Chapter 6: The Rights of Women at the Global, Regional and Local Levels 
323 
 
notion of a distinction between the public and private realms.
111
 Is there utility for women in 
developing nations in agitating for extension of rights to a private, domestic realm that does 
not exist for them? Does conflating women with ‘the private’ threaten to embed the very 
assumptions about the public/private divide that are being challenged? CEDAW’s stance on 
other cultural issues has not always met with the whole-hearted support of feminists, 
particularly feminists writing in the global South. To many, it has seemed that inordinate 
attention has been given to certain ‘traditional practices’ (polygamy; female genital cutting; 
suttee; foot-binding) to the detriment of other more quotidian but equally damaging issues, 
such as economic disadvantage and the absence of education for girls.
112
 In this context, the 
suspicion has arisen that the women’s human rights movement, as part of the broader human 
rights movement, is an example of Western feminist universalising—a(nother) ‘tool of the 
West and its self-serving Enlightenment project.’113  
There have been some convincing responses to claims about the culturally imperialist 
nature of women’s human rights. Scholars such as Sally Mary Engle argue that culture is 
rarely simply ‘imposed’ on another culture, and never successfully. Instead, and ideally, what 
occurs is a process of negotiation and translation, rather than confrontation and conflict, 
where the boundaries of ideas are expanded, or develop new practices of intervention are 
developed.
114
 Seen this way, culture is not immutable, permanent and bounded: instead, it is 
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contested and constantly renegotiated. There is not necessarily conflict between culture and 
rights, but dialogue and the reformulation of values.
115
 
Nonetheless, at least until the end of the 20
th
 century, there was persisting 
ambivalence about the women’s rights project in Southeast Asia. At the regional level, this 
ambivalence is reflected in the tone of the ‘Declaration on the Advancement of Women in the 
ASEAN Region’, which was completed and adopted by ASEAN Heads of State in July 
1988.
116
 The Declaration contains only one reference to the principle of equality. In Article 1, 
it lists as one of its objectives:  
to promote and implement the equitable and effective participation of women 
whenever possible in all fields and at various levels of the political, economic, social 
and cultural life of society at the national, regional and international levels. 
 
The Declaration makes no reference at all to cultural impediments that might prevent 
women from achieving equality and no reference to women’s ‘rights’.117 Instead, the 
Declaration recognises the ‘multiple roles of women in the family, in society and in the 
nation and the need to give full support and provide facilities and opportunities to enable 
them to undertake these tasks effectively.’118 It advances as its reason for why ASEAN states 
should pay attention to women’s issues:  
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To enable women in the region to undertake their important role as active agents and 
beneficiaries of national and regional development, particularly in promoting regional 
understanding and cooperation and in building more just and peaceful societies.
119
  
 
 The Declaration refers to the role of women in strengthening ‘national and regional 
resilience’120 and ‘strengthening solidarity in the region and international women forum by 
promoting harmonization of views and of positions.’121 
Between 1988 and 2004, during which period ASEAN’s membership doubled, the 
ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW) worked to advance the aims of the Declaration, 
chiefly through holdings meetings and workshops. It also devised a ‘Work Plan for Women’s 
Advancement and Gender Equality.’ One of the outputs of this was the publication of a series 
of reports on progress in achieving the goals of the Declaration. The first report was 
published in 1996 with data from seven ASEAN countries; the second report was published 
in 2001 with data from all ten ASEAN countries.
122
 The ACW was also responsible for 
producing the 2004 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the 
ASEAN Region (DEVW).
123
  
The DEVW, adopted eleven years after the signing of the United Nations Declaration 
on the Elimination Violence Against Women,
124
 is markedly less utilitarian in tone than the 
1988 Declaration on the Advancement of Women. The DEVW states that the purpose of the 
Declaration is to: 
promote an integrated and holistic approach to eliminate violence against women by 
formulating mechanisms focusing on the four areas of concerns of violence against 
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women, namely: providing services to fulfil the needs of survivors; formulating and 
taking appropriate responses to offenders and perpetrators; understanding the nature 
and causes of violence against women; and changing societal attitudes and 
behaviour.
125
  
 
At Article 5, the Declaration links non-discrimination and women’s economic 
independence and empowerment to the prevention of violence. The Preamble to the 
Declaration notes that violence is an obstacle to the achievement of equality, development 
and peace. As I noted in the preceding section, within three years of the adoption of this 
Declaration, all ASEAN states (except Myanmar) passed legislation criminalising violence 
against women. Most of this legislation was enacted shortly after the adoption of the regional 
Declaration (the Philippines, Laos and Indonesia in 2004; Cambodia in 2005; Thailand and 
Vietnam in 2007). Malaysia and Singapore, however, passed domestic violence legislation in 
1994 and 1996, respectively, closer in time to the adoption of the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women. What we see, in relation to the issue of violence 
against women, is a broad alignment between global, regional and local ideas about the moral 
imperative of preventing violence against women. This follows, it should be noted, the 
demise of the ‘Asian Values’ debate at the end of the 1990s, and the admission to ASEAN of 
communist states Laos and Vietnam (countries with strong histories of promoting women’s 
rights under Marxist principles of equality between the sexes). 
The ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women 
and Children, (ACWC) inaugurated in 2010, has as its aim: ‘to promote and protect the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of women and children in ASEAN.’126 The ACWC 
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has adopted as its first task advancing the issue of violence against women and children.
127
 
Despite some excitement at the reference to the ACWC’s apparent ‘protection’ function, it is 
clear that the ACWC is a consultative body. Its mandate and functions, listed in Article 5, all 
concern the promotion of the rights of women and children and the Commission’s role in 
coordinating action amongst ASEAN states.
128
 Similar to AICHR, ACWC has no 
investigative, evaluative, or enforcement powers or any early warning mechanisms. ACWC 
can provide advice to ASEAN sectorial governments upon request and advocate on behalf of 
women and children to improve their human rights situation.
129
 
The ACWC oversaw the drafting of the Declaration on Elimination of Violence 
Against Women and Elimination of Violence Against Children in ASEAN, (DEVWC) which 
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was adopted by ASEAN Leaders at the October 2013 Summit in Brunei.
130
 The DEVWC 
acknowledges the commitment of ASEAN states to international instruments such as the 
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, but does not 
include the strong and specific definition of violence that we find in Articles 1 and 2 of the 
United Nations Declaration.
131
 Nor does the ASEAN instrument set out in the body of the 
text the various rights to which women are equally entitled (life, equality, liberty and security 
etc).
132
 There are other small but not necessarily trivial differences between the two 
instruments. The Preamble to the DEVWC employs the language of CEDAW, obliging 
ASEAN Member States to take all appropriate measures to modify social and cultural 
patterns of conduct with a view to eliminating prejudices and customary practices based on 
the idea of inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes.
133
 In the United Nations 
Declaration, this same obligation is placed in the Declaration proper, under Article 4. Like 
the United Nations instrument, the DEVWC lists the various methods that should be pursued 
to eliminate violence against women and children, largely by strengthening and making 
effective legislation, policies and measures to prosecute perpetrators of violence, protect 
women and children and provide them with access to remedies.
134
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In sum, it could be said that on the issue of violence against women, there is a degree 
of concordance between global, regional and local norms on the issue of women’s rights in 
Southeast Asia and that furthermore, in the work of the ACWC, we see the beginnings of a 
regional approach to managing the issue. However, we do not find the same robust regional 
response centred around regional understandings about the meaning of women’s equality.  
Particularly troubling in ASEAN is the way we see, from 2010, in the Ha Noi 
Declaration on the Enhancement of Welfare and Development of ASEAN Women and 
Children, the rights of women aligned with the rights of children. The Ha Noi Declaration 
references ASEAN States’ commitments to the Women’s Convention and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and recognises in its Preamble ‘a need to continue to tap on the 
strength of these groups [women and children] as well as to empower those who are in 
vulnerable situations.’135 The 2013 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, as we have seen, 
contains Article 4, which discusses the ‘inalienable, integral and indivisible rights’ of women, 
who are placed beside other ‘vulnerable and marginalised groups’ such as ‘children, the 
elderly, persons with disabilities, migrant workers.’136 It is significant, perhaps, that by this 
time, any influence Vietnam and Laos had promoting women’s rights under the ideology of 
communism had faded. Globally, the position of women in communist countries deteriorated 
rapidly after the advent of glasnost and perestroika.
137
 In Vietnam and Laos, after Doi Moi 
(economic ‘renovation’), women’s representation in the National Assemblies of Laos and 
Vietnam declined.
138
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and Laos—at least officially—subscribed to the communist idea of the family as merely a 
‘sentimental’ unit. By 2010, with economic liberalism underway, the idea of ‘the family’ was 
revived, in tandem with regional moves to link the wellbeing and advancement of women 
with the wellbeing and advancement of children.  
The conflation of women’s rights and children’s rights in ASEAN institutions and 
declarations is problematic for the advancement of women’s equality. The unique 
characteristic of children (their dependence on adults and their lack of capacity) are of an 
entirely different character to the attributes of women. Women do have special attributes that 
require particular attention, such as historical subjugation and the fact of reproductive 
capacities. However, merging the rights of children with the rights of women perpetuates the 
idea of women’s biologically determined dependency and the role of women in society as 
being primarily concerned with home and child-raising. It is too early to say how the ACWC 
will proceed to fulfil its mandate and whether or not in practice, it will distinguish women’s 
issues from children’s issues and work to promote policies directed towards substantive 
equality for women.  
Why was a separate regional institution to oversee women and children’s rights 
created at all, in light of the global trend towards mainstreaming women’s issues? In an 
influential article published in the Human Rights Quarterly in 1990, Charlotte Bunch argued 
that ‘woman-centred’ strategies had failed and that the separation of ‘women’s rights’ from 
‘human rights’ had led to the marginalisation and devaluation of women’s issues. Bunch 
argued that the effects of this were both material (at the global level, the Human Rights 
Commission had more power to hear and investigate cases than the Commission on the Status 
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of Women, ‘more staff and budget, and better mechanisms for implementing its findings’).139 
and ideological (‘human’ rights were considered more important than ‘women’s’ rights, 
based on an idea that the rights of women are of a lesser order than the ‘rights of man’).140 In 
the wake of Bunch’s article and in the shadow of gender-specific events such as ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ in Bosnia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, a project of ‘gender mainstreaming’ was 
advocated as a new global strategy for promoting gender equality.
141
 At the core of gender 
mainstreaming was the idea that equality between the sexes should no longer be addressed as 
a separate ‘woman’s issue’, but must be a part of all UN activities.142 The Commission on 
Human Rights defines mainstreaming as ‘the placing of an issue within the pre-existing 
institutional, academic and discursive framework.’143 For many feminists, however, 
mainstreaming means more than that. The goal of Bunch and her colleagues was to impact on 
and ideally to transform the mainstream: to rebuild the concept of human rights from a 
feminist perspective, so that it took greater account of the realities and concerns of women's 
lives.
144
 The ‘women’s rights are human rights’ movement was to a degree successful in 
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bringing women’s rights into the fold of broader human rights. Yet the second part of the 
post-Beijing World Conference project—the goal of reimagining the human rights project to 
account for the perspective of women, while at the same time recognising difference, 
specificity and context—was only ever imperfectly realised.145  
The creation of the ASEAN Commission on Women and Children may be merely an 
accident of history. In 2003, Vitit Muntarbhorn, academic and activist, at a meeting of the 
Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, suggested that the precursor to 
the creation of a fully-fledged regional human rights commission in Southeast Asia might be 
the establishment of a body mandated to promote and protect international human rights to 
which all ASEAN states have already subscribed—namely, those in the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. Muntarbhorn’s point was that a regional body should subscribe to global norms, 
and not be established based on a weaker set of regional norms. Yet the end result has been 
the creation of a separate body for women and children, with no clear relationship to AICHR 
and a real risk that ‘women’s issues’ will be deflected to what will inevitably become an 
inferior body. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
How does this chapter advance our understanding of whether or not, and the conditions under 
which, a regional system for the promotion and protection of human rights might possess a 
particular legitimacy? The picture is neither clear nor neat—nor would we expect it to be, 
given the complexity of local, regional and global interrelationships, the diverse cultural 
backgrounds of ASEAN states, and the long history towards (but only very recent 
establishment of) regional human rights institutions in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, we can 
draw several tentative conclusions. 
First, leaving aside the specific issue of violence against women, we see amongst 
ASEAN states tactical concessions to global international norms relating to women’s rights. 
The most plausible explanation for these concessions, given the temporal and spatial 
dimensions of ASEAN states ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, centres on socialisation (primarily through the World 
Conferences on Women) or diffusion (through the regional ‘neighbour’ effect). We do not yet 
see a full-blown translation of these concessions into prescription (domestic law reflecting 
genuine commitment to international norms). What we can see, however, are examples of the 
way that domestic groups have employed commitments to the Convention in order to move 
states along the path to prescription. The examples provided of activism in Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Brunei, usefully illustrate the different dynamics at play in different political 
contexts. In Malaysia, which is a demi-democracy, litigation and lobbying around 
international norms has proven to be an effective strategy for engaging government in 
accepting the validity of a particular norm (the Malaysian government, under pressure, 
withdrew its appeal in the Noorfadilla case). In Indonesia, a state that prides itself on its 
democratic credentials, discursive processes of argumentation are more evolved, and directed 
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towards exploring the meaning of norms in particular contexts (what does it mean to severely 
discriminate against women?). In Brunei, where there is no political opposition, civil society 
activity is curtailed and religious norms are dominant in society, the government is reluctant 
to engage in discussion or argumentation at all—the state is still in the ‘denial’ stage. 
Simmons argues that: ‘the findings are remarkably robust: international legal commitments 
improve the legitimacy of women’s demands for equality and help to elicit social change.’146 
She notes, however, that ratification makes little difference in countries where the conditions 
do not exist for ‘mobilisation’ or litigation: ‘CEDAW effects could never be shown to exist in 
countries with established, stable official religions or in countries with nonperforming 
judicial systems.’147 In ASEAN, Brunei—at present—stands as an example of this. 
Second, regional instruments and institutions in Southeast Asia, at present, only 
weakly reflect a commitment to the idea of women’s equality. This ambivalence, I argue, 
stems from several factors. The first has to do with the historical development of ASEAN’s 
women’s rights institutions. States were advised, in 1975 after the First World Conference on 
Women, to devise a regional response to the issue of promoting and protecting women’s 
rights. ASEAN states reluctantly came together to do so. But at this particular stage of the 
economic development of ASEAN states, what mattered (to governments at least) was the 
equality and social welfare of all citizens. The idea of women’s right to equality was resisted 
by governments, based on the poor economic and social position of both men and women in 
Southeast Asia. Where governments were forced to pay attention to the issue, the 
advancement of women was couched in instrumental terms, concerned with the contribution 
that women’s advancement could make to the wellbeing of all people within the region. This 
alignment sat neatly with national conversations orchestrated by many ASEAN states about 
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‘family’ and ‘family values’.148 Yet it is important not to overstate ASEAN’s singularity in 
this regard. Deep and unresolved tensions also undercut the global women’s rights 
movement. On the question of culture, for example, CEDAW consistently refuses to allow 
traditional family structures to excuse or justify the unequal treatment of women. It could 
hardly do otherwise, given the text of Article 5(a) of CEDAW).
149
 Yet the discourse of other 
agencies of the United Nations has not been uniform. For example, other agencies have 
prominently advanced the role and importance of the family, without necessarily emphasising 
equality within the family. 
Third, civil society groups, which might have pushed states towards a regional 
consensus on equality issues, had (at least initially) reservations about the global women’s 
movement, and focused their energies locally. Regional networks of activists, of the kind I 
discuss in the next chapter, did not develop until the 1980s. What we do see, in more recent 
times, is a trans-regional movement by civil society groups such as Sisters in Islam. The 
focus of SIS is not on specifying the meaning of women’s rights in the regional context, but 
on specifying the meaning of women’s rights in the context of Islam. We also see that 
increasing levels of democratisation in countries such as Malaysia are progressively widening 
the space for civil society activism, which is further encouraged by growing judicial 
sensitivity to global human rights developments. 
Fourth, in relation to the most recent institutional developments, we can see the 
results of a certain pragmatism underpinning the drive to create a regional human rights 
institution. The fact that all ASEAN states had acceded to the Convention on the Elimination 
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of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (though with reservations, as we have seen) 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, prompted the push towards the establishment 
of an institution dedicated to promoting and protecting the rights of women and children. But 
as I have argued, the conflation of the rights of women and the rights of children has a 
deleterious effect on generating an autochthonous regional understanding about women’s 
equality. It is unclear at the time of writing how the work of the ASEAN Commission on 
Women and Children will evolve. It is a positive sign, perhaps, that the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women and Elimination of Violence Against Children in 
ASEAN hints at an understanding that the needs of women and children are of a different 
order (we see this in the bifurcated phrasing of the title of the Declaration).
150
  
Finally, related to this last point, it is significant that the issue of violence against 
women has gained significant traction at global, regional and state levels. This confirms the 
view that norms protecting the physical security of innocent or vulnerable actors have a 
particular purchase: as a norm, they possess an ‘oughtness’ that sets them apart from other 
kinds of norms. Because of this, we see a stronger push to reach precise understandings about 
what constitutes ‘appropriate’ or ‘proper’ behaviour in relation to the promotion and 
protection of this particular norm and more standard-setting taking place. Furthermore, 
greater disapproval and stigma attaches to state failure to translate the norm into prescriptive 
form. Regional examples of how this should be done, in the form of domestic legislation, are 
highly relevant.  
But overall, we do not see, at the regional level, the development by states of a 
distinct regional response to the meaning of equality between men and women and the 
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abnegation of distinction based on gender, or the laying out of specific ways, relevant to 
states in the region, of how states might begin to modify social and cultural patterns of 
conduct of men and women with a view to eliminating prejudices. We can conclude, then, 
that in relation to the issue of women’s rights, a particular legitimacy does not—at the present 
time, given the particular stage of the norm life cycle presently occupied by ASEAN states—
attach to the regional approach in Southeast Asia. On the subject of women’s rights, the 
global regime currently has greater utility as an instrument of change. 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
Let us return to the original idea sketched out in Chapter 1, of what a regional approach to 
human rights, meeting the requirements of legitimacy, might look like. First, we would see 
evidence of a shared understanding of what the problem is, how the problem manifests itself 
in specific local circumstances and why, adopting a political conception of human rights, a 
certain issue qualifies as a human rights issue; second, we would see dense interaction 
between states within a particular constrained geographical area, in the form of joint 
instruments and shared institutions created to address the problem, and also in the form of 
less formal interactions, between networks of actors at different levels of governance 
(bureaucrats, members of the executive, civil society organisations); third, we would see all 
this occurring against a backdrop of shared economic, political or security interests. 
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This chapter describes how in relation to the issue of trafficking in persons, precisely 
this type of regional approach exists (or is in the process of being formed) in Southeast Asia. 
We should not find this particularly surprising. Trafficking, as defined in the 2000 United 
Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women 
and Children (‘the Trafficking Protocol’)1, involves the prominent violation of a range of 
individual civil liberties (the prohibitions against slavery, servitude and compulsory labour; 
liberty and security of the person; and, potentially, life). There seems to be, at least at the 
level of rhetoric, a global consensus that trafficking is a moral evil and that states have a duty 
to prevent it. Furthermore, unlike the rights of women, addressing the problem of human 
trafficking requires collaboration between countries of origin (from which victims are 
transported), countries of transit (through which victims are trafficked) and countries of 
destination (where exploitation occurs). Unilateral action to address the problem and its 
consequences will be ineffective. The issue lends itself, therefore, in a practical way, to 
intergovernmental cooperation.  
In particular, the issue is one that would seem to lend itself to intergovernmental 
cooperation among states within a particular geographic region. Recall the sorts of ideas put 
forward in Chapter 1 about proximity and levels of interaction and concern that exist between 
states at the regional level. In relation to the issue of trafficking in persons, we would 
anticipate that: institutions situated at the regional level would be more likely to possess more 
intimate knowledge of the economic geographies that influence trafficking flows; they would 
be more likely to be in a position to foster co-operative efforts at borders and in relation to the 
return of trafficked persons; and they might be better able to frame the issue in a way that 
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establishes links between trafficking and high-priority regional issues such as transnational 
crime, increasing the political palatability of state responses. Furthermore, we might 
anticipate that regional arrangements would have a comparative advantage to global schemes 
given the sheer number of states participating in the global regime and the diverse forms the 
problem takes in different geographical regions. This last point is what concerns Emmers et 
al, in their discussion of human trafficking and other forms of transnational crime. The 
authors argue that: ‘Within the international arena there are simply too many states, with too 
great a capacity gap, to allow for the swift resolution of a particular problem.’2 Emmers and 
his colleagues argue strongly for regional levels of governance, which act as ‘a supporting 
horizontal structure where states at particular levels of development, with similar needs, can 
work together in enhancing their security.’3 Regional programs, they claim, ‘allow states to 
develop transnational responses to such threats [as transnational crime] with mutual 
confidence in their other partners based on their similarities rather than their differences.’4 
In this Chapter, I argue that ASEAN’s efforts to prevent trafficking in persons are the 
result of precisely the sorts of regional-level processes that I describe in Chapter 1: moral 
consciousness-raising, argumentation and persuasion amongst regional peers, by national and 
regional actors, both governmental and non-governmental, coupled with the alignment of 
interests among states that share instrumental reasons for advancing a particular joint project. 
I argue that what emerges is a specifically regional understanding of the problem of 
trafficking that is particularly well-suited to promoting the internalisation of norms about 
preventing trafficking. In this way, I offer this chapter as an example that provides (overall) 
support for my hypothesis about the legitimacy of regional systems for the promotion and 
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protection of human rights. I argue that the 2004 ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in 
Persons, Particularly Women and Children and the ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in 
Persons (currently being negotiated) are reflections of this regional vision.  
This chapter is also about how global mechanisms of influence might (under certain 
conditions) distort and delay the internalisation of human rights norms. In this chapter I 
demonstrate how different modes of influence (persuasion, material inducement, fines) 
implemented at the global level, do not necessarily complement processes of socialisation at 
the regional level. I argue that interaction between different mechanisms of influence can 
have negative effects, and that global attempts to influence state responsiveness on the issue 
of human trafficking in Southeast Asia, predominantly the actions of the United States under 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, provide an example of this.  
 
7.2 The Global Regime to Prevent Trafficking in Persons 
 
The extent of trafficking in persons in Southeast Asia is difficult to assess. There are several 
reasons for this: the borders of many Southeast Asian states are porous and trafficking may 
go undetected; citizenship and birth records do not exist in parts of Southeast Asia, making it 
difficult to identify trafficked persons; trafficked persons may be reluctant to make reports to 
the police because the result can be deportation.
5
 The extent of internal trafficking occurs on 
a scale and magnitude that is even more difficult to assess than cross-border trafficking.
6
 The 
United Nations reports that in 2012 there were 10,000 cases of trafficking in persons in South 
Asia, East Asia and the Pacific.
7
 It appears that since 1997 and the Asian Financial Crisis, 
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trafficking has increased.
8
 Although charting the geography of inter-state trafficking flows is 
complicated, the overall pattern seems to be that people are trafficked from Laos, Cambodia, 
Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Myanmar, into the relatively rich and developed 
countries of Malaysia and Singapore, and (sometimes) further abroad to Australia, Europe 
and the United States.
9
 China and Thailand are countries of both origin and destination, and 
also places where internal trafficking occurs.
10
 
The centrepiece of the global effort to end human trafficking is the Trafficking 
Protocol.
11
 The central elements of the Protocol are as follows. First, the Protocol depicts 
human trafficking as a complicated form of organised crime, systematically run by 
subnational and transnational corporate agencies.
12
 Indeed, the Protocol only applies only to 
trafficking conducted by ‘an organized criminal group.’13 Second, in relation to the 
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exists, defines an ‘organized criminal group’ as ‘a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a 
period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes.’ Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime, ibid, Art. 2 (b): ‘Serious crime’ shall mean conduct constituting an offence 
punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty’; Article 2(c) 
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prevention of trafficking, the Protocol places significant emphasis on border control.
14
 Third, 
the Protocol attempts to distinguish human trafficking from practices such as people 
smuggling and illegal migration by emphasising the elements of coercion and exploitation 
inherent in human trafficking.
15
 The Protocol provides that consent is irrelevant in 
circumstances where coercion is present.
16
 Finally, although the Trafficking Protocol 
encompasses all forms of exploitation, there is an emphasis placed on sexual exploitation.
17
 
The United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act (2000) (TVPA)
18
 was passed 
less than one month before the General Assembly adopted the UN Protocol on Human 
Trafficking. Like the Trafficking Protocol, the TVPA has two primary purposes: combatting 
human trafficking (largely through the prosecution of traffickers) and protecting the human 
rights of trafficked persons.
19
  
The TVPA contains a set of Minimum Standards for combating trafficking, which 
require the government of a country to: prohibit severe forms of trafficking in persons and to 
punish acts of trafficking by making trafficking a criminal offense; provide adequate 
punishment; prescribe appropriate sentences in cases of sex trafficking involving children or 
which include aggravated circumstances, such as rape, kidnapping, or death; prescribe 
                                                                                                                                                        
and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a 
developed structure.’ 
14
 Trafficking Protocol, above n 1, Arts. 10(1)(a); 11(1)-(6); 12; 13. 
15
 Trafficking Protocol, ibid, Art. 3(a). See: Phil Williams, ‘Trafficking in Women: the Role of Transnational 
Organised Crime’ in Sally Cameron and Edward Neuman (eds) Trafficking in Humans: Social, Cultural and 
Political Dimensions (2008) United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris, 126–158, 133. 
16
 Trafficking Protocol, above n 1, Art 3(b). 
17
 Trafficking Protocol, ibid, Art.3(a), definition of trafficking in persons: ‘Exploitation shall include, at a 
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.’ Gallagher, above n 1, 984-
985. Negotiations surrounding the drafting of the Trafficking Protocol were marked by intense debate about the 
‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’ nature of prostitution. Gallagher, above n 1, 984-985, esp. footnotes 62-63; L. Sandy, 
‘Sex Work in Cambodia: Beyond the Forced/Voluntary Dichotomy’ (2006) 15(4) Asian and Pacific Migration 
Journal 449, 449-470.  
18
 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 [United States of America], Public Law 106-386 
[H.R. 3244], 28 October 2000, available at:  <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b6104.html> [accessed 8 
October 2013]. 
19
 TVPA, ibid, Section 102(a) and (b). 
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‘sufficiently stringent’ punishment for severe forms of trafficking to deter others from 
committing the crime and to reflect the serious nature of the crime; make ‘serious and 
sustained efforts’ to eliminate trafficking.20 In order to determine whether a government's 
implementation efforts are ‘serious and sustained,’ the TVPA delineates seven criteria. The 
first three criteria measure government efforts in the areas of prosecution, protection, and 
prevention. The remaining four criteria measure the degree of international cooperation, 
including investigation of severe forms of trafficking, extradition of traffickers, monitoring of 
immigration and emigration, and investigation and prosecution of public officials involved in 
trafficking.
21
  
The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, located within the US 
State Department, publishes an annual ‘Trafficking in Persons’ report (TIP), in which 
countries are ranked into ‘tiers’ of compliance with the TVPA: Tier 1 (fully compliant); Tier 
2 (not fully compliant but making efforts to ensure compliance); Tier 2 Watch List (where a 
country is not compliant and the problem of trafficking is significant or increasing, and where 
a country makes a commitment to take additional steps to combat trafficking the following 
year but cannot provide evidence of doing so); Tier 3 (not compliant).
22
 There is a two-year 
time limit for countries on the Tier 2 Watch List: at the end of this two-year period, those 
Tier 2 Watch List countries that have not made significant efforts to address human 
trafficking are classified as Tier 3.
23
 
                                                 
20
 TVPA, ibid, Section 108(a).  
21
 TVPA, ibid, Section 108(b). 
22
 United States Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Reports, available at: 
<http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/index.html> [accessed 29 October 2013]. 
23
 Ibid. In 2008, the reauthorization of the TVPA established a 2-year time limit for the Tier 2 Watch-list 
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The TIP Office works closely with foreign governments to ‘bring their domestic anti-
trafficking laws and policies into compliance with the US Minimum Standards.’24 For 
example, the State Department provides a set of model provisions for states to consider 
incorporating into their own domestic legislation (the ‘Legal Building Blocks to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons’).25 The definition of ‘exploitation’ in the Trafficking Protocol and the 
Legal Building Blocks are identical, except for the inclusion as part of the Building Blocks 
definition: ‘engaging in any other form of commercial sexual exploitation, including but not 
limited to pimping, pandering, procuring, profiting from prostitution, maintaining a brothel, 
child pornography.’26  
In contrast to the Trafficking Protocol, which under the Organised Crime Convention 
has no machinery for oversight or enforcement,
27
 the TVPA provides for a program of 
unilateral sanctions against countries deemed non-compliant with the Minimum Standards.
28
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 Janie Chuang, 'The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human 
Trafficking' (2006) 27(2) Michigan Journal of International Law 441. 
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 Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, ‘Legal Building Blocks to Combat Trafficking in 
Persons’ (February 2004) in Chuang, ibid, 467. 
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TVPA, above n 18, Sections 103(8)(a) and (8)(b). See Chuang, above n 24, 467; Alison Brysk, ‘Sex as Slavery? 
Understanding Private Wrongs’ (2011) 12 Human Rights Review 259.  
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 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, above n 1, Article 32(1); Conference of 
Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, Decision 1/5, Protocol to 
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OTOC/COP/2004/6 (23 September 2004), 5. The Organised Crime Convention establishes a Conference of 
Parties (COP) with the power to review implementation of the Convention, request and receive information on 
implementation of the Trafficking Protocol and make recommendations to improve the Protocol and its 
implementation. Gallagher writes that under this mechanism: ‘reporting rates are low and the information 
received is uneven, shallow and often ambiguous. There is no opportunity to seek clarification from, or for 
dialogue with, state parties.’ Gallagher, above n 1, 469. 
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 TVPA, above n 18, Section 110. 
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Sanctions for failure to meet TVPA standards can include the denial of non-humanitarian aid, 
non-trade-related assistance, certain development-related assistance and aid from 
international financial institutions, specifically the International Monetary Fund and 
multilateral development banks such as the World Bank.
29
 In applying the US Minimum 
Standards, the State Department considers whether countries are of origin, transit or 
destination for trafficking; the extent to which government actors are involved or complicit in 
the trafficking; and what measures would be reasonable given a countries resources and 
capabilities.
30
 The object of the TIP Reports is to pressure governments to institute policies 
and strategies to reduce the trafficking of persons, using the threat of US-imposed sanctions 
and the shame attached to international approbation that follows a low ranking in the TIP 
reports. 
Anne Gallagher, international expert on the law of human trafficking, argues that 
there is no substantive difference between US standards relating to trafficking in persons and 
those that have emerged from the United Nations.
31
 The indicators for both are largely the 
same (criminalisation of trafficking, number of prosecutions, number of ‘victims’ repatriated 
and their conditions of care). Nonetheless, Gallagher champions the Trafficking Protocol and 
is, by and large, highly critical of the US approach. In 2007, Gallagher produced a ‘Shadow 
                                                 
29
 United States Department of State, ‘Trafficking in Persons Report 2003’ (June 2003) available at: 
<http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/index.html> [accessed 8 October 2013]. 
30
 TVPA, above n 18, Section 100 (b)(3). 
31
 Anne Gallagher, ‘A Shadow Report on Human Trafficking in Lao PDR: The US Approach v. International 
Law’ (2007) 16(1) Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 525, 531. Gallagher writes: ‘In several important 
respects there is not much substantial difference. The US definition of what constitutes trafficking does not vary 
significantly from the definition contained in the Protocol. Both sets of standards highlight the need for 
criminalization, victim protection, prevention and cooperation with other countries. While the US framework of 
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Report on Human Trafficking in Lao PDR: the US Approach vs International Law.’32 In it, 
she argues that: 
the U.S. government, through its annual TIP report, has developed a unilateral 
assessment system based on standards derived from its own national legislation and 
reflecting its own understandings of the problem and its own views on the best 
solutions. Part One of this study has demonstrated that such an approach is 
conceptually faulty, politically divisive, and ultimately unpersuasive. It hampers 
international norm development and thereby directly serves the interests of those 
States that wish to weaken and disengage from international rules, systems and 
processes.
33
 
 
While recognising that there may be some role for unilateral assessments of state’s 
efforts in some cases, Gallagher nonetheless contends that: 
the impetus for development of an effective national response to trafficking must 
come from within. Unilateral assessments that do not derive their legitimacy from 
internationally agreed standards will therefore never be as significant or as legitimate 
as a judgment made on the basis of commitments voluntarily accepted by Lao PDR 
and endorsed by the international community of States. This is the value and the 
strength of international law.
34
 
 
The fundamental distinction Gallagher perceives, between the US approach and the 
UN approach, lies in the idea that greater legitimacy attaches to the Trafficking Protocol than 
to the TVPA by virtue of the fact that the former was negotiated and agreed upon in a 
multilateral forum, and then voluntarily accepted by states. Over the past decade, however, 
the US approach and the UN approach to the issue of trafficking in persons have been 
conflated, both in perception and in the way that anti-trafficking measures are undertaken by 
UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The TIP reports exhort states to 
subscribe to the Trafficking Protocol, giving the impression that the objectives of the two 
regimes are identical. At the same time, measures taken to prevent trafficking, under the 
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33
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auspices of the UN, are often funded by the US, meaning that in general, greater attention is 
paid to the issue of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation than, for example, 
trafficking for exploitation of labour.
35
  
 
7.3 Response of ASEAN States to the Global Regime 
 
The engagement of ASEAN states with the United Nations regime for combating human 
trafficking has been equivocal.
36
 Brunei and Singapore have still not signed the Trafficking 
Protocol. Thailand signed the Protocol in 2001, but is yet to ratify it. Indonesia did not ratify 
the Protocol until 2009. All other ASEAN states have ratified or acceded to the Protocol, with 
Vietnam’s accession, in 2012, being the most recent. Only the Philippines and Cambodia 
have accepted Article 15(2) of the Protocol, which provides for the submission of disputes to 
arbitration, or failing that, to the International Court of Justice. 
One explanation for the reluctance of ASEAN states to engage with the international 
regime is the disjuncture that exists between the global conception of the problem of 
trafficking, and the dimensions and scope of the problem as it exists in Southeast Asia. Let us 
consider this further. 
First, the Trafficking Protocol emphasises the nature of trafficking as an organised 
transnational crime. The idea of trafficking in the Trafficking Protocol is usually described 
along the following lines:  
Over the last ten years, the issue of illegal migration has been increasingly linked to 
organised criminal groups that now largely control the smuggling and trafficking of 
people. People traffickers and smugglers make high profits while risking relatively 
                                                 
35
 Chuang, above n 24. 
36
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Justice 105. 
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short prison sentences in comparison with drug dealers. They are connected to other 
transnational criminal networks involved in narcotics, arms trafficking, money 
laundering and counterfeit documentation and dispose over the necessary funds to 
purchase modern equipment and corrupt police and other government officials. Their 
activities rely on complex infrastructures and are taken more and more seriously by 
states.
37
 
 
But there is scant evidence that trafficking in Southeast Asia is practiced 
predominantly as a systematic, patterned and organised form of crime. Indeed, recent 
ethnographically-oriented research points in precisely the opposite direction.
38
 Molland’s 
work, for example, carried out along the Thai-Lao border, reveals that much trafficking is not 
the prerogative of organised and calculating criminal groups,
39
 but takes place on an 
opportunistic basis, by friends, acquaintances and sex workers themselves, who recruit 
among their peers on visits back to their village communities.
40
 The research of Derks et al, 
carried out in the Mekong region, also concludes that trafficking is a ‘cottage industry’ 
involving family members, neighbours and friends and that no specific studies have revealed 
the ‘criminal networks’ of human traffickers.41 The work of Thierry Bouhours and his 
colleagues, in Cambodia, also casts doubt on claims about the high prevalence, profitability, 
or role of organised crime in human trafficking. Bouhours points out that incarcerated 
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 Ralf Emmers, 'The Threat of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia: Drug Trafficking, Human Smuggling 
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38
 An example of this kind of work can be found in Michele Ford, Lenore Lyons and Willem van Schendel’s 
book, Labour Migration and Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia: Critical Perspectives (2012) Oxford, 
Routledge.  
39
 Sverre Molland, ‘The Inexorable Quest for Trafficking Hot-spots Along the Thai-Lao Border’ in Michele 
Ford, Lenore Lyons and Willem van Schendel, ibid, 57-74. See also R. Väyrynen, ‘Illegal Immigration, Human 
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World Institute for Development Economics Research,  
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 Sverre Molland, ‘The perfect Business’: Human Trafficking and Lao-Thai Cross-Border Migration (2010) 
41(5) Development and Change 831, 848; Sverre Molland ‘The Value of Bodies: Deception, Helping and 
Profiteering in Human Trafficking Along the Thai-Lao Border’ (2010) 34(2) Asian Studies Review 211, 222. 
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traffickers in Cambodia are poor, uneducated individuals, and 80 per cent of them are 
women: 
Their activities are unsophisticated and conducted by sole operators or small casual 
or informal networks. Pushed by a lack of legitimate opportunities and pulled by the 
presence of illegitimate opportunities, they engage in trafficking for very modest 
gains.
42
  
 
Second, the Trafficking Protocol emphasises the presence of coercion as the element 
that distinguishes trafficked persons from migrants or participants in people-smuggling 
schemes.
43
 Yet in Southeast Asia, the circumstances of poverty which cause people to move 
or makes them susceptible to being moved involuntarily (trafficked) severely complicates 
notions of consent. There is a significant body of research demonstrating that in many cases, 
at least initially, the ‘victim’ of trafficking in Southeast Asia is a willing participant in a 
scheme that promises benefits, which might be economic (work, food, housing)
 
or social (in 
the form of chiwit thyansamay, the ‘taste for modern life’).44 Molland argues that while there 
does appear to be some cases of abduction, more commonly what occurs is deceptive 
recruitment, primarily about conditions of work (which are sometimes more restrictive than 
described) and earnings (which can be less than described).
45
 In this way, much trafficking in 
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Caballero-Anthony, ‘Human Trafficking and Human Rights in Asia: Trends, Issues and Challenges’ in G. 
Shabbir Cheema, Christopher McNally and Vesselin Popovski, Cross Border Governance in Asia: Regional 
Issues and Mechanisms (2011) Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 219–266, 219; Michele Ford, Lenore 
Lyons and Willem van Schendel (eds) above n 38. 
Chapter 7: Trafficking in Persons 
351 
 
Southeast Asia is conflated with, or hidden within the broader (and more difficult to prevent) 
phenomenon of illegal migration.
46
  
Third, it is not at all clear that in Southeast Asia the majority of trafficking occurs for 
the purpose of prostitution or sexual exploitation. The evidence would seem to show that in 
Southeast Asia, exploitation of labour is at least as prevalent as sexual exploitation.
47
 For 
those migrating from Lao PDR, for example, the largest site of exploitation seems to be 
labour outside of the sex industry.
48
 Even in Cambodia, where there is significant evidence 
that trafficking does occur for the purpose of work in the sex industry, there is also evidence 
that equally as many (mainly men) are trafficked into other industries, such as ‘factories, the 
agricultural sector and fishing industries where they work in circumstances of actual or 
potential exploitation, for legal and illegal work, legal and illegal marriages, organ trade, 
camel racing and bonded labour.’49 
Finally, the Trafficking Protocol places an emphasis on maintaining the integrity of 
borders. Yet many of Southeast Asia’s borders were imposed (sometimes arbitrarily) by 
colonial rulers. Prior to this, they were ‘frontier’ areas, where neighbours and family travelled 
and traded without restriction.
50
 In many cases, the traditions of unfettered trade and 
exchange have continued, because states lack either the incentive or the capacity to stem 
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unofficial cross-border commerce.
51
 In Hekou, for example, where the Nanxi River and the 
Red River merge, and China and Vietnam meet, tens of thousands of undocumented 
Vietnamese women, many of them under the age of eighteen, enter China illegally by boat.
52
 
In the Isaan region, where the Mekong River marks the border between Thailand and Laos, 
government regulations on both sides make legal migration a lengthy, expensive and difficult 
process, unfamiliar to many people and avoided by most.
53
  
The inadequacy of the global regime in reflecting the particularities of the practice of 
trafficking in Southeast Asia might plausibly explain the reluctance of states to subscribe to 
the Protocol. Yet, as the following section shows, the majority of ASEAN states have passed, 
or are in the process of passing, legislation aimed at addressing trafficking in persons. This 
legislation, without exception, draws heavily on the text of the Protocol and the TVPA. This 
raises two central and related questions. First, why, over the period of a decade, despite the 
disjuncture between the practice of trafficking and the global anti-trafficking architecture, 
have the ten member states of ASEAN passed broadly similar legislation, consonant with 
international norms, directed at preventing human trafficking and protecting the human rights 
of trafficked persons? In the language of compliance scholarship, this question can be put in 
the following way: what factors led to the decision on the part of states to give international 
human rights norms prescriptive status in domestic law? Second, what is the effect of global 
norms in these circumstances? Is it the result compliance (rule-consistent behaviour)? If not, 
then what is the explanation for this? 
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7.4 Domestic Response of ASEAN States to Trafficking in Persons 
 
Except for Laos and Singapore, every ASEAN state has passed specific legislation relating to 
human trafficking. In all cases, the legislation includes provisions for the protection of 
victims of trafficking, as well as for the prosecution of perpetrators. All legislation references, 
to different extents, the Trafficking Protocol definition of ‘trafficking in persons’. In 2003, 
the Philippines passed the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law of the Philippines, which sets the 
issue of trafficking within a human rights framework and provides a broad definition of 
‘trafficking,’ deeming the issues of ‘consent’ irrelevant.54  
In February 2013, President Aquino signed the expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons 
Act,
55
 which strengthens powers to prosecute those who engage or attempt to engage in 
human trafficking, and provides increased protection for the rights of trafficked persons.
56
 In 
2004, the Government of Brunei announced the passage of the Trafficking and Smuggling 
Persons Order of 2004.
57
 The means for procuring trafficking as set out in Section 4 of the 
Brunei legislation (threat, use of force or other forms of coercion etc) is identical to the 
means set out in the Trafficking Protocol.
58
 In 2005, Myanmar’s ‘Anti-Trafficking in Persons 
Law’ was decreed. Again, Myanmar’s legislation sets out in identical form the prohibited 
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means of procuring persons for the purpose of exploitation.
59
 Myanmar’s anti-trafficking law 
also replicates the definition of ‘exploitation’ contained in the Trafficking Protocol.60 In 
2007, the Malaysian House of Representatives passed the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, 
which adopts the Trafficking Protocol language regarding means of trafficking
61
 and the 
Trafficking Protocol definition of exploitation.
62
 The Malaysian Act deems consent to be 
irrelevant and provides some measures for the care and protection of trafficked persons.
63
  
In June 2008, Thailand introduced the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act,
64
 which 
replaced the 1997 Measures in Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Women and 
Children Act.
65
 Thailand’s 2008 Act extends protection to male victims of trafficking, and 
significantly strengthens the protection for victims of trafficking. The Thai legislation does 
not mirror the Protocol language as precisely as does the legislation of Myanmar, Brunei and 
Malaysia. However, the Thai legislation does contain the essential elements of the Protocol 
definition of trafficking.
66
 The same may be said of Cambodia’s Law on the Suppression of 
Human Trafficking and Commercial Sexual Exploitation, passed in 2008.
67
 In March 2011, 
Vietnam’s National Assembly passed the Anti-Human Trafficking Law and introduced a 
$13.5 million dollar, five-year anti-trafficking plan.
68
 Laos, at the time of writing, is drafting 
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specific anti-trafficking legislation.
69
 Singapore’s government continues to rely on provision 
of existing criminal and labour law to prosecute traffickers and protect victims.
70
 However, in 
2012, Singapore’s government implemented a National Plan of Action designed to combat 
human trafficking.
71
 
Bilaterally, there are a host of agreements and Memorandums of Understanding 
between ASEAN states on the issue of trafficking: between Lao PDR and Vietnam;
72
 
between Cambodia and Thailand;
73
 between Lao PDR and Thailand;
74
 between Cambodia 
and Vietnam;
75
 between Myanmar and Thailand;
76
 between Thailand and Vietnam;
77
 between 
Myanmar and China.
78
 Not all of these agreements include the definition of trafficking 
contained in the Trafficking Protocol, but most provide details about the way in which 
trafficked persons should be treated (for example, referring to the provision of medical and 
psychological care) and make reference to the process for their return home (for example, 
within a certain time frame). No ASEAN-wide extradition treaty exists, although Cambodia 
and Thailand have signed one between themselves.
79
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It is helpful to recap briefly, at this point, some of the various theories canvassed in 
Chapter 1, about why states commit to international human rights norms and then translate 
their commitments into domestic laws and policies. First, the assumption of compliance 
scholars such as Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, and many others, is that states do not of their own 
accord effect measures to protect international human rights—states must be coerced, 
persuaded or socialised by the international community into doing so.
80
  
Theories about why states commit to international human rights cluster around three 
main ideas. First, many scholars, following the ‘spiral theory of human rights’ described by 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink in The Power of Human Rights, argue that states act instrumentally 
in committing to international human rights norms, rationally balancing the costs and benefits 
of material and/or social sanctions and rewards.
81
 The central argument of Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink is that tactical concessions by states (such as treaty ratification) provide domestic and 
international actors with the leverage and lobbying power to pressure states to give norms 
prescriptive status.
82
 In this way, eventually, the passing of domestic legislation will follow 
ratification. In Section 7.5 (below), I argue that the first stage of this process—tactical 
concessions motivated by sanctions and rewards—explains why ASEAN states passed 
domestic legislation to prevent trafficking. As I will show, however, this stage is not 
necessarily followed by compliance.  
There are two other ways in which human rights change is commonly held to occur. 
One is where there is a community of states that practice certain patterns of behaviour, and 
states within that community behave in ways that the community deems appropriate. Where 
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the adoption of international human rights norms is part of this pattern, then states will, like 
their peers, also adopt human rights norms.
83
 This is connected to (but distinct from) the third 
process of human rights change. This is where interaction, social learning and deliberation 
about human rights norms occur between and among a group of states. The result is that 
states gradually redefine the way they think about themselves and reshape their interests and 
preferences.
84
 My theory about the legitimacy of regional human rights system posits that 
within a regional system of states or as a result of regional-level interaction, these last two 
processes take place, and that the result is a deeper level of commitment and better level of 
compliance, because norms are developed and articulated by (and between) a small number 
of states which share similar backgrounds, histories, borders and concerns. We see this 
occurring, I argue, in relation to the response of ASEAN states to the issue of trafficking in 
persons (Section 7.6).  
 
7.5 Responding to Pressure 
 
The most plausible explanation for why ASEAN states transposed international norms into 
domestic legislation centres on the influence and effect of the TVPA in encouraging the 
passage of domestic legislation and in generating policy measures. The history of Indonesia’s 
anti-trafficking measures provides an illustration of the way the TVPA operates in this 
regard. In 2001, the United States published its first Trafficking in Persons Report, placing 
Indonesia in the Tier-3 category. Indonesia remained in the Tier 3 category in the 2002 
report. On 30 December 2002, through Presidential Decree Number 88, 2002, Indonesia 
announced a ‘National Plan of Action’ (NPA) to end human trafficking. The NPA references 
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the specific criticisms made of Indonesia in the 2002 TIP (for example, ‘that there is currently 
not a comprehensive and specific trafficking law in Indonesia’) and lists amongst its 
objectives: ‘the passage of laws to punish trafficking and traffickers and to protect victims of 
violence, witnesses, and migrant workers.’ The NPA recognises ‘the need to ratify the 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000 and two associated international 
protocols related to trafficking in persons in order to meet international standards’ and the 
need to ‘synchronize international standards on trafficking with national laws through 
revision of the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedural Code, Marriage Law, Immigration Law, 
and the Law on the Human Rights Tribunal.’85 The NPA adopts a definition of human 
trafficking that conforms to the definition contained in the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons. Following these efforts, in the 2003 TIP, Indonesia was 
placed in the Tier-2 category.
86
  
By 2006, however, Indonesia had still not passed comprehensive anti-trafficking 
legislation and in the view of the US, had not provided evidence of increasing efforts to 
combat trafficking.
87
 In 2006, Indonesia was downgraded to the Tier 2 Watch-list. Following 
this, in April 2007, Indonesia’s President signed into law a comprehensive anti-trafficking 
bill. In the 2007 TIP, Indonesia was again returned to Tier 2. Observers within Indonesia are 
candid about the fact that Indonesia’s response to human trafficking has been motivated by 
the need to escape sanctions from the US, such as restrictions on funds not only for counter-
trafficking measures but also for non-humanitarian and non-trade aid.
88
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There are many examples of this kind of responsiveness in Southeast Asia. In 2010, 
the Philippines was placed on the Tier 2 Watch-list, which, according to Philippines Vice-
President Jejomar C. Binay, placed at risk ‘some $700 million worth of non-humanitarian and 
non-trade related aid from the US.’89 Increased efforts to prevent trafficking, including the 
Philippines ‘Expanded Anti-Trafficking Act’ (2013) were passed explicitly: ‘to make the 
fight against human trafficking more effective, as the country remains in the United States 
State Department's radar as a venue that harbors the modern form of slavery.’90 Vice-
President Binay stated that:  
increasing the number of anti-human trafficking monitoring teams in entry and exit 
points in the country, strengthening anti-trafficking legislation and speeding up 
prosecution for trafficking cases. With all these initiatives in play, Tier 1 classification 
[fully compliant with anti-trafficking standards] is more than possible. Indeed, it is 
only a question of time.
91
 
 
The government discourse surrounding the introduction of the 2013 Act was entirely 
focused on the potential for the new measures to change the Philippines position in the TIP 
rankings. Introducing the bill, Presidential spokesperson Edwin Lacierda said that:  
It is Malacañang’s [the Presidential Palace] hope that the new law would result in the 
United States’ removing the Philippines from its anti-trafficking watchlist. This is a 
concern and a priority of our President and this measure will be enforced by the 
different agencies, especially by the Department of Justice as well as our police 
agencies….. [o]ver a year ago we were taken out of that category—Tier 2. [But] 
we’re still in the watchlist. We would like to improve our standing in the watchlist 
and we hope that, with this expanded coverage of anti-trafficking, we will be able to 
remove ourselves from the watchlist.
92
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In Thailand, the Thai government Minister of Social Development and Human 
Security, Santi Promphat, announced on 3 April 2013 the drafting of new anti-trafficking 
laws, designed to respond to the fact that:  
the United States has placed Thailand in the Tier 2 Watch List for three consecutive 
years in the Trafficking in Persons Report of its Department of State, which could 
affect Thailand’s image. The image of Thailand’s exports into the American market 
could also be affected, especially seafood products, which have been determined as 
products that involve the use of child labor and illegal foreign workers, and human 
trafficking.
93
  
 
 Writing specifically in relation to Southeast Asia, trafficking expert Anne Gallagher 
claims to have observed ‘multiple instances in which the open threat of a negative grade in 
the U.S. TIP Report provided the impetus for major reform initiatives, including the 
criminalization of trafﬁcking.’94  
Although several ASEAN states appear to have passed reforms directly in response to 
US pressure, there has been cavilling (which has been public, in the case of Singapore) about 
the lack of transparency and the subjective methodology employed to rank states into tiers of 
compliance and accusations that ranking are based less on empirical evidence than on the 
political preferences of the United States.
95
 Myanmar, for example, despite passing 
significant legislation directed to addressing trafficking in persons in 2005, has been 
consistently ranked ‘Tier 3’. Myanmar finally achieved a ‘Tier 2 watch-list’ ranking in 2012, 
the same year that the US dropped many of its sanctions against Myanmar, and after 
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Myanmar agreed to a joint plan on trafficking with the United States.
96
 Chuang notes that 
Indonesia achieved a Tier 2 ranking in 2003, at around the same time that Indonesia became a 
key US ally in the War against Terrorism.
97
  
One of the criticisms of the TIP reports is that they place significant emphasis on the 
numbers of convicted traffickers, and an increase in the number of convictions from previous 
years in viewed as an indicator of a country’s success in addressing the issue of trafficking.98 
For example, in 2004, Laos’ anti-trafficking office reported five convictions for trafficking-
related crimes. The 2005 TIP Report placed Laos in the ‘Tier 2’ category.99 The following 
year, Laos reported only one conviction for trafficking. Noting this, that year, the US placed 
Laos in the Tier 3 category.
100
 In 2007, however, the TIP Report lauded the fact that the Lao 
government had demonstrated progress in its anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts, 
reporting 27 trafficking investigations that resulted in the arrests of 15 suspected traffickers, 
12 of whom were prosecuted. Laos was returned to Tier 2. In relation to Thailand, the 2012 
TIP report noted that the Royal Thai Police initiated 83 investigations of trafficking in 2011: 
67 for sex trafficking and 16 for forced labour, involving 155 suspected offenders and 
representing an increase from 70 such investigations in 2010. However, it also noted that 
investigations led to only 67 prosecutions in 2011, compared to 79 prosecutions in 2010. The 
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report also noted that there were 12 trafficking-related convictions in 2011, a decrease from 
the previous year’s 18 convictions.101 Thailand remained on the Tier 2 Watchlist in 2011. 
The problem with what Anne Gallagher describes as a ‘success by numbers’ approach 
is that it: 
serves to discourage the development of longer-term capacities, systems and 
processes that are actually required for an effective criminal justice response. 
Conversely, it promotes a focus on the easy wins, the small players who can be 
identified and apprehended much more easily than those who are reaping the real 
financial rewards. The US standards are also silent on the issue of quality. All 
prosecutions seem to count, irrespective of their adherence to international criminal 
justice standards. The absence of an explicit qualitative element in the crucial area of 
prosecutions risks undermining basic rights including the right to fair trial as 
dysfunctional, often corrupt, national criminal agencies are called in to help secure a 
positive report card.
102
 
 
I return here to some of the discussion in Chapter 1, where I explained how 
international relations theorists drew on individual level psychology (shame, social status, 
material reward) to explain what motivates macro-level state practices. In Chapter 1, I noted 
that although there have been questions and criticisms about how appropriate it is to employ 
theories about what motivates individuals to explain the behaviour of states, that most 
theories of human rights did this, either explicitly or implicitly.
103
 Part of my argument about 
legitimacy in Chapter 1, drawing on macro-level psychology, was that there was likely to be 
greater compliance with human rights norms in cases where states were intrinsically 
motivated because of congruence between human rights norms and their own interests, or 
between human rights norms and social norms that have significant legitimacy locally. I 
argued that without this congruence or local acceptance, the result was likely to be 
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diminished incentive for compliance. From this perspective, let us consider the operation of 
the TVPA in relation to Southeast Asian states. 
One of the primary ways that the TVPA operates as an external motivator is through 
material inducement and material disincentive. The problem with material rewards or 
punishment is that it has the potential to ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation states may have to 
follow norms for non-material reasons.
104
 Incentive-based or punishment-based policies 
suggest to states that preferred behaviour (preventing trafficking, protecting the rights of 
trafficked persons) is ‘not self-evidently appropriate or that the broader social environment 
does not adequately value self-motivated rule adherence.’105 As Goodman and Jinks argue, if 
action can be justified by both normative sentiments and externally imposed material 
incentives or disincentives, then the result may be a negative effect on the internalisation of 
norms.
106
 The reasons are as follows. 
First, the purpose of a regime of penalties and incentives is two-fold: to supply states 
with a rational reason for pursuing certain behaviour; and to supply a signalling effect, 
indicating that the proscribed behaviour is abhorrent to a community of actors. In relation to 
the former, the inference that is generally drawn from the presence of material incentives or 
disincentives is that the reason for action is the material incentive, rather than a state’s moral 
character or principled beliefs. We see this clearly in the statements that have emanated from 
government representatives of the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, when they have 
supplied reasons for their actions in relation to anti-trafficking measures. References to the 
importance of protecting the human rights of trafficked persons (where any exist) are almost 
entirely drowned out by references to the importance of avoiding negative sanctions from the 
                                                 
104
 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘Social Mechanisms to Promote International Human Rights: 
Complementary or Contradictory?’ (2013) in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds) The 
Persistent Power of Human Rights (2013) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K., 106. 
105
 Ibid. 
106
 Ibid. 
Chapter 7: Trafficking in Persons 
364 
 
United States. At a minimum, this creates confusion: how can one tell whether a government 
is acting out of a principled belief about how it ought to behave, or in pursuit of a material 
benefit? In relation to the ‘expressive function’ of punishment (as a signal that the 
international community condemns the proscribed behaviour), Goodman and Jinks argue that 
this is diminished if penalties and rewards issue from actors who have insufficient social 
standing vis-à-vis the signalled actors—‘a narrow band of donor countries, a remote foreign 
court, unrepresentative segments of civil society, a hostile country.’107 In relation to most 
Southeast Asian states, in relation to most human rights issues, the United States would fall 
within the category of actors with ‘insufficient social standing vis-à-vis the signalled actors’ 
(see the discussion on democracy in Chapter 3). 
Second, Goodman and Jinks argue that over-justification effects self-perception, 
causing actors to lose cognitive track of their motives for abiding by a norm. In these 
circumstances, actors are most likely to attribute their actions to material incentives. The 
result is that the strength of intrinsic motivation for observing a social norm is lost.
108
 That is, 
states that comply (or would have complied) with a norm because it is an extension of their 
identity or internal value system, lose track of this as the reason for compliance, because of 
the presence of material reasons. This can delay the final stages of rule consistent behaviour 
or make it more shallow and difficult to sustain: 
Accordingly, communicative exchanges within a domestic setting might shift toward 
the more limited agenda of powerful international institutions when those institutions 
promote human rights through material inducements. One concern is that, had actors 
been left to their own devices, a broader and stronger human rights agenda might have 
emerged.
109
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Third, and relatedly, the provision of material incentives often compromises a sense 
of self-determination and degrades intrinsic motivation for engaging in behaviour.
110
 
Goodman and Jinks suggest that where international coercion through material incentives is 
considered controlling, actors resist even normative practices that they would otherwise agree 
with. We can see this in the attitude taken by Singapore to the requirements of the TVPA. 
Singapore, despite implementing policies designed to prevent trafficking, has refused to pass 
legislation for this purpose and has publicly expressed resentment at U.S. attempts to 
influence the domestic agenda.  
One might argue that this does not matter much. After all, if states are not intrinsically 
motivated to follow certain norms, then it is irrelevant how they are brought to include human 
rights norms on the domestic agenda. What matters is that they do something, regardless of 
why, or whether it is the result of coercion. It might also be argued that even if states are 
initially spurred to action by crude measures of coercion and bribery, this may begin a 
process (of education and reflection) that ends in genuine acceptance of and respect for a 
particular norm.  
My response to such arguments is that is does matter by what means states are lead to 
adopt different norms, because this affects how deeply and sincerely norms are promoted and 
acted upon. Granted, in circumstances where there is a blanket rejection of norms and denial 
that violations exist, then coercion and bribery that results in even superficial change might 
be seen as better than no change at all. But where intrinsic motivation does exist, as I argue is 
the case in Southeast Asia in relation to the issue of trafficking in persons, then I maintain 
that coercive measures can lead to over-justification and problems around self-perception and 
self-determination.  
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Let us turn then, finally, to my argument that an autochthonous regional conception of 
the importance of preventing trafficking in persons exists in Southeast Asia. What evidence is 
there to support the idea that if ASEAN states ‘had been left to their own devices, a broader 
and stronger human rights agenda might have emerged’?111 What is the evidence that 
ASEAN states are sufficiently motivated to conform to norms about trafficking for non-
material reasons? In the following section of this chapter, I describe how ASEAN states do in 
fact possess intrinsic motivation for pursuing anti-trafficking norms, born out of long-
standing and deeply held concerns about state sovereignty and the threat posed by the illegal 
traffic of persons across borders; and also, more recently, born out of the work of the regions 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), which have focused on the human rights 
aspects of the practice of trafficking in persons. These reasons for actions are occluded by the 
discourse around the introduction of anti-trafficking measures, which focuses on immediate 
responsiveness to US threats and TIP rankings.  
 
7.6 ASEAN and Trafficking in Persons  
 
In 2004, the same year that ASEAN states signed the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women,
112
 and agreed upon the Vientiane Action Program (which 
explicitly commits ASEAN to promote the awareness, education and protection of human 
rights),
113
 ASEAN states signed the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons, 
Particularly Women and Children.
114
 As well as identifying trafficking in persons as a 
security concern, the Declaration notes the link between social and economic rights, 
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migration and vulnerability to trafficking, and strikingly, draws attention to the ‘immorality 
and inhumanity of this common concern.’115 2004 was also the year that the ASEAN Inter-
Parliamentary Organization passed a ‘Resolution on the role of Parliament in Combating 
Trafficking in Women and Children in the ASEAN region,’116 drawing attention to ‘the lack 
of education, unequal treatment and low status of women, poverty and unemployment of 
women, particularly in the ASEAN region, are major factors contributing to the causes of 
trafficking of women and minors.’117  
Seven years later, AICHR identified human trafficking as one of the thematic studies 
to be undertaken within the first five years of the commission and the ASEAN Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) included a 
focus on victims of trafficking in its 2012–2016 work-plan.118 In their 2007 Joint 
Communiqué, ASEAN leaders foreshadowed the development of an ASEAN Convention on 
Trafficking in Persons,
119
 currently being prepared by the Philippines, and at the time of 
writing under consideration by the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting.
120
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In this final section, I argue that a regional approach to the issue of human trafficking 
in Southeast Asia has been generated from the ‘top down’ by states with similar concerns 
about sovereignty, territorial integrity and threats to state security; and from the ‘bottom up’, 
by engagement between and among regional networks of non-governmental organisations 
and national human rights institutions (NHRIs). The driving factors behind these two 
interests in developing a regional approach to trafficking in persons are entirely different, and 
because of this, there is inconsistent and sometimes conflicting emphasis placed on different 
aspects of the issue of trafficking in persons; on the protection of borders and the prosecution 
of the crime of trafficking, for example, as against the protection of the rights of trafficked 
persons. Nonetheless, divergent interests in eliminating trafficking are broadly congruous 
with a regional approach to the problem, and this explains why ASEAN states have shown 
increasing willingness to cooperate amongst themselves on the problem of trafficking in 
persons, even to the extent of appearing willing to subscribe to a legalised regime for 
addressing the issue. The backdrop to cooperative efforts is the imminent creation of a single 
ASEAN economic community.
121
  
The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint envisages, by 2015, the 
following: (a) a single regional market and production base, (b) a highly competitive 
economic region, (c) a region of equitable economic development, and (d) a region fully 
integrated into the global economy. The AEC is expected to transform ASEAN into a region 
with free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labour, and freer flow of 
capital.
122
 As we have seen, one of the aims stated in the ASEAN Charter is to alleviate 
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poverty and address the development gap between ASEAN states.
123
 The AEC, arguably, will 
generate economic growth, resulting in more jobs, improved livelihoods and an overall 
reduction in poverty. But it also has the potential to accentuate disparities within and between 
ASEAN countries and increase relative poverty and inequality, leading to cross-border 
migration and trafficking.
124
  
First, let us consider the ‘top down’ perspective of states. Why is trafficking in 
persons an issue of joint concern to states in Southeast Asia? One part of the explanation 
centres on the particular notion of state security that prevails in the region. The idea of 
‘comprehensive’ or ‘overall security’, originally coined by Japan in the 1970s, was adopted 
by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore a decade later.
125
 Within the 
framework of comprehensive security, national security depends not only on the absence of 
external military hostility, but also on the presence of socio-economic development.
126
 
Internal threats as well as external threats are recognised as having the potential to destabilise 
the state and undermine sovereignty. Different ASEAN states developed different perceptions 
about the nature of these internal threats, based on their different historical experiences. For 
example, Malaysia’s concern with societal order grew out of its experience containing the 
communist insurgency in the period 1948–60, and the recognition that its racial and religious 
cleavages could lead to dangerous disharmony. Indonesia’s concern, shaped by its struggle 
against Dutch colonialism, focused on the necessity of building a united Indonesian state. For 
Singapore, a small island state, internal stability was viewed as exacerbating external 
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vulnerabilities. The idea of ‘resilience’ took shape amongst ASEAN’s original members as 
part of the political discourse (Malaysia)
127
 and as part of official policy (keratasan nasional 
‘national resilience’) (Indonesia). In Indonesia’s case, national resilience consisted of 
strengthening and developing the nation’s ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, 
security and defence capacities.
128
  
As early as 1976, the idea emerged that the stability and internal and external security 
of individual states was dependent on the stability of other states in the region, and that 
regional resilience and national resilience were interdependent. At the first ASEAN Summit, 
ASEAN’s five members declared, ‘The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN 
region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state 
resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national 
and ASEAN resilience.’129 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, agreed 
upon at this same meeting, requires ASEAN member states to ‘endeavour to strengthen their 
respective national resilience in their political, economic, socio-cultural as well as security 
fields in conformity with their respective ideals and aspirations, free from external 
interference as well as internal subversive activities.’130  
Transnational crime—specifically drug trafficking—was identified early on as a 
threat to comprehensive security and hence to national and regional stability.
131
 Drug 
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addiction and trafficking in drugs and crime were perceived as indicators of a state’s inability 
to control its borders, and thus as signs of a weak state where leaders were unable to maintain 
social order.
132
 Later, in the 1980s, drug trafficking and drug use fed concerns about 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and the views of some ASEAN member 
states that AIDS was the result of homosexuality, prostitution and heroin use.  
In 1983, the Malaysian government officially declared illicit drug trafficking to be a 
threat to national security. In 1988, ASEAN issued a Joint Declaration in which it stated that 
the illicit drug trade was a problem that ‘could escalate to such a level where perpetrators can 
pose serious political and security threats to the region.’133 ASEAN Ministers argued, ‘[T]he 
management of such transnational issues is urgently called for so that they would not affect 
the long-term viability of ASEAN and its individual member nations.’134 In this context, the 
decision to expand the membership of ASEAN in the 1990s to include Myanmar and Laos, 
which were major cultivators of opium poppies, led to increased concern about drug 
trafficking. At a regional conference on transnational crime held in the Philippines in 1997, 
Philippine President Fidel Ramos declared, ‘regional security continues to be assaulted by 
transnational crime and from time to time international terrorism.’135 Following this 
conference, at the 1997 meeting of ASEAN Ministers, it was agreed that ‘sustained regional 
cooperation’ was necessary in order to deal with ‘the problems of terrorism, narcotics, arms 
smuggling, piracy and human trafﬁcking.’136  
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The ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, signed by Heads of State in 1997, 
draws attention to: ‘the pernicious effects of transnational crime … on regional stability and 
development, the maintenance of the rule of law and the welfare of the region’s peoples’ and 
recognises the need for effective regional modalities to combat these forms of crimes.
137
 In 
1999, ASEAN implemented a ‘Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime’, which 
instituted the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and the Senior 
Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC), both bodies established to promote 
cooperation and coordination amongst ASEAN states in addressing human trafficking (as 
well as other transnational crimes).
138
 
Although it had been mentioned earlier, it was not until the early 1990s that 
trafficking in persons came to be identified as another transnational crime that had the 
potential to threaten economic, political and societal stability.
139
 ASEAN’s concern about 
human trafficking was threefold: first, it was seen as linked to drug trafficking (Thailand’s 
government in particular viewed trafficking of drugs and persons from Myanmar as an 
immediate threat to its security); second, it had the potential to undermine orderly, legal 
migration and hence, jeopardise relations between states, thereby threatening peace and 
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security;
140
 third, it was something that was viewed as having the potential to undermine the 
moral foundation of the nation. In relation to this last point, in Indonesia, for example, the 
Islamic-based Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) argued that trafficking ‘disgraced 
Indonesia’s dignity and identity as a nation,’ giving the impression that Indonesia is 
‘incapable to protect its citizens and is grouped with countries which have bad records on 
trafficking in persons.’141 An official at the Indonesian Ministry of Women Empowerment 
agreed: ‘Indonesia is committed to eliminate human trafficking, especially women and 
children. This is a matter of national dignity and human rights.’142 Trafficking implied that 
the state cannot protect its citizens, particularly its ‘most vulnerable’ citizens (‘especially’ 
women and children).  
 The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis exacerbated poverty, intensified pressure for political 
change (most dramatically in Indonesia), and increased voluntary and involuntary irregular 
migration. Thailand, recently democratic, urged that a solution to these problems was a 
reconceptualisation of security along the lines of ‘human security’, which (it was argued) 
emphasised the needs of individuals and communities rather than the state and regime 
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security.
 143
 The idea was that poverty, illiteracy, and economic dislocation lead to violence, 
rebellion and instability, all of which threatened the stability of the region as a whole. 
Economic development was viewed as the central plank of domestic stability.
144
 In 1998, at 
the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) in Manila in 1998, a Caucus on 
Human Security was held and the following year, an ASEAN-PMC Caucus was established 
on Social Safety Nets. Human security was taken up with alacrity by ‘track-two’ regional 
processes such as ASEAN ISIS and the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: 
there were some thirty track-two meetings from 1998 to 2002 that had human security as the 
principal focus or a major theme. In the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 
(2009), human trafficking is identified as a ‘non-traditional security issue’. The Blueprint 
exhorts states to ‘further strengthen criminal justice responses to trafﬁcking in persons, 
bearing in mind the need to protect victims of trafﬁcking in accordance with the ASEAN 
Declaration Against Trafﬁcking in Persons Particularly Women and Children.’145  
What I have described above shows the historical pedigree of the issue of trafficking 
in persons as a regional concern. This is precisely what I argued, in Chapter 1, was a 
necessary prerequisite for legitimacy in constructing a regional approach to a particular issue. 
There is ample evidence of state-led autochthonous regional conceptions around the 
importance of preventing trafficking in persons, as part of a normative framework that 
involves the idea of transnational crime as a threat to the survival of the state.  
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The emphasis placed on securing the state by preventing crime and ensuring the 
integrity of borders does not necessarily translate into concern for protecting the human rights 
of trafficked persons. Indeed the framing of trafficking as a transnational crime and security 
issue has the potential to undermine the rights of trafficked persons and elide key aspects of 
the reasons why trafficking occurs. The ‘national dignity’ rhetoric, which emphasises 
trafficked persons as rights-bearers because they are citizens of the state, and holds the value 
of these persons to be their role as emblems of the dignity of the state, is deficient in its 
failure to appreciate the nature of trafficking as a rights issue involving the denial of 
individual autonomy and self-direction.  
In the final part of this section, I argue that there is also evidence of regional-level 
concern about trafficking in persons as a distinct human rights issue, caused by economic and 
social inequity. This concern has been generated from the ‘bottom-up’ by the region’s 
national human rights institutions, by institutions within different states that have a human 
rights focus, and by networks of civil society actors. 
The 1999 Bangkok Declaration on Irregular Migration (the Bangkok Declaration), 
which was agreed upon by ASEAN states (and others) at the conclusion of an International 
Symposium on Migration, ‘Towards Regional Cooperation on Undocumented/Illegal 
Migration’, acknowledges the links between migration, irregular migration and human 
trafficking, notes the complexity of the issue of returning irregular migrants, and the human 
rights dimensions of the problem of trafficking in persons and worker exploitation. It 
explicitly recognises poverty as a root cause of trafficking and the need for international 
cooperation to promote sustained economic growth and sustainable development in the 
countries of origin as a long-term strategy to address irregular migration.
 146
 The Declaration 
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is of course not legally binding, and although the Symposium recognised the need for a 
regional mechanism to deal with the problem of trafficking in persons and migration, the 
Declaration does not refer to the creation of an institution to promote, monitor or enforce its 
goals.
147
 The Bangkok Declaration has been followed by many other Southeast Asian 
regional declarations and statements that profess a commitment to addressing trafficking in 
persons as a human rights issue.  
It could be argued, of course, that such statements remain at the level of rhetoric; that 
ASEAN states are ‘mimicking’ concern for norms prioritised by the international 
community;
148
 or that these instruments reflect the views of international experts who are 
called in to advise on the drafting of regional statements and declarations.  
However, the way these ideas have evolved belies this interpretation. Prominent in 
generating a human rights approach to trafficking has been the region’s National Human 
Rights Institutions (NHRIs). In Southeast Asia, NHRIs have been established in the 
Philippines (1987), Indonesia (1996), Malaysia (1999), Thailand (2001), and Myanmar 
(2011). NHRIs are independent institutions created by governments, with a mandate to 
promote and protect human rights. They are tasked with critiquing government laws, actions 
and policies that might hinder the realisation of human rights or violate rights. Part of their 
role is to engage with the United Nations and to promote its treaties and policies; the other 
part is to engage with civil society and government within their own country. NHRIs are 
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positioned, therefore, at the intersection between state, society and the international 
community. NHRIs across the Asia Pacific are linked by a regional network, the Asia Pacific 
Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (APF). Southeast Asian NHRIs have formed 
their own sub-network, the Southeast Asian NHRI Forum (SEANF).
149
  
In 1999, the High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that national human rights 
institutions are ‘an underutilized resource in the fight against trafficking.’150 That same year, 
Anne Gallagher, Adviser to the High Commissioner on Trafficking, addressed the APF on 
the subject of ‘The Role of National Institutions in Advancing the Human Rights of Women; 
a Case Study on Trafficking in the Asia-Pacific region.’151 The APF later established a 
Trafficking Focal Point Network between member institutions and the APF. In 2010, all of 
the then existing NHRIs in Southeast Asia signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding Against 
Trafficking of Women and Children.’152 The Memorandum begins with a statement about the 
principle of equal worth and dignity of women and children as members of the human family; 
adopts the definition of trafficking set out in the Trafficking Protocol; and makes detailed 
recommendations about the protection of victims, reparations, the provision of legal aid, and 
the development of victim-centred standards for dealing with trafficked persons. It exhorts 
states dealing with trafficking in persons to adopt ‘an inclusive perspective in its 
undertakings,’ be accessible to civil society, be guided by the ‘best interest of the child’ 
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principle, and the ‘right of a woman against discrimination and gender-based violence in all 
its forms, particularly trafficking and exploitation.’153 
The concern of the region’s NHRIs for the issue of trafficking in persons was driven 
very much from ‘the bottom-up.’ It is important to consider how this kind of concern arises. 
As critics of constructivist approaches to international law and international relations have 
pointed out, studies of socialisation too often remain at the level of theory, saying too little 
about ‘the actual people who are supposed to be engaged in “mimicry”, worried about being 
shamed, or seeking to achieve substantial affective returns (“‘cognitive comfort”).’154 In 
Chapter 1, I referred to the comment made by Alvarez: ‘states (or ‘organizations’ in the 
abstract) do not ‘socialize’; people do.’155  
An example of the sorts of interactions that lead to the evolution of a human rights-
based approach to trafficking in persons is the visit of the Human Rights Commissioners 
from SUHAKAM, the Malaysian Human Rights Commission, to Kajang Women’s Prison, 
near the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur, in January 2003. During their visit, 
Commissioners noticed that a large number of foreign nationals, mainly young girls, were 
being held in remand. In conversations with these girls, the Commissioners heard that many 
of them had come into the country because they had been ‘lured and coerced with promises 
of jobs as home help, in supermarkets or restaurants, with lucrative incomes, but inevitably 
ended up in the pernicious flesh trade, often against their will.’156 Many of the girls were 
reluctant to tell their stories to officials, for fear of being deported. Distressed by the plight of 
these women, the SUHAKAM Commissioners formed a sub-committee to look into the issue, 
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and the following year organised a forum on ‘Trafficking of Women and Children—A Cross 
Border and Regional Perspective.’ Prior to the forum, they held a series of roundtable 
dialogues on the issue of human trafficking, with personnel from the police, immigration 
officers, representatives of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Women Development Ministry, welfare officers, prison officers, representatives from the 
tourism ministry, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Bar Council, academics, 
human rights practitioners and representatives from the embassies of Indonesia, Russia, 
Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines, China and Myanmar. Discussion at the forum 
noted the complexities of the causes of trafficking and made various recommendations: that 
Malaysia ratify the Trafficking Protocol (it was to do so five years later); that the government 
should pass an Anti-Trafficking Act (eventually passed in 2007); that the role of NGOs ‘who 
operate at the grass roots level’ in combatting trafficking should be recognised.157 Of signal 
importance is the message contained in the final written report of the forum, where 
SUHAKAM refers to the need to harbour ‘the political will of the government and social will 
of the people/civil society’ to protect ‘foreign victims of trafficking,’ and the state’s duty to: 
‘reach out to victims and send the message that human freedom and dignity will be 
protected.’ The report includes a statement about the nature of human trafficking as a rights 
violation: 
Traffickers violate the universal rights of all persons to life, liberty and freedom. It is 
an obstacle to the achievement of the objectives of equality and development. 
Trafficking of women and children impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women and 
children of their basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.
158
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In June 2007, SEANF, then comprising the NHRIs of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia 
and the Philippines, agreed to carry out a series of programs and activities in relation to five 
human rights issues of common concern, one of which was the issue of trafficking in persons. 
SEANF also agreed to prioritise encouraging other ASEAN countries to establish NHRIs, so 
that they could more effectively engage with other institutions in cross-border issues of 
common concern. After Myanmar established its NHRI in 2011, it also joined SEANF. 
SEANF agreed to work cooperatively with civil society organisations, such as the Coalition 
Against Trafficking in Women in Asia-Pacific (CATW-Asia-Pacific) and the Global Alliance 
against Trafficking in Women (GAATW). Since 2009, AICHR has provided another forum 
for interaction between different actors around the problem of trafficking. In November 2013, 
AICHR hosted a Regional Workshop on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.
159
 The Workshop discussed the 
adoption of a legally-binding ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP) 
and a Regional Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons. The Workshop also 
highlighted the need ‘to infuse the ACTIP with a human rights-based approach.’160 
What we see, in summary, is that amongst the ASEAN states that have NHRIs, and 
perhaps more broadly across the region since the establishment of AICHR, evidence of the 
emergence of a shared understanding of the problem of international trafficking and a shared 
approach to addressing the problem. Between some key actors within ASEAN states, we see 
increased levels of exchange (both formal and institutionalised, and informal and voluntary). 
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We also see engagement between actors pursuing different policy approaches (border guards, 
prosecutors, police, and NGOs focused on the protection of trafficked victims).
161
  
As Acharya (and others) have argued, actors in democratic states are often more 
inclined to network with actors in other democratic states, and these networks are more 
efficient: the exchange of information is better, levels of trust are higher and similar goals are 
pursued.
162
 These things are part of what Amitav Acharya calls ‘participatory regionalism’.163 
Participatory regionalism implies two things. First, acceptance of a more relaxed view of 
state sovereignty and the norm of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states, which 
permits more discussion of and action on problems facing the region and creates more space 
for non-government actors in the decision-making process. Second, a closer nexus between 
government and civil society in managing regional and transnational issues. The result is 
greater domestic discussion and debate over foreign policy goals, higher levels of 
transparency, increased availability of information, greater levels of openness, understanding 
and trust between states, a greater space for civil society and greater willingness on the part 
of states to be accommodating to the concerns of civil society. All of these things increase the 
likelihood that states will respond to demands for regional solutions to problems such as the 
environment, refugees, trafficking in persons and migration, and allow regional institutions to 
address sensitive issues.  
It remains to be answered why trafficking persists, in the face of what I argue is the 
apparent legitimacy of the regional anti-trafficking norm amongst both states and civil society 
actors in Southeast Asia, and despite a plethora of domestic legislation directed towards 
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ending the practice of trafficking that exists across the region. There are several explanations. 
First, and most obviously, there is limited state capacity and resources, and the underlying 
causes of trafficking (poverty, domestic instability and corruption) are intractable. Regional 
bodies such as the ASEAN Secretariat have only limited capacity and resources to coordinate 
member states’ actions. Second, there is also the influence of non-state actors, such as the 
multinational companies that employ irregular migrants and trafficked persons. 
Finally, there remain entrenched proclivities that augur against cooperative efforts. 
Concerns about state sovereignty and patterns of non-cooperative behaviour stymie the 
effectiveness of regional approaches. The 2004 ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in 
Persons, for example, which places the issue of trafficking within the context of ASEAN’s 
efforts to address transnational crime, declares an urgent need for a ‘comprehensive regional 
approach’ to addressing the problem.164 Yet it also contains a ‘claw-back’ provision relating 
to any cooperative efforts, in the form of a statement that only ‘to the extent permitted by 
their respective domestic laws and policies need concerted efforts be taken to effectively 
address the problem.’165 
What cannot be discounted, however, in answering why trafficking persists, is the 
distorting effect of the global regime to end trafficking, which undermines regional normative 
commitment and encourages states towards superficial and unilateral efforts to end 
trafficking. I contend that the global architecture to end trafficking in persons, particularly the 
TVPA, has made the progress of ASEAN states towards preventing trafficking in persons 
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slower and more uneven than it would otherwise have been,
166
 and has undermined an 
inchoate, genuinely autochthonous regional approach to the human rights problem of 
trafficking in persons. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
My central points about legitimacy are that it matters whether or not law reflects the social 
reality with which it is supposed to deal, and it matters how law is brought into being. My 
argument in this chapter has been that the global approach to human trafficking, applied in 
Southeast Asia, lacks legitimacy. In the first place, it does not adequately reflect the social 
reality of the practice of human trafficking in Southeast Asia. This is because both the 
Protocol and the TVPA are based on certain assumptions about the practice of trafficking that 
does not match the particularities of the practice in the region. One of these assumptions is 
that what defines trafficking and distinguishes it from practices such as migration and people 
smuggling is the element of coercion: trafficked men, women and children do not choose to 
move or be moved or would not so choose if they were apprised of the conditions that 
awaited them at their destination. This is partly tied to the idea that human trafficking is about 
sexual exploitation and that all sexual commerce involves exploitation.
167
 The reality in 
Southeast Asia is that the circumstances of poverty and economic deprivation complicate 
notions of coercion in ways that law has difficulty responding to. Another assumption is that 
the perpetrators of trafficking are involved in large-scale criminal enterprises and that their 
victims are usually unknown to them. But there is no compelling evidence that this is the case 
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in Southeast Asia, and crime control measures designed to detect and prevent this kind of 
crime expend the scarce resources of states. A final assumption is that borders are logical 
political and geographical divides between states, and that policing borders is the best way to 
prevent trafficking. Again, this is not the case. Borders are not accepted as logical divides in 
many parts of Southeast Asia; nor are people within borders necessarily ‘citizens’ who enjoy 
the protection of the state.  
Second, the global regime lacks legitimacy because of the unilateral actions of the 
United States under the TVPA, and the influence of the TIP. It is difficult (if not impossible) 
to distinguish which of a state’s anti-trafficking efforts flow from a commitment to fulfil 
obligations under the Trafficking Protocol, which flow from a state’s fear of reprisals from 
the US under the TVPA, or which flow from a genuine and principled commitment to ending 
the practice of trafficking. We cannot take what states say in this regard at face value. As we 
have seen, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand often explicitly explain domestic efforts to 
address trafficking in terms of a response to the US TIP reports. Singapore, in contrast, which 
has still not signed the Trafficking Protocol, but which has nonetheless put in place certain 
measures to combat trafficking, does not concede that its actions are in any way a response to 
its ranking in the TIP reports. What is clear is that the TIP confuses and distorts (public and 
self) perceptions about states’ responses to human trafficking.  
Why is this a problem? After all, the approach to human trafficking promoted by the 
United Nations is a web of interlocking and complementary laws and policies at the 
domestic, regional and international levels.
168
 Why could the coercive measures of the US not 
be complementing other processes (such as socialisation among states within the region)? 
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One answer to this is that explicit incentive-based policies in the TVPA suggest that 
preventing trafficking, and protecting the human rights of trafficked persons, is not self-
evidently appropriate to ASEAN states. This directly affects the way the problem is 
perceived, the way responses are interpreted and the way that legislation is implemented and 
enforced on the ground. Another answer is that incentive-based policy suggests that the 
broader social environment does not adequately value self-motivated rule adherence. In any 
regard, the net effect is to diminish the value of principled pursuit of a policy. It is impossible 
to aggregate what proportion of the failure of trafficking policy in Southeast Asia can be 
attributed to the influence and effect of the TVPA, but I suggest that it is significant. 
As well as sketching the contours of a global approach to a human rights issue lacking 
legitimacy, this chapter has charted the emergence of what I argue is a legitimate regional 
approach to addressing the issue of trafficking in persons. As we have seen, this is picture 
formed by multiple and somewhat conflicting patterns of response to the issue of trafficking 
in persons. The most obvious regional response focuses on trafficking in persons as a security 
issue of concern to states because it is a potential threat to national and regional stability. But 
I also plot out another response, generated bottom-up from the experience of actors (NHRIs) 
bought into contact with the issue of human trafficking in direct ways, which contributes to 
shaping a distinct human rights approach to the issue of trafficking in persons. Below these 
broad levels of response, there are other complexities and contradictions in the regional 
vision. For example, it is possible to distinguish between the approach and attitude of 
ASEAN’s more democratic states, and those that are less so; and between the concerns and 
preoccupations of ‘sending’ as compared to ‘receiving’ states.  
Nonetheless, I offer this chapter as evidence that, overall, supports my hypothesis 
about the particular legitimacy of a regional approach to particular human rights issues. In the 
end, this chapter argues that both a broad multilateral (UN) and a unilateral (US) approach 
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can be set against a regional approach. The argument is that given the nature and scope of the 
issue, and considerations of geography, socio-cultural understandings between states and 
levels of interaction between rule-makers and administrators in different states, the 
appropriate level for managing the issue of trafficking in persons is the regional one. 
Furthermore, we can see the emergence of a regionally based, multilateral response to the 
issue of human trafficking, where the parameters of the problem of human trafficking in 
Southeast Asia are defined not only as an issue of security, but also as an issue of the 
violation of individual rights. This is taking place incrementally, through a process that 
engages many domestic institutions and the regional networks that operate between them, and 
which through interaction and engagement, generates a shared regional understanding about 
the nature of the problem and the parameters of a solution. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
Do regional systems for the promotion and protection of human rights possess a particular 
kind of legitimacy? My brief answer is no—at least, not when the region in question 
possesses a preponderance of states that are not democracies. This is because democracy, in 
both the deliberative sense, and in the sense of a system of government that represents the 
freely expressed will of the people, plays an essential role in creating and maintaining 
legitimacy in regional norms and institutions. In different ways, this is what has been 
demonstrated throughout the course of this dissertation.  
In Chapter 2, I set out the link between democracy and human rights and showed the 
way this link is explicated in international human rights theory and law. Chapter 3 
demonstrates the functional role played by democracy in international human rights 
regimes, in: (1) providing a ‘channel of accountability’ between the people and institutions 
of global governance; and (2) creating incentives for governments to respond to public 
demands for greater recognition of rights.  
Chapter 3 shows how the indeterminacy of democracy in ASEAN instruments leads 
to (and justifies) multiple and contradictory understandings of democracy among different 
ASEAN states. This leads to non-compliance, which itself further undermines legitimacy. 
Chapter 4, a case study of Myanmar, shows how the ‘regional effect’ of 
democratisation (diffusion or contagion) does not apply to the case of Myanmar and ASEAN. 
The argument is simple: A regional association that represents a number of non-democratic 
states, with a governing charter that does not set democracy as a condition of membership, 
does not possess the authority to shame a wayward state. Admittedly, I advance the 
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arguments that Indonesia, as a powerful and new democracy in the region, carries some 
influence with Myanmar as an example of democratisation, and that ASEAN’s withholding 
(and then later awarding) the chairmanship of ASEAN had a not insignificant effect in 
contributing to Myanmar’s democratic consolidation. My overall argument is nonetheless 
that in Southeast Asia, there is no regional effect operating to engender or sustain democratic 
reform in individual member states.  
Chapter 5 turns to democracy in the deliberative sense, showing how the absence of 
processes allowing discourse in the drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 
constrain regional dialogue on the meaning and value of rights. The result is that the 
Declaration was dismissed by key stakeholders, on the basis of the unrepresentative and 
exclusive process that marked its creation (in short, its lack of legitimacy).  
The final two chapters ask the central question of this dissertation: whether or not 
norms articulated at the regional level do in fact evidence a higher degree of legitimacy than 
norms articulated at the global level, in turn leading to greater commitment and greater 
compliance. The answer is both that they do not (in relation to the rights of women) but that 
they may (in relation to norms relating to trafficking in persons). I can explain the different 
results in relation to these two rights in the following way: First, in the case of women’s 
rights, there exists a strong global norm, which is only weakly mirrored in regional 
understandings about the meaning and scope of women’s rights (despite regional level 
commitment to the CEDAW). This has the effect of rendering the global norm the more 
powerful one as a dynamic in transnational legal processes. Second, in the case of human 
trafficking, there exist strong geographic, economic, political and security imperatives 
compelling state attention to the issue at the regional level.  
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The hypothesis I set out at the beginning of this dissertation is that the regional level 
of governance in relation to human rights, has the potential to provide something unique and 
additional; a via media between the particularistic nature of rights violations in their local 
contexts, and the ideal of universalism. My suggestion was that regions represent more than 
merely a useful level for implementation of precepts formed at the global level, and that 
specifically regional interaction and dynamics around the meaning and value of rights could 
impart a particular sense of appropriateness (legitimacy) to human rights norms. As I have 
shown, the current democratic deficit in Southeast Asia undercuts this hypothesis.  
It remains to be asked whether the findings of this dissertation can be extended to 
broader ideas about the current state and future direction of existing and future regional 
human rights regimes. What do my conclusions suggest about the future evolution of human 
rights in Southeast Asia? Do my findings have relevance beyond Southeast Asia? A number 
of areas would seem to warrant further exploration. 
First, in relation to Southeast Asia, we should bear in mind that at the time of writing 
the first reports of AICHR have yet to be released. We do not know how ASEAN states will 
respond to them. A positive and coordinated response, which results in domestic policy and 
legislative reform, would have immediate effects on AICHR’s legitimacy. So too would a 
positive response from the judiciary or the legislature to efforts to invoke the ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, legitimacy is not static. In circumstances 
where states are prepared to respect the rulings and reports of institutions (in the way that, for 
the most part, the states of Europe implement the judgements of the European Court of 
Human Rights) then legitimacy can accrue to an institution. This is the case, even if the 
circumstances of its birth are inauspicious. 
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Second, I have made much in this dissertation about the primacy of democracy and 
the democratic deficit that exists in Southeast Asia. This, I argue, is what undergirds the lack 
of legitimacy that currently attaches to the region’s human rights institutions. Yet democracy 
in Southeast Asia is in flux. There are both positive and negative currents at play. Both may 
influence the future development of a regional human rights regime. As I write this 
conclusion in February 2014, Myanmar’s parliament is debating amendments to the 
Constitution to enable democratic elections to be held in 2015. At the same time, in Thailand, 
protestors are again marching in the streets, many of them demanding that the elected 
government of Yingluck Shinawatra be replaced with an unelected People’s Council. 
Regional shifts towards or away from democracy (and the way that ASEAN responds to these 
shifts) have the potential to alter the democratic balance of power within the region. These 
shifts will certainly affect the relevance and potential of ASEAN’s new human rights 
institutions.  
Third, in assessing the power and legitimacy of ASEAN’s human rights institutions, 
we should be alert to not only the behaviour and responses of states, but also to the rise and 
influence of informal institutions that coalesce around these institutions. Particularly 
important in this regard are networks of domestic and regional non-governmental 
organisations, such as the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism and 
Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy. These groups lobbied states about the establishment 
and the original TOR of AICHR, and later about the content of the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration. They are now involved in the review of AICHR’s TOR, which will take place in 
2014. The mere existence of ASEAN’s human rights institutions has created new theatres for 
state/civil society discourse.  
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Fourth, ASEAN’s regional institutions have created new vectors for communication 
between the global level and the regional level. I have pointed out that AICHR’s 
Commissioners remain ‘accountable to their appointing governments’ and that this is one of 
the factors that impugns the legitimacy of the institution. However, AICHR’s commissioners 
might also find that they are subject to a new kind of accountability, which derives from their 
peers in the world of international human rights. The constructivist theories with which I 
began this dissertation hold that the experiences and standards shared in the course of 
transnational interactions between judicial and quasi-judicial members can have a significant 
effect on shaping the world-view of individuals. Those individuals in turn influence the 
direction of the institutions that they work for. It should be remembered that this kind of 
influence is not one-way. ASEAN and AICHR are also now in a position to influence the 
international human rights agenda. For example, AICHR has decided that its next thematic 
report will be on the right to peace, set out in Article 38 of the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration. As I discuss in Chapter 5, the scope of this right is unclear in international law. 
AICHR’s study will be important beyond the borders of Southeast Asia.  
Fifth, I have argued at several points that the legitimacy of regional human rights 
depends on the presence of shared concerns and commonalities. From this perspective, 
changes in the economic and security dynamic of Southeast Asia have the potential to hasten 
(or impede) the formation of a regional human rights regime. ASEAN, as I have mentioned, 
is committed to establishing a common economic market by 2015. Critics doubt that this can 
occur, and point to the different levels of economic development of ASEAN states and the 
lack of intra-regional trade. Nonetheless, even the existence of the goal may drive a greater 
degree of integration at government and societal levels, which might also (eventually) evolve 
into closer ties and interdependencies in the field of human rights. In relation to the security 
dynamic of Southeast Asia, this is highly uncertain. For example, at present, several ASEAN 
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states have conflicting interests in the South China Sea. Disputes could splinter ASEAN 
cohesiveness and ultimately undermine stronger relationships in the field of human rights.  
Is it possible to extend some of the conclusions about Southeast Asia’s nascent human 
rights regime to other regions of the world? One would make this attempt very cautiously. 
The field of comparative regionalism is unsettled, largely because the particularities of each 
region are held to be unique and distinctive. Nonetheless, several paths for future research 
seem suggestive. It would be fruitful to study regions (or sub-regions) where no formal 
human rights system currently exists (East Asia, South Asia and the Pacific). On the basis of 
the findings in this dissertation, we would predict that democracy in (at least) the political 
system of the dominant regional member (China, India and Fiji respectively) would be a 
minimum prerequisite for the creation of a regional human rights system possessing even 
minimal legitimacy. We would also predict that even with a democratic regional hegemon 
(for example, Indonesia in the case of ASEAN), the regional organisation’s ability to 
influence a ‘pariah state’ (Myanmar in the case of ASEAN) would be limited.  
Second, it would be fruitful to consider the experience of another human rights system 
comprised of non-democratic states, such as the League of Arab States and its human rights 
institution, the Arab Human Rights Committee. In this dissertation, I suggest that in regions 
comprised of non-democratic states, rights unrelated to civil and political freedoms may gain 
more traction, as there is likely to be a greater degree of state-level consensus around these 
issues. It would be interesting to consider whether or not this has indeed been the experience 
of the League. It would also be interesting to consider the extent to which constraints placed 
on civil society in non-democratic societies in the Middle East have prevented state 
responsiveness to the work of the Arab Human Rights Committee. 
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Finally, let me return to the intuition that prompted this investigation into regionalism 
and human rights in the first place. This was a sense that the global human rights regime had 
perhaps over-reached; that it lacked a necessary sense of accord about important beliefs and 
values, and that this accord might be more readily found at the more modest level of the 
region. In the end, it seems that a bifurcation along global/regional lines is too simplistic. 
This is what we might have expected in a complex and untidy world. The most we can say is 
that if there is potential for Southeast Asia’s regional human rights system to positively shape 
the behaviour of states, it lies in the fact that the new institutions emanate from the region 
itself. No Southeast Asian government will ever again be able to deflect criticism on the basis 
that human rights are a ‘western imposition’. 
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